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PREFACE

This work is the first part of a projected lengthier
study:

the United States' response to the violent phase of

the Mexican Revolution, that period from the overthrow of
Francisco I. Madero early in 1913 to the suppression of the
Adolfo de la Huerta revolt in the spring of 1924.

In the

present portion, 1 have treated the period February, 1913,
to January, 1916— from the deposition and murder of Madero
to the so-called Santa Ysabel massacre and its immediate
aftermath.

Within that period, I have focused attention on

the year 1915.

The events of that critical twelve-month

period determined in large part both the survival and the
direction of the Mexican revolutionary movement and the
future course of relations between the United States and
Mexico for the balance of the decade.
Older interpretations of the 1913-1916 period, as
well as earlier emphases relative to it, seem to me to be
inadequate.

I believe that scholars have overemphasized the

influence of Woodrow Wilson in the shaping of United StatesMexican relations.

At the same time, while not ignoring other

determinants, they have paid them too little heed and have
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thereby failed not only to establish the importance of those
determinants but in some instances even to identify them.
Moreover, I believe that those scholars have attributed to
the American President an undue degree of control over the
execution of his administration's Mexican policies.

There

were other officials, both in Mexico and in Washington it
self, who strongly influenced the implementation of those
policies and who, on occasion, purposely frustrated their
intent.
I attribute those oversights to the fact that
earlier studies of the period are based primarily upon
presidential papers and upon the memoirs and papers of
cabinet officers and other persons who for the most part
viewed Mexican affairs almost solely from the vantage points
of the White House or one or the other of the several
Executive departments.

Although the voluminous records of

the Department of State have indeed been employed in varying
degree in the preparation of those studies, much of what
those records reveal about conditions and developments in
revolutionary Mexico and attitudes in the Department of
State itself has been overlooked, misunderstood, or simply
dismissed as irrelevant to the subject at hand.

Conse

quently, much of significance, not only with regard to the

evolution and execution of Wilsonian Mexican policy but to
the determination of Mexican-American relations generally,
heretofore has been largely neglected.
My intent, then, has been to reexamine the familiar
events of the period under consideration in the light of a
broader and more detailed study of the relevant State
Department documents, particularly those pertinent to the
Mexican petroleum industry, and thus to approach those
events from a somewhat different perspective.

In addition,

I have tried to test certain of the stereotypes and theses
set forth in earlier studies of the period.

In particular,

I have attempted to reevaluate the role of the American oil
man in Mexico and the not infrequent assertion that he and
other foreign investors in the republic were instrumental
in obtaining United States armed intervention in that
country on their behalf.

Accordingly, I have emphasized the

behavior of various special interest groups, both domestic
and foreign, which attempted to influence the Mexican poli
cies of the Wilson Administration and through those policies
in turn, to dictate the course of events below the border.
I have devoted considerable attention, also, to the Mexican
petroleum industry and developments within the petroleum
province.

These were critical factors in the determination
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of Mexican-American relations and in the internal politics
of revolutionary Mexico as well.

Finally, I have sought

first to reexamine the more important points of friction
between the Wilson Administration and the Carrancista
faction of the revolutionary movement and, second, to
ascertain and explore the underlying causes for the failure
of the short-lived Mexican-American rapprochement of
October, 1915, and the subsequent armed intervention of the
following spring.
Briefly, my views are as follows:

(1) As a group

American oilmen in Mexico were well-disposed toward the
Huerta Government and urged its recognition by the Wilson
Administration.

Rather than taking sides in the ensuing

civil war, however, they preferred to remain neutral or to
hedge by attempting to accommodate both factions.

Although

ultimately they did appeal to the Department of State for
relief from revolutionary extortion and threats upon the
lives of their employees, they did not for some time call
for armed intervention or annexation of the oilfields.

For

the most part, they submitted to all demands made upon them
by revolutionary and counterrevolutionary forces alike with
little more than a perfunctory protest.

Only when the wells

and production facilities were threatened with actual

physical destruction did they suggest United States inter
vention, and then solely for the purpose of neutralizing
the petroleum province for the duration of the fighting.
Moreover, in seeking the support of their government their
tone was almost always one of supplication rather than
insistence.

Not until after promulgation of the revolu

tionary Constitution of 1917 and American entry into the
First World War, at a time when the revolutionary regime
had adopted an avowedly confiscatory petroleum policy, did
the oilmen finally organize effectively and launch a
vigorous defense of their property rights in Mexico.

Then,

and only then, did they become openly interventionist and
advocate occupation of the petroleum province.
(2)

Although oilmen and other American corporate

and private investors in Mexico were slow to move effec
tively against revolutionary encroachment, there were other
special interest groups which shortly after the Constitu
tionalist schism sought to enlist the support of the Wilson
Administration in significantly altering the course of the
revolutionary movement or in frustrating it altogether.
And, on more than one occasion, until de jure recognition
of the Carranza regime in August, 1917, they very nearly
succeeded.

The most important of those groups, the
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Antirevolutionists, consisted of a number of lower-echelon
officials within the Department of State.

Concentrated in

the Divisions of Mexican Affairs and Latin American Affairs,
they strongly opposed the revolutionary movement on ideolo
gical as well as on practical grounds.

Admirers of the

stable and prosperous Porfirian state, they viewed the
Revolution as a colossal fraud perpetrated by cynical op
portunists, a ruinous and seemingly endless contest for
spoils and power.

In short, they equated the struggle in

Mexico with contemporary disorders in the chronically un
stable Caribbean states.

Accordingly, their proposed

remedy for the "Mexican problem" was essentially the same
as that already or shortly to be applied to Cuba, Haiti,
Nicaragua, and the Dominican Republic:

the establishment

of an American protectorate over the republic and the in
stallation of a pliable conservative or reactionary regime
bound to the United States by treaty obligations similar to
those embodied in the Platt Amendment.
Mexican exiles in the United States composed a
second group of considerable importance in shaping MexicanAmerican relations during the period under consideration.
At one time or another, several of the more conservative
or reactionary factions worked closely with the Antire
volutionists in attempting to launch a successful
viii

counterrevolutionary venture from north of the border.
From early 1915 through de jure recognition of the Carranza
regime, they constituted a serious threat to the survival
of the revolutionary movement.
Finally, the Roman Catholic hierarchy in the United
States, implacably opposed to the Revolution and especially
hostile toward the Constitutionalists, played a significant
role in the determination of Mexican-American relations.
Throughout 1915 and for some time thereafter they apparently
provided considerable financial and moral support for
counterrevolutionary elements, unquestionably sought to
obstruct and later to undo United States recognition of the
Carranza regime, and both before and after that move pressed
the Wilson Administration to interfere in the internal af
fairs of the republic on behalf of the Mexican Church.
(3)

Despite the fact that Wilson and Bryan despised

the "concessionaire,11 particularly the oilman in Mexico,
they refused to abandon the Mexican oilfields to destruction
or expropriation by revolutionaries or by any other faction.
Economic, political, and strategic exigencies forbade it.
In the first place, the Wilson Administration, in accord
with the unfortunate Tyrrell Agreement, was pledged to
protect foreign lives and property in the republic; second.

the Monroe Doctrine notwithstanding, the British Government
would not tolerate interdiction of the production and export
of Mexican petroleum, the primary source of fuel oil for the
embattled Royal Navy; third, as the United States itself
drifted ever closer to participation in the European con
flict, the oil fields of Mexico assumed ever greater strate
gic importance to Washington as well; and, finally, to have
permitted revolutionary expropriation of legitimately ac
quired petroleum properties in Mexico would have been to
permit the establishment of an extremely dangerous precedent,
one which would have invited repetition and jeopardized
American overseas investment everywhere.

Not even Wilson

and Bryan, and certainly not Robert Lansing, were willing
to run such a risk.

Thus the Mexican petroleum industry

was in a category unto itself.

During the years immediately

preceding and during American participation in the World
War, it was held inviolate by the United States and Britain
alike, and, in effect, internationalized.

In that instance,

at least, the President and others in his administration
sympathetic to the Revolution readily accepted the premise
that the national interests of the United States trans
cended those of the Mexican people.

Accordingly, then, the

oilmen were permitted to enter into a marriage of convenience
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with Manuel Pelaez, the local-autonomist caudillo of tho
petroleum province.

Pelaez, supported by substantial sums

allegedly extorted from the companies, successfully defied
the revolutionary regime and denied it control of the oil
fields.

That relationship could never have developed and

certainly could not have been maintained for any length of
time without the tacit approval of the Department of State.
Pelaez, however, proved the perfect cat's-paw for Washington,
London, and the oilmen alike.

And once that fact was appre

ciated by those concerned, the relationship was allowed to
stand.

The Constitutionalists, of course, were fully cog

nizant of that devious arrangement and deeply embittered by
it.

It clearly gave the lie to those self-denying prin

ciples set forth in the President's Mobile Address of
October, 1913, and was a primary cause of Constitutionalist
fear of and hostility toward the Wilson Administration and
American oilmen in Mexico.
(4)

The primary cause of recurring- friction between

the Carrancista faction and the Wilson Administration was
the President's persistent meddling in Mexican affairs:
first, in order to fulfill his rash pledge of November,
1913, to protect the lives and property of foreigners in the
republic; second, because of the necessity to maintain order

in the petroleum province; and, third, because of Wilson's
own vicarious participation in the revolutionary movement
and his well-meaning but disastrous refusal to allow the
Mexican people to work out their own destiny free of
Wilsonian tutelage.

Exacerbating the tension were a series

of presidential blunders which intensified Carrancista
antagonism toward the Wilson Administration and deepened
the First Chief's suspicion of its underlying motives.
Especially significant were the failure to inform Carranza
in advance of the Veracruz operation and Wilson's subsequent
refusal to withdraw American forces from the port following
the demise of Huerta; the decision in late 1915 to break
relations with the Constitutionalists and to recognize the
new Conventionist regime; Washington's inexplicable solici
tude for some prominent counterrevolutionary leaders;
failure to curb the activities of the State Department Anti
revolutionists; and, finally, the recurrent veiled threats
to intervene militarily against the Constitutionalists in
response to one or another of their acts that aroused the
displeasure of officials in Washington.
other irritants as well.

And there were

In retrospect, it is indeed sur

prising that at some point between the Tampico incident and
de jure recognition of the Carranza regime formal hostilities

did not erupt between the United States and Mexico.
Certainly, from the Mexican point of view, there was ample
provocation.
(5)

Recognition of the Carranza regime against the

advice of the Antirevolutionists and over the urgent pro
tests of the Roman Catholic hierarchy and American investors
in Mexico was unquestionably premature.

The resultant

tenuous Mexican-American rapprochement was doomed from the
start.

Once recognized, the revolutionary government re

ceived little sympathy and understanding and even less
effective support from the Wilson Administration.

At the

same time, however, Washington expected and demanded a
great deal from that government.

In addition to eliminating

Villa before he could retaliate against American interests
in the North, it was expected to complete pacification of
the republic, suppress the Texas Rebellion and the Indian
uprisings of Sinaloa and Sonora, and protect foreign lives
and property throughout Mexico.

The United States itself,

as subsequent events were to prove, would have been hardpressed to complete such a task; for the Carrancistas it
was patently impossible.

Bankrupt, torn by factionalism,

and weakened by disaffection, ineptness, and rampant corrup
tion, the Carranza regime was incapable of responding
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effectively to any one of the manifold formidable challenges
confronting it.

Consequently, as the year 1915 drew to a

close, Mexico again appeared on the verge of anarchy.

By

that time, too, the Wilson Administration had a number of
legitimate and very serious grievances against the Carran
cistas, and relations between the two governments were ra
pidly approaching a nadir.

For some time, moreover,

officials in Washington had been receiving increasingly
discouraging reports on the state of affairs in Mexico.
Thus, by early January, 1916, what little confidence those
officials had in the ability of the Carranza regime to
endure, much less to fulfill its obligations to the United
States, was almost completely dispelled.

Certainly State

Department representatives and perhaps even the President
himself were resigned to its imminent collapse.

The Santa

Ysabel massacre and the apparently dilatory Carrancista
response strained relations to the breaking point.

In that

incendiary atmosphere, under the goad of election-year
partisan politics, the Wilson Administration was bound,
sooner or later, to intervene militarily in Mexico.

The

Columbus raid was anticlimactic.
As suggested above, the principal sources upon which
this study is based are published and unpublished documents
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of the Department of State:

Papers Relating to the Foreign

Relations of the United States; Records of the Department
of State Relating to the Internal Affairs of Mexico, 19101929; and especially. Records of the Department of State
Relating to the Internal Affairs of Mexico, 1910-1929.

In

addition, I have made considerable use of several congres
sional publications, the papers and memoirs of contemporary
statesmen, the New York Times, and a number of secondary
accounts of the period under consideration.
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ABSTRACT

In February, 1913, counterrevolutionaries overthrew
the government of Francisco I. Madero ,< established a dicta
torship under Victoriano Huerta, and subsequently murdered
the deposed president.

Those events, in turn, provoked up

risings in both the north and south of Mexico and formation
of the Constitutionalist party, a diverse coalition of old
and new revolutionary elements under the nominal leadership
of Venustiano Carranza.

Simultaneously, a well-meaning but

misguided Woodrow Wilson, ignorant of Mexican affairs and
insensitive to the intensity of Mexican nationalism, deter
mined to oust the usurper and to restore legitimate consti
tutional government to the neighboring republic.

So began

an unprecedented American interference in the internal affairs
of Mexico.
Disregarding the advice of authorities on Mexican
matters, the President initiated and vigorously pursued an
aggressive diplomatic campaign to force Huerta's resignation.
In so doing, he repeatedly violated Mexican sovereignty,
offended all Mexican factions, and rashly assumed full
responsibility for the protection of foreign lives
xviii

and property in Mexico, thereby placing his administration
irrevocably at odds with the revolutionary movement.

Finally,

in April, 1914, in a desperate attempt to force Huerta from
power, the President ordered the seizure and occupation of
Veracruz.

Although achieving its immediate objective, that

act aroused the hostility and suspicion of the Constitu
tionalists and very nearly precipitated a major MexicanAmerican conflict.

Undeterred, Wilson continued to meddle

in Mexican affairs through the summer of 1914, cultivating
Carranza's principal rival and completing alienation of the
dominant wing of the revolutionary movement.
In the ensuing factional strife, the President again
ignored the advice of informed sources, broke relations with
Carranza, and declared for the dissident Convention of
Aguascalientes.

By early 1915, the Conventionist regime was

moribund, Wilson was faced with a., unpalatable choice:
recognition of the intractable Carranza and loss of all
control over the subsequent course of events in Mexico or
armed intervention in an attempt to establish a pliable and
cooperative puppet regime.

Increasingly preoccupied with the

war in Europe and anxious to disengage from Mexican affairs,
the President seriously considered joint Pan-American inter
vention and an imposed settlement of the Mexican civil war.

Taking advantage of Wilson's distraction and dislike of
Carranza, a group of lesser State Department officials made
common cause with Mexican reactionaries and sought Adminis
tration support for a counterrevolutionary settlement of the
Mexican problem.

Their ultimate goals were to frustrate the

Revolution and to establish an American protectorate over
Mexico.

They very nearly succeeded.

In the final analysis,

however, neither Wilson nor Lansing would countenance the
scheme.
Eventually, Carrancista military victories and dis
covery of a German plot to prolong Mexican-American tension
prompted a thorough re-evaluation of Wilsonian Mexican policy.
Consequently, in October, 1915, the President grudgingly
extended de facto recognition to the Carranza regime.

That

government, in turn, was pledged to complete pacification,
halt border raids, and protect foreign lives and property
throughout Mexico.

It was an impossible task.

By early 1916,

the republic was again on the verge of anarchy, and legitimate
American grievances against Carranza were mounting.

Offi

cials in Washington, meanwhile, had all but lost faith in the
ability of the Carranza regime to endure, much less to fulfill
its obligations to the United States.
imminent.

Its collapse appeared

In that climate of mutual distrust and disillusion

ment the atrocity at Santa Ysabel occurred.
xx

Given the

violent reaction of the American people, particularly along
the Southwestern frontier, and the exigencies of electionyear politics, preventive armed intervention in Mexico was
a foregone conclusion.

Villa's Columbus raid was anticli-

mactic.
The principal sources utilized in this study are
published and unpublished records of the Department of State.
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Chapter 1

WOODROW WILSON AND THE MEXICAN REVOLUTION:
THE INITIAL RESPONSE

I.
On the afternoon of May 24, 1911, angry crowds
surged through the streets of Mexico City.

Demanding the

resignation of President Porfirio Diaz, they massed before
the National Palace, overflowed the plaza, and invaded the
galleries of Congress.

The end of an era was at hand.

The

Porfirian edifice, a monument to political stability, fell
crashing to earth.

Some thirty years of material progress

and domestic tranquillity gave way to more than a decade of
wanton destruction and savage factional strife.

Not until

the late nineteen-twenties did the bloodshed cease and
Mexico again return to the rule of law.

When the fighting

was over the Old Regime had passed forever.

In its place

stood the Mexican Nation.^-

1Among the principal general works in English
treating the Mexican Revolution are the standard history
of Mexico, Henry Bamford Parkes, A History of Mexico (3rd
ed., rev. and enl.; Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1960)
Ernest Gruening, Mexico and Its Heritage (2nd ed.; New York
D. Appleton-Century Company, 19 42); Howard F. Cline, The
1

The demise of Porfirian Mexico was due in large part
to the efforts of one of its own disaffected sons, Francisco
I. Madero, scion of one of the great aristocratic families
of northern Mexico.

Convinced that the regeneration of his

country could be achieved only through effective suffrage
and a return to legitimate constitutional government, Madero
declared his opposition to the Diaz dictatorship and announced
his intention to seek the presidency in the election of 1910.
Candid, idealistic, and incredibly naive, Madero at first
evoked only amused contempt in the capital.

As opposition

to the reelection of Diaz spread throughout Mexico, however.

United States and Mexico (3rd ed., rev. and enl.; New York:
Atheneum, 1963); and William Weber Johnson, Heroic Mexico,
The Violent Emergence of a Modern Nation (New York: Double
day & Company, 1968), hereafter cited as Heroic Mexico. A
useful general account of the Revolution in Spanish is
Jesus Silva Herzog, Breve Historia de la Revolucion Mexicans
(2 vols.; Mexico City: Fondo de Cultura Economica, 1962),
hereafter cited as Breve Historia. More detailed specialized
studies include Charles C. Cumberland, Mexican Revolution:
Genesis Under Madero (Austin: University of Texas Press,
19 52), hereafter cited as Genesis Under Madero; Kenneth J.
Grieb, The United States and Huerta (Lincoln: University of
Nebraska Press, 1969), hereafter cited as Huerta; Michael C.
Meyer, Mexican Rebel: Pascual Orozco and the Mexican Revolu
tion, 1910-1915 (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1967)
hereafter cited as Orozco; Robert E. Quirk, The Mexican Revo
lution. 1914-1916: The Convention of Aguascalientes (New York:
The Citadel Press, 19 63), hereafter cited as The Mexican Revo
lution: Stanley R. Ross, Francisco I. Madero, Apostle of
Mexican Democracy (New York: Columbia University Press, 1955),
hereafter cited as Madero; and John Womack, Jr., Zapata and
the Mexican Revolution (New York: Alfred K. Knopf, 1969),
hereafter cited as Zapata.

amusement turned to apprehension.
San Luis Potosi.

Madero was jailed at

Escaping to the United States in the fall

of 1910, he sought in vain to organize an effective uprising
against the dictator.

Finally, in February 1911, he re

crossed the border to join the Chihuahua insurrectionists
under Pascual Orozco.

2

Shortly after returning to Mexico, Madero emerged
as ideological leader of a powerful revolutionary coalition.
During the weeks that followed his return, the Maderistas,
or Antireelectionists, extended their control over most of
northern Mexico.

Meanwhile, south of the capital,

Emiliano Zapata led the peasants of Morelos against the
great hacendados, confiscating the land and redistributing
it among his indigent followers.^

In still other parts of

the republic lesser chieftains rose in rebellion, increas
ing the pressure on a government already on the verge of
collapse.

Paralysis gripped the capital.

Surrounded by

2

Ross, Madero, 135; Cumberland, Genesis Under
Madero, 129; and Meyer, Orozco, 27-29. The origins of both
the Maderista movement and the popular insurrections in
northern Mexico are best treated in the three aforementioned
works.
3Parkes, A History of Mexico, 327-328;
United States and Mexico, 127; Womack, Zapata,
39 3-404.
Zapata's program was embodied in the
Ayala, proclaimed in November, 1911, and in an
law of October, 1915. Ibid., 393-411.

Cline, The
87-96,
Plan of
agrarian

incompetence, apathy, and defeatism, the old dictator was
unable to mount an effective defense.

On May 21, far to

the north in Ciudad Juarez, his most trusted agents sold
out to the Revolution.^

Pour days later, in the wake of

violent demonstrations, Porfirio Diaz stepped down.
The joy of the Mexican people was short-lived.

As

previously determined at Ciudad Juarez, a provisional
government composed largely of former Porfiristas assumed
control in Mexico City pending national elections in the
fall.

Recovering rapidly from the shock of defeat, con

servative and reactionary elements subverted the interim
government and joined in a widespread conspiracy to frus
trate reform.

The hapless Madero, shrinking from leader

ship, played directly into their hands.

At the same time,

factional bitterness threatened to destroy the revolutionary
coalition at the very moment when unity was most sorely
needed.

Nonetheless, in October 1911, in what was

"probably the freest election ever held in Mexico," Madero
was chosen president of the republic.^

United States

recognition quickly followed.6

^Cline, The United States and Mexico, 121-124;
Johnson, Heroic Mexico, 64-65.
6Parkes, A History of Mexico, 326.
6Cline, The United States and Mexico, 129.

Despite his success at the polls, Madero was unable
to consolidate his victory.

He was concerned primarily

with political reform, with establishing effective suffrage
and genuine constitutional democracy.

When those goals

were achieved, he believed, desperately needed social and
economic reforms would naturally follow through the normal
legislative process.

As a moderate, however, Madero was

immediately suspect.

His personal following rapidly fell

away.

Conservatives feared change and resisted his pro

grams, while many of his former comrades-in-arms angrily
denounced him as a Judas betraying the Revolution.

As

opposition to his administration mounted, Madero was
forced to rely increasingly upon the old Porfirista Federal
army to maintain order.

Soon after the inauguration

Zapata's acraristas resumed their campaign of expropria
tion against the hacendados of Guerrero and Morelos.
General Victoriano Huerta, chief of the Federal army, was
sent to the southern sierra where he succeeded in momen
tarily containing, if not breaking, the Zapatista revolt.
The result was the further estrangement of Madero from his
erstwhile revolutionary allies.

Some months later, during

the fall of 1912, Huerta was again called upon to suppress
armed rebellion.

Three successive counterrevolutions, the

last led by the old dictator's nephew, General Felix Diaz,
were put down in short order.

By the beginning of the new

year, then, all serious overt opposition to the Madero
Government had been overcome.

But stability was merely an

illusion.
Strong and implacable covert opposition to both
Madero and his program of moderate reform persisted.

Arrayed

against the President were the powerful and reactionary
Mexican Church, the great hacendados, the majority of the
officer corps of the Federal army, and virtually all Mexican
conservatives.

So too were many foreigners resident in the

republic and most American and European corporations with
large investments in Mexico.

Among those persons most

deeply antagonistic to the President was the United States
Ambassador, Henry Lane Wilson.

7

The unabashed champion of

American business interests in Mexico, Wilson was closely
Q

associated with the Guggenheim enterprises.

The Guggenheims,

in turn, controlled the huge American Smelting and Refining
Company (ASARCO) whose principal competitor in northern Mexico

Cumberland, Genesis Under Madero, 235-236? Ross,
Madero, 237-240.
Q

Cline, The United States and Mexico, 128-130;
Parkes, A History of Mexico, 330.

was a mining and smelting company owned by the Madero
family.

In addition to those considerations, Wilson soon

developed an intense personal dislike of Madero himself.
He availed himself of every opportunity to harass the
President, to frustrate his programs, and to discredit his
administration abroad.10

g0 biased were the Ambassador's

reports on conditions in Mexico that State Department
officials eventually discounted them all together.
Wilson was not recalled.

11

Yet

The consequences were tragic.

On February 9, 1913, Generals Diaz and Bernardo
Reyes, having suborned a large part of the army, rose again
against the Madero Government, Reyes was killed almost im
mediately.

Nonetheless, for more than a week the capital

was a battleground between Felicistas and Federal troops
under Victoriano Huerta.

Then, on February 17, Huerta

arranged a secret meeting with his adversary.

q

The result

Ross, Madero, 3, 237. ASARCO, with home offices
in New York, was one of the largest foreign investors in
Mexico.
Its holdings included producing mines in seven
north-central Mexican states and five multi-million-dollar
lead and copper smelting plants at Monterrey, Chihuahua City
Matehuala, Aguascalientes, and Verladena. Moody1s Manual
of Railroads and Corporation Securities, Industrial Section,
1919 (New York: Poor's Publishing Company, 1919) 2122-2127.
^Ross, Madero, 237-239.
iaTbid., 239

was the infamous Pact of the Ciudadela by which the General
agreed to betray his chief and share the spoils with Diaz.
Accordingly, on the following afternoon, at Huerta's com
mand, Madero and Vice-President Jose M. Pino Suarez were
arrested and imprisoned.

The General then informed Congress

and the several state governors of his action and announced
his assumption of power.

To President Taft he coolly ad

dressed the following message:

"I have the honor to inform

you that I have overthrown this Government.

The armed

forces support me, and from now on pea^a and prosperity
will reign.
Henry Lane Wilson was instrumental in the overthrow
of M a d e r o . ^

Cumberland observes that while the Taft ad

ministration itself was not particularly opposed to the
Mexican President, Wilson as its "official representative"
was known to be "exceedingly antagonistic."

And since

Washington gave its agent "at least tacit support in his
activities,11 Cumberland concludes,

"it may be said that the

12Huerta to Taft, February 18, 1913, U.S., Depart
ment of State, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of
the United States, 1913 (Washington, D.C.: Government Print
ing Office, 1920), 721. Hereafter cited as Foreign Relations,
1913.
13

Ross, Madero, 293-311; Cumberland, Genesis Under
Madero, 243.

American government was hostile."'*'4
to informed Mexicans.

Certainly it seemed so

That impression, in turn, unquestion

ably encouraged Madero's domestic opponents.
powerful ally in Wilson and they knew,it.

They had a

Indeed, upon con

clusion of the Pact of the Ciudadela, the conspirators
straightway advised the Ambassador of the meeting and informed him that Madero's removal was imminent.
Wilson was elated.

16
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The following day, some hours

before the coup was actually executed, he proceeded to wire
Washington that Madero had fallen.

Then, "not content

merely to watch developments," the Ambassador "took an active
part in determining the course of events."

17

Following

Madero's arrest, he summoned Diaz and Huerta to the Embassy
where he presided over negotiation of the so-called Pact
of the Embassy.

Essentially a reaffirmation and elabora

tion of the Ciudadela agreement, it provided for the immediate
installation of Huerta as provisional president, the appoint
ment of a predominantly Felicista cabinet, and a mutual

14Ibid., 258.
15
Wilson to Knox, February 17, 1913, Foreign
Relations, 1913, 718.
l6Wilson to Knox, February 18, 1913, Ibid., 720-721.
17

Cumberland, Genesis Under Madero, 238.

10

guarantee that under no circumstances would a Maderista
restoration be permitted.

It was further understood that

Huerta would ultimately step down and support Diaz'
candidacy in the next regular e l e c t i o n . W i l s o n was more
than satisfied with the "happy outcome of events . . . ."^9
From that point on, he was among the most vociferous ad
vocates of the Huerta regime.
Anxious to legitimize his position, Huerta obtained
the resignations of Madero and Pino Suarez in exchange for
a pledge to them of safe conduct out of the country.

Then,

through the intimidation of Congress and clever manipula
tion of the presidential succession law, the General emerged
as legal provisional president of the republic.20

Mean

while, both in Mexico and abroad, apprehension mounted over
the fate of Madero and his deputy.

And with good cause.

Despite a flood of pleas for clemency the prisoners were
doomed.

Early in the pre-dawn of February 23 they were

removed from their cells and shot to death, allegedly while

l*8lbid., Ross, Madero, 310-311.
•t-9Wilson to Knox, February 18, 1913.
Relations, 1913, 720-721.

Foreign

20Grieb, Huerta, 21-23; Cumberland, Genesis Under
Madero, 239.

11
attempting to escape.

21

Henry Lane Wilson did not protest.

On the contrary, he readily accepted Huerta’s explanation
of the incident and, with his own endorsement, passed it on
to the Secretary of State.

At the same time, he strongly

recommended to his superiors that Washington immediately
extend full recognition to the new regime.

22

Wilson was either "unaware or indifferent" to the
wave of revulsion against Huerta then sweeping the United
States.

23

Outraged liberals, albeit for vastly different

reasons, added their demands for intervention to those al
ready voiced by Americans resident in Mexico or those with
large investments in the republic.

OA

But Taft steadfastly

refused to be pushed into war, particularly a war which he
believed would be fought solely for "the purposes of ex
ploitation and g a i n . N o r
recognition to Huerta.

would he extend immediate

Instead, Taft hoped to use the

matter of recognition as leverage in winning prompt and

21Ross, Madero. 328-329; Grieb, Huerta, 27-29.
22

Ross, Madero, 331; Cline, The United States and
Mexico, 133.
23Ibid.
24Ibid.
25Ibid., 134.
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satisfactory settlement of a number of unresolved disputes
between the United States and Mexico.

26

Washington, then,

assumed de facto relations with the new regime while denying
it de -jure recognition.

The effectiveness of that measure

was markedly reduced, however, when Great Britain, Germany,
France, and a number of other states with envoys in the
Mexican capital subsequently extended full recognition to
the Huerta regime on the ground that it was in fact the
legitimate constitutional government of Mexico.

27

Kenneth J. Grieb contends that Huerta "sincerely
wished to help his people and considered further economic
development the most effective method" of doing so.

The

General, however, "failed to perceive that the necessary
protection of foreign interests antagonized the povertystricken peons who comprised the overwhelming majority of
the Mexican people."

Moreover, he was "firmly convinced

that Mexico was not prepared for democracy," that such a
system was doomed to failure in his country.

In sum, Huerta

believed that "only a strong government" could control the

26Ibid.
27
Arthur Link, Wilson; The New Freedom (Princeton;
Princeton University Press, 1956), 348.
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republic "sufficiently to promote its development."

Mexico,

he informed 0'Shaughnessy some months after the coup, was
"not ready for any government save a dictatorship,"

no

The General's plan to reconstruct the centralized
Porfirian state drew immediate opposition from a number of
regional caudillos.

In northern Mexico Governors Venustiano

Carranza of Coahuila and Abram Gonzalez of Chihuahua re
fused to accept the provisional government.

Huertistas in

Chihuahua countered by hurling Gonzalez beneath a moving
train.

That brutal assassination, following hard on the

no

Grieb, Huerta, 51. Huerta's views clearly re
flected his background and personal experience. An Indian
from the State of Jalisco, he entered the Military College
in 1871 and was commissioned a lieutenant soon after. For
some forty years, Huerta served Porfirio Diaz, assisting in
the suppression of the sporadic revolts that marked the
early days of the regime and directing the work of the
Geological Survey Commission in various parts of the re
public. While still only a captain of engineers, he de
vised the plan for a Mexican General Staff and was himself
appointed to that body. He was subsequently promoted to
brigadier general following campaigns against the Yaqui and
Maya Indians.
Upon the ouster of Diaz, Huerta offered his
services to Madero. Soon he was sent to the North to put
down the revolt under Pascual Orozco. But his success in
that endeavor aroused the fears of the Maderos, and Huerta
was removed from command and recalled to the capital. Con
sequently, Orozco rose once again, and for a second time
Madero called upon the General to restore order. He did so
and was promoted to major general. Ill at the time of the
first Felix Diaz revolt in October, 1912, Huerta played no
part in its suppression. Nonetheless, by February, 1913,
he was generally acknowledged to be "the greatest man in the
Mexican Army." By that date, too, he had developed a pro
found dislike of the Maderos and a deep contempt for parlia
mentary democracy. New York Times, January 14, 1916.
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murder of the President, provoked armed rebellion in the
North.

29

On March 26, 1913, disaffected northerners pro

claimed the Plan of Guadalupe, a brief political declara
tion reiterating Madero1s earlier insistence upon the
restoration of genuine constitutional government.

At the

same time, Carranza, who had emerged as nominal leader of
the dissidents, organized the Constitutionalist Army and
assumed the title of First Chief.

Some days later he pro

claimed himself provisional president of the republic.3^
Never a single cohesive unit, the so-called Con
stitutionalists were bound together solely by a mutual ani
mosity toward the usurper.

The new revolutionary movement

was basically a coalition of regional strongmen, each with
his own private army/ his own "brain trust" of intellectual
sycophants, and his own highly personal revolutionary
"philosophy."

Perhaps the one common bond in their re

spective pasts was earlier participation in the Maderista
movement.

In addition to Carranza, the most important of

the northern factional leaders were Alvaro Obregon, ranchero
and former school teacher and industrial worker from the

29

Cline, The United States and Mexico, 136; Johnson,
Heroic Mexico, 147-152; Quirk, The Mexican Revolution, 8-9.
30Ibid.; Link, Wilson: The New Freedom, 351; Silva
Herzog, Breve Historia, II, 19.
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State of Sonora; Francisco Villa, erstwhile bandit and bitter
personal enemy of Huerta; and Pablo Gonzalez, commander of
Carranza's personal following and an ardent if self-seeking
revolutionary.

South of the capital, in the rugged moun

tains of Morelos, Emiliano Zapata and his bands of agraristas made common cause with the men of the north.

31

II.
On March 4, 1913, barely a week after Madero's
murder, Woodrow Wilson was inaugurated as President of the
United States.

From the Mexican capital Henry Lane Wilson

renewed his bid for de jure recognition of the Huerta regime.
Supported by Latin American specialists in the Department
of State, the Ambassador pointed out that failure to re
cognize the General’s government would encourage still new

^Cline, The United States and Mexico, 136-139.
"To the Constitutionalist cause," Cline declares, "rallied
a motley collection, all nominal subordinates of the First
Chief . . . Their concepts of Mexico as a nation were but
enlarged and hazy projections of the way of life in their
respective patrias chicas . . . Chiefs and subchiefs professed
loyalty to one or another of the four main divisions of the
Constitutionalists.
Shifting from one to another was fre
quent. Whether a large band, a larger body, or one of the
main hordes, each unit preserved a wide autonomy; the cement
holding the Constitutionalists together was not ideology
but personalities and success of guerrilla leaders, here
tofore unknown persons . . . Locally, and for various reasons,
the Constitutionalist groups were determined to oust the
Usurper . . . ." Ibid., 136-138,

revolutionary ventures, thereby jeopardizing American lives
and property in Mexico.32

State Department Counselor John

Bassett Moore reminded the President that traditional
United States policy called for recognition of de facto
governments regardless of their origins.

33

Additional

pressure for recognition came from the large American
colony in Mexico City and from individuals and corporations
with substantial investments in the republic.

Huerta

alone, it was contended, was capable of protecting the
lives of the some forty thousand Americans resident in
Mexico and guarantying the estimated one billion dollars'
worth of American property in that country.3^
Advocates of recognition argued in vain.

The

President had been disgusted by the usurpation and outraged
by the murder of the deposed Madero.

35

He could not con

done the overthrow of a legitimate government, much less
the execution of its duly elected officials.

Moreover, he

32Link, Wilson: The New Freedom, 348-349.
33Ibid., 349.
3^Ibid.; Grieb, Huerta, 72.
35Ibid., 4 3; Arthur Link, Woodrow Wilson and the
Progressive Era, 1910-1917, The New American Nation Series,
eds. Henry Steele Commager and Richard B. Morris (New York:
Harper and Row, 1963), 109 (Hereafter cited as Woodrow
Wilson and the Progressive Era).
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was convinced that American acquiescence in the Huerta coup
would almost certainly encourage similar adventures in
other Latin American countries.

Consequently, shortly

after his inauguration, Wilson made his position clear:
The United States could not and would not sympathize "with
those who seek to seize the power of government to advance
their own personal interests or ambitions."3®

Thus the

President adopted "constitutional legitimacy" as the
fundamental requisite for American de jure recognition.
It was a policy, observes Arthur Link, adopted "not
blindly, but in the face of clear warnings from Counselor
Moore that it was historically and legally unsound and
could lead only to immeasurable interference in Mexican
37

affairs.And

so it did.

Nonetheless, for far too long,

the President stubbornly adhered to his original position.
Unfortunately, upon assuming office and for some
time thereafter, Wilson badly misunderstood both the temper
of the Mexican people and the nature of the revolutionary
movement.

Moreover, as Howard Cline maintains, the Presi

dent was "unprepared by experience or inclination to handle
delicate international matters."

He tended to "project his

36New York Times, March 12, 1913.
37Link, Wilson: The New Freedom, 350.
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domestic policy— where he could control the situation—
into international affairs" and tried to "control those
elements in the same manner" that he forced bills through
C o n g r e s s . The convergence of such serious liabilities
predictably produced deplorable results.

Not until the

summer of 1915, long after irreparable damage had been
done to Mexican-American relations, did the President
finally grasp the full significance of the Mexican Revo
lution and begin to deal realistically with the problems
arising from it.
For months after his inauguration Wilson believed
that the Mexican people "were fully prepared for democracy
in the American style."

He assumed that there was little

basic difference between Mexican culture and society and
that of the Anglo-Saxon peoples.

Those obvious differences

that could not be overlooked he dismissed as merely super
ficial rather than fundamental.

His early approach to the

Mexican question was "predicated on the belief that if the
Mexicans would hold a free election and follow constitu
tional practices their troubles would

e v a p o r a t e . "39

por

two and a half years, despite over-whelming evidence to the

38ciine, The United States and Mexico, 140.

39Ibid.

contrary, he stubbornly clung to that dogma.

"Unfortunately

Cline concludes, "Woodrow Wilson in 1913 was a man with a
single view of Mexico and that one was wrong."

The Presi

dent, "in a program of moral imperialism . . . placed the
weight of the United States behind a continuous, sometimes
devious, effort to force the Mexican nation to meet his illconceived specifications."4®

One mistake followed another.

To his credit, Wilson moved slowly in formulating
a definite Mexican policy.

He soon came to despise and

distrust Ambassador Henry Lane Wilson, but allowed that
official to remain at his post another six months while he
sought to inform himself on the true state of affairs in
Mexico.

Meanwhile, in March, 1913, the New York World and

several other leading journals launched a fierce attack on
the Ambassador, exposing his participation in the Huerta
coup.

In addition to that damning evidence, the Ambassador

was further discredited by the patent falsity of his reports
concerning the subsequent civil strife in Mexico.41

Finally

40Ibid., 141.
41Josephus Daniels, The Wilson Era: Years of Peace,
1910-1917 (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina
Press, 1944), 180-181 (Hereafter cited as The Wilson E r a :
Years of Peace).
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in July, he was recalled.

For some time thereafter the

ranking American diplomatic representative in the Mexican
capital was Charge d'Affaires Nelson O'Shaughnessy, him
self an admirer of H u e r t a . ^

Not until March 1917 did a

fully accredited American ambassador return to Mexico City.
During the spring of 1913, pressure upon the Presi
dent to recognize the Huerta regime mounted on all sides.
It came from such close friends and advisors c 3 Cleveland
H. Dodge and Colonel Edward M. House; from Secretary of
War Lindley H. Garrison and Secretary of the Interior
Franklin K. Lane; from the British Foreign Secretary, Sir
Edward Grey; and finally and increasingly from American
a

investors in Mexico.

n

Ultimately, in a cabinet meeting

on May 2 3, the matter of recognition came to a head.

The

President and Secretary of State William Jennings Bryan were
convinced that the great majority of the Mexican people were
opposed to Huerta and that recognition of the General's
regime would be "wrong from every consideration.11

Strong

support for their position came from Secretary of the Navy
Josephus Daniels and Secretary of Agriculture David F.
Houston.

Only Lane and Garrison openly questioned the

42Grieb, Huerta, 88.
^Daniels, The Wilson Era: Years of Peace, 181-182;
Grieb, Huerta, 73.
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President's decision to withhold recognition from the Huerta
regime.44

In subsequently announcing that decision, Wilson

expressed both indignation and alarm at the intensity of
pressure brought to bear on the White House by American in
vestors in Mexico:

"I have to pause," he declared to the

assembled Cabinet, "and remind myself that I am President
of the United States and not of a small group of Americans
with vested interests in Mexico."46

He was to remind him

self of that fact many times in the years that followed.
Earlier in the month, the President had begun to
move toward a more active role in Mexican affairs.

On

May 6, Julius Kruttschnitt, Chairman of the Board of the
Southern Pacific Railroad, a firm with large interests in
Mexico, submitted to Colonel House a plan for restoring
peace in Mexico.46

Drafted by Kansas City attorney Delbert

J. Haff, himself an investor in the Mexican oil industry,

44Daniels, The Wilson Era: Years of Peace, 182.
45Ibid.; Joseph P. Tumulty, Woodrow Wilson As I Know
Him (Garden City: Doubleday, Page & Company, 1921), 147.
46Link, Wilson: The New Freedom, 351. The Southern
* Pacific Company's principal interests in the republic were
the highly profitable Southern Pacific Railroad of Mexico,
whose track extended some 1200 miles down the west coast
of Mexico, and the East Coast Oil Company, a substantial
producer of crude oil in the fields around Tampico.

22

the plan was alleged to have the support of such major in
vestors in Mexico as the Greene Cananea Copper Company;
Phelps, Dodge and Company; and E. L. Doheny's Mexican
Petroleum Company .^

In mid-May, Wilson's friend and ad

visor, Cleveland H. Dodge of Phelps, Dodge and Company, one
of the world's great copper producers, brought Haff to the
White House for a personal interview with the President.
The attorney presented his plan to Wilson and urged its
adoption.

Haff called for the conditional recognition of

Huerta's government contingent upon the General's agreeing
to cooperate with the Constitutionalists in holding early
elections to choose a permanent government.

Wilson liked

4^Ibid. The aforementioned corporations were among
the dozen largest foreign enterprises in Mexico.
The
Greene Cananea Copper Company, controlled by Boston capital,
held a large number of mining claims and more than 15,000
acres in the north Mexican state of Sonora.
Its producing
agent, the Cananea Consolidated Copper Company, operated at
Cananea, Sonora, some forty miles below the Arizona border.
Moody's Manual of Railroads and Corporation Securities,
Industrial Section, 1919, 2516-2518. Phelps, Dodge & Com
pany, with home offices in New York, controlled the Moctezuma Copper Company which, in turn, worked the Pilares Mine
at Nacozari, Sonora, a company town some ninety miles south
of Douglas, Arizona.
Ibid., 1645-1647.
The Mexican
Petroleum Company, with home offices in New York and Los
Angeles, held through its several producing subsidiaries
in excess of 600,000 acres - approximately 1000 square
miles - in the heart of the Mexican Gulf Coast oilfields.
In addition to its oil interests, the company also had a
large investment in stock-raising in the same region.
Ibid., 2707-2710.

the plan.

It seemed to him to offer a simple and equitable

solution to the problem.
proposal.

4R

Still he hesitated to adopt the

A revised plan, submitted some days later by

Kruttschnitt, was more to his liking.

It omitted alto

gether conditional recognition of the General, merely sug
gesting American mediation to bring about national elections.
It is clear, then, that both the President and his would-be
advisors utterly failed to grasp the situation below the
border.

Neither began to comprehend the profundity of the

passions aroused.
In the end Wilson chose to pigeonhole mediation,
deciding instead to withhold recognition.

His distrust of

Henry Lane Wilson was by then complete and he was thoroughly
confused by the flood of conflicting reports on conditions
•

♦

xn the neighboring republic.

Cf)

At that point, acknowledging

his ignorance of Mexican affairs, he sent the first of a
succession of special presidential envoys to Mexico to ob
tain accurate information upon which to construct a sound

49Link, Wilson: The New Freedom, 351,
49Ibid., 352.
50Daniels, The Wilson Era: Years of Peace, 181.
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Mexican policy.

Late in May, 1913, the President asked his

personal friend and biographer, William Bayard Hale, to go
to the Mexican capital and make a first-hand study of the
situation.

51

III.
Although Hale knew almost nothing about Mexico, he
was trusted implicitly by .Wilson.

Consequently, his reports

strongly influenced the President's position on Mexico
during the summer of 1913.

c9

Remaining in the Mexican

capital from June through August, Hale "largely confirmed
the President's own intuitive judgement of Huerta" and
painted a bleak future for the troubled republic.

53

The

General, Hale believed, would never retire voluntarily; yet
his continuance in power was certain to lead inevitably to

51Ibid.
52Link, Wilson:
53

The New Freedom, 354.

Ibid. Hale described Huerta as an "ape-like old
man, of almost pure Indian blood. He may almost be said to
subsist on alcohol.
Drunk or only half-drunk (he is never
sober), he never loses a certain shrewdness. He has been a
life-long soldier, and one of the best in Mexico, and he
knows no methods but those of force.” Ibid. Given the
President's own stern moral standards, Hale's portrait of
Huerta almost certainly strengthened Wilson's resolve to
force the General from office. In addition, it doubtless
enhanced his sense of moral ascendancy vis a vis Mexican
political leaders, an unfortunate characteristic manifested
time and again by what must have struck those leaders as an
insufferable self-righteousness.
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bankruptcy and chaos.

If Huerta was not soon removed. Hale

predicted, the United States eventually would be forced to
occupy the republic.

Wilson's agent was unimpressed with

the General's opponents.

He considerably underestimated

both the popularity and the power of the Constitutionalist
movement, dismissing it as relatively unimportant and of
little value in solving the immediate problems raised by
the Huerta

coup.^

Further discouraging reports came from a second
unofficial agent sent out by the Secretary of State to in
vestigate the revolutionary coalition.

Reginald F. Del Valle,

"an obscure friend of Bryan's," proceeded in early June to
Carranza's headquarters in northern Mexico.

There he con

ferred with most of the important Constitutionalist leaders.
He too was unimpressed.

The Del Valle mission. Link declares,

was "not merely a fiasco . . . but a positive disaster."

The

agent's analysis of the revolutionary movement was "gravely
misleading" at a time when it was imperative that Wilson
and Bryan have accurate information.

Bryan's man "com

pletely misjudged or confused everything that he heard and
saw."

Relying upon his estimate of the political situation

54ibid., 354-355.
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in Mexico, there was no way that Washington could have
taken the Constitutionalist movement seriously.

Del Valle

erred still further by stopping in Mexico City while en
route to Zapata's headquarters in Morelos.

While in the

capital he foolishly exposed the nature of his mission in
northern Mexico, further poisoning relations between Washington and the Huerta Government.

55

By midsummer, 1913, due in large part to the alarm
ing reports of Hale and Del Valle, Wilson and Bryan were con
vinced that they must move at once to forestall the complete
collapse of Mexican society and subsequent American occupa
tion of large areas of the republic.

The Huerta Government,

it was believed, was on the verge of bankruptcy.

From

Washington, at least, its dissolution appeared immiment.
Wilson anticipated subsequent anarchy and xenophobic out
bursts against the foreign community.

He was equally cer

tain that European governments with citizens and extensive
interests in the republic would not hesitate to intervene,
the Monroe Doctrine notwithstanding, should Washington prove
unwilling or unable to provide adequate protection.

cc

More

over, attacks on American citizens and the confiscation or

55Ibid., 355.
56Ibid., 355-356.
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destruction of American properties in Mexico would unques
tionably give rise to intense domestic pressure for armed
intervention.

For those reasons, then, Wilson and Bryan

believed that they must stabilize the Mexican situation as
rapidly as possible.

The alternative appeared to be eventual

armed intervention and, ultimately, war with Mexico.
Late in July, the President and the Secretary of
State moved toward a positive settlement of the Mexican
question.

The discredited Henry Lane Wilson was recalled,

the Kruttschnitt-Haff mediation plan revived and modified,
and a former governor of Minnesota, John Lind, was appointed
confidential agent to present the amended plan to the Huerta
Government.

Lind was instructed to offer American media

tion of the civil war and to accompany that offer with four
demands:

(1) an armistice between Huerta's Federal forces

and those of the Constitutionalists (2) a pledge of early

57Ibid., 356. Lind, a friend of Bryan, was a pro
gressive Democrat with a reputation for combatting the
trusts. He knew virtually nothing of Mexico, spoke no
Spanish, and had no prior experience in diplomacy. Grieb
accurately describes him as "singularly unqualified." Lind
"inspired devotion among his supporters and hatred among
those he opposed, and he reciprocated these feelings." In
addition, he was a "rabid anti-Catholic," certainly no asset
in Mexico. Nonetheless, his domestic political record and
his "anti-imperialist and anti-big-business views" strongly
commended him to Wilson and Bryan. They thought alike,
and that was enough.
Grieb, Huerta, 92.

and free elections in which all factions would be allowed
to participate (3) the General's pledge not to be a candi
date, and (4) the acquiescence of all parties in the results
of the election and mutual cooperation in supporting the
C Q

new administration. °

On paper at least the American plan

appeared to offer an ideal solution to the Mexican problem.
Unfortunately, it was never put to the test.

"If John Lind

had possessed every art and talent and genius of ail the
diplomats of a century," reminisced Josephus Daniels,

"he

could not have secured the consent of Huerta to eliminate
himself, or persuade Carranza and Villa to lay down their
arms.

The noble purpose failed . . - ."59
Huerta reacted angrily to Lind's overtures, denounc

ing Washington's interference in Mexican affairs and threat
ening to "resist with arms" any further meddling.®9

How

ever, despite the General's official hostility, Lind was able
to confer at length with Foreign Secretary Federico Gamboa.
Huerta's spokesman unequivocally rejected Lind's proposals,

5®Address of the President... Embodying the Presi
dent's Instructions to Mr. Lind..., August 27, 1913,
Foreign Relations, 1913, 822.
59
6n

Daniels, The Wilson Era; Years of Peace, 182.

uNew York Times, August 9, 1913.
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insisting instead upon recognition of the General's regime
and a formal exchange of ambassadors.

C1

Realizing that he

had made no progress whatsoever, Lind offered to sweeten
the deal with a large American loan to the de facto govern
ment.

But Huerta indignantly rejected the bribe.

Frustrated,

Wilson's agent sought and shortly obtained permission to in
timidate the General.

If Huerta continued to resist American

demands, Lind warned, the United States would be forced
either to recognize the Constitutionalists or to intervene
itself in the Mexican imbroglio.
sensed the bluff and called it.

Huerta stood fast.

He

In a final meeting between

Lind and Gamboa, the Secretary noted that Mexican law pro
hibited a provisional president from standing for reelection.
Grasping at straws, Lind chose to interpret that chance re
mark as evidence of Huerta's acceptance of the American de
mands and so reported it to Washington.

Gamboa {and Huerta),

of course, intended nothing of the s o r t . ^
On August 27, shortly after Lind left Mexico City,
Wilson went before a joint session of Congress to explain

^Grieb, Huerta, 96-99. The ridiculousness of the
American position was revealed with telling effect in
Gamboa's formal reply to Lind on August 16. Doubtless the
President was stung. See Reply of... Gamboa to the Propo
sals of... Lind, August 16, 1913, Foreign Relations, 1913,
823-827.
69
Cline, The United States and Mexico, 146.

his Mexican policy.

It was his first major public statement

on the situation in the neighboring republic.

The President

discussed in full the Lind mission and expressed deep re
gret at its apparent failure.

Still, he reminded his lis

teners, the United States could not in justice impose its
will upon the Mexican people.

"Clearly," he continued,

"everything that we do must be rooted in patience and done
with calm and disinterested deliberation."

The United States

could "afford to exercise the self-restraint of a really
great nation," one "which realizes its own strength and
scorns to misuse it."

In closing, Wilson urged all Americans

still in Mexico to withdraw from that country.

Meanwhile,

his administration would adopt a neutral position and embargo
arms shipments to both Mexican factions. 6 1
The President's speech was well-received both by the
press and by the majority of the American people.64

The

neutral stance and the policy of non-interference proved
immensely popular.

Moreover, immediately ensuing events in

Mexico appeared to vindicate Wilson's forebearance.

Early

in September, Huerta announced his intention to retire from

OJAddress of the President... Embodying the Presi
dent's Instructions to Mr. Lind..., August 27, 1913, Foreign
Relations, 1913, 822-823.
64

New York Times, August 28, 1913.
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office.

Shortly thereafter, Gamboa was designated presi

dential candidate of the conservative Catholic Party, and
the objectionable Felix Diaz was dispatched to Japan on a
lengthy diplomatic mission.^

At last the way seemed clear

for a return to true constitutional government in Mexico.
Highly pleased, Bryan declared that the United
States stood ready to extend full recognition to Gamboa
should he emerge the victor in the projected October 26
election.

The fact that the Constitutionalists and the

Mexican Liberal Party might boycott the polls and continue
the civil war in no way affected the Secretary's decision.
It was a "simple solution," Link observes, "but a hopelessly
unrealistic one."

The Catholic Party was a distinct minority

dominated by former Porfiristas.

Clearly reactionary and

avowedly opposed to reform, it singularly failed to repre
sent the revolutionary aspirations of the majority of the
Mexican people.

At the same time, however, the Constitu

tionalists, the one faction capable of fulfilling those as
pirations, stood discredited in the eyes of the President
and the Secretary of State.

Although Huerta's opponents had

^Link, Wilson: The New Freedom, 363-364; Grieb,
Huerta, 104.
6^Link, Wilson: The New Freedom, 364.

32

neither organized a government nor drafted a constitution,
they were still the obvious heirs of the Madcro Revolu
tion.^^

It was folly to assume that they would accept a

president not of their own choosing, to say nothing of a
protege of the usurper.
Among Wilson's advisors William Bayard Hale alone
had come to recognize that salient fact.

Proceeding to

Washington late in September, he succeeded in impressing
upon the President the necessity of Constitutionalist
participation in the approaching election.

6Q

Bryan then

opened negotiations with Carranza, calling upon him to co
operate in arranging an armistice and in choosing a new
government for the republic.

Rejecting the Secretary's

proposal, the First Chief denounced compromise as a solu
tion to his country's problems.

It was his intent, he

informed Bryan, to forcibly eject Huerta and bring all of
Mexico under revolutionary control.

69

Hammering home the point, Constitutionalist troops
shortly seized the strategic rail center of Torreon.

Quirk, The Mexican Revolution, 9; Gruening,
Mexico and Its Heritage, 98-99.
^®Link, Wilson: The New Freedom, 364-365.
69Ibid., 365.

Fall

33

of the "key to Huerta's defenses in northern Mexico" re
sulted in near-panic in the capital, precipitating a politi
cal crisis which forced the General's h a n d . ^

On October 10

the Chamber of Deputies, grown weary of Huerta and hedging
against his downfall, threatened to adjourn and reconvene
in Constitutionalist territory.

Moving swiftly to quell

incipient rebellion, Huerta dismissed Congress and jailed
more than a hundred disaffected deputies.

Firmly in control,

the General reiterated his intention to retire and announced
that elections would be held on October 26 as

s c h e d u l e d .

73*

In Washington the President expressed dismay and in
dignation at the vigorous suppression of Huerta's opposition.
In a strongly-worded note to the Mexican Foreign Office, he
protested the "lawless methods" employed by the General,
branding the dissolution of Congress and imprisonment of
the deputies as "an act of bad faith toward the United
States."

Huerta's acts had destroyed all possibility of a

free and fair election, he charged, and because of that
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Ibid.; Cline, The United States and Mexico, 147;
Edith O 'Shaughnessy, A Diplomat's Wife in Mexico (New York:
Harper & Brothers, 1916), 6-7; O'Shaughnessy to Bryan,
October 11, 1913, Foreign Relations, 1913, 836; Silva Herzog,
Breve Historia, II, 14-16.
73-0'Shaughnessy to Bryan, October 11 and 23, Ibid.,
836-837 and 848-849.
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fact the United States could not accept the results of
such an election or recognize the government chosen thereby.
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Considering themselves freed from their prior pledge
to uphold the results of the October 26 elections, Wilson
and Bryan moved rapidly to forestall European recognition
of Huerta's successor and to isolate and force from office
the dictator himself. ^

Their determination to achieve

those ends was greatly intensified by certain indiscreet
remarks attributed to the new British Ambassador to Mexico,
remarks which led, in turn, to a serious misunderstanding
with the British Foreign Office.

At the heart of the

matter lay two all but irreconciliable issues;

(1) The

British Government's concern for the security of its citizens'
huge investment in Mexico, particularly in the strategi
cally vital Mexican oil industry, and (2) the obsessive
distrust of and antagonism toward "the interests", regard
less of nationality, shared by Wilson and Bryan, and their

^ B r y a n to O'Shaughnessy, October 13, 1913, Ibid.,
838.
73

Link, Woodrow Wilson and the Progressive Era,
117; Ray Stannard Baker, Woodrow Wilson, Life and Letters
(8 vols.; Garden City: Doubleday, Doran & Company, 192719 39), IV, 274-275 (hereafter cited as Woodrow Wilson).
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mutual revulsion against and opposition to Dollar or Pound
T A

Sterling Diplomacy.
Already, on October 8, Lind had complained to
Bryan that Sir Weetman Pearson, Lord Cowdray,
the Huerta Government.

"controlled"

The largest single foreign investor

in Mexico, Cowdray owned and operated the big Mexican
Eagle Oil Company (Aguila Company).

The Aguila had re-

fineries at Tampico and Minatitlan and drilling rights to
some 1.6 million a c r e s . B y

1913, it was virtually the

British investment in Mexico's railways, banks,
mines, public utilities, and petroleum industry was immense,
approaching or rivalling that of the American investors.
Peter Calvert, The Mexican Revolution, 1910-1914; The Di
plomacy of Anglo-American Conflict (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 196 8) , 19-21 (hereafter cited as Diplomacy
of Anglo-American Conflict) . The opposition of Wilson and
Bryan to economic imperialism is well documented. See, for
example. Link, Wilson: The New Freedom, 277; John Morton
Blum, Woodrow Wilson and the Politics of Morality (Boston:
Little, Brown and Company, 1956), 86-87; Daniels, The Wilson
Era: Years of Peace, 157; Lincoln Steffans, The Autobiography
of Lincoln Steffans (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company,
1931), 736; and Richard Challener, "William Jennings Bryan,"
An Uncertain Tradition: American Secretaries of State in the
Twentieth Century, ed. Norman A. Graebner (New York: McGrawHill, 1961), 82-83 (hereafter cited as "Bryan," An Uncertain
Tradition).
75J. A. Spender, Weetman Pearson, First Lord Cowdray
(London: Cassell and Company, 1930), 171 (hereafter cited
as Lord Cowdray).

sole supplier of fuel oil to the Royal Navy.?**

Obviously

it was in the interest of the British Government to pro
tect the Cowdray concern from excessive taxation as well
as from the ravages of civil war.

However, that government

could not intervene to assure the unchecked flow of fuel
oil without violating the Monroe Doctrine and thereby
risking a serious confrontation with the United States.
Its only recourse, then, lay in supporting the de facto
government in return for whatever degree of protection
that government was willing to afford to British invest
ments in Mexico.

Thus the British Foreign Office, upon

extending recognition to the Huerta regime, had sought
and duly obtained the aforementioned guaranties.7?

Lind,

"who was as anti-British as he was gullible," was by no
means alone in assuming that there was a much closer
working relationship than truly existed between Cowdray
and Whitehall in the shaping of Britain's Mexican policy.7®

7^Cline, The United States and Mexico, 152; Link,
Wilson: The New Freedom, 370. For a somewhat differing
view of the importance of Mexican oil to the British Govern
ment see Calvert, Diplomacy of Anglo-American Conflict,
173-174.
77

Link, Woodrow Wilson and the Progressive Era, 116n.

7ft
Link, Wilson: The New Freedom, 371; Grieb,
Huerta, 130,
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Both Wilson and Bryan had for some time suspected as much.
By mid-October, they were firmly if erroneously convinced
of it.
On October 11, the day after the purge of Huerta's
congressional opposition, the new British Ambassador, Sir
Lionel Carden, arrived in the Mexican capital.

Proceeding

at once to the National Palace, he "ostentatiously" pre
sented his credentials to the General, in effect endorsing
the latter's stern measures of the previous day.^®

Then,

on October 21, after Lind had dispatched several more
messages to Washington charging collusion between Cowdray,
Carden, and Huerta, the British Ambassador conducted the
unfortunate interview which was to precipitate an AngloAmerican crisis over Mexico.

Carden informed reporters

that his government had no intention of withdrawing recog
nition from the Huerta regime.

The American Government, he

observed, failed to understand the gravity of the situa
tion in Mexico.
contrary.

Elections offered no solution; quite the

A purge of dissident elements and rule by a

strong man was far more in order.

It was "ridiculous," he

concluded, to suppose that such a man could be found in a
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Cline, The United States and Mexico, 148.
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"haphazard election under the present circumstances."^
True or not, the Ambassador’s remarks were unquestionably
tactless and certain to arouse indignation in Washington.
And so they did.
Wilson was incensed by Carden's statement.

It

seemed to confirm the most serious of Lind's charges and
the worst of the President's suspicions.

Anti-British

feeling in Washington "grew suddenly to proportions so
dangerous as to menace friendly Anglo-American relations.
Wilson was now convinced that Huerta had maintained his
position largely through the moral and financial support of
interested European powers, principally Great Britain, France,
and Germany.

He was particularly vexed at Whitehall since

other European governments with interests in Mexico had
agreed to follow Britain's lead in their relations with
the republic.

82

Moreover, the support given to Huerta by

the Europeans had been extended "without regard to the
wishes or purposes of the United States."

Had that support

*^New York Times, October 22, 1913.
81
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Link, Wilson: The New Freedom, 371.

Cline, The United States and Mexico, 148; Calvert,
Diplomacy of Anglo-American Conflict, 233.
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been withheld, the President believed, the Huerta Government
would have collapsed months earlier.

83

Certainly the dic

tator would have been forced to accept American mediation.
Wilson's position on European relations with Mexico
was expressed in a smoldering memorandum to Bryan written
shortly after receipt of the Carden statement.

The Secre

tary was instructed to embody the President's views on the
matter in a circular note which Wilson intended to send to
the pertinent governments.

Accordingly, in a sharply-

worded draft, Bryan declared that while the United States
had larger investments in Mexico and more of its citizens
resident therein than did any other nation, its treatment
of Mexico had been dictated not by those material interests
but by the moral and political questions involved.

Re

grettably, he charged, "European financiers," aided by the
recognition extended Huerta by their respective governments
and acting in return for "commercial concessions," had
given the usurper the means to perpetuate his power.

84

Clearly the Secretary had Cowdray foremost in mind.
Lind and Nelson O'Shaughnessy, both confirmed Anglophobes,

83Link, Wilson; The New Freedom, 367-368.
84Ibid., 368.
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had succeeded by late October in convincing Wilson and
Bryan that Cowdray and Carden were indeed in collusion and
actively engaged in frustrating the President’s Mexican
policy.
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Further "evidence" allegedly attesting to the

existence of a conspiracy between the Cowdray interests
and the British Government was proffered by the oilman's
principal competitor, Henry Clay Pierce of the Waters

85

Ibid., 371-372. The charges against both men
were largely groundless yet, in view of the circumstances,
understandable.
Calvert, Diplomacy of Anglo-American Conflict, 173-177 and 246. Nonetheless, "a more displeasing
appointment (than Carden's) could scarcely have been made.
Carden had been serving for several years in the British
legations in Central America and the West Indies, was an
economic imperialist in viewpoint, and notoriously antiAmerican."
Bryan's predecessor, Philander Knox, had twice
tried and failed to have Carden recalled from his post
in Cuba. Baker, Woodrow Wilson, IV, 261. The belief
that Carden was anti-American and pro-oil, that is proCowdray, was accepted without question in Washington.
Daniels, The Wilson Era:
Years of Peace, 181. Without
doubt, Carden was anti-American and apparently with good
cause.
The German Ambassador to Mexico, recounting a
conversation with Carden, provided a fascinating glimpse
of the other side of the coin:
"He (Carden) tells me
that in Cuba, Guatamala and other Latin American countries
he has always met the same opponents:
the Americans.
He
has always found them people of bad faith, unbelievable
crooks, swindlers . . . He has often attempted to reach an
understanding with Americans; always they have broken their
word . . . S i r Lionel thinks that now he has run the United
States to earth in Mexico, 'now there is a chance of
exploding that most foolish of all theories:
the Monroe
Doctrine.'" Quoted in Calvert, Diplomacy of AngloAmerican Conflict, 259.
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Pierce Oil Company.

ft6

Finally, reports from the American

ambassador to Great Britain, Walter Hines Page, seemed to
corroborate the allegations.

Complaining bitterly that

British policy in Mexico was totally amoral, Page insisted
that the Foreign Office sought stability in the republic

8^Ibid., 96-98 and 179. The Waters Pierce Oil
Company, owned one-third by Henry Clay Pierce and twothirds by Rockefeller's Standard Oil Company, had enjoyed
a monopoly of the retail oil trade in Mexico for some
thirty years when Lord Cowdray entered the Mexican oil
business in 1903. The company produced no oil in Mexico
itself, instead importing crude to its refinery at Tampico.
Thus the Viscount, with production in the Mexican states
of Chiapas, Tabasco, and Veracruz and, eventually, re
fineries at both Tampico and Minatitlan, was able to
undersell Waters Pierce Oil Company in the Mexican market.
Cowdray approached Pierce in 1903 in an attempt to divide
the market equitably, but was rebuffed. A second attempt
in 190 8 also failed.
Soon Cowdray controlled between
eighty and ninety per cent of the Mexican market.
From
1910 through 1914 Pierce waged an unrelenting propaganda
campaign against Cowdray in the international press in an
attempt to deny him access to funds needed for further
exploration and development.
Therein was born the charge
that the Viscount had bribed and corrupted the Diaz
Government and, after 1911, each succeeding regime through
1914. The same source was also responsible for the charge
that ultimately imperiled Anglo-American amity in the
fall of 1913: that Cowdray used his influence within the
British Government to win support for Huerta and that he
received valuable concessions from the General in return.
Interestingly, the Standard Oil Company was embarrassed
by Pierce's conduct and formally apologized to Cowdray in
1912.
The following year, the tie between Pierce and the
Rockefeller interests was severed, and Pierce alone con
trolled the Waters Pierce Oil Company. The scurrilous
attacks on Cowdray thus continued well into 1914. Spender,
Lord Cowdray, 163-170.

solely "for the sake of financial interests.1,87

From the

welter of charges the following disturbing and unsavory
picture began to emerge:
behind Huerta.

Cowdray was the "sinister power"

In exchange for liberal new concessions,

the oilman had extended large loans to the General thereby
enabling him to remain in power.

Moreover, as a major

contributor to the Liberal Party, Cowdray was in a position
to dominate the Foreign Office.
Cowdray's mouthpiece in Mexico."

Carden, then, was "merely
The motivating factor,

of course, was control and monopoly of the Mexican petroleum
industry by the Aguila Company and, through it, by the
OQ

British Government.
Link, Calvert, and Cowdray's biographer, J. A.
Spender, all dismiss the charges against the Viscount as
fabrication or gross exaggeration.89

Nonetheless, the

charges were generally accepted in Administration circles,
and there is no evidence that they were ever seriously
challenged thereafter.

87Link, Wilson: The New Freedom, 371.
"ibid., 372; Grieb, Huerta, 132-134; Calvert,
Diplomacy of Anglo-American Conflict, 229-231, 234, and 245.
89Ibid., 173-176, 182-183, and 275-277; Link, Wilson
The New Freedom, 372; Spender, Lord Cowdray, 189ff.
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Reworked by Bryan, the President's memorandum was
passed on to State Department Counselor John Bassett Moore
for final polishing.

Wilson meant to dispatch the finished

note shortly after the results of the Mexican election were
made public.

He fully expected the return of Huerta or a

Huertista puppet and hoped that the circular note would
induce the several European governments to withhold recog. .
90
nitron from the new regime.
While Moore studied the draft with dismay, the
President proceeded to Mobile, Alabama.

There, on Octo

ber 27, he delivered one of the more important addresses
of his career.

It dealt primarily with the Wilson Adminis

tration’s future relations with Latin America.

Generally,

the Mobile Address consisted first of a sharp denunciation
of the "concessionaires" or foreign businessmen alleged to
be exploiting the Latin American republics and, second, of
the President's pledge of American assistance in halting
that exploitation.
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Delivered the day after the Mexican

^^Cline, The United States and Mexico, 148-149;
Grieb, Huerta, 114.
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New York Times, October 28, 1913. Por complete
text see Ray stannard Baker and William E. Dodds (eds.).
The Public Papers of Woodrow Wilson, The New Democracy
(2 vols.; New York: Harper & Brothers, 1926), I, 64-69
(hereafter cited as Public Papers of Woodrow Wilson) .
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elections, in which Huerta had been returned to the presi
dency as anticipated, Wilson’s words were aimed specifically
at Whitehall, Cowdray, and the General.

They were intended

to serve as a prelude to the blunt, more forceful circular
notes then in preparation.

Their meaning was clear.

If

the Europeans refused to cooperate with the United States
in peacefully forcing Huerta's retirement, the President
would have no choice but to turn to unilateral armed inter
vention to obtain that end.

In foreswearing annexationist

designs on Latin America, Cline explains, Wilson was assuring
the Mexican people that any future intervention by the
United States would be for "idealistic" rather than "impe
rialistic" ends.

In addition, he was anticipating and deny

ing in advance Republican demands for annexation of part or
all of Mexico.

Finally, the President left no doubt but

that Huerta must go, and that the United States was pre
pared to resort to any means short of an actual declaration
of war to assure his removal.

Qo
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^Cline, The United States and Mexico, 150. European
reaction to the Mobile Address was "stormy." Grieb, Huerta,
115. Calvert records the response of the British Foreign
Office: "The President is very sanguine about the future of
Latin-America after the opening of the Canal... His state
ment that the U. S. will never again seek one additional
foot of territory by conquest is the most important statement
in the speech, but this does not preclude the acquisition

Upon Wilson's return to Washington, the Counselor
"read him an unforgettable lesson on international manners,
especially those concerning recognition and impugning the
motives of friends.'

Grudgingly accepting Moore's

rebuke, the President retreated from the extreme position
set forth in his original memorandum.

The draft circular

note was quietly shelved, and no further mention was made
of the alleged hostile intrigues of British and other
European business interests in Mexico.
ever, were not forgotten.

The charges, how

Wilson and Bryan, at least, con

tinued to believe the worst.

of territory by other means than conquest... The speech is
a fine one to read, but its ideas do not seem very practical.
Calvert, Diplomacy of Anglo-American Conflict, 252. Un
doubtedly to European statesmen and to their Latin American
counterparts as well the President of the United States
appeared to be either a complete cynic or an utter fool.
Grieb, Huerta, 116-117. His actions were without prece
dent and hence beyond comprehension.
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Cline, The United States and Mexico, 150.
"Recognition," Moore informed the President, "is an act
performed in the ordinary course of diplomatic relations.
As the independent States of America are not protectorates
of the United States, we do not supervise their diplomatic
relations; and it has never before been considered neces
sary for Foreign Powers to ask our consent to their
recognition of an American Government, or to explain to
us their reasons for such a step. Nor can there be any
doubt that the American Governments would themselves deeply
resent any attempt on our part to assume such a super
vision. " Calvert, Diplomacy of Anglo-American Conflict,
252.
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Ultimately, it was the British Government which took
the initiative in attempting to dispel Anglo-American mis
understanding over Mexico.

Shortly after Wilson drafted

his intemperate condemnation of British activities in the
republic, the gist of the memorandum was leaked to the
Washington press corps.

In that way the Foreign Office
Q

was made aware of the President's displeasure.

A

Anxious

to allay Wilson's suspicions. Prime Minister Herbert
Asquith immediately declared that his government had no
intention of intervening in Mexico, nor was it in any way
attempting to thwart American aims in that country.

The

Prime Minister's statement was followed by the timely dis
patch of Grey's private secretary, Sir William Tyrrell, to
the United States to confer directly with the President.
Arriving in Washington early in November, Tyrrell
pledged his government's full cooperation in the removal
of Huerta and in persuading Germany and France to follow
suit.

In return, however, Tyrrell sought and obtained the

President's guarantee of American protection for British
lives and property in Mexico following the General’s
demise.
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Under the circumstances Wilson could hardly have

94Link, Wilson; The New Freedom, 373.
95Ibid., 376.
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denied Tyrrell's request.

Having insisted that the

Europeans recognize American preeminence in dealing with
Mexico, he had automatically assumed for his own govern
ment responsibility for the lives and property of all
foreigners in the republic.

It was an onerous obligation

all but impossible to fulfill.

Moreover, and of far

graver consequence, it was for many years to prove an
insurmountable obstacle to the establishment of normal
amicable relations between the United States and the
future revolutionary governments of Mexico.
The Tyrrell mission resulted in a new AngloAmerican accord on Mexico and thus, indirectly, to a
similar accord between the United States and other
nations with interests in the republic.

Although Grey

did not withdraw recognition from the Huerta regime, the
General was informed that he could expect no further
assistance from the British Government.

Further dis

engagement was manifested by the subsequent withdrawal
of Carden from the British Embassy in Mexico City.

By

late November 1913, Wilson's scheme for the diplomatic
isolation of Huerta appeared to have succeeded.

96Ibid., 377.
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Chapter 2

WILSON VS. HUERTA: INTERVENTION
AT VERACRUZ

I.
Undeterred by American opposition, Huerta had pro
ceeded as planned with the October 26 elections.

The polls

had returned a Huertista Congress which, in turn, had
promptly declared the presidential election null and void
and proclaimed the General ad interim president until a
new election could be held the following July.^"

Indignant

and frustrated, Wilson responded with a virtual ultimatum.
The election was fraudulent, he charged, and in contra
vention of the General's earlier pledge to retire.

If

Huerta refused to step down voluntarily he could expect
"very serious practical measures" to force his retirement.
In his stead, Wilson suggested the General should make way

•^0'Shaughnessy to Bryan, October 26 and December 10,
1913, Foreign Relations, 1913, 850 and 866; Silva Ilerzog,
Breve Historia, II, 62-63. The Constitutionalists had boy
cotted the elections on the correct assumption that Huertista
control of the election machinery would assure a Huertista
victory. The elections were indeed a farce, and the outcome
was never in doubt. Baker, Woodrow Wilson, IV, 280.
48
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for a new provisional junta composed of persons associated
as little as possible with the dictatorship.
By the end of October, when the President's warning
reached Mexico City, Huerta had begun to discount the flow
of admonishments from Washington.

He was well informed on

American domestic politics and because of it questioned
Wilson's readiness to follow up his threats with commensurate
action.

Bryan and Daniels, the two cabinet members most

concerned with Mexican affairs, were both renowned pacifists,
and the President himself was known to be strongly opposed
to armed intervention.

A Republican minority was indeed

demanding intervention, but Wilson could ill afford dicta
tion of Administration foreign policy by the opposition
party.

Finally, with Congress itself divided over the

Mexican question and American relations with the Constitu
tionalists far from cordial, Huerta had little fear of immi
nent armed intervention by the United States.4

Accordingly,

he ignored Wilson's threat and affirmed his intention to re
tain the presidency.^

2Grieb, Huerta, 111.
•^Cline, The United States and Mexico, 150-151.
4Ibid.
5New York Times, November 4, 1913.

50
Huerta's gamble paid off.

In Washington Wilson

briefly considered declaring war on Mexico, blockading its
ports, and sealing off its northern and southern borders
with American troops.

It was a plan that went far beyond

the President's attempts to isolate Huerta diplomatically,
and that was

designed to deprive the General of customs

revenues and cut off the flow of foreign arms and munitions
to the Federal army.

However, as the General anticipated,

Wilson shrank from armed intervention.

Instead, the Presi

dent turned again to moral suasion and diplomatic coercion.
In addition, his new offensive against Huerta called for
close cooperation with the Constitutionalists.

It was

assumed that Carranza would welcome American assistance in
his drive on the Mexican capital and that he would cooperate
with the United States in return for that aid.

On this pre

mise John Hale was sent to Nogales in mid-November to confer
with Carranza.

7

Grieb, Huerta, 112; Link, Woodrow Wilson and the
Progressive Era, 120. The origins of this scheme are ob
scure. Doubtless it grew out of one of the several contin
gency plans prepared by the General Staff in anticipation
of a possible conflict with Mexico.
In the future it be
came something of a standard blueprint for conquest of the
republic and reappeared with great regularity whenever in
terventionist sentiment mounted in the United States.
Its
advocates were legion and diverse, from Wilson and Bryan
on the one hand to Edward L. Doheny and William Randolph
Hearst on the other.
7

/Link, Wilson: The New Freedom, 382.
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Hale offered repeal of the embargo on arms shipments
to the Constitutionalists.

In return he asked for Carranza's

cooperation in negotiating an armistice with the Huertistas
and for the First Chief's pledge to protect American lives
and property in northern Mexico.

For the second time Carranza

refused to work with Washington.

He wanted no assistance

from the United States, he informed Hale, only repeal of the
arms embargo.

Nor would he tolerate American interference

in the internal affairs of the republic.

Armed intervention

was inexcusable under any circumstances, he declared, and
bluntly warned Wilson's emissary against it.

The Constitu

tionalists themselves would execute sweeping social and
economic reforms by decree.

Only then would they consider

popular elections and a return to constitutional government.^
Wilson was "deeply disturbed" by Carranza's rebuff, and

Grieb, Huerta, 112. In 1912, President Taft had
placed an embargo on the export of arms and ammunition to
all Mexican revolutionary factions. Although a large amount
of war materiel was subsequently smuggled across the border
into northern Mexico, the embargo was effective enough to
seriously inhibit sustained offensive operations by the Con
stitutionalists.
On the other hand, it was a boon to the de
facto Government. Controlling the major ports, the Government
was able to freely receive large shipments of arms from abroad. Thus repeal of the embargo was a primary diplomatic
objective not only of the Constitutionalists but of all other
factions opposed to the de facto Government at any given
moment.
9Ibid., 113; Link, Woodrow Wilson and the Progressive
Era, 121.
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especially so by the First Chief's program as outlined to
Hale.

It was a "crushing blow," Link concludes, to the

President's plans for steering the Mexican Revolution into
"democratic and constitutional channels."I®
Huerta was heartened by the President's failure to
reach an understanding with the Constitutionalists.

Early

in November, following conclusion of the Anglo-American ac
cord on Mexico, he had seriously considered resignation.^
However, he rallied strongly in the wake of the American re
versal at Nogales and was delighted with the President's decision to maintain the arms embargo.

12

During the weeks that

followed, Huerta's position grew more secure.

The Constitu

tionalist offensive in the north bogged down,1^ Wilson

l^Link, Wilson: The New Freedom, 383.
i;LIbid., 385.
13

12Ibid., 384.

Meyer, Orozco, 109; Grieb, Huerta, 66; Cline, The
United States and Mexico, 154. Early in December, the tide
of battle turned in favor of the dictator. On December 13,
Federal troops recaptured Torreon, shattering the Constitu
tionalist offensive in the North and temporarily halting
Carranza's progress toward the capital. Link, Wilson: The
New Freedom, 388. At the same time, the Constitutionalist
drive on the coveted Huasteca oilfields was frustrated by
American intervention. Acting on orders from Washington,
Admiral Frank F. Fletcher, commander of American naval forces
off the east coast of Mexico, warned the Constitutionalists
away from the strategic refining and oil shipping centers of
Tampico and Tuxpam. New York Times, December 10, 11, and 13,
1913; Calvert, Diplomacy of Anglo-American Conflict, 282. As
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reverted to a passive policy of watching and w a i t i n g , a n d
the President's plan to isolate the regime diplomatically
produced no immediate ill effects.

Meanwhile, landowners,

businessmen and Mexican Church hierarchy, frightened by the
violent rhetoric of the Constitutionalists, threw their
full support behind the de facto government as the sole
15

bulwark against threatened revolutionary excesses. J

Funds

raised from these sources, in addition to forced loans
wrung from large foreign firms operating in Mexico, assured
the solvency of the regime.

Still able to pay the generals

much as Wilson by then longed for a Constitutionalist
victory, he dared not risk destruction of the oilfields and
the loss of hundreds of millions of dollars worth of Ameri
can and European investments.
"Oil was too fragile an in
dustry," Calvert observes, "... and too important to be
endangered by nationalism.
It was taken into the inter
national system, and so lifted out of domestic politics,
until a new and stronger state could assert its claims to
it." Ibid., 292. In addition, the guarantee of American
protection for foreign properties in Mexico, extended to
Britain and indirectly to other nations with holdings in the
republic only weeks before, bound the United States to main
tain order and to preserve the peace in the oilfields.
It
was an onerous committment for the President, placing him in
the embarrassing position of defending the very "concession
aires" he had so strongly condemned at Mobile. Again and
again that fateful obligation arose to frustrate the return
of normal Mexican-American relations. It was truly the
Achilles' heel of American Mexican policy, a curse which
endured for years after the Wilson era and was not wholly
dispelled until Franklin D. Roosevelt acquiesced in the
nationalization of the Mexican oil industry in 1938.
^ N e w York Times, November 21, 1913.
118-119.

l^Link, Wilson: The New Freedom, 387; Grieb, Huerta,
-----------------------------
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and to purchase arms and munitions abroad, Huerta was stronger
than ever by the end of 1913.^-®
Wilson, on the other hand, found himself in an awk
ward position.

Having announced to the world his intention

to force Huerta from office, he had singularly failed in
that endeavor.

17

Bribery, threats and diplomatic isolation

had proved ineffectual.

So, too, had attempts to cooperate

^ The immediate effect of Fletcher's bold action, the
first of a succession of localized American interventions in
the petroleum province, was to turn the Constitutionalists
away from the coast.
It was a serious setback for the revo
lutionary cause and a windfall for Huerta.
The Constitu
tionalists were thereby denied access to ports through which
they might receive desperately needed arms and ammunition.
Moreover, the possessor of Tampico and Tuxpam was also the
recipient of all revenues derived from taxes on the produc
tion and export of petroleum products, one of the major
sources of wealth in the republic. Link, Wilson: The New
Freedom, 408; Quirk, The Mexican Revolution, 28 and 151;
Charles C. Cumberland, Mexico, The Struggle for Modernity
(New York; Oxford University Press, 1968), 249 (hereafter
cited as Mexico). Control of those revenues, in turn,
enabled Huerta to put a formidable force in the field and to
maintain it at full strength through the purchase of muni
tions abroad. Until the Huertistas were driven from Tampico
and Tuxpam, the dictatorship was capable of withstanding in
definitely its internal opposition.
17

x,On November 24, a circular note was sent to nations
with interests in Mexico clarifying the position of the Wilson
Administration vis a vis the Huerta regime. In it the Presi
dent declared that if Huerta did not soon retire "by force
of circumstances" it would "become the duty of the United
States to use less peaceful means to put him out." Bryan
to all embassies....November 24, 1913, Foreign Relations, 1914
(Washington, D.C.; Government Printing Office, 1922), 443444 (hereafter cited as Foreign Relations, 1914).
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with the Constitutionalists.

Armed intervention to depose

the dictator had been ruled out for fear of driving all
Mexican factions into a common alliance against the United
States.

18

One option remained:

Wilson could resign himself

to Carranza's intransigence, lift the arms embargo, and extend diplomatic and moral support to the revolutionaries.

19

It was generally believed by Administration officials that
such a course would greatly strengthen the Constitutionalists
and hasten the fall of the Huerta regime.
The proposal to back Carranza came first from John
Lind, the President's agent in Veracruz, early in December,
1913.

u

Lind continued to press his recommendation through

the beginning of the new year.

Returning to Washington after

a Christmas conference with Lind at Pass Christian, Mississippi,
Wilson "found a storm of criticism and ridicule of his policy
of 'watchful waiting.'

OI

Lane and Garrison called for im

mediate and "vigorous" action to depose Huerta and bring the
civil war in Mexico to a close.

Lane urged the President to

choose a strong Mexican leader, establish him in the National

^®Link, Wilson: The New Freedom, 386.
19Baker, Woodrow Wilson, IV, 299.
21

20Ibid., 298-299.

Daniels, The Wilson Era: Years of Peace, 184.
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Palace and extend to him the full support of the Administra
tion.

The Secretary went so far as to invite his colleagues

to a private luncheon in order to better promote the fortunes
of his personal choice for the Mexican presidency-~General
Eduardo Iturbide, a prominent conservative politician and
Huertista governor of the Federal District.

Cabinet response

to Lane's proposal was negative, however, and the Secretary
dropped the matter for the time being.

22

As pressure on the Administration to end the fighting
in Mexico mounted both at home and abroad, Wilson began to
move toward the adoption of Lind's recommendation of strong
support for the Constitutionalists.

23

During the same period.

22Ibid. The interest of Lane and, later, of other
Administration officials in Iturbide is intriguing.
In the
spring of 1915, Lane again urged support for the General,
cooperating with several lesser State Department officials
in a concerted effort to win Wilson's support for a counter
revolutionary movement headed by Iturbide.
The enthusiasm
of the General's American backers in the absence of some form
of remuneration is inexplicable. Nonetheless, no conclusive
evidence of scandal has ever emerged.
23Early in January, 1914, Huerta suspended interest
payments on the Mexican debt, causing great consternation in
European financial circles and prompting the British Govern
ment to propose joint Anglo-American intervention to depose
the dictator.
Baker, Woodrow Wilson, IV, 300. At the same
time, Representative Frederick H. Gillett, a powerful Massa
chusetts Republican, sharply attacked the Administration's
Mexican policy in a speech before the House. New York Times,
January 16, 1914. The Congressman's address and accompanying
journalistic criticism of that policy caused the President
"no little anxiety." Baker, Woodrow Wilson, IV, 303.
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developments in Mexico prompted Carranza to reconsider his
relations with the United States.

The bases for a mutually

advantageous rapprochement now existed.

Huerta's counter

offensive in northern Mexico had split the revolutionary
forces, seriously lowering their morale, while growing dis
sension between Villa and Carranza threatened to splinter
the movement still further.

24

Meanwhile, atrocities perpe

trated by the men of Villa's Division of the North aroused
disgust and indignation in Europe and the United States, tar
nishing the reputation of the Constitutionalist movement and
sustaining the demand for armed intervention.

Anxious to re

furbish the revolutionary image, Carranza sent Luis Cabrera,
his principal advisor and ablest ambassador, to Washington to
proselytize Administration officials.

25

On January 27, Cabrera met with State Department rep
resentative William Phillips, explaining the Constitutionalist
position and requesting repeal of the arms embargo.

26

Shrewdly

OA
Quirk, The Mexican Revolution, 16-18; Cline, The
United States and Mexico, 154.
25Ibid.
26
^Phillips, at the time of his conference with Cabrera,
was under consideration for the post of Third Assistant Secre
tary of State and was so appointed in March, 1914. His career
as an American diplomat spanned a period of almost fifty years.
He left Harvard Law School in 1903 for a position in the
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skirting Carranza's political ambitions, Cabrera stressed
instead the First Chief's plans for social and economic re
form.

Only legal and constitutional means would be employed

in executing the reform program, he assured Phillips.

Pro

perty rights would be respected, and foreign investors need
i

not fear confiscation or the nullification of "just" con
cessions.

Wilson was both impressed and relieved by Cabrera's

statement.27

It was precisely what he wanted to hear at the

moment, and he accepted it in toto.

If the First Chief was

indeed the sincere and selfless reformer that his spokesman
made him out to be, the President could, in good conscience,

American Embassy at London. Thereafter, he served as Second
Secretary of the American Legation at Peking, 1905-1907;
Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs, Department of
State, 1908-1909; Third Assistant Secretary of State, 1909;
and, for the next three years, Secretary to the American Am
bassador to Great Britain. He rejoined the State Department
in 1914 as Third Assistant Secretary, serving in that capa
city until appointed Assistant Secretary in January, 1917.
In 1922, he was promoted to Undersecretary and subsequently
served in a number of ambassadorial posts until his retire
ment after the Second World War. U.S., Department of State,
Register of the Department of State, 1924 (Washington, D.C.:
Government Printing Office, 1924), 176 (hereafter cited as
Register, 1924); New York Times, February 24, 1968. Phillips
took a strong interest in Mexican affairs during the period
1914 to 1929. As one of the very few high-ranking officials
in the Department whose tenure remained unbroken during that
period, his opinions on Mexican matters were frequently soli
cited by the several Secretaries of State under whom he served.
27Link, Wilson; The New Freedom, 389.
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support him wholeheartedly.

Cabrera offered Wilson an

apparently simple escape from a complex and agonizing dilemma.
The President eagerly accepted.
Shortly after the Phillips-Cabrera conference, Wilson
abandoned his original plan for the creation of a coalition
government in Mexico, deciding instead to back the Constitu
tionalists exclusively.^®

Accordingly, he appealed to Grey

to continue withholding British support from Huerta, and in
a new circular note to interested nations he endeavored to
explain the sudden shift of American policy.

The Mexican

civil war, he declared, could best be settled by the Mexican
people themselves.

The only alternative to an all Mexican

solution was massive foreign intervention; and that, he warned,

28

Ibid. Cabrera convinced Wilson that the problem
was economic and social rather than political and that at
the heart of the problem lay the system of land tenure. Land
ownership and economic and political power were concentrated
in the hands of a small conservative propertied class strongly
represented in the Huerta government.
It was clear to Wilson
that a coalition government including members of the land
owning class would not effectively represent the landless
peasantry. At the same time, he realized that a new Mexican
government created through American intervention and supported
by American armed forces would ultimately fail because all
Mexicans would unite against it. Only the Constitutionalists,
who were firmly committed to agrarian reform, truly repre
sented the submerged masses.
The obvious course for the
Wilson Administration appeared to be one of "hands off" with
regard to the civil war, coupled with strong moral support
for the Constitutionalists. Walter V. Scholes and Marie V.
Scholes, "Wilson, Grey, and Huerta," Pacific Historical Review,
XXXVIII (May, 1968), 153-156 (hereafter cited as PHR).
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"would be the beginning of a still more difficult problem."29
Then, on February 3, shortly after dispatching the circular
notes, Wilson lifted the embargo on the shipment of arms and
munitions to Mexican revolutionaries.2®

29Bryan to Page, January 29, 1914, Foreign Relations,
1914, 445; Bryan to all diplomatic missions, January 31, 1914,
Ibid., 446-447.
^Proclamation revoking the proclamation of March 14,
1912, prohibiting the exportation of arms or munitions of war
to Mexico, February 3, 1914, Ibid., 448. In late 1913 and
early 1914 the British Government grew increasingly appre
hensive over the apparent lack of foresight in Washington.
Wilson and Bryan were obsessed with driving Huerta from power
but seemed to have no definite plans beyond that point. Grey
feared a long period of "disorder and destruction," during
which British as well as other foreign investments would be
ravaged, or armed intervention and subsequent occupation by
the United States. He preferred the latter simply to "shorten
the agony." But after the Tyrrell accord of the previous
November, Grey was reluctant to urge policy on Washington.
Scholes and Scholes, "Wilson, Grey, and Huerta," PHR, 152153. The Phillips-Cabrera conference changed that. Wilson's
sudden enthusiasm for the Constitutionalists, particularly
for Villa, frightened the British.
Grieb, Huerta, 140. That
faction they judged to be "totally incompetent to govern...
and unable to cope with the anarchy which inevitably would
follow Huerta's ouster." Accordingly, Grey initiated a new
round of highly secret talks with Wilson and Bryan.
In midFebruary, 1914, T. B. Hohler, Carden's replacement, stopped
in Washington on his way to Mexico City to discuss with the
President and Secretary of State the disturbing change in the
Wilson Administration's Mexican policy.
Grey's objective was
to make sure that the United States "understood what it was
doing" and to guarantee the protection of British interests
in Mexico. Following conferences with Wilson and Bryan,
Hohler reported that both men had been completely won over by
Cabrera. In fact, their arguments for backing the Constitu
tionalists followed "even to the slightest detail" a recentlypublished pamphlet by Cabrera defending that faction. Even
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II.
During the weeks that followed, Wilson awaited the
anticipated Constitutionalist victory with growing impatience.
Yet by the end of March Huerta was still securely ensconced
in the National Palace.

Largely because of the American

naval presence off the coast of Mexico, Huertista forces
remained in control of the vital Gulf ports whose revenues
maintained the solvency and thus the stability of the dicta
torship.

Meanwhile, Carranza's pledge to uphold foreign

concessions in exchange for repeal of the arms embargo had
disillusioned large numbers of Mexicans and had actually
strengthened Huerta's position.

The First Chief stood dis

credited as defender of the concessionaire, while the General
emerged as the champion of Mexican nationalism.

31

Wilson

more alarming to Hohler was American gullibility with regard
to Pancho Villa. Despite the fact that Cabrera represented
Carranza, Wilson and Bryan appeared to favor Villa instead.
Indeed the President saw Villa as a "sort of Robin Hood" and
anticipated his eventual emergence as head of the revolu
tionary movement. Hohler cited Villa's deplorable record to
no avail. Neither Wilson nor Bryan would listen. Thus the
British attempt to dissuade the President from proceeding
along his radical new course failed, and Grey's worst fears
were realized. Scholes and Scholes, "Wilson, Grey, and Huerta,"
PHR, 153-157.
31ciine, The United States and Mexico, 154. Again,
Wilson's pledge to protect foreign interests in Mexico served
to frustrate his plans for an early end to the civil war.
His insistence upon Carranza's guarantee for the safety of
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watched helplessly from the sidelines, "trapped by his own
essentially reckless promises."-*^
Link suspects that the President "must have tried
many times during March and early April of 1914 to discover
some way to intervene and depose Huerta without risking an
actual war.

And yet there seemed no way out."

33

As the

necessity for eventual American military intervention grew
more apparent, Wilson began to rationalize it.
Cabrera's facile phrases eased the way.

Again,

Carranza's repre

sentative had considerably broadened the President's per
spective on the Revolution.

For the first time, Wilson had

begun to grasp the real significance of that epic struggle.
On April 27, shortly after ordering the occupation of Vera
cruz, he discussed his enlightenment with columnist Samuel G.
Blythe.

The President pictured Mexico's plight as similar

foreign investments cost the Constitutionalists whatever claim
they might have had to moral ascendancy over the Huertistas
and, consequently, considerable support from the Mexican
people at a critical stage in the struggle. Moreover, it
compounded the damage already done the Constitutionalist cause
the previous December when Admiral Fletcher had turned General
Gonzalez away from the oilfields and the ports of the Huasteca.
The cumulative effect of both measures was to strengthen
Huerta's position, weaken the Constitutionalists, and prolong
the conflict that Wilson was so anxious to end. Ironically,
it also rendered all but inevitable the very action that the
President wanted most to avoid - American armed intervention
to depose the Huerta regime.
32Link, Wilson: The New Freedom, 392.

33Ibid.

63
to that of revolutionary France more than a century past.34
The Mexican Revolution, he believed, was fully as "profound’'
as its European predecessor.33

Following Cabrera's artful

promotion of the revolutionary movement, the President was
"convinced that the Constitutionalists intended to effect a
genuine economic and social regeneration and to lead the
Mexican masses eventually to political democracy."3®

He

could ask no more himself.
"It was inevitable," Link asserts, "that a man of
Wilson's active disposition would also believe that the
United States could not refuse the opportunity, even the
duty, to help the Mexican people."*w

And in his interview

with Blythe the President said as much:

The Mexican people,

he assured the reporter, should be allowed to work out their
own destiny.

But the United States would always stand ready

to impose guidance when necessary.

It was not his intention

to "turn back," Wilson declared, until he had "assurances

34Samuel G. Blythe, "Mexico: The Record of a Con
versation with President Wilson," Saturday Evening Post,
CLXXXVI (May 23, 1914), 4.
35Link, Wilson:
36Ibid.

The New Freedom, 393.
37Ibid
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that the great and crying wrongs the people have endured are
lO

in process of satisfactory adjustment.''
So the President prepared himself, both to order
armed intervention and subsequently to defend that order.

It

is clear that for some time prior to the occupation of Vera
cruz, he was seeking "moral justification" for greater par
ticipation in Mexican affairs.

Nonetheless, Link contends,

the "process of rationalization was unconscious, automatic,
and completely satisfying."

39

And indeed the evidence

appears to bear out his contention.

When the opportunity to

intervene finally did present itself Wilson, secure in his
self-righteousness, seized it with alacrity.
The break that Wilson sought came early in April,
shortly after Villa's stunning victory over the Federal army
at Torreon.

As Huertista forces fell back in disarray, Con

stitutionalist columns overran the remaining Federal outposts
in northern Mexico and turned again in the direction of the

jaBlythe, "Mexico: The Record of a Conversation with
President Wilson," Saturday Evening Post, 4 and 71.
J^Link, Wilson; The New Freedom, 393. Grieb records
the British interpretation of the President's position: "Grey
concluded that Wilson was now compelled to force Huerta from
power, because his pronouncements had 'created a situation in
which the personal credit of the President and Secretary of
State was involved.'
In this sense, Huerta's retirement had
become a 'point of honor for the United States.'" Grieb,
Huerta. 139.
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Gulf coast.

As before, the prime objectives were the ports

of Tampico and Tuxpam and the adjacent Huasteca oilfields.
The decision to move again into the petroleum province was '
a fateful one, virtually assuring a greater or lesser degree
of foreign intervention.
Tampico, six miles up the Panuco River from the open
Gulf, was the center of the Mexican petroleum industry.

As

such, it was one of the most strategically important cities
in the world in 1914.^®

Poreign-owned oil installations

40Robert E. Quirk, An Affair of Honor, Woodrow Wilson.
and the Occupation of Veracruz (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1964),
6-7 (hereafter cited as An Affair of Honor); George Marvin,
"The Jeopardy of Tampico," World's Work, XXXIV (August, 1917),
374; Thomas H. Bevan, "Oil Industry of the Tampico District'1
(Tampico: American Consular Service, 1912), 3-5, File ho. 5344,
Everette L. DeGolyer Papers, Southern Methodist University
Library; Everette L. DeGolyer, "The Petroleum Industry of
Mexico" (1920), File no. 5220, Ibid. DeGolyer was considered
by many of his colleagues to have been the oil industry's
foremost geologist. He first went to Mexico in 1909 to con
duct field studies of the petroleum province for Dr. C.
Willard Hayes, Chief Geologist for the United States Geologi
cal Survey. When Hayes resigned from government service in
1911 to become vice-president in charge of production for
Cowdray's Aguila Oil Company, he appointed DeGolyer chief
geologist for the firm. DeGolyer had already made a name for
himself as discoverer of the great Potrero del Llano No. 4,
one of the most prolific oil wells in the history of the in
dustry. As chief geologist he conducted a number of pioneer
studies of Mexican Gulf Coast geology.
In 1914, he moved to
New York, establishing himself as the most eminent independent
consulting geologist in the country.
In 1918, he went to
London to participate in the sale of the Aguila Oil Company
to the Royal Dutch-Shell interests, ultimately using his share
of the profits to organize the highly successful Amerada
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valued in the millions of dollars were strung out for miles
along the banks of the Panuco.

Tampico itself, which had

only recently evolved from a collection of "miserable mud
huts to a city of paved streets and American homes and a
semblance of sanitation," had a foreign population second
only to that of the capital .^

Its rapid growth was the

direct result of the phenomenal development of the Huasteca
oil industry.

In many respects it resembled the oil boom

towns of Louisiana, East Texas and Oklahoma; indeed most of
its American residents were recent arrivals from the Gulf
Coast or Midcontinent oil fields.

In short, Tampico in 1914

Petroleum Company. The oil industry owes a great debt to
DeGolyer for his early research in the field of geophysics
and more specifically for his application of the principles
of seismology to petroleum exploration.
DeGolyer was also
highly regarded in literary circles as resuscitator and
chairman of the board of The Saturday Review. During World
War II, he served on several government advisory boards and
headed missions to Mexico and the Middle East. At the time
of his death in 1956, DeGolyer was president of Amerada
Petroleum Company and a partner in the consulting firm of
DeGolyer and McNaughton. New York Times, December 15, 1956.
The DeGolyer Papers are an excellent source of information
on the technical aspects of the Mexican oil industry during
its formative years.
^*Quirk, An Affair of Honor, 6-7; Carleton Beals,
"The First Wild Oil Rush in Mexico," Current History, XXVII
(March, 1928), 855-856.
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was virtually an American colon y . ^

Yet despite that fact

the city was by no means inviolate.

For the next six years

it was among the most coveted prizes in a savage and san
g u i n a r y civil war, and on more than one occasion skirmishing
flared within the heart of the city.

American and European

oilmen, as well as their respective governments, were natu
rally alarmed by the prospect of fighting in and around
Tampico.

A stray round could spell disaster, sending millions

of dollars worth of property spiraling upward in smoke.

More

over, the lives of several thousand foreign workers and their
families were at stake.

Given the xenophobia of the revolu

tionaries, there could be no guarantee for their safety.

^Ibid.; Charles W. Hamilton, Early Day Oil Tales of
Mexico (Houston: Gulf Publishing Company, 1966), 23 et passim.
Hamilton joined Cowdray's Aguila Oil Company in 1912. For
the next three years he worked under the direction of E.L.
DeGolyer in both the Huasteca and Tehuantepec petroleum
provinces, becoming thoroughly familiar with the Mexican
oil industry. In 1916, he was appointed chief geologist
for the Mellon interests' Mexican Gulf Oil Company. The
following year, he became general agent for that company#
remaining in Mexico in that capacity until 1923. Hamilton
eventually retired in 1957 as a vice-president of Gulf Oil
Corporation. Although Hamilton's book is largely anecdotal,
it is the only published first-hand account of the great
Huasteca oil boom of the early twentieth century. It is
invaluable both in capturing the flavor of the times and
in bringing into focus the sometimes placid, sometimes
perilous day-to-day life of the American oilman in revo
lutionary Mexico.

Of still greater concern to the oilmen was the fate
of the oilfields themselves.

Lying just west of Tampico

and extending some eighty miles down the coastal plain to
Tuxpam, the principal oil-producing zone embraced some
21,000 square miles.43

From a mere 10,000 barrels of oil in

1901, production had steadily increased to almost 4,000,000
barrels in 1910.

The following year it rose sharply to over

12,000,000 and by 1913 it had climbed to some 26,000,000
barrels.44

Mexican production was exceeded only by that of

the United States and Russia, and it was generally believed
by oilmen that Mexico would soon surpass even those giants of
the industry.43

The peculiar structure of the oil-bearing

formations in the Huasteca fields created a unique situation;
great gushers that flowed thousands of barrels per day.46

43DeGolyer, "The Petroleum Industry of Mexico,"
DeGolyer Papers; Bevan, "Oil Industry of the Tampico District,
Ibid.; Everette L. DeGolyer, "Mexico as a Source of Petroleum
and Its Products" (1919), File no. 5220, Ibid. There were
two general regions in Mexico in which petroleum was producedthe important Tampico-Tuxpam region or Huasteca Veracruzana
along the Gulf coastal plain and the barely explored Tehuan
tepec Tabasco region. Virtually all commercial production
came from the so-called Huasteca fields which, in turn, were
divided into two general groups— those of the Panuco River
Valley (northern) and those of the Tuxpam district (southern).
Ibid.
44Ibid.
45Bevan, "Oil Industry of the Tampico District," Ibid.
46DeGolyer, "Mexico as a Source of Petroleum and Its
Products," Ibid.
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The legendary wells, Potrero del Llano No. 4 and Juan
Casiano No. 7, each produced more oil in a comparable period
than any single field along the American Gulf coast, while
production from the Gulf coast fields came from hundreds if
not thousands of wells.47

During the boom years of the Mexi~

can oil industry, from 1912 to 1925, virtually the entire
production of the country came from no more than a few hun
dred fantastically prolific wells.4®

Obviously, the

47Ibid.
4®As late as 1919 fewer than 1000 wells had been
drilled in all of Mexico, and many of those were located in
the relatively unproductive Tehuantepec-Tabasco region or
were dry holes. It was a rare year when more than 100 new
wells were drilled.
Ibid. In 1917, when Mexican production
first surpassed that of Russia and was exceeded only by that
of the United States, a mere 174 wells produced more than
55,000,000 barrels of oil. Merrill Rippy, "The Mexican Oil
Industry," Essays in Mexican History, ed. Thomas Cutner and
Carlos E. Castaneda (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1958),
253.
In 1910, the Aguila Oil Company brought in the great
Potrero del Llano No. 4. The well flowed unchecked for sixty
days, the oil moving down the Tuxpam River to the Gulf and
blanketing the beaches for hundreds of miles, north and south
of Tampico. When the gusher was finally controlled, it
gauged a flow of approximately 100,000 barrels of oil per day.
It continued to flow at a phenominal rate for eight years,
producing over 100,000,000 barrels of oil. DeGolyer, "The
Petroleum Industry of Mexico," DeGolyer Papers. In the same
year, Doheny's Huasteca Petroleum Company completed the Juan
Casiano No. 7 which flowed at 60,000 barrels per day and pro
duced over 100,000,000 barrels in less than a decade. Testi
mony of Edward L. Doheny, September 11, 1919, U.S., Senate
Committee on Foreign Relations, Investigation of Mexican
Affairs, 66 Cong., 2 sess. (2 vols.; Washington, D.C.:

70

destruction of a single producing well in the Huasteca could
be catastrophic.

49

Fire represented the gravest threat to the wells,
and the smoldering remains of the great Dos Bocas crater
served as a constant reminder to nervous field superinten
dents in Tampico.

It was almost inevitable that large-scale

military operations in the petroleum province would be at
tended by fire, and realization of the fact caused great
apprehension, not only among the oilmen, but among all who
understood the threat to the oilfields and were concerned for

Government Printing Office, 1920) , 242 (hereafter cited as
IMA). In 1916, the Doheny company brought in what was perhaps
the greatest well in the history of the industry, Cerro Azul
No. 4, which attained a flow in excess of 260,000 barrels
per day before capping.
Ibid.
^ I n 1908, the Pearson (Cowdray) interests com
pleted San Diego No. 3 or Dos Bocas as it came to be known.
The extreme subsurface pressure opened fissures in the ground
around the well, emitting gas and oil which was immediately
ignited by sparks from the boilers.
"Soon the hole began
to crater - drilling rig, derrick, pumps and boilers, all
disappeared.
In spite of anything a man could do an oil field
was lost. Instead of another Spindletop there was only an
ever enlarging crater spewing forth hot salt water, gobs of
asphalt and sulphurous vapors...." Some four years later,
the crater had grown to some forty acres in area and the hot
water and vapors had destroyed all life for some distance around it. Hamilton, Early Day Oil Tales of Mexico, 74-75.
San Diego No. 3 was believed by one expert to have been even
larger than Cerro Azul No. 4. DeGolyer, "The Petroleum In
dustry of Mexico," DeGolyer Papers. The disaster at Dos
Bocas destroyed not only San Diego No. 3 but the underlying
reservoir as well. An entire oilfield was thus destroyed be
fore it could ever be brought into commercial production. Hun
dreds of millions of dollars worth of oil was lost.
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the future welfare of the Mexican p e o p l e . it was generally
conceded that fighting in the vicinity of the oil camps would
force evacuation of the crews and temporary abandonment of the
wells.

That prospect, too, aroused considerable anxiety be

cause of still another peculiarity of the Huasteca fields:
unusually high subsurface pressures.

Unlike most wells in

the United States and in other producing zones of the world,
those of the Huasteca required constant attention.

In some

instances subsurface pressures were so great that new wells
could not be shut in, and partial choking could be effected
only at great risk of explosion, fire, and the subsequent
cratering and destruction of the well.

Under these circum

stances a broken flow line, a malfunctioning pump or valve,
or even the slightest spark might set off an uncontrollable
conflagration, devastating the countryside for miles around.

Taxation on the production and exportation of crude
oil and its by-products was by the late teens the single
largest source of revenue for the Mexican Government. Cum
berland, Mexico, 249. Rapid reconstruction of the republic
during the post-war period was contingent largely upon main
taining a high rate of production in the Huasteca oilfields.
Constitutionalist leaders were certainly aware of the value
of the oilfields and of the important role the oil industry
would play in reconstruction. Yet initially they apparently
failed to comprehend the seriousness of the threat to the
industry posed by the Huasteca campaign. The fact that the
oilfields survived the civil war is little short of miracu
lous. They did so in spite of the Constitutionalists.
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Again, the Dos Bocas disaster and several less spectacular
fires stood as grim evidence of the dangers inherent in
inattentiveness and careless production practices.
With so much at stake —
strategic considerations —
national powder keg.

in lives, in money, and in

the Huasteca was truly an inter

As the Constitutionalists again ap

proached Tampico, tension mounted among both Huertista de
fenders and the foreign naval forces stationed in the road
stead to safeguard the lives and interests of their respective
nationals.

On April 9, in this strained atmosphere, a

legitimate misunderstanding between a Federal officer and a
group of American sailors led to the arrest and brief de
tention of the sailors and, ultimately, to a serious con
frontation between the United States and the Huerta regime.
Although the prisoners were speedily released and an apology
conveyed to Admiral Henry T. Mayo, commander of American
naval units off Tampico, the matter did not end there.

Mayo

informed General Ignacio Morelos Zaragoza, military governor
of the State of Tamaulipas, that he expected the court martial
of the arresting officer, a written apology from the General,
and a twenty-one-gun salute to the American flag.

The Mexican
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commander was given twenty-four hours to comply with Mayo's
demands. ^
At the suggestion of Charge d*Affaires Nelson O'Shaughnessy, Huerta himself sent a formal apology to Bryan and pro
mised to court martial the officer in question.

He refused,

however, to accede to Mayo's demand for a salute, requesting
instead that it be rescinded.^2

But Bryan, despite Daniels'

hesitancy, chose to back the Admiral.

His sole concession to

Huerta was an extension of the deadline.

It was Bryan's

belief that the dictator was deliberately testing the Adminis
tration and that the incident at Tampico should be used to
impress upon the General the error of his ways.

Moreover,

the opportunity was at hand to demonstrate to Huerta the de
termination of the United States to force his resignation,
and Bryan was reluctant to let it pass.

Accordingly, when

5^*Quirk, An Affair of Honor, 20-26; Cline, The United
States and Mexico, 157. A strongly nationalistic Mexican
interpretation of the Tampico incident is set forth in
Roberto Blanco Moheno, Cronica de la Revolucion Mexicana
(13th ed.; 2 vols.; Mexico City: Libro Mex, 1965), I, 182183.
52

Daniels, The Wilson Era; Years of Peace, 187.
Huerta's strength rested largely upon his recently-acquired
reputation as the defender of Mexican sovereignty. He dared
not imperil that reputation by submitting to Mayo's demand
for a salute to the American flag. Cline, The United States
and Mexico, 156.
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the Secretary informed Wilson of developments at Tampico, he
strongly endorsed Mayo's action.
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While Mexican-American tension mounted over Huerta's
procrastination, two lesser incidents, the arrest of an
American sailor at Veracruz and the unaccountable disruption
of communications between Washington and Mexico City, aggra
vated the situation.

Coming so close together on the heels

of the affront at Tampico, these incidents appeared to confirm
Bryan's suspicions of a plot to humiliate and discredit the
United States.

54

Still, Link suggests, the crisis might have

passed as suddenly as it had arisen had not the President
been "seeking a pretext at this precise moment for launching
55
large-scale military operations against Huerta."

And, in

deed, in the subsequent Blythe interview, Wilson referred to
the period immediately before intervention as the "psycho
logical moment."

His meaning was clear.

There had been "no

great disaster like the sinking of the Maine,” he explained
to Blythe, "but there was an adequate reason for our action
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Daniels, The Wilson Era:

Years of Peace, 189.
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Cline, The United States and Mexico, 156; Baker,
Woodrow Wilson, XV, 317.
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Link, Wilson;

The New Freedom, 395.
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in this culminating insult in a series of insults to our
country and our flag."

56

Wilson refused to act decisively, however, until he
could confer with John Lind, recently returned from Mexico.
Lind, by the spring of 1914, had become a strong proponent
of armed intervention and did nothing to counter the President's own drift in that direction.
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Consequently, on

April 14, after discussing the Tampico crisis first with Lind
and then with the Cabinet, Wilson decided to make a strong
naval demonstration against Huerta.
Gulf ports might follow.

A blockade of Mexican

The entire Atlantic fleet, including

seven battleships and a regiment of marines, was ordered to
Mexican waters to join the units already off Tampico and
Veracruz.

58

Brushing aside the navy's warning that such a

concentration might provoke armed resistance, Wilson persisted
in his plan to force a showdown with Huerta.^9

The following

^6Blythe, "Mexico: The Record of a Conversation with
President Wilson," Saturday Evening Post, 71. On the other
hand, Daniels records that shortly after the President ap
proved Bryan's reply to Huerta he expressed strong doubt as
to the rectitude of his course. Daniels had "never seen the
President so disturbed." The thought that he might be the
"cause of the loss of lives of many young men" weighed
heavily on his mind. Daniels, The Wilson Era: Years of Peace,
189.
57

Cline, The United States and Mexico, 157.

58Baker, Woodrow Wilson, IV, 319.
59ciine, The United States and Mexico, 157

76
day he conferred with leading members of the congressional
committees on foreign affairs, informing them of the steps
already taken in warning that it might soon become necessary
to use the army and navy to settle the Tampico dispute.

If

Huerta continued to resist Washington's demands, he disclosed,
American forces would be ordered to seize Tampico and Veracruz
and blockade both coasts of Mexico.

Wilson was confident

that these operations could be executed without a declaration
of war.

Still, he intended to seek congressional approval

before taking such bold action.60
Response to the President's proposal was favorable.
Republican Senator Henry Cabot Lodge, powerful chairman of
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, assured Wilson that
under the circumstances there was no need for congressional
approval.

The President, he declared, had the power to seize

Tampico if such a step appeared necessary to protect American
lives and property.

Most of his colleagues concurred.61

Jingoistic sentiment in Congress was running high.

Dis-

cussing the meeting with reporters. Democratic Senator William
E. Chilton of West Virginia expressed congressional consensus

6^New York Times. April 16, 1914; Baker, Woodrow Wilson,
IV, 320.
61Ibid.
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at the moment: "I'd make them salute the flag if we had to
blow up the whole place."62

"They were hot," Daniels recalls,

"ready to pass any law desired."62
But Wilson did not want war.

He still believed that

Huerta could be bluffed if the show of force was sufficient.
Naval commanders were thus ordered to avoid hostilities.64
Meanwhile, as the fleet steamed toward Mexican waters, a
series of "ridiculous exchanges" passed between Wilson and
Huerta.65

Growing increasingly impatient, the President

continued to press for immediate fulfillment of the American
demand.

But Huerta, his position in the capital growing

shakier by the day, dared not submit.

By the 18th, with the

fleet due off Tampico the following morning, Wilson decided
that he could wait no longer.

Tapping out a new ultimatum

on his own typewriter, the President gave Huerta one more day
to fire the salute.

If the

General refused, Wilson would go

before Congress and initiate "such action as may be necessary

62New York Times, April 15, 1914.
63Daniels, The Wilson Era: Years of Peace, 190.
64Cline, The United States and Mexico, 157.
65Link, Wilson: The New Freedom, 397.
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to enforce the respect due the national's flag."

6fi

Huerta

continued to stall, and the deadline passed.
The General himself had taught Wilson the folly of
idle threats.

Having finally learned his lesson at the cost

of considerable humiliation, the President moved at once to
follow up his ultimatum with action instead of words.

Going

before a joint session of Congress on the afternoon of the
20th, he reviewed the development of the Tampico crisis and
requested congressional approval of a draft resolution em
powering him to use the armed forces against Huerta to vindi
cate "the dignity of the United States."®^

At the same time

he stressed that there would be no war with Mexico; the United
States was at odds with the dictator, not with the Mexican
people.

While a majority of both Congress and the general

public agreed wholeheartedly with Wilson that strong action
against the de facto government was indeed warranted, many
of them questioned the grounds for such action as set forth
£O
in his address.
The President was right, they believed, but
for the wrong reasons.

66Bryan to O'Shaughnessy, April 18, 1914, Foreign
Relations, 1914, 468.
67uew York Times, April 21, 1914. Already there was
talk in Washington of sending American marines or regular army
troops to Mexico City to evacuate the American colony therein.
Ibid., April 20 and 21, 1914.
**®Baker, Woodrow Wilson, IV, 327.
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Lodge, whose earlier advocacy of bold presidential
action was perhaps instrumental in committing Wilson to his
present course, now led the opposition to the President's
resolution.

The Senator was displeased with the wording of

both the speech and the resolution which he criticized as
"weak and insufficient."

For the United States to open

hostilities without a declaration of war seemed highly irregu
lar to Lodge, and for the Administration to go to such lengths
against one man was simply ludicrous.

Before he would approve

the resolution, the Senator declared, all references to Huerta
as the cause for intervention would have to be deleted and
the true causes, the murder of American citizens and the de
struction of American property, inserted instead.69

69

Wilson,

Henry Cabot Lodge, The Senate and the League of
Nations (New York: Charles Scribners' sons, 1925), 13-14.
Lodge received strong support from the venerable Elihu Root
who clearly and concisely stated the classic interventionist
position.
"If there were nothing else but the incident re
ferred to in the resolution," Root queried, "would the Ameri
can government have thought for a moment of treating this
poor, weak country in this peremptory way?" Hardly so, he
believed. On the other hand, lying behind the insult to the
flag were the real reasons for intervention: "years of violence
and anarchy in Mexico... hundreds of American lives sacrificed,
millions of American property destroyed, and thousands of
Americans reduced to poverty to-day through the destruction
of their property.... It is a justification lying not in
Victoriano Huerta or in his conduct alone, but in the uni
versal condition of affairs in Mexico." U.S., Congressional
Record, Containing the Debates and Proceedings, 63 Cong.,
2 sess., 1914, LI, 6986-6987 (hereafter cited as Cong. Rec.?.
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however, had deliberately refrained from including a specific
bill of particulars for fear of inflaming public opinion and
arousing demands for just such action as the Senator sought.^
Thus an impasse developed at the very time when speed was of
the essence.

Unknown to Lodge, important new developments in

Mexico, word of which had reached Washington shortly before
the President addressed Congress, threatened to completely
frustrate Administration plans for forcing Huerta*s retire
ment.

Only immediate American intervention could salvage

those plans.

But Wilson's resolution, although it passed the

House the same day, was stopped cold in the Senate.

There

it was delayed, amended, and finally approved only after Ameri
can marines had gone ashore at Veracruz.

Lodge's opposition

had forced the President to act alone and, rightly or wrongly,
it was upon Wilson alone that the onus of Veracruz descended.

?°Baker, Woodrow Wilson, IV, 327. Doubtless the Presi
dent also realized that a list of wrongs inflicted upon Ameri
cans and other foreigners in Mexico would clearly indicate
that the great majority of such offenses was committed not by
Huertistas but by one or the other of the several revolutionary
factions, and that the most grievous offenders were to be found
among the ranks of the very faction that the Administration
now so enthusiastically supported. Indeed, it might well have
been argued on practical as opposed to moral grounds that the
United States should have intervened on behalf of Huerta
rather than the Constitutionalists. The logic of that argu
ment, from the point of view of the foreign investor or the
foreign resident in Mexico, was indisputable and became in
creasingly apparent after the Constitutionalist victory.
Doubtless it occurred many times to Administration officials
in their subsequent relations with the revolutionary government.
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On the morning of the 20th the President had learned
that in the absence of a declaration of war his projected
naval blockade of Mexican ports would not affect neutral
shipping.

At the same time he was informed that Huerta had

just received a large shipment of arms from Europe and that
a second still larger shipment was expected to arrive at Vera
cruz almost any day aboard the German steamer Ypiranga.
Fearing that the arms might again turn the tide of battle in
favor of the General, Wilson abandoned his original plan for
a naval demonstration and blockade and began to consider ways
to prevent the Ypiranga1s cargo from reaching its destination.
Upon delivering his message to Congress, the President
hurried to the White House to join Lind, the Secretaries of
State, War and the Navy, and high-ranking army and navy
officers in drafting a new plan of operations.

Late in the

evening the conferees reached agreement on a "comprehensive
plan" for the occupation of Tampico and Veracruz, the possible
dispatch of an expedition from Veracruz to the Mexican capital,
and a blockade of both coasts of the republic.

The new scheme,

considerably bolder than Wilson's original plan to force

71

Cline, The United States and Mexico, 158.
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Huerta's submission, was to go into effect as soon as the
Atlantic fleet reached Mexican waters.72
Very likely the conferees were influenced both by
word of deteriorating conditions in the Huasteca and by the
fact that the United States had already intervened in that
province to a limited degree.

Fighting between Federal troops

and Constitutionalists in and around Tampico posed a serious
threat to its extensive storage and refining facilities and
had provoked repeated appeals for relief from the oilmen.
Already, on April 11, Henry Clay Pierce had complained to
Bryan that Federal gunboats had inexplicably bombarded the
Pierce Oil Company refinery.

The Secretary had responded by

ordering Mayo to obtain a cease-fire, but Huerta denounced
the order as a violation of Mexican sovereignty and the Con
stitutionalists continued to probe the city's defenses.73
Thus the threat to the oil industry remained.

Some of the

conferees, particularly Garrison, viewed that threat as a
matter of the gravest concern and urged the occupation of
Tampico.^

Daniels recounts that the President's military

72Link, Wilson: The New Freedom, 399.
73Baker, Woodrow Wilson, IV, 318; Quirk, An Affair
of Honor, 7-19.
74

Daniels, The Wilson Era: Years of Peace, 192.

83
advisors wanted to go still further.

They sought a formal

declaration of war against Mexico and, according to the Sec
retary, hoped to "annex all the country to Panama to the
domain of the United States."

Wilson, however, was interested

only in toppling Huerta, not in the acquisition of territory
*JC

or the defense of property rights.

His will prevailed.

Early the following morning, Bryan was awakened by
word from Veracruz that the Ypiranga had arrived off the bar
and was e j e c t e d to enter the harbor later in the day.

In

a series of urgent pre-dawn telephone conversations, Wilson,
Bryan, Daniels, and Garrison agreed that the plan completed
only a few hours earlier must be set aside for the time being
and immediate steps taken to prevent the arms shipment from
reaching Huertista forces.

In the absence of a formal blockade,

however, seizure of the Ypiranga would constitute a violation
of international law and could conceivably lead to serious
complications with Germany.7** Ultimately, at Daniels' sug
gestion, it was decided to take the custom house at Veracruz
and impound the arms as they were unloaded.

At first Wilson

hesitated, but when Daniels warned that the arms might well
be turned against American soldiers in the near future, the

75Ibid.

76Link, Wilson; The New Freedom, 399

84
President relented.77

Neither he nor his civilian advisors

anticipated armed resistance from the Huertista garrison,
assuming that it would be intimidated by the impressive dis
play of military might standing off the bar.78

Shortly be

fore dawn, Daniels wired the fateful order to Admiral Fletcher:
"Seize custom house.

Do not permit war supplies to be de-

livered to Huerta government or to any other party."

7Q

In

the excitement of the moment a serious oversight was committed—
no one thought to inform Carranza.
Fletcher immediately contacted the American Consul at
Veracruz, William W. Canada, requesting that he confer with
the Huertista conmander, General Gustavo Maass, and make arrange
ments for peaceful transfer of the custom house and wharves
to American forces.

With the way assumed to be clear, several

hundred marines and blue-jackets landed and quickly took pos
session of the waterfront.

The initial critical phase of

the operation had passed without incident.

Shortly before

noon, however, Mexican soldiers and civilians opened fire on
the landing party and sporadic firing continued well into the

77Daniels, The Wilson Era: Years of Peace, 19 3.
?®Quirk, An Affair of Honor, 77; Cline, The United
States and Mexico, 159.
78New York Times, April 22, 1914.
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night.

Early the following morning Fletcher was reenforced

by the main body of the Atlantic fleet under Admiral Charles
J. Badger.

Some three thousand men went ashore and in a

daylong battle broke Mexican resistance and occupied the
city.80
Mexican reaction was violent.

Anti-American demon

strations flared throughout the republic.

On the 22nd

Huerta severed relations with the United States and exhorted
all factions to join in repelling the invader.

Along the

tense northern border both sides prepared for war.

And,

indeed, for several days after the occupation of Veracruz,
war between the United States and a united Mexican people
appeared a certainty.8^

Wilson, who was "profoundly un

nerved" by news of the bloodshed at Veracruz, had blundered
badly and knew it.®^

Moreover, in failed to give Carranza

8°Ibid.; Quirk, An Affair of Honor, 85-102; Silva
Herzog, Breve Historia, II, 74-75. The Ypiranga entered the
inner harbor at Veracruz on April 23 but did not discharge
its cargo of arms. Ultimately, after a lengthy circuitous
voyage, it delivered its cargo to Huertista officials at
Puerta Mexico, south of Veracruz. Although the arms eventu
ally reached Mexico City, they arrived too late to save
Huerta. Quirk, An Affair of Honor, 151-152.
81

Link, Wilsons The Mew Freedom, 400. See, for
example, New York Times, April 23, 24, 25, and 26, 1914.
8^Link, Wilsons The New Freedom, 402
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advance notice of the landing, he had aroused in Constitu
tionalist leaders a deep and lasting suspicion of American
motives.

With regard to Carranza and several of the more

important sub-chiefs, the damage appears to have been irre
parable.

Certainly relations between Washington and the

dominant Carrancista wing of the Constitutionalist movement
were never again the same.**-*
Both at home and abroad the seizure of Veracruz
proved a severe embarrassment to the President.

Through

his address to Congress and the unfortunate wording of the
joint resolution, Wilson had misrepresented his motives, not
only to the legislators, but to the American people and the
world-at-large.

That the President should so overreact to

so slight a provocation seemed in retrospect absurd, not

B^When American forces entered Mexico in pursuit of
Pancho Villa early in 1916 no amount of reassurance by Wilson
Administration officials could allay Carranza's fears that
the President had acquisitive designs on northern Mexico.
Daniels, The Wilson Era; Years of Peace. 202. A similar ob
sessional fear of American annexation was manifested by
Candido Aguilar, Constitutionalist commander in the Huasteca
and later governor of the State of Veracruz and minister of
foreign affairs. The fact that the greater part of the oil
fields fell under Aguilar's jurisdiction greatly exacerbated
the distrust and animosity between the Constitutionalists
and the oilmen. Aguilar, however, had some grounds for his
fears. Joaquin Meade, La Huasteca Veracruzana (2 vols.;
Mexico City: Editorial Citlaltepetl, 1962), IX, 146-147 and
168-169.
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only to detached observers, but to many patriotic Americans
as well.**4

A barrage of criticism, both foreign and domestic,

was levelled at the Administration.

Still more disturbing

to Wilson, however, was the fact that the situation in Mexico
was now completely beyond his control.

He wanted desperately

to disengage, but with the outbreak of hostilities a definite
possibility he dared not withdraw from Veracruz.

Possession

of Mexico's major port was the one trump card in his hand
and he could ill afford to discard it.
Consequently, on April 23, the Fifth Brigade com
manded by General Frederick N. Funston sailed from Galveston
to relieve the marines at Veracruz.

At the same time, addi

tional army units were sent to the border and the National
Guard was alerted for call-up in the event of war.**^

Still,

the more determined interventionists were disappointed,
those in the Administration urging the President to retain
the initiative and impose a settlement of the Mexican

84Baker, Woodrow Wilson. XV, 332; Link, Woodrow
Wilson and the Progressive Bra, 124-125; Link, Wilson;
The New Freedom, 403-404.
B5New York Times, April 24, 1914
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problem.
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Garrison, who anticipated a massacre of American

citizens in Mexico City, pressed Wilson to authorize an
expedition to the capital at once.

The Secretary was no

less concerned over the fate of the oilfields, recommending
execution of the earlier plan to seize Tampico and occupy
the petroleum province.
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However, both Bryan and Daniels

strongly opposed further military operations against Huerta
and so advised the President.

Abhoring bloodshed and deeply

grieved by the deaths at Veracruz, Wilson had no stomach
for further fighting.

Garrison's plans and other proposals

for new offensive action against Huerta were rejected.

In

stead, the President retreated from his earlier belligerent
stance, seeking to preclude a second round of hostilities
O O

through the timely mediation of Argentina, Brazil and Chile.00
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°°Quirk states that many Americans believed or hoped
that Funston's 3000 soldiers "represented but a part of a
larger expeditionary force which would pacify Mexico. Among
these was their commander Frederick Funston; his chief.
Secretary of War Garrison; the Republicans in the United
States; most of the American newspapers; and abroad, the
American colony in Mexico and the government of Great Britain,
which was disturbed because of the mistreatment of British
nationals by revolutionaries such as Villa." Quirk, An
Affair of Honor, 123*
8^Link, Wilson; The New Freedom, 401.
88Ibid., 401-402
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III.
Carranza's reaction to the seizure of Veracruz posed
a grave threat to Wilson's plans for American participation
in the reconstruction of Mexico as well as to future MexicanAmerican amity in general.

On April 22, while fighting still

ranged in the streets of Veracruz, the First Chief had been
informed by an Administration spokesman that the United
States had no intention of "intervening” in Mexico.

The

Veracruz expedition, he was assured, was aimed solely at
QQ
Huerta and should not be considered "intervention."0^ Al
ready annoyed by the President's meddling in Mexican affairs
and increasingly suspicious of his motives, Carranza was
enraged by Wilson's semantic sophistry.

Rejecting Washington's

explanation, he insisted upon the immediate withdrawal of
American forces from Veracruz.

A blunt threat of war accom-

QQ

panied his demand.
Meanwhile, along the border, an explosive situation
had developed.

It was with the greatest difficulty that

®^Bryan to Carothers, April 21, 1914, Foreign Rela
tions, 1914. 480. Cline notes that Wilson had his own special
definition of "intervention.” To the President it implied
the establishment of a protectorate and the "re-arrangement
and control of Mexico's internal affairs.” Wilson did not
consider the dispatch of troops into Mexico as either "inter
vention” or "war" once he was convinced that the moral right
was on his side. Cline, The United States and Mexico, 182.
90Carranza to Bryan, April 22, 1914, Foreign Relations,
1914. 483-484.

cooler heads on both sides of the line prevented the out
break of hostilities.

At the height of the crisis, Pancho

Villa stepped forward in the implausible role of peacemaker.
For some time villa had schemed to depose Carranza and assume
control of the revolutionary movement in his own right.®1
Well aware of the necessity for Washington's support, he
was anxious to cultivate the good will of the man in the
White

House.®^

Veracruz showed him the way.

Upon receiving

word of the landing. Villa hastened to Juarez to confer with
George C. Carothers, Wilson's personal representative in
northern Mexico.

Professing his approval of the President's

decision to occupy Veracruz, Carranza's rival promised to
use his influence to head off an open break between Washington
and the Constitutionalists.93
Commanding the loyalty of the majority of the troops
in the revolutionary armies. Villa was in a position to make

®1Quirk, The Mexican Revolution. 26-27; Link, Woodrow
Wilson and the Progressive Era. 128.
®2Link, Wilson: The Hew Freedom, 403; Clarence C.
Clendenen, The United States and Pancho Villa:
a Study in
Unconventional Diplomacy (Ithaca: Cornell University Press,
1961), 120 (hereafter cited as The U. S. and Villa).
®3Carothers to Bryan, April 23, 1914, Foreign
Relations, 1914. 485.
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good his pledge.

His disaffection simultaneously cut the

ground from beneath Carranza and greatly strengthened the
President's hand.

It gave Wilson room to maneuver, enabling

him to retreat with a semblance of grace from an embarrassing
and potentially disastrous cul-de-sac.

At the same time,

however, it caused him to reassess revolutionary leadership
and on the basis of that erroneous estimate to embark upon
still another ill-fated course in his pursuit of an accep
table Mexican settlement.

Wilson was grateful to Villa and

deeply impressed with his apparent enthusiasm to work with
the United States.

For some time thereafter, despite over

whelming evidence to the contrary, the President clung to
the fantasy that Villa was a true patriot, an eminently
reasonable man with whom he might cooperate closely in the re
habilitation of the Mexican nation.94

But Wilson was wrong,

and in the long run his misjudgement of Villa proved perhaps
still more regrettable than the decision to intervene at
Veracruz.
On April 24, with war still a distinct possibility,
diplomatic representatives of Argentina, Brazil, and Chile

94Link, Woodrow Wilson and the Progressive Era, 129.
Bryan, too, was completely taken in, as evidenced by his
description of Villa as a "high-minded and noble citizen."
Quirk, An Affair of Honor, 117.
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offered to mediate the differences between the United States
and Mexico.

Wilson readily accepted, and little urging was

required to win Huerta's acquiescence as well.

95

Still, an

effective and lasting settlement of the Mexican question de
pended upon the willingness of the Constitutionalists to
accept mediation.

By the end of April, however, Carranza

was on the verge of total military victory and was not disposed
to settle for less.

While acknowledging mediation "in prin

ciple," the First Chief refused to send delegates to a con
ference on Mexican-American differences and rejected the
mediators' plea for an armistice.

Foreigners had no business

meddling in Mexican affairs, he declared.

96

On May 19, shortly before the talks began at Niagara
Falls, Ontario, Carranza reiterated his intention to subdue
the republic by force of arms and to proceed with its reconstruction without interference from abroad.
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Wilson had

been warned, but despite successively stronger protests
against his persistent intervention in Mexican affairs, he

95Cline, The United States and Mexico, 161.
96
"Carranza to the Mediators, May 3, 1914, Foreign
Relations, 1914, 518-519.
97New York Times, May 20, 1914.

could not turn his back on the Revolution.

With the passing

of the Veracruz crisis he had regained his self-assurance,
and by the time the conference opened he was as determined
as ever to exert his personal influence over the movement.
Consequently, he ignored Carranza's statement and proceeded
to work through his representatives at the conference for a
settlement assuring maximum American influence in post-war
Mexico.® ®

Link, Wilson: The New Freedom, 409-411. On June 16,
as the conference was drawing to a close, Carrancista agents
Luis Cabrera and Rafael Zubaran Capmany met with the President*
representatives in Buffalo, New York.
In no uncertain terms
they spelled out the Constitutionalist position with regard
to the United States and the Mexican Revolution. The Revolu
tion was an exclusively Mexican affair and so it would remain;
under no circumstances would it be permitted to fall under
American influence. Foreign interference in the War Between
the States would have been intolerable to the American people
in 1861, Cabrera reminded Wilson's envoys, and so it was to
the Mexican people in 1914.
Ibid., 412. The Buffalo meeting
was a turning point. Prior to it, relations between Washing
ton and the Constitutionalists, while hardly cordial, were
relatively free from rancor. But following the seizure of
Veracruz, Carranza had intensified his efforts to discourage
further American meddling in Mexican affairs. Three times in
less than two months he had strongly appealed to Wilson to
exercise restraint and to respect the sovereignty of the
Mexican Nation. Dismissing those remonstrances, the Presi
dent continued to pursue his plans for controlling the revo
lutionary movement.
The failure of the Buffalo talks to stay
his hand marked the beginning of a rapid deterioration of re
lations between the United States and the dominant Carrancista
wing of the Constitutionalist movement. When the First Chief
proved intractable, Wilson turned against him and sought to
destroy him much as he had earlier destroyed Huerta. The Ad
ministration backed first one rival and then another. When

94
Wilson was confident that sooner or later a satis
factory arrangement with the Constitutionalists would be
reached, one which would allow him to play an important
role in determining the future course of the Revolution.
For the moment, however, his efforts were concentrated on
the elimination of Huerta.

Mediation appeared to offer an

effective and far safer means to that end than did further
armed intervention.

But the President "had no intention of

submitting to a genuine mediation.""

Instead, he pressed

mediators to obtain Huerta's resignation and to effect the
organization of a provisional government composed entirely
of Constitutionalists.

In due course, he hoped, a permanent

revolutionary government would be chosen, and it, in turn,
would execute the necessary reforms.
The talks at Niagara Falls between the ABC mediators,
Huerta's agents, and Wilson's "unofficial" representatives

Villa faltered, Wilson turned to Alvaro Obregon; and when
Obregon remained loyal to his chief the President searched
for still another catspaw. Eventually Wilson resigned him
self to the First Chief's preeminence and ceased opposing
him. However, a genuine rapprochement between Washington
and Mexico City was out of the question for some time there
after.
"ibid., 407

iOOibid.

were little more than a “staged show" conducted from the
White H o u s e . T h e

real issuer the one which brought

Huerta to the conference table, was the American occupation
of Veracruz.

Yet that issue was studiously ignored.

In

stead, at Wilson's behest, the conferees focused their at
tention on the "internal problems" of the republic, jL.e.,
the Huerta dictatorship.

By the end of June agreement had

been reached on a draft protocol providing for the General's
resignation and for the organization of a provisional govern
ment.

There was no assurance, however, that the new regime

would be controlled by the Constitutionalists, and for that
reason the President forbade his representatives to sign
the document.
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The mediation attempt. Quirk concludes,

"resembled nothing so much as an elaborate quadrille from
Alice in Wonderland in which nothing anyone did or said made
sense to anyone else . . . .

Given the extreme intransigence

on all sides, the mediation had little chance of

succ e s s . " ' * ' 0 '^

Meanwhile, as the talks dragged on, Carranza's
forces pushed slowly southward toward the capital.

Early

in May they had moved into the oilfields, and on the 14th

^°^Quirk, An Affair of Honor, 118; Cline, The United
States and Mexico, 161.
•L02Ibid.

*02Quirk, An Affair of Honor, 118.

Tampico itself had been occupied following evacuation of the
Federal garrison.

Thereafter, Huerta's days were numbered.

To a degree, then, mediation had served its purpose, at
least from Wilson's point of view.

As a "propaganda device,"

Cline observes, it "seemingly showed the world that Wilson
was willing to listen to reason and to consult Latin America."
In reality, of course, he was willing to do neither.^-04

Still

more important, the talks served as a smokescreen obscuring
the fact that American forces continued to occupy Veracruz
in flagrant violation of Mexican sovereignty.

So long as

they remained, Huerta was cut off from Europe.
By early July the end was in sight.

Loss of the

principal Gulf ports denied the dictatorship the means of
resupply from abroad.

It also deprived the regime of customs

receipts and the vital oil revenues of Tampico and Tuxpan.
Huerta could neither purchase nor receive munitions, nor
could he pay his restive troops.

The General was finished.

On July 15 he submitted his resignation to Congress, made his
way to Puerto Mexico, and boarded the Ypiranga for exile in
France.

In the capital Congress hurriedly organized a new

*04Cline, The United States and Mexico, 162.

provisional government.

A Constitutionalist sympathizer,

former Chief Justice Francisco Carbajal, was appointed
provisional chief-of-state.

Chapter 3

THE CONTEST OVER OIL

I.
When American forces occupied Veracruz in the spring
of 1914, the position of the foreign investor in Mexico,
particularly that of the American investor, changed radically.
In one stroke Woodrow Wilson not only doomed the Huerta re
gime, unquestionably solicitious of foreign enterprise in
Mexico, but greatly intensified the hostility of the Mexican
people toward the United States and assured the ultimate
triumph of a political faction firmly committed to ejection
of the foreigner and confiscation of his investments.^-

Testimony of William F. Buckley, December 6, 1919,
IMA, 767-843. Buckley, a Texan, had gone to Mexico in 1908,
and was a resident of Mexico City at the time of his appear
ance before the subcommittee. An attorney by profession, he
had practiced law in the republic for some time before turning
to speculation in real estate and oil leases. His holdings
in Mexico he valued at several hundred thousand dollars.
Buckley had been closely associated with the Huerta regime
and had served as counsel to the Mexican delegation at the
Niagara Conference of May-June, 1914.
Roman Catholic,
fluent in Spanish and widely acquainted with conservative
and revolutionary leaders alike, he had a grasp of Mexican
affairs perhaps unsurpassed among foreigners in the republic.
Few were better qualified to assess the course of events in
98

99
Almost immediately sharp differences arose between the vic
torious Constitutionalists and American firms operating in
the republic.

Perhaps most important was the bitter and pro

longed contest which grew out of the revolutionary govern
ment's attempts to obtain a larger share of oil industry
profits.

The mutual suspicion and antagonism engendered by

Mexico in the decade following the Madero revolution.
Although Buckley disagreed strongly with the position of
the Wilson Administration on Mexico, he opposed armed
intervention and was not associated with any of the several
interventionist groups then active in the United States.
Discussing the anti-Americanism of the Constitu
tionalists, Buckley recalled a conversation with Carranza's
principal advisor in the spring of 1914 "in which Mr. Cabrera
very frankly told me that the menace of the American in
Mexico must be removed and that the only way to do this
was to drive him out of the country and take his property.”
Again, in October, 1914, speaking at a banquet given in
honor of the First Chief at Veracruz, Cabrera had "dilated
on the aims of the revolution and stated that the Constitu
tionalists were going to confiscate American property and
take over American oil wells . . .
Ibid., 796-797.
Buckley's testimony was corroborated by that of
William W. Canada, American consul at Veracruz from 1897
to 1918. Canada had attended the aforementioned banquet
in the company of several other foreign consuls. He had
been struck by the vehemence of Cabrera's words. While
the bitterest diatribe had been aimed at Canada, similar
remarks were addressed to the British and Cuban consuls.
Cabrera professed to be speaking for the Carrancista faction
generally.
In retrospect, Canada observed, Cabrera's
threats had been "carried out . .
and then some, I think."
Testimony of William W. Canada, April 30, 1920, Ibid.,
2424-2425.
See also Testimony of Charles E. Jones, May 17
and 18, 1920, Ibid., 2889-3201, especially 2910-2929.
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this running battle led rather shortly to a more serious
struggle for ultimate control of the industry itself.
all involved the stakes were very high.

For

9

At least one revolutionary leader was prepared to
nationalize the industry as early as 1913.

Candido Aguilar,

commander of the first Constitutionalist forces to penetrate

2
As early as 1914, when the industry was still in
its developmental stage, capital investment in the produc
tion of petroleum was estimated at $175,000,000. Clarence
A. Miller to Bryan, July 2, 1914, U. S., Department of State,
Records of the Department of State Relating to the Internal
Affairs of Mexico, 1910-1929 (National Archives Microfilm
Publication M-274)
File no. 812.6363/124 (hereafter cited
as SDR 812.00). Collapse of the Russian oil industry in the
First World War, accompanied by increased use of oil-fueled
vessels for both commercial and military purposes, "created
a tremendous demand during the war for heavier grades of
crude oil, such as those produced in Mexico." Consequently,
the Mexican industry "underwent its greatest expansion during
and immediately following the war ." Eugene Holman,
"American Oil Companies in Foreign Petroleum Operations,"
Our Oil Resources, ed., Leonard M. Fanning (New York: McGrawHill Book Company, 1950, 38. In 1914, American firms accounted
for 58% of Mexican production; by 1924, they were producing
slightly over 80% of the total.
Ibid., 39. By the latter
year, American investment in the industry was estimated at
$398,200,000.
Rippy, "The Mexican Oil Industry," Essays in
Mexican History, 256. In 1928, after seven straight years
of steadily declining production, the Mexican Department of
Commerce and Industry estimated total investment in the Mexi
can oil industry at $1,050,535,000: American ($606,043,000),
British ($354,776,000), Dutch ($71,191,000), Mexican ($11,582,
000), miscellaneous ($6,993,000). Max Winkler, Investments
of United States Capital in Latin America (Boston: World
Peace Foundation, 1929), 224-225.
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the oilfields, seems to have had this end in mind for some
time prior to commencement of the Huasteca campaign.

As

military chief and later as civil governor of the State of
Veracruz, he posed a greater threat to the oilmen than did
any other revolutionary leader.

Personally close to Car

ranza, able, intelligent and ruthless, he was a formidable

^Nationalization of the Mexican petroleum industry
was by no means a new idea in 1913. It was implicit in
the slogan "Mexico for the Mexicans," which considerably
pre-dated the Carranza uprising. Nor was consideration
of that course restricted to revolutionaries alone. In
1913, Huertista delegates in the Chamber of Deputies
"considered the creation of a national oil company—
apparently the first such proposal in the world— as a chal
lenge to foreign control." Harvey O 'Conner, World Crisis
in Oil (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1962), 108.
Moreover, at least one member of the General's cabinet
strongly urged nationalization of the industry. Miller
to Bryan, July 2, 1914, SDR 812.6363/124.
Clarence Miller served as consul and vice-consul
at Tampico from 1910 through 1921. Prior to his appoint
ment, he had been employed in Washington as an attorney
for the Bureau of Pensions and, later, for the Bureau of
Corporations. Miller's influence in shaping the Wilson
Administration's Mexican policy was considerable. He was
Washington's principal source of information on developments
in the Huasteca, particularly those relating to the petro
leum industry. Certainly he was the Administration's most
creditable source in that respect. Miller was widely
acquainted with foreign oilmen and Mexican officials alike
and was thoroughly familiar with the mechanics of the
Mexican oil industry. On more than one occasion he was
called upon to mediate disputes between the oilmen and
Huertista or Carrancista bureaucrats.
Few, if any, of the
Administration's representatives in Mexico played so
important a role over such an extended period of time.
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adversary.4

During the chaotic aftermath of the Veracruz

landing, the first of a series of recurring crises for the
oilmen, Aguilar emerged as the principal obstacle to extended

4Aguilar was among the inner circle of Constitutiona
list leadership. As "de facto boss of Vera Cruz'1 in 1913,
he had "thrown his influence, his patronage, and his financial
backing on the side of the First Chief during a critical
period in the letter's political fortunes." Marvin, "The
Jeopardy of Tampico," World's W o r k , 376. His influence and
prestige within the Carrancista faction was enhanced by his
engagement and eventual marriage to the First Chief's
daughter.
In 1914, he was appointed preconstitutional
governor of Veracruz and was subsequently "elected" to that
post.
In 1916, he was appointed minister of foreign rela
tions and served briefly in that capacity before reassuming
the governorship of his native state. Aguilar was one of
the few prominent Carrancistas to remain loyal to his chief
in the revolution of 1920. Although one of the principal
figures in the De la Huerta revolution of 1923-1924, he was
allowed to return from exile in the United States during the
Calles regime. He was subsequently elected senator for the
state of Veracruz and was able to reestablish himself as jefe
politico in Jalapa during the 1930's. John W. F. Dulles,
Yesterday in Mexico, A Chronicle of the Revolution, 1919-1936
(Austin: University of Texas Press, 1961), 34, 237, 260-262,
629, 674 (hereafter cited as Yesterday in Mexico). A former
comrade-in-arms, General Salvador Alvarado, the radical
Carrancista governor of the Yucatan, described Aguilar in
1920 as "notoriously anti-American" and a "perfect tool and
henchman for Carranza." Despite Aguilar's success in dealing
with the oilmen, Alvarado dismissed him as an "absolute nonen
tity who never had any time to attend to any matters ex
cept with both hands to grab all property or money, dis
honestly or otherwise that he could lay his hands on."
Moreover, he declared, it was "generally understood" that
Aguilar was emotionally unstable and that in 1918 "for a time
everybody knew that he was insane." Testimony of Jones, IMA,
2929. Bumbler or not, Aguilar was undeniably a thorn in
the side of the foreign oilman, and a painful one. See, for
example, Meade, LaHuasteca Veracruzana, II, 172.
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foreign control of the Mexican oil industry.

For the next

five years, until the collapse of the Carranza regime in the
spring of 1919, he was truly the nemesis of the oilmen.
For some months prior to the occupation of Veracruz,
the Constitutionalists had waged a desultory campaign to
wrest control of the Huasteca from Huertista forces and to
drive them from Tampico and Tuxpam.

Occasional skirmishing

around the oil camps, accompanied by harassment of the
workers, had caused some concern among company executives in
Tampico.

But frequent threats to fire the wells and murder

foreign workers had been largely discounted.

It was gene

rally believed that American supervisory personnel in the
field could cope with all but the most serious problems
arising from the fighting.

Although ill will existed be

tween Constitutionalist soldiers and oilfield workers, par
ticularly Americans, violent personal assaults on company
employees were not anticipated.
were armed.

Consequently, few workers

On the eve of Veracruz there appeared to be

little cause for apprehension.
Overnight, conditions changed.
seizure of the port was explosive.

Mexican reaction to

American workers, unarmed

and isolated in the jungle camps below Tampico, feared for
their lives.

Almost immediately an exodus en masse from the
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oilfields began.

Arriving in Tampico, workers found the

city seething with anti-Americanism.

After a harrowing

night under seige, most were evacuated to American warships
off the Panuco bar.^

They protested in vain when the

^J. F. Lucey to Bryan, April 29, 1914, SDR 812.6363/34;
Testimony of Captain William M. Hanson, May 20, 1920, IMA,
3223-3249. At the time of his testimony, Hanson, a senior
captain in the Texas State Rangers, was serving as a special
investigator for the subcommittee. Hanson had served for more
than twenty years as deputy United States marshal along the
Rio Grande boundary and as United States marshal for the
southern district of Texas.
In 1906, he had resigned from
Federal service and emigrated to Mexico. There he purchased
a large hacienda north of Tampico, organized the Mexican Land
Company, and raised cattle and citrus fruit. He introduced
scientific agriculture, organized a growers' association,
and was soon one of the most prominent citizens in north
eastern Mexico.
In January, 1914, Hanson and other Americans
residing in the vicinity of Tampico were ordered into the
city by American consular officials to remove them from the
path of advancing Constitutionalists under General Pablo
Gonzalez.
In Tampico they established themselves at the
Southern Hotel and the Hotel Victoria, intending to return
to their homes when order was restored in the interior.
On the day of the Veracruz landing, unruly crowds
incited and armed by General Zaragoza, Federalist commander
in the city, beseiged the two hotels. No help could be ex
pected from American naval forces. Some time earlier,
Daniels had ordered Admiral Mayo to withdraw his squadron
from the Panuco. Americans in Tampico were left to shift
for themselves. Daniels' order, approved by President Wilson,
was executed over the strong protest of Consul Miller and
Admiral Mayo himself. Report of S. D. Lester, April 28, 1920,
Ibid., 2452. Lester was a special investigator for the sub
committee.
His report consisted in large part of affidavits
obtained from American citizens, both in and out of Mexico,
who had testimony bearing on the treatment of Americans in
revolutionary Mexico.
Through the night of April 21-22, Hanson, commanding
a body of armed men in the Southern Hotel, succeeded in

105
vessels weighed anchor for the United States.

Some 2,800

men, virtually the entire American labor force in the oil
fields were thus prevented from returning to the job and
g

were eventually disembarked at Galveston.

holding the mob at bay. However, only the timely interven
tion of German naval officers from the cruiser Dresden pre
vented a pitched battle and the probable murder of the Ameri
cans.
Testimony of Hanson, Ibid., 3230-3233. Captain Koeh
ler, commander of the German warship, had followed develop
ments ashore with growing apprehension. Early in the morning
of the 22nd, he ordered Zaragoza to disperse the mob immedi
ately or the Dresden would clear the streets with her guns.
Federal troops broke up the crowds. By dawn, however, the
mob had reassembled and a fresh assault upon the hotels
appeared imminent. Hanson made his way to the consulate,
informing Miller that he could not restrain his men if the
mob again approached the hotel. Miller, in turn, warned
Zaragoza, who urged immediate evacuation of the Americans.
Koehler and a very reluctant British naval officer agreed to
transfer the Americans to Mayo's ships standing off the
Panuco bar. By the end of the day, the evacuation had been
completed. Report of Lester, Ibid., 2452; Testimony of Han
son, Ibid., 3230-3233. See also Testimony of Michael A.
Spellacy, January 9, 1920, Ibid., 939-956. In almost every
instance testimony relating to the night of April 21-22 is
marked by indignation and bitterness toward Administration
officials and a lingering incredulity that those officials
could have so cavalierly abandoned their countrymen in dis
tress .
6Lucey to Sir Cecil Spring-Rice, April 29, 1914, SDR
812.6363/34. Americans composed the bulk of the non-Mexican
labor force in the Huasteca oilfields. British, Dutch and
other foreign firms relied heavily upon experienced oilfield
workers from the United States in both exploration and pro
duction. The evacuation of American workers thus inhibited
or halted outright the operations of all firms but one, the
British-owned Aguila. The Cowdray company employed enough
British citizens to enable it to maintain operations through
out the crisis. Until American workers returned to the
Huasteca, the Aguila enjoyed an effective monopoly on the
production and marketing of Mexican petroleum products.
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As Mexican wrath subsided, oil company managers,
most of whom had remained in Tampico, were confronted with
still a new and potentially far graver crisis.

The oilfields

had been all but abandoned in the rush to the city.
supervisory and skilled personnel had fled.

All

Only a handful

of Mexican laborers, and those of questionable loyalty, had
remained behind.

Meanwhile, the wells continued to flow, and

oil poured into the storage pits.

Normally, the surplus would

be pumped into new pits or through pipelines to steel tanks
around Tampico and Tuxpam.

But with the camps deserted, con

struction of new storage facilities ceased and the liklihood
of pump malfunction greatly increased.

When existing storage

filled to capacity, the overflow would rapidly flood the
surrounding countryside, creating extremely hazardous conditions.

Fire, the oilmen's nightmare, was bound to follow.

n

7W. A. Thompson to Bryan, May 1, 1914, SDR 812.6363/67.
Thompson, a vice-president of the Texas Company, submitted to
Bryan a vivid description of conditions in the oilfields,
going to great lengths to impress upon the Secretary the
dangers inherent in the current situation.
In recent months,
he explained, production had risen rapidly and now exceeded
exports.
There was a constant need, then, for new ground
storage in the field. But American workers skilled in the
construction of reservoirs had been taken to Galveston against
their will and were forbidden by Administration officials to
return to Tampico. Thompson noted that few of the wells were
producing at full capacity, most being "pinched in" by chokes
and valves which regulated flow. This limited production
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It was of the utmost importance, then, to return trained
workers to the camps as soon as possible.

Yet Administra

tion officials, particularly the Secretary of the Navy, at
first refused to cooperate with the companies in returning
their employees.

Daniels, in fact, expressed overt hostility
Q

to the Tampico refugees and to Americans in Mexico generally.

alone would soon exhaust existing storage facilities. Over
flow and fire would certainly follow.
"The whole surrounding
country," he warned, " . . . will become flooded with oil and
I cannot see how this can occur without . . . fire. Once
started, it will carry with or against the tide and wind. Rain
cannot put it out, but instead would increase its violence . .
. . Such a fire would burn the entire oil country and doubt
less a multitude of its inhabitants." And fire would melt the
chokes on "pinched in" wells, more than tripling the current
rate of flow. See also Lucey to Bryan, April 29, 1914,
SDR 812.6363/34 and E. T. Dumble to Senator T. A. Culberson,
April 29, 1914. Dumble was president of the East Coast Oil
Company, a subsidiary of the Southern Pacific Railroad.
Formerly Texas State Geologist, Dumble had conducted much of
the early geological investigation of the Mexican Gulf Coast
ind was perhaps better qualified than anyone in the industry
to gauge the consequences of fire in the oilfields. His
brief but forceful statement was almost identical with that
of Thompson.
O

Report of Lester, IMA, 2448-2451. On or about May 1,
1914, a committee representing the American community of
Tampico submitted to the President, through the Secretaries
of State, War, and the Navy, a petition calling upon the
Administration to return the evacuees to their homes in and
around Tampico and to afford them "suitable protection." It
further requested that warships be stationed in the Panuco
River and their commanders given instructions "similar to
those . . . given to the commanders of war vessels of other
nations who have successfully protected the lives and property
of their citizens resident in Tampico and environs . . . ."
The petitioners also criticized the withdrawal of Mayo's ships
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The companies, too, were reluctant to return their men to
the camps, but for a different reason.
lives.

They feared for their

Constitutionalist and Huertista soldiers alike were

embittered by the seizure of Veracruz, and their animosity

from the Panuco prior to the Veracruz landing. While in
Washington, Captain Hanson and several other members of the
committee called upon the aforementioned officials. The
first interview, with Daniels, "was distressing and unfortu
nate. The Secretary gave his callers his opinion of them,
in terms that were neither kind nor just; this angered his
callers who... behaved somewhat discourteously... showing
little control of temper or tongue. The Secretary was ini
tially to blame in that, without waiting to hear what his
callers had to say, he gave them his uncomplimentary opinion
of them, spoke of them as 'refugees,' called them adventurers
who had gone to Mexico with buccaneering intent, and said
that they should have come to him with greatful thanks for
having rescued them" A more sympathetic hearing was accorded
the committee by the Secretary of War, although he was the
least able to assist the evacuees.
Bryan, on the other hand,
while cool to the committee, agreed to provide funds for the
immediate relief of the group at Galveston and to accept
written statements of protest from members of the committee.
Both Garrison and Senator. T. P. Gore of Oklahoma
offered to arrange an interview with the President. The
way was cleared by Gore, and all that remained was to fix
the date. However, when Gore forwarded a copy of the evacuees'
petition to the White House the President abruptly cancelled
the interview.
Ibid.
For the bias of Wilson and Daniels against Americans
resident in or doing business in Mexico and their lack of
concern over the fate of those individuals, see Lodge, The
Senate and the League of Nations, 13-14; Daniels, The Wilson
Era; Years of Peace, 181, 185-186; Cline, The United States
and Mexico, 187; David Cronon, Josephus Daniels in Mexico
(Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1960), 56-59.
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toward American workers might prove difficult to contain.
Of still greater urgency, however, was arrangement of an
immediate cease-fire in the vicinity of wells and storage
facilities.

But Constitutionalist commanders, already com-

mitted to operations in the oilfields, refused to withdraw.
Fearing the worst, company executives appealed to
their respective governments to intercede on their behalf.
First, they sought to win guarantees from both Mexican factions
that foreign workers would be allowed to return to the camps
and resume work unmolested.

Second, they hoped to halt

fighting in the oilfields and around the storage and shipping
facilities at Tampico and Tuxpam.^0

In accord with the

9Charles F. De Ganahl to Boaz Long, May 1, 1914,
SDR 812.6363/33.
De Ganahl represented a group with producing
wells in the Huasteca.
"The forces of neither Federals nor
Constitutionalists realize the danger involved." he complained.
"An hour's work of ignorant soldiers would destroy values
staggering in magnitude." See also Dumble to Bryan, May 4,
1914, SDR 812.6363/44 and Canada to Bryan, May 21, 1914,
SDR 812.6363/69.
^ Thompson to Bryan, May 1, 1914, SDR 812.6363/67.
Thompson urged "the great necessity of establishing a neutral
zone in the oil country or of giving protection to the opera
tors in the field without delay. If it is not possible or
advisable to stop the conflict at Tampico let it go on, but
insist on peace in the producing country." Thompson assured
the Secretary that American workers in Galveston were ready to
return to the oilfields, "but the responsibility of sending
them back without protection is more than their employers should
and will take. We are all in business for gain," he declared,
"but we all put humanity and man's duty to man before profit.”
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Anglo-American agreement of the previous November, the Wilson
Administration ultimately assumed responsibility for relief
of the oil companies, European as well as American.

Ironic

ally, the task of defending those veritable archetypes of
"Big Business" fell to one of their severest and most persis
tent critics.

The relationship between the oilmen and William

Jennings Bryan had never been and never would be a cordial

During the height of the crisis, when destruction of
the Mexican oil industry appeared a distinct possibility,
representatives of several of the larger American firms had
suggested to Bryan that the Administration work for the
neutralization of the oilfields.

The Secretary, in turn,

discussed the matter with the President and with the British
Ambassador, Sir Cecil Spring-Rice.

Both approved the p l a n .

^ T h e following correspondence reveals the lack of
rapport between the Secretary and the oilmen, and the cool
ness of their relationship:
Dumble to Bryan, May 4, 1914,
SDR 812.6363/44; Thompson to Bryan, May 1, 1914, SDR 812.
6363/67; Bryan to A. F. Corwin, May 18, 1914, SDR 812.6363/68.
Bryan was embarrassed by his role of protector of the "in
terests." When Corwin, general manager of the Penn-Mex Fuel
Oil Company, wired his thanks to the Secretary for assistance
rendered during the Huasteca crisis, Bryan tersely replied
that the company's relief had come from Constitutionalist
authorities and "not from this Government.11
l2Bryan to Spring-Rice, April 29, 1914, SDR 812.
6363/60a.
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Bryan then opened communications with Huerta and Carranza in
an attempt to enlist their support for peace in the Huasteca.
On April 28, one week after the Veracruz landing,
urgent notes were dispatched to the opposing factional chiefs
calling upon them to cooperate with the companies in preventing disaster in the oilfields.

13

Foreign oilmen, the

Secretary observed, would not be the only losers in event
that fire swept the oil camps.

Rather, a "great national

calamity" for the Mexican people would result.

The greatest

present and future source of revenue for the republic might
well be lost forever.

Moreover, thousands of Mexican workers,

currently drawing the highest wages paid anywhere in Mexico,
could conceivably lose their livelihood in a matter of hours.
It was "vitally important," Bryan declared, not only in the
interests of the companies and of the Mexican people but of
"the world at large" that immediate steps be taken to pre
clude a "wholly unnecessary and appalling" disaster.

The

Secretary then called for an armistice in the petroleum pro
vince and guarantees for the safety of returning American
workers.

He expected written endorsements of his suggestions,

urging that field commanders of both factions be ordered to
adhere to them immediately.

14

^3Bryan to Carothers, April 28, 1914, SDR 812.6363/29a.
14Ibid„

112
Working closely with Spring-Rice and the Secretary
of the Navy, Bryan then arranged for cooperation between AngloAmerican naval forces off Tampico and the British consul in
the city.

Together they were to "induce'' Constitutionalist

and Huertista commanders in the Huasteca to accept neutrali
zation of the oilfields.^
Meanwhile, Bryan's notes of the 28th had served to
aggravate already strained relations between Washington and
the contending Mexican factions.

Not content with having

Daniels to Bryan, April 30, 1914, SDR 812.6363/39.
Although Mexican hostility toward foreigners in the Huasteca
was focused almost entirely upon the American community at
this time, Bryan's response was considerably milder than
that of Spring-Rice. The British Ambassador displayed none
of Bryan's hesitancy to defend the interests of his country
men.
He was prepared to demand rather than to suggest neu
tralization of the oilfields. And he would have neutralized
Tampico and Tuxpam as well. The combatants, he complained,
were daily seizing the property of British citizens and other
Europeans and sending it north to the border for resale in
the United States. Both factions, he argued, should be made
to "clearly understand that proper respect must be paid to
the principles of international law and the property of
neutrals." But Bryan overruled the Ambassador, fearing that
the latter's demand for neutralization of the ports was ex
cessive and a threat to the American plan to neutralize the
oilfields only.
Spring-Rice was annoyed, but he followed
Bryan's lead, in accord with the Anglo-American agreement on
Mexico. This instance was but one of many in which Adminis
tration officials manifested their lack of concern for Ameri
can and European property rights in Mexico.
It was a position
sharply in contrast with that adopted by other governments
whose citizens resided in or had interests in the republic.
Bryan to Spring-Rice, April 29, 1914, SDR 812.6363/60a;
Spring-Rice to Bryan, April 30 and May 1, 1914, SDR 812.
6363/46,47.
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seized Veracruz, the Americans appeared to have designs on
Tampico and the oilfields as well.

Still more important

from the Mexican point of view, compliance with Bryan's re
quest for neutralization would seriously undermine Mexican
sovereignty over the richest state in the republic and, in
effect, internationalize the nation's most lucrative industry.
Thereafter it would be but a short step to the establishment
of an outright foreign protectorate over the petroleum pro
vince,
Mexican leaders, irrespective of faction, were
alarmed by the Secretary's proposal and angered by the
manner in which it was being forced upon t h e m . A l t h o u g h
by no means as humiliating as the seizure and occupation
of Veracruz, the establishment of foreign control over the
Huasteca would, in the long run, represent a far graver
threat to the republic.

Bryan's scheme, if executed, would

set a precedent for the "neutralization1' of still other vital
industries or provinces in which foreign capital was heavily
invested.

The implications for the future of Mexican inde

pendence were frightening.

Given the recent performances

l6Carothers to Bryan, May 1, 1914, SDR 812.6363/32;
Spring-Rice to Bryan, May 3, 1914, SDR 812.6363/52; Bryan
to R. E. Brooks, May 6, 1914, SDR 812.6363/54c.
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of European and American imperialists in other areas of the
Caribbean basin, it was not at all unreasonable to inter
pret the seizure of Veracruz and the subsequent attempt to
"neutralize" the Huasteca as the first steps in a multiphase
subjugation and partition of the entire republic.

Nor could

the foreigner have asked for a more propitious moment to
launch such a venture.

Doubtless, many Mexicans did believe

that invasion and possibly partition were in the offing.*^
The presence of a powerful Anglo-American squadron off the
Panuco bar certainly lent credence to the allegation; re
placement of the marines at Veracruz by regular army units
appeared to many to confirm it.
The prospect of neutralization or internationaliza
tion of the petroleum province was especially disconcerting
to the Constitutionalists.

A very large part of government

revenues now came from taxation of the oil industry.

For

some time, Carranza and his aides had anticipated the
seizure of Tampico and Tuxpam and the subsequent diversion
of oil revenues to the revolutionary party.

They were re

lying heavily upon those funds to finance pacification and
reconstruction of the republic, to say nothing of their own

^Quirk, An Affair of Honor, 107-108; Link, Wilson:
The New Freedom, 400-405.
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"reimbursement” for services rendered the Revolution.^8
Control of the Huasteca was thus of vital importance to
the Constitutionalists and they meant to have it.

With

Huertista resistance on the wane, attainment of that end
appeared imminent.

Then came the Bryan note of April 28.

The Secretary's scheme threatened to completely up
set Constitutionalist plans and, indirectly, to jeopardize
the success of the entire revolutionary movement.

Given to

^Cumberland, Mexico, 256-258; Womack, Zapata, 193.
Of the Carrancistas, Womack states:
"The new, nationalist
entrepreneurs who composed its Carranza's party high
command and local cadres were intensely more deliberate
than the Villistas.
If they plundered, it was not for
fun but on business. The fortunes the Carrancista generals
sought were huge beyond the drifters' Villistas dreams,
guaranteed, and... officially certified and socially
acceptable. And to achieve them they had a positive, un
equivocal policy. First they would purge the government
completely.... And then they would organize their own
regime, a sound system of reform in which they could
succeed - to the presidency." See also Duval West to
Woodrow Wilson, April 5, 1915, SDR 812.00/20721. West,
one of a succession of executive agents dispatched to
Mexico to gather intelligence for the President, inter
viewed a number of Carrancista leaders in Veracruz in the
spring of 1915. Luis Cabrera readily admitted to West that
some leaders very close to Carranza were merely seekers of
"personal advantage." And, West concluded, "general rumor
has it that all around Carranza, including Cabrera, are
engaged in enriching themselves." See also Testimony of
Jones, IMA, 2916-2930. The SDR 812.00 series provides
abundant evidence of grafting on a massive scale by
Carrancista civil and military authorities.
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wholesale speculation themselves,

19

Constitutionalist

leaders naturally assumed that the oilmen, if protected
by American forces, would evade taxes and otherwise defraud

19

Cumberland, Mexico, 256-258; Womack, Zapata, 193.
Womack discusses the profiteering of General Pablo Gonzalez,
commander of the Constitutionalist Army Corps of the North
east and an intimate of the First Chief.
Ibid., 259-260;
Parkes, A History of Mexico, 359. Parkes states that the
Carranza regime has been described, "perhaps with truth,
as the most corrupt administration in the history of the
country.” See also Testimony of Jones, IMA, 2916-2930.
The revelations of ex-Carrancista General Salvador Alvarado
in the course of several conversations with Jones constitute
a damning indictment of the integrity of Carrancista leader
ship in general.
Jones, a journalist with considerable experience in
Mexico and Central America, served as an unofficial agent
for the Justice Department's Bureau of Investigation from
1915 through early 1920. Posing as a propagandist for
hire, he successfully penetrated the Carrancista organiza
tion in the United States. Early in 1917, representatives
of the Mexican Foreign Office, then headed by Candido Aguilar,
attempted to recruit Jones as "publicity director" for the
Constitutionalist regime. In addition to refurbishing the
Constitutionalist image in the American press, Jones was to
advise Aguilar "as to exactly what was occurring here in
Washington.11 Jones rejected the first offer but accepted
a second one in early 1918 at the behest of A. Bruce Bielaski,
Chief of the Bureau of Investigation. As a double agent,
Jones was eminently successful. His immediate superior
penned the following commendation in May, 1919:
Jones
more than anyone else is entitled to the credit for breaking
up the activities throughout the United States of the Nica
raguan, Guatamalan, Salvador, and Honduranian revolutionary
movements. He has also furnished the Department of Justice
as much, or more inside information pertaining to revolu
tionary movements in Mexico as any man in this country.
Results secured by him regarding activities of German spies
and propagandists in Mexico and along the border was of
great value to the United States Government. I know of no
man in the United States so thoroughly posted on Mexican
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the revolutionary regime of desperately needed revenues.

20

Moreover, the deceptively close alliance between the com
panies and the Government of the United States appeared to
pose a serious obstacle to realization of a primary if
longer-range revolutionary objective, the recovery of sub
soil wealth from foreign concessionaires.

Once "neutralized,*1

it was highly unlikely that the oilfields would ever revert
to Mexican ownership.

Given these considerations, Carranza

was certain to reject Bryan's proposal.

Better to sacrifice

some of the fields than to lose them all.

and Central American affairs, and he is, without question,
the most astute, accurate, and resourceful investigator I
have ever met. . . .Ibid.,2889-2894. Although Jones'
testimony at times borders on the sensational, much of it
was corroborated by other witnesses and, more important,
by documents in the SDR 812.00 series.
20

Cumberland, Mexico, 249. "Despite the mutuality
of interests and dependence, the government and the oil
companies quarreled incessently, with each accusing the other
of shoddy principles and shady practices.” Ibid. Cumber
land's point is well taken. The feud between foreign oilmen
and Carrancista officials at times approached the ridiculous.
The former were obsessed with fear of confiscation and the
possible loss of their entire investment in Mexico; the
latter, with the fear that they were being duped, that they
were not extracting all that they might from the companies.
Yet it should have been obvious to the oilmen that for some
time to come their capital, technology, and marketing struc
ture would be indispensible to the Mexican oil industry.
It should have been equally obvious to the Carrancistas
that in their frantic pursuit of the golden eggs they might
well kill the goose that laid them.
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Meanwhile, for the First Chief and his lieutenants
the foreign-owned oil companies were rapidly assuming tre
mendous symbolic as well as strategic significance.

Highly

visible and maddeningly enduring, they were ever a source
of frustration, humiliation and embarrassment to Mexican
p a t r i o t s . T h e i r presence served as a constant reminder
that elements of the old order not only persisted but
thrived.

Their very existence, a challenge to Mexican

sovereignty, seemed to mock the Revolution and that for
which it stood.

And so long as they remained they blocked

recovery of the subsoil.

Graver still, the companies rep

resented a direct threat to the revolutionary movement it
self, first by virtue of the support, involuntary or other
wise, which they extended to domestic reactionaries and.

2-*-Ibid.? Testimony of Jones, IMA, 2958-2965. In
December, 1919, Ignacio Bonillas, Carrancista Ambassador
to the United States, attempted to hire Jones to discredit
Senator Fall's investigation of Mexican affairs. During
the course of their negotiations, Bonillas repeatedly ex
pressed the conviction that American oilmen were seeking
armed intervention through the proceedings of the subcommittee
as well as through the activities of the National Associa
tion for the Protection of American Rights in Mexico (NAPARM).
Bonillas expressed "deep hatred" for NAPARM, its officers
and members, and the man whom he believed to be the central
figure in the alleged conspiracy against the Carranza re
gime, Edward L. Doheny. Similar views were expressed by
Ramon P. de Negri, Mexican consul-general and commercial
agent in New York City, in conversations with Jones in
October, 1919. Ibid., 2945-2952.
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second, by their persistent agitation abroad for intervention, diplomatic or military, on their own behalf.

22

As

long as foreign oilmen continued to operate in Mexico,
armed intervention and the subsequent occupation of the

There is conclusive proof that the oilmen paid
"protection” money to counterrevolutionary elements in the
Huasteca.
Testimony of Doheny, IMA, 282-287. However,
there is strong disagreement over whether or not that
assistance to Carranza's opponents was freely given. Car
rancista officials and Carrancista propagandists and journa
listic sympathizers in the United States repeatedly and
vociferously charged that American oilmen were actively
conspiring with local counterrevolutionaries to overthrow
Carranza.
See Testimony of Dr. Samuel Guy Inman, September
8, 1919, IMA, 52-55, 63-68, 141; Testimony of L. J. DeBekker,
September 15, 1919, Ibid., 331-370; Testimony of James G.
McDonald, September 10, 1919, Ibid., 202-207. Doheny's
testimony before the subcommittee, backed by corroborating
documents, effectively refuted the charges and placed the
burden of proof upon his accusers. They, in turn, performed
very poorly before the subcommittee, singularly failed to
substantiate their charges, and admitted that the bulk of
their "evidence" against Doheny and other oilmen operating
in Mexico was hearsay. On the other hand, foreign oilmen
repeatedly appealed to their respective governments to
intercede of their behalf in their running battle with the
revolutionary regime.
In this respect, the companies did
represent a definite threat to the Carrancistas. At any
time, diplomatic intercession could escalate into armed in
tervention. Again, there is disagreement as to whether or
not the oilmen actually sought armed intervention and occu
pation of the Huasteca. Cline contends that "the American
petroleum companies" diligently pursued intervention in the
Huasteca in 1918. Cline, The United States and Mexico, 187.
O'Conner is more specific, stating that E. J. Sadler, presi
dent of the Transcontinental Oil Company, a Standard sub
sidiary, called for occupation of the petroleum province
in 1918. O'Conner, World Crisis in Oil, 108. Link differs.
Through 1916, at least, he believes the oilmen were innocent
of the charges brought against them. Link, Wilson: Con
fusions and Crises, 1915-1916 (Princeton: Princeton University
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Huasteca remained a distinct possibility.

Collectively,

then, the foreign-owned oil companies became the bete noire
of Mexican revolutionary leadership.

Until they were broken,

dispossessed, and driven from the country, the Revolution
would not be secure.
While Bryan awaited replies to his notes of April 28,
European and American oil interests continued to press the
Administration for prompt action of their behalf.

On

April 29, the Secretary conferred with Captain J. F. Lucey,
spokesman for a consortium of British, Dutch, and American
oil companies with operations in Mexico.

Introduced to

Bryan by Boaz Long, Chief of the Department's Latin American
Division, Lucey discussed the plight of the Mexican oil in
dustry from the viewpoint of European investors.23

British

Press, 1964), 220-221 {hereafter cited as Wilson: Confusions
and Crises). See also Testimony of Ira Jewell Williams,
September 20, 1919, IMA, 604-607. Williams was a former
president of the Panuco-Boston Oil Company, a major Mexican
producer, and a member of the Association of Producers of
Petroleum in Mexico (APPM). Speaking for the Association,
Williams denied that its members sought armed intervention
in Mexico and challenged "our calumniators" (particularly
Inman) to prove their allegations. No proof was forthcoming.
23Lucey to Bryan, April 29, 1914, SDR 812.6363/34.
Lucey represented John Hays Hammond's International Petroleum
Company; the Corona Oil Company, a Royal Dutch-Shell sub
sidiary; and the British-owned Veracruz Oil Syndicate. Lucey
himself was head of the J. F. Lucey Company of California
and the Southern Well Works Company of Chattanooga, both
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and Dutch oilmen, he informed the Secretary, were dismayed
by the flight of American workers and puzzled by the de
cision to evacuate them from Mexico.

European oil execu

tives had been under the impression that United States
naval forces would occupy Tampico in the event of such
troubles as had recently arisen.

This, they “understood/'

was to have been "the policy of the American Government."
However, nothing of the sort had occurred.

Consequently,

most of the European oil camps had been abandoned along
with those of the American firms.

It was imperative, Lucey

concluded, that American workers be returned to the oil
fields immediately and that Washington guarantee their
safety.

OA

Thus for the Administration there appeared to

be no escaping decisive action with regard to the Huasteca.
While both Huerta and Carranza responded promptly
to Bryan's note, neither would accept his proposal in toto.

with holdings in the Huasteca. Lucey's meeting with Bryan
represented one of several early attempts by the oilmen to
achieve collective international cooperation in defense of
their mutual interests. The obvious necessity for such con
certed action led eventually to establishment of the Associa
tion of Petroleum Producers in Mexico.
24Ibid
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Each consented to the return of American workers, pledging
protection for foreign lives and property in their respec
tive spheres of influence.

But neutralization of the oil

fields was another matter altogether.

Constitutionalists

and Huertistas alike dismissed the plan as impractical and
all but impossible to implement.

25

Carranza bluntly re

jected the scheme, shrewdly observing that "should such
benefits (neutralization of the oilfields) be established
for some foreigners, others would have the right to expect
the same privilege causing great damage to the speediness
of our triumph."

26

Neutralization was a dead letter.

The

plan to "induce" acceptance of Bryan's proposal was aban
doned in the face of unequivocal resistance.27

Already

anxious to withdraw from Veracruz and determined to avoid
further armed intervention, Wilson and Bryan could do no
more than lecture the belligerents on the folly of their
current course.
Early in May, conditions in the Huasteca worsened.
Constitutionalist commanders, ignoring Carranza's pledge to

25Carothers to Bryan, May 1, 1914, SDR 812.6363/32;
Bryan to R. E. Brooks, May 6, 1914, SDR 812.6363/54c.
26Carothers to Bryan, May 1, 1914, SDR 812.6363/32.
27Ibid.
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Bryan, were openly hostile to returning Americans.
quently, few workers proceeded on to the camps.

Conse

At the

same time, however, the Constitutionalists permitted workers
of other nationalities, mostly British subjects, to go about
their business unmolested.

28

Adding to the Secretary's

chagrin, the British chose this awkward moment to withdraw
their support from Bryan's demand for protection.

Both

Admiral Craddock and the British Consul at Tampico urged
Spring-Rice to discourage the return of American workers to
the oilfields.

Reappearance of the Americans, they conten

ded, would enrage Mexican patriots and thereby endanger the
lives of all foreign workers in the Huasteca. 29

However,

OQ

54b.

Bryan to Marion Letcher, May 6, 1914, SDR 812.6363/
Letcher was United States consul at Chihuahua.

29Miller to Bryan, May 7, 1914, SDR 812.6363/53.
The British position was certainly questionable. American
consular officials at Tampico suggested that Anglo-American
competition for control of the Mexican oil industry lay be
hind Craddock's action. With American and other foreign
oil camps deserted, each passing day strengthened the Aguila*s
position vis-a-vis its competition. See Miller to Bryan,
May 9, 1914, SDR 812.6363/55.
Despite the accord of November 1913, Anglo-American
cooperation with regard to the Huasteca was limited. The
Tampico evacuees, particularly, were embittered by British
indifference to their plight, by the reluctance of British
naval officers to assist in the evacuation, and by the
"attitude of unfriendliness" manifested by those officers.
Report of Lester, IMA, 2451-2452.
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reports from American agents near Carranza indicated that
the First Chief was indeed striving to make good his pledge.
New orders calling for the protection of American workers
had recently been issued to field commanders.
on

ordinates appeared inclined to obey. w

Most sub-

The principal

question mark was Candido Aguilar.
Consul Clarence Miller, meanwhile, had performed an
invaluable service in obtaining additional storage facilities
in Tampico for the great torrent of oil flowing up from the
unattended fields to the south.
gap.

But this was merely a stop

When the tanks were filled and the valves closed at

Tampico, oil from the wellheads would begin to spread across
the countryside creating the conditions that oilmen dreaded.
Unless workers returned to the camps immediately to con
struct new storage pits, the industry faced disaster.
Desperate, Miller implored the Secretary to have all com
panies with tanker fleets dispatch their vessels to Tampico
at once.33.
If Bryan was upset by the obstructionist tactics of
British officials at Tampico, the Consul was much more so.
Negotiating with General Zaragoza, Huertista commander in

30Letcher to Bryan, May 13, 1914, SDR 812.6363/63.
31Miller to Bryan, May 7, 1914, SDR 812.6363/53.
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the city, Miller had obtained important concessions.

The

General agreed to permit disembarkation of American workers
and promised safe conduct through Federal lines.

However,

British naval officers under Craddock's command inexpli
cably refused to allow disembarkation.32

Miller, long

resident in Tampico and thoroughly familiar with the prob
lems of the oil industry, recognized that time was now
vitally important.

Unless workers were permitted to return

to the camps at once, irreparable damage would almost cer
tainly follow.

There was no doubt in Miller's mind that

American oil interests were being deliberately sacrificed
for the benefit of their British competitors.

"It appears

absolutely unjust," he fumed, "to compel American interests
to be left abandoned for the benefit of others under such
circumstances."

In closing, the Consul pleaded with Bryan

to intercede immediately on behalf of the American companies.33
Certainly Craddock's action seriously jeopardized
American participation in the Mexican oil industry, and there
can be no doubt that the Admiral was cognizant of the fact.
In addition to the threat of immense physical loss, the com
panies now faced grave new problems arising from their in
ability to pay off Mexican employees and meet royalty payments

32Miller to Bryan, May 9, 1914, SDR 812.6363/55.
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to lessors.

Craddock's refusal to permit the return of

company employees, including paymasters and fiscal agents,
rendered impossible the fulfillment of such obligations.
Consequently, unpaid Mexican workers, the sole remaining
employees in the field, threatened to walk off the job at
the very moment when their services were most urgently
needed.

Much more important in the long run, however, was

the failure to meet contractual obligations to lessors.

Non

payment of royalties within the prescribed time constituted
a breach of contract, justifying legal proceedings for the
recovery of oil leases by the lessors.34

And nowhere did

there exist a more determined group of would-be leasebreakers.
Most of the American oil properties had been obtained
through long-term leasing from persons who either failed to
grasp the magnitude of the subsoil wealth or who were under
the impression that the land was worthless and the transaction
a neat trick at the expense of the gringo.35

As well after

34Bryan to Carothers, May 8, 1914, SDR 812.6363/57d;
Bryan to Canada, May 15, 1914, SDR 812.6363/64; J. M. Postelle
to Bryan, May 11, 1914, SDR 812.6363/64.
35

Testimony of Edward L. Doheny, September 11, 1919,
IMA, 229. Persons willing to dispose of their land, Doheny
recalled, "usually wanted to sell outright for cash or else
receive a specific sum in cash annually for the right to
the subsoil values." Some properties were obtained in fee
simple and others by cash rental. None were obtained on a
royalty basis because the landowners "did not have any faith
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well blew in, however, the skeptics were converted, and not
without considerable bitterness.

Private litigation ini

tiated by landowners to break the leases had begun almost
immediately after the discovery wells were brought in.

The

companies had responded shrewdly by hiring Mexican lawyers,
thereby enjoying near uniform success in preserving their
leases.

Now, however, with the British blocking the return

of American employees, it appeared that American firms
would be forced to default on royalty payments.

Lawyers

for the lessors would be quick to exploit their advantage,
and many of the most productive properties would revert to

in the discovery of oil, because none had ever been dis
covered. The material which promised a supply of oil was
always considered a nuisance and a danger, and they would
rather get some certain value for it than to run the risk
of getting profit as the result of the exploitation.11
Doheny and Cowdray owned the bulk of their lands outright.
The oilmen who followed them for the most part obtained
their properties through leasing and were thus vulnerable
to dispossession. See also Testimony of Spellacy, Ibid.,
939-940. Spellacy's story was a common one in the early,
formative years of the Mexican oil industry. Spellacy had
gone to the Huasteca in 1908 or 1909 as a driller.
In
time, he had obtained some leases, secured the backing of
a group of Los Angeles promoters, and launched his own
producing company. He sold his crude oil to the big inte
grated companies with refineries at Tampico or in the United
States. Like Spellacy a number of small "independent" pro
ducers enjoyed considerable success in the Huasteca until
bought out or forced from the field by the hostility of
Carrancista officials on the one hand and the cutthroat
competition of the integrated giants on the other.
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the original holders.

Few of the companies were strong

enough to withstand such a blow.

The result might well be

greatly diminished American participation in the Mexican oil
industry.
Fully aware of the threat to the oilmen, Miller re
quested permission to draw on government funds to pay off
■57

Mexican workers and meet royalty payments for the companies.
But Bryan, while expressing regret over the hardship of the
oilmen, denied Miller's request.

The Department could not

advance funds to private interests, he informed the Consul.38
The Secretary was clearly reluctant to become involved
in the affairs of the oil companies.

His correspondence

with consular officials in the Huasteca was marked by its
restraint.

Time and again, the Department's agents in the

field pleaded with Bryan to act with greater vigor in the
defense of hard-pressed American investors, but to no avail.
Repeated appeals for coercive action were almost uniformly

36Among American producers, only the Doheny com
panies were assured of emerging relatively unscathed from
a lease-breaking campaign. And some Doheny properties,
especially the most recently acquired, were held under long
term leases.
37Miller to Bryan, May 9, 1914, SDR 812.6363/55.
38Bryan to Miller, May 14, 1914, SDR 812.6363/55.
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rejected.

When called upon to alleviate the plight of the

oilmen in particular, the Secretary manifested an obvious
distaste for the task.

Washington would do little for the

oilmen per se.
On the other hand, the abstract principle of property
rights was at stake, and the Administration rose to its de
fense.

On the vital issue of leases, the Secretary stood

squarely behind the companies.

On May 15, he informed

Carranza that Constitutionalist authorities were expected
to "perceive the justice of taking no action in forfeiture
of leases until owners have had reasonable time to pay
rent."39

Several days later, Bryan opened negotiations

with representative of Great Britain and the Netherlands
with a view to securing guarantees that no person or corpo
ration, Mexican or foreign, would take "advantage of the ex
ceptional conditions in the oil districts in the matter of
leases, royalties and rentals . . . during the disturbed
period.

39Bryan to Canada, May 15, 1914, SDR 812.6363/64.
^®Bryan to Canada, May 20, 1914, SDR 812.6363/70a.
It is highly probable that the Administration1s position
was based upon political and strategic considerations. It
will be recalled that Wilson and Bryan suspected that London's
Mexican policy was shaped in accord with the interests of
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Both governments subsequently agreed to cooperate
with the United States in preservation of the status quo in
the Huasteca prior to the occupation of Veracruz.

41

On

Lord Cowdray. Burton I. Hendrick, The Life and Letters of
Walter H. Page (3 vols.; Garden City: Doubleday, Page, 19241926), I, 202-203.
Craddock's refusal to permit the return
of American workers to the oilfields almost certainly deepened
that suspicion. Anglo-American competition for control of
the Mexican oil industry was no secret, and it was clear that
Craddock's action threatened to upset the balance in the
Huasteca and tip the scales permanently against future Ameri
can participation.
Had widespread leasebreaking begun as a
result of the inability of American firms to meet their con
tractual obligations, the principal beneficiaries would have
been Cowdray's Aguila and the Royal Dutch-Shell's Corona
Oil Company. They alone possessed the capital to re-lease
proven producing properties wrested from American control.
Given the growing hostility of the revolutionary regime, it
is doubtful whether American firms would have attempted a
come-back in Mexico. Certainly they would have been in no
position to compete with the Europeans who would have acquired
the best of the former American holdings the moment the origi
nal contracts were voided. With the bulk of American compe
tition eliminated, Anglo-Dutch oilmen (and their respective
governments) would virtually monopolize the Mexican oil in
dustry.
That condition, in turn, would bestow upon the
British Government in particular immense fiscal and political
leverage over the revolutionary regime. Woodrow Wilson, ob
sessed with exerting his own personal influence over the
course of the Mexican Revolution, could not permit such a
development. As distasteful, then, as protection of the oil
companies was to the President, the possibility that the Revo
lution might fall under the control of Cowdray or the Royal
Dutch's aggressive Sir Henri Deterding was even more so. In
view of those circumstances, it became necessary for Washing
ton to intervene on behalf of the American firms. It should
be noted, however, that at a later date, when the threat of
dispossession came from the revolutionary government itself,
the President's response to appeals for relief was, at best,
half-hearted.
41Spring-Rice to Bryan, June 2, 1914, SDR 812.6363/88;
W.L.F.C. van Rappard to Bryan, June 2, 1914, Ibid. Van
Rappard was the Netherlands Ambassador to the United States.
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May 13, while these talks were in progress, Tampico fell
to Constitutionalist forces under General Pablo Gonzalez.
Shortly thereafter, Craddock permitted the disembarkation
of American workers.
Having done all that he was prepared to do on behalf
of the oilmen, Bryan awaited the results of his efforts.
Early reports were favorable.

On May 21, Miller informed

the Secretary that Constitutionalist authorities in Tampico
were complying-with Carranza's order and cooperating fully
with returning American oilmen.
awaited company superintendents.

Moreover, a welcome surprise
Workers returning to camps

behind Constitutionalist lines found wells and storage
facilities, believed to have been abandoned for more than a
month, relatively undamaged.

AO

They credited this great

good fortune to the fidelity of Mexican employees, some of
whom had remained behind at considerable risk to themselves
to protect the camps from fire and vandalism.

43

moment it appeared that the crisis had passed.
alarming news from Tuxpam.

For the
Then came

Retreating Huertista forces had

42Miller to Bryan, May 21, 1914, SDR 812.6363/72.
43

Ibid.; Thompson to Robert Lansing, May 29, 1914,
SDR 812.6363/85; Dumble to Bryan, May 4, 1914, SDR 812.6363/
44.
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suddenly halted in the middle of the Panuco fields and were
"generally believed prepared to destroy all oil wells" if
attempts were made to dislodge them.44

But some days later,

as Constitutionalist units drove down the coast toward
Tuxpam, the Huertistas quietly withdrew.

Thereafter, the

threat of physical destruction of the oilfields was minimal.
For the oilmen, however, trouble had just begun.

II.
Upon withdrawal of the Huertistas from the Huasteca,
Constitutionalist forces in the petroleum province were
divided into two separate commands.

The city of Tampico

and the territory north of the Panuco River were adminis
tered by General Luis Caballero, a political power in the
border state of Tamaulipas.45

Presumably because of the

proximity of his domain to the United States, Caballero was
at least outwardly well disposed toward Americans.

Thus,

oilmen in the northern fields enjoyed a relative tran
quillity altogether lacking below Tampico.

That portion of

the Huasteca lying south of the Panuco, including the port
of Tuxpam and the greater part of the petroleum province.

44Miller to Bryan, May 21, 1914, SDR 812.6363/69.
45Miller to Bryan, June 13, 1914, SDR 812.6363/106.
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fell to General Candido Aguilar.

There the oilmen en

countered immediate implacable hostility.
A native of the State of Veracruz, the General en
joyed great popularity in its principal city and throughout
the central portion of the state.

His influence in this

politically and economically strategic district made him
indispensible to the First Chief.

His marriage to Carranza's

daughter further enhanced his power and prestige.

Appointed

military governor of Veracruz soon after the fall of the
Huerta regime, he became virtually sovereign in those areas
of the state under his control.

46

This was to prove most

unfortunate for the oilmen.
The attitude of the inhabitants of the petroleum
province toward the foreign firms was a factor of great
importance in the struggle for control of the Mexican oil

Testimony of Spellacy, IMA, 955. Commenting on
the harassment of American companies in Mexico, Spellacy
declared that Carranza was apparently unable to control his
powerful lieutenants, particularly in those areas where
foreign firms proved susceptible to blackmail.
In the state
of Sonora, he noted, Governor Plutarco Elias Calles extorted
large sums from American mining interests and refused to
share his take with the revolutionary government. In
Veracruz, Aguilar behaved in the same manner:
"Oil men
have told me they get their orders from Carranza and take
it on to the governor, and if he didn't tear it up he would
write something insulting on it, telling him he was running
Vera Cruz." See also Marvin, "The Jeopardy of Tampico,"
World's Work, 376.
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industry.

Aguilar was intensely anti-American and apparently

committed to the ruin of American and other foreign enter
prise in the republic.

Moreover, much of the population of

the State of Veracruz, especially those in the vicinity of
the occupied city, understandably shared his sentiments.
Strong anti-Americanism persisted in the greater part of
the state long after Funston1s force was withdrawn in Novem
ber, 1914.

Aguilar's persistent harassment of the oilmen

in part reflected this antagonism.
In the vicinity of the oilfields themselves, however,
sentiment varied widely.

Anti-Americanism in the northern

third of Veracruz, center of the oil industry, was consider
ably less apparent than in the lower reaches of the state .^
And there were sound reasons for it.

Foreign-owned oil

companies paid the highest wages in the republic.

In addi

tion, a number of them provided Mexican employees with free
housing, schooling, medical care, and other benefits rarely
if ever enjoyed by workers elsewhere in Mexico.

The standard

of living for indigenous oil company employees was thus far

^Testimony of Spellacy, IMA, 940-949; Testimony
of Doheny, Ibid., 237-238; Hamilton, Early Day Oil Tales
of Mexico, 74 et passim.
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above the national mean.^®

While the cost to the companies

of providing these services was substantial, the return
therefrom was incalculable.

The fidelity of Mexican workers

during the April crisis speaks for itself.
In addition to the support of much of the labor
force in northern Veracruz, the oilmen enjoyed the protection
of General Manuel Pelaez, an invaluable if embarrassing
ally.
Tuxpam.

Pelaez was a

landowner and

rancher with holdings near

Like other

hacendados in

the

petroleum province,he

had leased his lands to foreign oilmen and anticipated a
sizeable income from the development of his properties.
Although locally prominent, Pelaez and his several brothers
were not active politically prior to the Carrancista revolt.
Initially, however, they were sympathetic to the new move
ment.

Then, in May, 1914, Candido Aguilar established him

self in Tuxpam and began to systematically pillage the sur
rounding countryside.

Pelaez' stock was stolen, his money

taken through forced "loans," and his hacienda put to the
torch.

Other local landowners, large

and small alike,

^Testimony of Doheny, IMA, 224-225, 233-238;
Hamilton, Early Day Oil Tales of Mexico, 238-239; Testimony
of Spellacy, IMA, 940-942; Cumberland, Mexico, 309; Bryan
to Carothers, April 28, 1914, SDR 812.6363/29a.
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suffered a similar fate.

Pelaez had the "alternative of

leaving the country or revolting, and he preferred the
latter.
In the summer of 1914, Pelaez organized a small but
effective band of irregulars almost all of whom had been
victimized by Aguilar.

By early 1915, his force had in

creased in size from less than 100 to more than 3,500 men.
The Pelaecistas were motivated by hatred and fear of the
Constitutionalists, particularly of Candido Aguilar.

They

anticipated the nationalization of the petroleum industry
and the confiscation of their own oil-rich properties.
Promulgation of the revolutionary Constitution of 1917,
which vested ownership of the subsoil in the nation, would
confirm those fears and greatly augment Pelaez' following.
Although frequently labelled "Villistas" or "Felicistas,"
the Huastecans were, in reality, "Pelaecistas."

From its

inception through the fall of 1918, the movement was almost

49

Testimony of Buckley, IMA, 839-840; Paul Patterson
Young, "Mexican Oil and American Diplomacy" (unpublished
Ph.D. dissertation, University of Texas, 1934), 46-47;
Marvin, "The Jeopardy of Tampico," World's Work, 376. In
the spring of 1914, "there were no political lines drawn...
in the jungle, no Constitutionalistas or Huertistas or any
other kind of the 'istas' then current. Aguilar brought
politics with him." Ibid.
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exclusively a local phenomenon confined to the petroleum
province.50

Nonetheless, its influence was far-reaching.

It was a major factor in determining the state of MexicanAmerican relations throughout the Carranza era.
By the end of 1914, Pelaez had consolidated his
control of the oilfields.

In the years that followed, he

repeatedly frustrated attempts by successive Carrancista
commanders to drive him from the province.

For six years,

until he cast his lot with Obregon in the spring of 1920,
Pelaez was de facto ruler of the Huasteca.

During the

same period, Carrancista forces held the oil shipping ports
of Tampico and Tuxpam.

Despite the stalemate and inter

mittent campaigning in the oilfields, production of petro
leum continued uninterrupted.

And well it might.

Carranza

and Pelaez alike were heavily dependent upon oil revenues
for solvency.

Crude oil was piped out of Pelaez' territory.

Ibid., 376-377; Young, "Mexican Oil and American
Diplomacy," 48. In September, 1918, Pelaez opened nego
tiations with Zapata, Obregon, and other anti-Carrancista
caudillos in a bid for unity under himself. There is some
indication that the General anticipated the backing of
American corporate interests. Pelaecista military opera
tions were extended into southern Veracruz and into the
adjoining states of Puebla, Hidalgo, and San Luis Potosi.
Failing to win adequate support beyond his power base,
Pelaez threw his support to Obregon in April, 1920. Womack,
Zapata, 310, 340-342, 360.
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where production taxes were levied, and into the Carrancista
spheres of influence, where export taxes and bar dues were
collected.

It was an unusual arrangement, but a practical

one for all concerned.

51

The Pelaecistas were well-disposed toward the oilmen, particularly toward Americans.

They recognized the

fact that the companies, especially if supported by their
respective governments, constituted an effective deterrent
to nationalization of the oil industry and confiscation of
the oilfields.

Moreover, they realized that the companies

alone possessed the capital to develop Pelaecista oil lands
and to pay the taxes and royalties that enabled the General
to hold his own against the rapacious Aguilar.

Finally,

the companies proved highly susceptible to blackmail.

In

late 1914, Pelaez had obtained sizable loans from Doheny,
Cowdray, and the American-owned Penn-Mex Fuel Oil Company.
In February, 1916, he demanded and received from the afore
mentioned interests monthly payments ranging from 5,000 to
30,000 pesos in return for protection from bandits and

51

Marvin, "The Jeopardy of Tampico," World's Work,
376-377; Testimony of Doheny, IMA, 279-290.
-^Testimony of Spellacy, IMA, 954; Testimony of
Buckley, Ibid., 840.
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Carrancista raiders.

Smaller sums were extracted from

other foreign firms operating in the Huasteca.

53

At first the oilmen resisted Pelaez, considering
him a dangerous nuisance.

However, by 1917, the oilmen

grudgingly acknowledged his usefulness and willingly met
his demand for payments in excess of $100,000 per month.
Their change of heart was due to a number of factors:

fear

that Carranza would enforce nationalization of the subsoil;
increasing friction between the oilmen and the Carrancista
regime; the apparent pro-German sympathies of the First
Chief; the threat of German or I.W.W. sabotage; and, of
more immediate importance, the growing lawlessness in the
Huasteca, a condition ultimately attributable to the an
tagonism of Candido Aguilar and other Carrancista officials
in the states of Tamaulipas and Veracruz.54

In time, then,

there evolved a sort of rough "marriage of convenience"
between the oilmen on one hand and Pelaez and the people
of the Huasteca on the other.

However trying that rela

tionship may have been, it unquestionably benefited both

53young, "Mexican Oil and American Diplomacy," 48;
Testimony of Doheny, IMA, 283-290; Marvin, "The Jeopardy
of Tampico," World's Work, 377.
^4Young, "Mexican Oil and American Diplomacy,"
48-49; Testimony of Doheny, IMA, 282-287.
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parties.

Without it the foreign firms would not have

survived for long the advent of the Carranza regime.
The oil companies1 difficulties with Aguilar began
almost as soon as American workers crossed the Panuco.
Carranza's pledge notwithstanding, the General refused to
cooperate with the companies in returning their men to the
southern fields.

Indeed, instead of protecting American

lives and property, Aguilar permitted his lieutenants to
incite the populace to acts of violence against foreigners
and foreign holdings in the southernmost fields.

Further

north, where local anti-foreign sentiment diminished,
soldiers from Aguilar's own command, in the guise of
bandits or deserters, struck at American oil camps in a
series of destructive raids.

Company employees were phy

sically abused, payrolls and supplies stolen, and production
and storage facilities damaged.^

Under these circumstances

company superintendents in Tampico hesitated to restaff the
more remote camps or to send additional crews into the
field.

56

Aguilar's campaign of intimidation against the

oilmen not only delayed resumption of normal operations in

55Miller to Bryan, May 31, 1914, SDR 812.6363/82.
56Ibid.
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the southern fields but threatened to shut them down al
together.57
Having been acquainted with the General for some
time, Miller believed that conditions in the Panuco fields
might become still more serious if allowed to drift.

On

May 31, he conveyed his fears to Bryan, urging the Secre
tary to dispatch a warship to Tuxpam where Aguilar main
tained temporary headquarters.

Miller was convinced that

only the threat or actual use of force would induce the
General to abandon his current course.

The Consul also

expressed concern over the safety of American workers in
the southern fields.

Naval units off Tuxpam should be pre

pared to rush aid to workers in beleaguered camps, he
warned, and, if necessary, to evacuate all Americans from
the district.5®
Bryan and Daniels alike concurred in Miller's analy
sis of conditions in the southern fields.

A warship was

immediately ordered to Tuxpam despite receipt of a written
guarantee from Aguilar affirming the inviolability of Ameri
can lives and property in his command.

Naval officers trans

mitting the General's pledge had found him "very friendly

57Miller to Bryan, June 16, 1914, SDR 812.6363/111.
58Miller to Bryan, May 31, 1914, SDR 812.6363/82.

to foreigners, including Americans," but the Secretaries
were unconvinced.

59

Aguilar was suspect.

His actions

belied his words.®®
On June 6, Bryan received still further disturbing
news from Miller.

Some days earlier, the Consul reported,

the president of the Tampico Chamber of Commerce had been
called before General Caballero and informed that large
sums of money were required for the purchase of munitions.
Because the Huertistas had seized via forced "loans" vir
tually all of the cash in Tampico prior to evacuating the
city, the General had been unable to raise the requisite
amount.

A commission had been appointed to study possible

sources of revenue and to determine the amount of assess
ments.

All businesses in Tampico were "expected" to con

tribute.

For the community of foreign oil companies the

General suggested a contribution of 200,000 pesos (c. $100,000).
The Tampico Oil Association, representing both European and

59Daniels to Bryan, June 6, 1914, SDR 812.6363/98.
®®Miller to Bryan, June 16, 29, and 30, 1914,
SDR 812.6363/111,116, and 119.
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American firms, was to meet in special session to consider
Caballero's demands.61
Several days later. Miller informed Bryan that the
division of the Huasteca between Generals Caballero and
Aguilar had been confirmed.

The last of Caballero's troops

had been withdrawn from northern Veracruz, leaving the
majority of the oil camps without the slightest protection.
Unarmed and at the mercy of roving bands of outlaws or offduty soldiers from Aguilar's command, American and other
foreign workers feared for their lives.
pessimistic.

The Consul was

He had no illusions as to the kind of "pro

tection" the oilmen could expect from Aguilar.®2
Miller believed that dual control of the petroleum
province would lead to serious "complications" for the oil
companies, particularly for those firms with operations in
the more productive southern fields now under Aguilar's
gO
jurisdiction.
He warned Bryan that the General could be

61Miller to Bryan, June 6, 1914, SDR 812.6363/105.
Subsequent correspondence between Miller and Bryan suggests
that Caballero was successful in obtaining at least a
part of the sum demanded. Miller to Bryan, June 13, 1914,
SDR 812.6363/107.
62Miller to Bryan, June 13, 1914, SDR 812.6363/106.
63Ibid
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expected to revert to type at any moment, resuming his
earlier practice of extorting large sums of money from the
oilmen.

During the previous November, despite pledges to

the contrary to both Hiller and Admiral Fletcher, Aguilar
had forced $11,000 from two of the largest foreign firms
in the Huasteca.

Because those companies had surrendered

to the General's demands. Miller asserted, "all companies
may now have to pay voluntary contributions . . . ."

Nor

would the companies dare report those exactions to the
Department of State.

Field operations, wells, and pipelines

were "completely at the mercy of General Aguilar."®4

He had

the oilmen by the throat.
The Constitutionalists, Miller warned, could no
longer be expected to settle for forced "loans" or "war
taxes" such as those recently levied by General Caballero.
Instead, he predicted, they would "spare no pains to
collect 'voluntary loans', and diplomatic protests and

®4Miller to Bryan, June 13, 1914, SDR 812.6363/107;
Hamilton, Early Day Oil Tales of Mexico, 118-119. Hamilton
states that Aguilar demanded and received from the Aguila
and from Doheny*s Huasteca Petroleum Company alike suras of
$100,000, horses, and a quantity of arms and ammunition.
Doheny recalled that the sum paid Aguilar was $10,000. The
payoff was made only after Doheny1s lieutenants conferred
with President Wilson's personal representative in Veracruz,
John Lind, and were assured by Lind that the Administration
approved the company's action. Testimony of Doheny, IMA,
276-277.
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promises would avail no more" than they had the previous
N o v e m b e r . 65

lation.

Bryan could offer little in the way of conso

"In order to safeguard their possible future in

terests," he advised Miller, "American citizens should be
advised to pay oil production taxes under protest."
was a fateful directive.

66

It

67

^ M i l l e r to Bryan, June 13# 1914, SDR 812.6363/107.
Miller's prediction was accurate.
In the summer of 1914,
Aguilar held up the principal producing companies in the
southern fields "for $10,000 apiece on the threat of
stopping their pumps." The only company which refused to
comply was Cowdray's Aguila.
"The consequent stoppage of
its pumps caused leaks around the bonanza Potrero well,"
great loss of oil, and a surface fire which blazed for four
months and cost the company far more than Aguilar had de
manded. Marvin, "The Jeopardy of Tampico," World's Work,
376. The Aguila's misfortune served as an object lesson
to those oilmen who would defy the General. Thereafter,
Aguilar's demands were promptly met.
66Bryan to Miller, June 15, 1914, SDR 812.6363/91.
^Testimony of Buckley, IMA, 830-833. Buckley had
little sympathy for American oilmen in Mexico. Their hard
ships, he believed, could be attributed as much to their
own timidity and ineptitude as to the indifference of the
Wilson Administration:
"There is no question that the oil
companies are right in their contention - there is no
question that their properties were legitimately acquired,
that they have been confiscated, and that they are entitled
to the protection of the American Government. On the other
hand, there is no question that these companies, through a
weak and vacillating policy very similar to that followed
by the American Government in handling the general Mexican
situation, have in large measure brought on the present
condition.... The oil companies... should stand on their
rights and render more easy the efforts of their Government
to protect them." Buckley believed that the oil company
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On June 16, the Consul informed Bryan that conditions
in the Panuco fields had deteriorated rapidly since Cabal
lero's withdrawal from northern Veracruz.

Hostility toward

Americans in the southernmost camps was widespread causing
"much uneasiness"

among the workers.

Anti-American

demonstrations around the camps were increasing.

executives had failed to understand the Mexican situation
and that their managers in the field had bungled negotia
tions with the revolutionary regime.
"When an American in
Mexico is attacked by the authorities, in the absence of . . .
protection . . . from his own Government, if he is to stay
there he must fight or bribe. The American with $5,000
of property all in Mexico, and no resources in the United
States— and this type of American constituted 80 per cent
of those in Mexico— could not bribe and it has been hard
for him to fight alone; some have fought and are still
there. The great majority have lost their small property
and were left no course but to abandon the country. The
oil company, able to fight, has not had the courage to do
so, and has fallen back on the one alternative— bribery . . .
In adopting this contemptible policy, the oil companies
have not only contributed to their present plight, but they
have failed to seize that leadership in the fight for Ameri
can rights in Mexico to which they were urged by circum
stances, and in so failing they have done incalculable harm
to the American of small means and to the American people
and American prestige • . .
The oil companies long ago
accepted the theory of the American Government to the
effect that American property in Mexico is not entitled to
protection; their whole attitude has been one of apology.
Apparently they have been of the opinion that they did not
have the sympathy of the American people, and they have been
loath to stand on their rights." Ibid. It was a shrewd
analysis-blunt, accurate, and to the point.
It concisely
explained the development of the conplex relationship be
tween the oilmen, the Wilson Administration, and the Car
rancista regime.
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Caballero was powerless to curb these activities, and
Aguilar, in whose command they were occurring, was not
disposed to do so.

Indeed, it appeared that the General

himself was encouraging unrest in the south.
for company employees was now imperative.

Protection

Without it, all

work in the southern fields would soon come to a halt.**8
Late in June, almost a full month after Carranza
promised security for foreign workers. Miller reported that
intimidation continued.

Apparently in defiance of the

First Chief's order, Aguilar was deliberately withholding
protection.

And while "prominent citizens" of Panuco

"fostered . . . secret anti-American meetings," the General
was in the process of disarming the oilmen.*>9

All company

employees, Mexican as well as foreign, had been ordered to
turn in their weapons to Constitutionalist authorities.
Persons found in possession of firearms after the deadline
for their surrender would be considered "spies" and dis
posed of

a c c o r d i n g l y . 7 0

i t

was Miller's belief that the

situation in the southern fields was more serious now than
at any time since the seizure of Veracruz.

American workers,

^ M i l l e r to Bryan, June 16, 1914, SDR 812.6363/111.
69Miller to Bryan, June 29, 1914, SDR 812.6363/116.
70Ibid.
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he warned, would resist disarmament.

He anticipated trouble.

Accordingly, he had appealed directly to the General to
rescind the arms decree and to comply with Carranza's
order to extend protection to the oilmen.

However, Miller

believed that little could be expected from his entreaties.
Instead, he foresaw a dangerous confrontation with Aguilar.
The General's response was unexpected.

71

He not only

amended the arms decree to permit retention of sidearms,
but also dispatched a body of troops to the southern fields
to protect the camps from marauding bands of outlaws.
Relief in Tampico was shortlived.

72

The very night that the

soldiers reached the Panuco district, they struck and
plundered the American-owned National Oil Company camp.
Guns, horses, and a quantity of supplies were seized.

Dis

armed and badly shaken, American workers abandoned the camp
for the safety of the city.
taking Aguilar's position.

73

There was no longer any mis

Miller knew his man.

Finally aroused, Bryan instructed George C. Carothers,
assigned to Constitutionalist headquarters at Monterrey, to
"take up with Carranza at once" the situation in the Panuco

71Ibid.
72Miller to Bryan, June 30, 1914, SDR 812.6363/117.
73Miller to Bryan, June 30, 1914, SDR 812.6363/119.
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fields.

Carothers was to “insist" that Aguilar provide

adequate protection for the oilmen without further procras
tination.

In addition, the weapons decree must be res

cinded without qualification.

In closing, the Secretary

observed that "this Government is deeply concerned over
the alarming reports from the Panuco District and hopes
H

that immediate steps will be taken to remedy the situation."
Carranza, doubtless mindful of the American presence at
Veracruz, could ill afford to defy Washington at so critical
a time.

Until Huerta was disposed of, it behooved the Con

stitutionalists to avoid further antagonizing the Secretary.
And as it was clear that Bryan was growing impatient with
Aguilar's duplicity, Carranza moved at once to curtail the
anti-American activities of his headstrong son-in-law.
Harassment of the oilmen declined sharply, and for the
moment at least, tension subsided in the Huasteca.

III.
At the height of the crisis in the oilfields, Bryan
received from Justice Department officials a confidential
report pertaining to the alleged involvement of self-seeking

74Bryan to Carothers, July 1, 1914, SDR 812.6363/122a.
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American corporate interests in Mexican revolutionary
p o l i t i c s . O n June 24, Assistant Attorney General Charles
Warren forwarded to the Secretary a copy of a sensational
article which had appeared some two weeks earlier in a
leading Texas journal.

Included with the article, which

dealt primarily with the splintering of the Constitutionalist
movement, was a corroborating report from Special Agent
Robert C. Barnes, officer in charge of investigations in
the border states.

Doubtless these and accompanying docu

ments confirmed Bryan's and the President's darkest suspi
cions as to the unsavory role of American business interests
in the Mexican imbroglio.
According to the article, carried in the June 8 edi
tion of the San Antonio Express,
and his principal

the rupture

lieutenant was the "result

between Carranza
offinancial

help and political intrigue on the part of large interests
as the basis of a gigantic scheme to dominate the oil and
mineral wealth of

Mexico through concessions

by Villa."

Federal officials

in San Antonio considered the information

to he "wholly conclusive and of profound importance."

Seve

ral officials had been queried by representatives of the

75Charles Warren to Bryan, June 24, 1914, SDR 812.6363/
115.
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Express in an effort to confirm the story.

Although they

had declined to discuss the matter and "wondered how any
part of it had leaked,1' they had "admitted privately" that
they regarded the account as completely accurate.

76

Early in the year, it was alleged, representatives
of the Standard Oil Company and of the Guggenheims1 Ameri
can Smelting and Refining Company had held a series of
conferences with Villista agents at an El Paso hotel.

In

return for substantial financial assistance from those firms,
Villa was supposed to have granted exclusive rights to ex
ploit prime oil and mineral lands in northern Mexico.

Be

hind that deal lay a lurid tale of cutthroat competition
for control of the republic's vast natural resources.

For

Progressives Wilson and Bryan the report doubtless proved
a classic example of the machinations of the "malefactors
of great wealth."
According to intelligence gathered by the Express,
"all of the trouble" below the border was due "entirely to
a private war of the interests."

Because of the immense

concessions awarded Lord Cowdray by Porfirio Diaz, the Ameri
can companies involved had agreed "to rally around anybody"

76Ibid.

to oust the dictator.
their support.

Consequently, Madero had received

But Madero*s performance as president had

displeased all of the interests, British as well as American.
Thus when Cowdray offered his support to Victoriano Huerta,
"there were none to interfere."

In time, however, both

Rockefeller and Guggenheim interests had begun "to chafe
under the ascendancy of British financiers."

Simultaneously,

another revolution had grown out of popular revulsion for
Huerta and indignation over the assassination of Madero.
At first, neither of the American giants had had
cause for complaint against the Constitutionalists.

But as

that faction moved toward victory, difficulties had arisen.
Carranza had begun to speak of "Mexico for the Mexicans,"
issuing proclamations "to the effect that his country's natu
ral resources would be conserved for the country's good . . .
At that point, "'big business' scented danger and began
looking for an opportunity to further muss up the situation."
Representatives of the American firms sounded Villa and came
to terms with him. 77

As a result, "practically every

77Whatever the cause of the rupture between Villa
and Carranza, there was indeed some substance to the alle
gation that Villa and certain American firms operating in
Mexico were willing to cooperate with one another in order
to further their respective interests.
Luis Cabrera was
convinced that Felix Sommerfeld, Villa's principal agent in
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mineral concession worthy of the name in the States of
Chihuahua and Sonora was willed, granted and bequeathed to
the . . . American Smelting and Refining Company by orders
of Villa."

In exchange. Villa received "exceedingly remu

nerative allowances."
Copies of the official documents granting the con
cessions were transmitted to Carranza on the assumption
that he would readily approve the deal.

The final break

between Villa and Carranza, the Express declared, dated
from the First Chief's receipt of the documents.

Carranza

remonstrated strongly with Villa, endeavoring to persuade
him to "undo his action."

But both men were "obdurate."

Finally, in mid-May, Carranza tired of arguing with Villa.
"Grabbing the whole flood of papers," he "wrote in bold
letters across the face of each:

'Annulled. V. Carranza.'"

the United States, was actually an agent for the Guggenheims
and the Standard Oil Company. Quirk, The Mexican Revolution,
95. In fact, the Rockefeller interests had been attempting
to establish a position in Mexican petroleum production
for some time prior to the alleged El Paso conference. In
1912 it had considered acquisition of the Aguila, but Cowdray's price was too high. In 1917, however, the Standard
bought out the Transcontinental Petroleum Company, a small
firm with good leases and a refinery at Tampico. Under the
guidance of President E. J. Sadler, the Transcontinental
soon became one of the leading producers in the Huasteca.
O'Conner, World Crisis in Oil, 108-109.
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Villa responded with "hostile speech and unfriendly actions,"
whereupon the First Chief issued an order removing him from
command.
Subsequent events relevant to the break between
Villa and Carranza had been widely discussed in the American
press, the Express continued, and those accounts differed
little from the intelligence it had received from its own
source in Mexico.

Moreover, the San Antonio journal re

vealed, considerable corroborating evidence had been gathered,
evidence which coincided "so perfectly" with the report re
ceived from its agent that there could be no doubt as to
the accuracy of the expose.

78

The official report of Special Agent Barnes strength
ened the allegations made by the Express, shedding still
newer light on the apparent involvement of American firms
in Mexican revolutionary politics.

According to Barnes,

one Thompson, himself a former Justice Department operative,
had recently returned to the United States after serving a
stint as a Villista advisor.

Calling at Federal offices in

San Antonio, Thompson had passed on information implicating
the Standard Oil Company in the development of the new

^®Warren to Bryan, June 24, 1914, SDR 812.6363/115.
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Villista movement.

Representatives of that firm, "antici

pating that they would be able to secure, and probably al
ready had secured through Pancho Villa, valuable conces
sions in Mexico, had been causing very favorable press
reports to be sent out concerning him."

However, the pro-

Villa propaganda campaign, aimed at enlisting popular support
in the United States for the Villista movement, had been
initiated only after the futility of attempting to work
with Carranza had become apparent.

When company executives

learned that the First Chief had annulled the concessions
recently awarded the firm at El Paso, they threw their full
support to Villa.

Their ultimate objective was American

recognition of a Villista regime in Mexico.

Barnes endorsed

Thompson's report without reservation, observing that the
former agent was "probably in a position to know whereof he
speaks."

Heightening the aura of intrigue, Barnes told of

an Associated Press reporter in El Paso who, upon threaten
ing to expose the tie between Villa and the Rockefeller
interests, had been "promptly transferred to Chicago."

79

In sum, the Justice Department report did incalculable
damage to American and other foreign corporate interests in

79Ibid.
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Mexico.

X£ the account was accepted at face value by

Wilson and Bryan, and there is no indication that it was
not, its effect on those interests was profound, indeed.
It cast a cloud of suspicion over the activities of two
of the largest American firms operating in the republic and,
by implication, over all foreign enterprise therein.

The

report appeared to verify the President's contention that
all foreigners residing in or doing business in Mexico
were bent on exploiting the Mexican people.

80

Given Wilson's

antagonism toward the "concessionaires," it seriously under
mined the position of all foreign investors in Mexico and
virtually assured that in the future they would receive
something less than a sympathetic hearing in Washington.

IV.
Shortly after disclosure of the alleged RockefellerGuggenheim conspiracy, Bryan received from Clarence Miller
a lengthy study of the Mexican oil industry.

81

Researched

and written by the staff of the Tampico Consulate, it was

on

owQuirk, An Affair of Honor, 113; Arthur C. Veatch,
"Oil, Great Britain and the United States," Foreign Affairs,
IX (July, 1931), 669.
8lMiller to Bryan, July 2, 1914, SDR 812.6363/124.
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in large part a discussion of Mexican mineral law, tax
structure within the industry, corporate profit and loss,
and Anglo-American competition for control of the petroleum
province.

It refuted statistically a number of damaging

allegations made by critics of American oilmen operating
in Mexico, particularly the myth of the industry's fantastic
profitability.

In the wake of the damning evidence so re

cently received from Justice Department officials, Miller's
study may well have had a mitigating effect on the Adminis
tration's attitude toward the companies.

Certainly of con

siderable importance was the revelation that the Rockefeller
interests were not as yet participants in the production
end of the Mexican oil industry.

82

The study opened with a discussion of Mexican mineral
law pertaining to the exploitation of petroleum and other

82

Ibid. Miller drew a sharp distinction between the
big integrated companies and the actual producers of crude
oil who took the "real risks" in the Huasteca:
"Whenever
mention is made of the Producer of Petroleum, the abhorrent
idea of Standard Oil comes up to inhibit a fair hearing for
a class of business men who have nothing whatever to do with
the business methods of the great refining concern.11 The
majority of the companies operating in the Huasteca were in
deed "independent" firms engaged solely in the production
of crude, which they sold to the large refiners at Tampico
or Tuxpam. See also Clarence W. Barron, The Mexican Problem
(Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1917), 28-29 et passim.
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mineral fuels, noting that recent amendments of the law
had been made for the express purpose of encouraging foreign
investors to search for and develop deposits of coal and
oil.83

The Mining Law of 1887 had limited taxes on the

sale of mineral fuels to a mere four per cent of value,
explicitly exempting them from any form of special taxa
tion.

But despite this seemingly favorable climate for

investment, risks had remained high.

For years, foreign

capitalists had invested their money in ventures less
speculative and more rewarding than exploration for petro
leum.

The exception was Edward L. Doheny, pioneer of the

Mexican oil industry.8^

O 1

For discussions of Mexican mineral law see J.
Reuben Clark, Jr. "The Oil Settlement With Mexico," Foreign
Affairs, VI (July, 1928), 600-614, and Marvin D. Bernstein,
The Mexican Mining Industry, 1890-1950; A Study of the
Interaction of Politics, Economics, and Technology (Albany:
State University of New York, 1964), 18-19, 78-83, et passim
(hereafter cited as Mexican Mining Industry).
8^Whatever Doheny1s shortcomings, he must be given
full credit for the founding of the Mexican petroleum in
dustry. His foresight, shrewdness, courage, and, above all,
tenacity, in developing the great Huasteca oilfields were
remarkable indeed.
There are few parallels in the annals
of the international petroleum industry.
Doheny came up
the hard way.
With years of unsuccessful prospecting in
the Southwest and Mexico behind him, he was no stranger to
disappointment and failure.
His big break came in 1892.
While onlookers shook their heads, Doheny and a single
partner, Charles A. Canfield toiled in the muck beneath
the streets of Los Angeles to bring in the discovery well
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Doheny requested and received a guarantee against
capricious taxation as well as an exemption from import
duties on oil production equipment.

These provisions and

of one of the largest California oilfields. Overnight a
millionaire, Doheny could have retired. Instead, he and
Canfield took a calculated risk, gambling on the presence
of commercially exploitable petroleum reservoirs in the sub
soil of the Mexican Gulf Coast. Again ignoring the advice
of professional geologists, they staked all they owned on
the Mexican venture. Where others had succumbed to the
myriad obstacles of exploration and exploitation in the
jungle, Doheny and Canfield persisted. It very nearly
ruined them. Then in May, 1901, the Ebano discovery well
was completed. Despite this initial success, the venture
nearly foundered. Having sold his California interests to
finance the Mexican enterprise, Doheny was deeply in debt
and unable to secure further backing. At a critical moment
for the partners, they were joined by Mexican geologist
Ezequiel Ordonez. Upon the latter*s recommendation, a new
drilling site was chosen.
In April, 1904, the first well
of outstanding commercial production came in. It was Los
Angeles all over again.
From the Ebano district, Doheny
shifted operations south of the Panuco River in 1906. The
same year, he organized two new producing companies, the
Tuxpam Petroleum Company and the Tamiahua Petroleum Company.
Early in 1907, he organized the famous Huasteca Petroleum
Company, for years the largest producer of Mexican crude.
Shortly thereafter, he consolidated his extensive holdings
in a new parent organization, the Mexican Petroleum Company,
Limited, of Delaware. While developing the Ebano field,
Doheny wildcatted his Huasteca properties.
In September,
1910, the great Juan Casiano No. 7, a gusher, blew in at
70,000 barrels a day.
Doheny was a millionaire again. The
Doheny companies were the largest producers in Mexico. From
1901 to April, 1925, when Doheny sold his Mexican interests
to the Standard Oil Company of Indiana, they produced some
560,000,000 barrels of oil. On the date of transfer they
had reached peak production, gross receipts for the month
^exceeding $10,000,000.
The amount of the sale is disputed,
ranging from a low of $16,000,000 to a high of $150,000,000.
See Fritz L. Hoffmann, "Edward L. Doheny and the Beginnings
of Petroleum Development in Mexico," Mid-America, XXIV (April,
1942), 94-108; Testimony of Doheny, IMA, 207-294; O'Conner,
World Crisis in Oil, 105-110.
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still other attractive concessions were written into the
new Petroleum Law of 1901, a measure aimed at expediting
foreign investment in the development of a domestic oil
industry.

In addition, contracts between foreign oilmen

and the Mexican Government were to guarantee certain other
privileges and tax exemptions to the companies for a
period of ten years subsequent to the commencement of
operations.

By 1914, sixty-three foreign firms had taken

advantage of this favorable legislation to follow in the
path blazed by Doheny.

With one exception the conduct of

these firms, if at times unethical, had been scrupulously
within the law.
The exception, however, was an extremely important
one:

Cowdray's Mexican Eagle Oil Company (Aguila).

In

flagrant violation of the Petroleum Law of 1901, President
Diaz had awarded the firm of S. Pearson and Sons, the parent
company of the Cowdray organization, unusually favorable
terms for the exploitation of Mexican petroleum.

In 1906,

the Aguila was licensed to operate in six states and granted
exemption from certain taxes for a fifty-year period.

In

addition, the company was authorized to exploit federal
lands and waters, an invaluable privilege denied its

85Miller to Bryan, July 2, 1914, SDR 812.6363/124.
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competitors.

Besides exclusive access to the mineral

wealth of the so-called federal zones, this award enabled
the Aguila, if it so chose, to pirate oil from competitors
by directional drilling from federal properties located in
the midst of producing fields.**®

Still another advantage

enjoyed solely by the Cowdray firm was the privilege of
shipping crude oil from the free port of Tuxpam, thereby
escaping the special export tax levied on shipments passing
through the Port of Tampico, a tax illegally imposed by the
dictator in 1910.
In awarding these generous concessions to the Cowdray
interests, Diaz seriously undermined the competitive position
of American and other foreign oil companies vis a vis the
Aguila.

The way was thus opened for monopolization of the

Mexican oil industry.

Had Cowdray moved with greater alac

rity, despite the Madero revolution and the turmoil that

**®Ibid. All bodies of water were considered federal
property, as was a narrow strip of land along the banks.
Thus it was possible for the Aguila to drill wells on the
banks or in the beds of streams or other bodies of water
located on a competitor's productive properties. There is
no evidence that the Aguila ever took advantage of this
unique privilege, but the possibility that it might do so
caused considerable apprehension among its competitors.
8^Ibid.; Spender, Lord Cowdray, 149-162.
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followed, he might well have achieved that end.

As of the

summer of 1914 and for sometime thereafter, he enjoyed a
tremendous advantage over his competitors.

The fact was

distasteful to Miller, to say nothing of other oilmen.
Because of the British firm's favored position, other
companies operated under severe handicaps:

first, in the

search for oil; second, in the production of crude; and,
third, in the export of petroleum products.

In the vital

area of production lay the gravest threat of all.

If

Aguila managers chose to exercise their full privileges
in the federal zones, their competitors faced ruin.
Miller estimated American investment in the Huasteca
at $175,000,000, a conservative figure, he believed, since
he knew "positively" that it exceeded $100,000,000.

Al

though the industry was alleged to be "most profitable,"
such was not the case.

Only three of the sixty-three

companies operating in Mexico in 1914 had paid dividends.
And those firms were not returning their investment at a
competitive rate.

"The business," Miller asserted, "is

distinctly not profitable."®®
88

Ibid. As of 1914, the three companies referred to
by Miller had made a total cash investment of $48,000,000 in
the Mexican oil industry. The average rate of return to their
respective shareholders was slightly better than five percent
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Indeed, until large-scale production could be de
veloped, most companies in Mexico would continue to operate
in the red.

The initial cost of establishing a more or

less permanent position in the Huasteca was exorbitant.
Virtually all supplies and equipment had to be imported
from the United States.

Production sites were literally

hacked out of the jungle, and considerable sums expended
to make them habitable for foreign workers.

In addition,

an effective communications and transportation network had
to be constructed where before arrival of the oilmen nothing
of the sort had existed.

Hoads, railroad spurs, pipelines,

and telephone and telegraph lines were pushed through the
wilderness to isolated camps, tying them to company offices
and storage and shipping facilities in Tampico.

Thus expen

ditures far exceeded revenues in the early years of the
Huasteca oil boom.

In Mexico, as elsewhere, oilmen did not

on capital invested.
Investors could have obtained a
greater return on their money "in loan transactions."
Ibid. Until 1917, when the rate of production began to
accelerate rapidly, conditions remained unchanged. Although
by the latter date the number of oil-producing companies
had risen from 63 to 340, the number paying dividends did
not increase. Marvin, "The Jeopardy of Tampico," World1s
Work, 379. The sole American firm to declare a dividend
prior to 1917 was Doheny's Mexican Petroleum Company.
Testimony of Doheny, IMA, 243. Dividends were also paid
by Cowdray's Aguila and by the Royal Dutch-Shell*s Corona.
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anticipate steady profits until some time after initial
developmental work was completed.

89

Miller was concerned for American oilmen.

He believed

that prospects for increased profitability in the future
were dim.

"Each change of government1' meant increased

taxation; and taxation was "directed at industry and not
at the idle rich."

gn

Diaz had imposed the aforementioned

export tax in 1910; Madero, too, had violated the Petroleum
Act of 1901 by arbitrarily adding another "special tax" in
1912; next, the State of Veracruz had imposed its own
illegal production and export taxes; and, finally, in 1913,
Huerta had added still another production tax.

As of July,

1914, the companies were paying taxes at a rate occasionally

89Ibid. Hoffman, "Edward L. Doheny and the Be
ginnings of Petroleum Development in Mexico," MidAmerica, 100-107; Testimony of Doheny, IMA, 209-210, 229,
242-243; Bevan, "Oil Industry of the Tampico District,"
De GoIyer Papers; Barron, The Mexican Problem, 18-32,
95-100.
90

Miller to Bryan, July 2, 1914, SDR 812.6363/124.
For additional discussion of taxation in the Mexican
petroleum industry see Testimony of Buckley, IMA, 831832; Harold E. Davis, "Mexican Petroleum Taxes," Hispanic
American Historical Review, XII (November, 1932), 405419 (hereafter cited as HAHR).
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exceeding fifty per cent of the gross value of crude at
the wellhead. 91
In addition to those burdensome levies, the companies
also bore the high and rising cost of transporting the
crude from the fields to Tampico and from that point on to
foreign markets or to refineries in the United States.

Thus

91Miller to Bryan, July 2, 1914, SDR 812.6363/124.
Some five years later the companies were still paying taxes
varying from a minimum of twenty per cent to over fifty
per cent of the value of the oil at the wellhead.
Testi
mony of Buckley, IMA, 832, and Doheny, Ibid., 244. Ac
cording to Mexican law, the export tax on crude oil could
not exceed ten per cent of the value of the oil at the
well. Yet the Mexican Government "openly and obviously"
violated the law, Doheny declared. The Mexican petroleum
commissioner valued the oil not at the wellhead, but at
the port of New York where its value had been increased
by the cost of transportation, an increase of two or three
times the value at the wellhead.
Ibid., 259. Doheny
explained that despite the existence of extremely prolific
wells in Mexico, the owners of many of those wells had no
pipelines, no storage or harbor facilities, and no tankers
to carry their oil to market.
Consequently, oil in Mexico
“has very much the same value... ice has... in Greenland.
If it could be transported to New York these warm days it
would undoubtedly find a ready market and be very valuable,
but nobody would pay a very high price for it at its present
location. That is true of the oil underground in Mexico,
even where wells have tapped it...." Taxes on Mexican
oil, he believed, should be based on the value of the oil
"at the derrick" and not at New York City "where American
capital has expended millions... in building refineries
and storage facilities and tank steamers for transporting
it."
Ibid., 243-244. See also Barron, The Mexican Problem,
56.
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operating costs were large and growing larger. 9 2

Mean-^

while, companies which had pioneered the industry, in
effect at the invitation of the Mexican Government, and
justly expected a fair return on their investment were now
faced with the prospect of steadily shrinking profit margins.

93

Yet conditions in the industry were clearly con

ducive to movement in the opposite direction.

The increasing

disparity between potential and actual profitability, Miller
charged, was due to excessive and illegal taxation of the
industry by Mexican authorities.

94

The oilmen, Miller declared, realized that the fiscal
needs of the new Constitutionalist regime would necessarily

92

Testimony of Doheny, IMA, 246.

91
Nor did conditions improve with time.
Discussing
eroding profit margins in 1917, George Marvin identified
excessive taxation and increasing operating expenses as the
principal causes of the oilmen's discomfiture. A large
number of companies, he explained, were delivering oil
under long-term contracts, the "only way crude oil can be
sold in bulk." Some of those contracts still had many
months and years to run in 1917. But transportation costs
had risen sharply, as much as 400 percent in some instances.
Marvin cited one case in which a large American company had
contracted to deliver Mexican oil in New York at one dollar
per barrel but now paid two dollars per barrel for trans
porting the oil in chartered tankers. Marvin, "The Jeopardy
of Tampico," World's Work, 379.
94Miller to Bryan, July 2, 1914, SDR 812.6363/124.

167
be "enormous."

They feared that a significant increase in

taxation was "imminent."

Yet most companies operating in

the Huasteca had invested too much in the Mexican oil in
dustry to withdraw.

At the moment, the Consul declared,

that industry was the "least profitable business" in the
republic.

True, critics of the oilmen had made much of

the speed with which they had returned to the fields in
the face of great danger.

To some this was proof enough

of the "fabulous profitability" of the industry.
Miller asserted.

Not so,

The oilmen had returned to the fields to

"save what they had" and to preclude the occurrence of a
major disaster.®5
Briefly stating the position of American oilmen in
Mexico, the Consul explained that their principal fear was the
possible loss of their capital "under form of law through
ill-considered tax decrees . . . .”

Legal encroachment upon

the companies was a "danger . . . just as real as . . . con
fiscation by armed force . . . and more insidious."
result. Miller declared, would be the same.

The

Moreover, there

was no redress for the confiscation of property under form
of law.

He strongly urged that "governmental interest" be

95Ibid
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“shown in defense of Americans against this form of
threatened confiscation."

Such a course was absolutely

essential for preservation of the Mexican oil industry,
for the protection of American investors, and for assuring
the fuel supply of the United States Navy.96
It was the Consul's belief that if the Mexican Govern
ment took fifty per cent of the oilmen's capital-return
each year, few of the American companies could long afford
to continue operations in the republic.

Only recently, he

reminded Bryan, Huerta's Secretary of Fomento had urged
that the Mexican oil industry be nationalized and turned
over completely to the Cowdray interests.

“Unlimited

taxation of the industry under the form of law" would
almost surely produce that result, Miller concluded.97
Little more than a month after the submission of
Miller's report on the Mexican oil industry, new develop
ments in the Huasteca lent credence to his pessimistic
predictions.

In mid-August, Thomas Bevan, Miller's suc

cessor at Tampico, forwarded to Bryan copies of two de
crees issued by Candido Aguilar shortly before the fall of

96Ibid.

97Ibid
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the Huerta regime.

98

The first decree voided all real

estate transfers concluded in the State of Veracruz during
Huerta's tenure; the second required explicit approval of
state authorities for any future transfers.

The Governor's

action was clearly aimed at the oilmen, and, in an accom
panying statement, he denounced them in no uncertain terms.
Petroleum lands held by foreign companies, he contended,
had been acquired in a manner "detrimental to the owners"
and through "unfair and one-sided contracts."

Moreover, in

the past, when their investments had been jeopardized, the
companies had "solicited the aid of foreign armed forces."
The predominance of foreign capital in the industry was
clearly a threat to the Mexican nation.

It was only just,

the Governor declared, that "when the country passes through
critical periods, the foreigner ought to bear the same
losses as the natives."

Concluding his statement, Aguilar

^ T h o m a s H. Bevan to Bryan, August 14, 1914, SDR
812.6363/130. Prior to his appointment as clerk at the
Tampico consulate, Bevan had worked for the United States
Geological Survey and later as private secretary to a
United States Senator. From 1912 to 1916, he served as
vice-consul at Tampico, succeeding Miller when the latter
resigned briefly in the fall of 1914. Register, 1924,
96.
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warned that attempts to evade his decrees through clan
destine contracts would be punishable by confiscation of
the properties involved.

99

Commenting on the Governor's action, Bevan noted
that during the Huerta administration American and other
foreign firms had invested large sums of money in new
leases and land purchases.

The decree voiding those trans

actions deprived the companies of legally acquired property
while providing no compensation for losses incurred.
was a costly blow to the oilmen.

It

At the moment, Bevan

informed the Secretary, legal representatives of the com
panies were attempting to arrange a conference with the
Governor in hopes of winning a measure of relief.100

It

was well that the companies themselves took the initiative.
Little effective aid could be expected from Washington."*'01
V.
The political situation in Mexico had been completely
altered by the mid-July resignation and flight of Huerta.

^ B e v a n to Bryan, August 14, 1914, SDR 812.6363/130.
100Ibid.
101Arthur Link, Wilson: The Struggle for Neutrality,
1914-1915 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1960), 232
(hereafter cited as Wilson: Struggle for Neutrality) ; Cline,
The United States and Mexico, 171-172; Baker, Woodrow Wilson,
V, 56-57; Link, Wilson: The New Freedom, 414-416.
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So, too, was the relationship between the First Chief and
Woodrow Wilson.

Out of patience with the President's

persistent meddling in Mexican affairs and no longer de
pendent upon him for support against the usurper, Carranza
forgot the Cabrera pledge and abandoned all semblance of
cooperation with Washington.

He refused to recognize the

provisional government of Francisco Carbajal and pressed
on toward the capital.
commenced anew.

102

Abuse of foreigners and churchmen

Immediately immense pressure was brought

to bear upon the Wilson Administration to curb xenophobic

102

Testimony of Francis P. Joyce, April 29, 1920,
IMA, 2656-2653. Joyce, a Roman Catholic chaplain in the
United States Army, was a member of the force occupying
Veracruz from April to November, 1914.
He was appalled at
the brutal treatment of Roman Catholic clergy by Constitu
tionalist soldiers and devoted much of his time to allevia
ting the distress of those unfortunates. On the eve of
the American withdrawal, Joyce appealed to John R. Silliman,
Wilson's personal representative in Veracruz, for assistance
in evacuating several hundred nuns from the city. Many had
already been raped or otherwise abused, and Joyce had no
illusions as to their fate when the city was turned over to
Candido Aguilar.
Like his chief and his intensely antiCatholic predecessor, John Lind, Silliman was openly antago
nistic to the Mexican Church. He refused to cooperate with
Joyce, declaring that "the worst thing in Mexico, next to
prostitution, is the Catholic Church, and both must go."
Ibid., 26256a 2657. For an account of the extreme anti
clericalism of the Carrancistas see Testimony of Mother
Elias de Sta Sacto, April 29, 1920, Ibid., 2649-2656. Mother
Elias, a former Mother Superior of the Carmelite Order,
witnessed the occupation of Mexico City by Carrancistas in
late summer 1914.
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and anticlerical excesses in Mexico, but to slight avaxl.

103

Torn between humanitarianism and political expediency on the
one hand and his strong commitment to the Revolution on the
other, the President was inclined to procrastinate.

His

response to the baneful turn of events below the border was
half-hearted and largely ineffective.

Anticipating an orgy

of looting and killing when Constitutionalist forces en
tered Mexico City, Wilson and Bryan admonished Carranza to
"behave responsibly" in occupying the capital.

They would

not tolerate the sacking of the city, they warned.

Should

it occur, the United States would withhold recognition from
the new regime.
Glibly assuring the President that foreign lives
and property were secure, Carranza entered the capital on
August 20.

Discipline dissolved.

Disorder and bloodshed

■^0^Quirk, The Mexican Revolution, 62-6 3; Baker,
Woodrow Wilson, V, 57; Testimony of Buckley, IMA, 798-799.
Short of armed intervention, there was little effective
action that the President could take in order to check
Carrancista excesses in the capital. As Link observes:
"The Revolution was out of control at the very time that
he Wilson wanted most to guide it." Link, Wilson: The
New Freedom, 414.
104Ibid., 414-415.
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followed.

10 5

Shortly thereafter. Constitutionalist

officials seized the National Railways of Mexico, owned
in part by European and American bondholders.106
its recent threats, Washington demurred.

Despite

Spokesmen for

American interests in the republic were quick to upbraid
the Administration for its equivocal defense of property
rights.

Unless the government took a firm stand on the

matter, and soon, warned one irate investor, confiscation
and destruction of American property would "spread un
checked."10^

Time proved him correct.

By the end of the

summer, it was abundantly clear that the President had
lost whatever influence he might have once had over Con
stitutionalist leadership.

His pledge to protect European

and American interests under a revolutionary government
became increasingly difficult to fulfill.

10^Testimony of Buckley, IMA, 798-799; Quirk, The
Mexican Revolution, 62-63; Leon J. Canova to Bryan, August 27,
1914, SDR 812.00/13013, 13020.
100Hitchler to Lansing, September 1, 1914, SDR
812.6363/136.
Several million dollars worth of the company's
bonds were held by American investors.
Ibid.; Silliman to
Bryan, September 14, 1914, SDR 812.6363/136.
107

W. J. Payne to Lansing, September 29, 1914,
SDR 812.6363/140. Payne was president of the National
Petroleum Company, a firm with producing wells in the
Huasteca.

Chapter 4

WILSON VS. THE CONSTITUTIONALISTS:
REVOLUTIONARY DISCORD AND THE
BREAK WITH CARRANZA

I.
In September, 1914, Venustiano Carranza sat in the
National Palace as provisional president of the Mexican
Republic.

His position, however, was scarcely less em

barrassing than that of the man in the White House.

Like

Wilson, Carranza had recently experienced a considerable
diminution of influence over the course of events in Mexico.
He remained at the head of the Constitutionalist movement,
but only at the sufferance of his generals.

His command

of the revolutionary armies was no more than nominal.

Ef

fective power rested in the hands of a dozen or more pro
vincial caudillos, each pursuing his own tortuous path to
the presidency.^
The most serious immediate threat to Carranza's

^ u i r k , The Mexican Revolution, 60, 69-70; Link,
Wilson; Struggle for Neutrality, 233.
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authority came from Francisco Villa, commander of the
powerful Division of the North.

Strongly antagonistic

toward Carranza and egged on by ambitious and disgruntled
advisors, Villa was determined to wrest control of the
revolutionary movement from his chief.

2

By early 1914 he

had established a virtually independent regime in the
northern State of Chihuahua, hired propagandists and
lobbyists in the United States, and commenced recruiting
and equipping his own private army.

The necessary funds

were obtained through the sale of stolen cattle in the
United States and through "loans" extorted from American
and other foreign mining interests operating in northern
Mexico.3
Villa fully appreciated the importance of Washing
ton's favor.

He assiduously courted the Administration,

"at all times and in all places" saying "what he thought...

2Ibid., 234-237; Louis M. Teitelbaum, Woodrow Wilson
and the Mexican Revolution, 1913-1916: A History of United
States-Mexican Relations From the Murder of Madero Until
Villa's Provocation Across the Border (New York: Exposition
Press, 1967), 129-130 (hereafter cited as Wilson and the
Mexican Revolution)• See also Clendenen, The U.S. and
Villa, 93-94, 114-120.
-a

JIbid., 56; Link, Wilson: Struggle for Neutrality,
235; Teitelbaum, Wilson and the Mexican Revolution, 130.
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Wilson and . . . Bryan wanted to hear."^

The Veracruz inci

dent had proved a stroke of great good fortune for Villa,
and he had shrewdly turned it to maximum advantage.

Posing

as the steadfast friend of the United States, he had suc
ceeded in convincing Administration officials that he alone
among the revolutionary hierarchy was capable of respon
sible, disinterested leadership.

For months, despite

mounting evidence to the contrary, official Washington
held to the myth of Villa the patriot.®
In June, 1914, the smoldering quarrel between Villa
and Carranza flared into the open.

Alarmed at the prospect

of still new civil strife in Mexico, Wilson and Bryan strove
to effect a reconciliation.

Early in July, American agents

and sub-chiefs representing the contending factions con
ferred in Torreon and patched together a shaky truce.

4Link, Wilson;

Struggle for Neutrality, 245.

5

Ibid., 239. Link asserts that by midsummer 1914,
Villa ”had already given ample demonstration . . . of his
utter temperamental incapacity to govern in his own right
or to work in harness with the First Chief." It was clear
that Villa "was fast becoming the tool of some of the most
predatory elements in the revolutionary movement . . . .
It
is difficult to understand how Wilson and Bryan could have
failed to recognize what was clear to all disinterested
observers, that Villa was essentially violent and destructive
and therefore incapable of giving leadership to a great
people." Ibid., 238-239.
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According to the Torreon Agreement, revolutionary generals
were to convene in the capital upon the ejection of Huerta
to organize a new constitutional government.

Each delegate

to the proposed convention was to represent a thousand
revolutionary soldiers. **
Although factional differences were momentarily com
promised, Villa's determination to dominate the revolu
tionary movement assured eventual renewal of the contest.
Already his Division of the North equaled or exceeded in
size the combined forces of all other Constitutionalist
commanders.

And, as the date of the proposed convention

approached, Villa sought to assure his control of that
body by vigorously recruiting still new regiments.

In

forming Wilson of his plans, he revealed his intention to
back his chief of artillery, General Felipe Angeles, for
the presidency.

Villa was certain of victory if the

Carrancistas honored the Torreon Agreement.

If, however,

the First Chief reneged. Villa would forcibly install his
candidate in the National Palace.

He urged Wilson to use

his influence to force Carranza's adherence to the pact.

6Carothers to Bryan, July 9, 1914, Foreign Relations,
1914, 559-560; Quirk, The Mexican Revolution, 41-42.
^Link, Wilson;

Struggle for Neutrality, 237.
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He would make no move against the First Chief, Villa
assured the President, until he had received an acknow0
ledgement from the White House.
Villa's message reached Washington on August 1.
Already disappointed in Carranza and increasingly welldisposed toward his rival, Wilson and Bryan leaped at the
chance to play a greater role in Mexican affairs.

The

initiative lost in April appeared retrievable in August.
For some time, Administration officials had been inclined
to favor Villa over other lesser-known revolutionary
leaders.

By mid-summer, he had emerged as the single

admirable figure among the first rank of revolutionary
leadership, the only one of the lot apparently genuinely
concerned with the welfare of his people.

9

He alone ap

peared capable of truly uniting the disparate revolutionary
elements and restoring lasting peace to the republic.

Ad

ministration officials were further impressed by his
eagerness to cooperate with Washington and to defer to
the President's will.

Villa's behavior contrasted sharply

with the sullen contrariness of Carranza.

It was an im

portant factor in winning Washington's support.10

8Ibid.

9Ibid., 239.

10Clendenen, The U.S. and Villa, 121; Link, Wilson:
Struggle for Neutrality, 239-240.
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The President wanted very much to assist the Mexi
can people in the task of reconstruction.

Moreover, he

was still responsible for the protection of foreign in
terests in Mexico.

Thus it was of great importance to

Wilson that the leaders of the faction which ultimately
gained control of the republic should be men with whom he
could work amicably.

In the summer and fall of 1914, the

Villistas appeared best able to fulfill that requirement.
Strengthening the case for Villa was his growing popularity
among a large segment of the American people, particularly
among Wilsonian progressives and liberals generally who
had come to view the erstwhile bandit as a sort of modern
Robin Hood.11

In the final analysis, however, Wilson's

decision to back the Villista movement grew out of the
conviction that Carranza was finished, that the First
Chief could not long stand before the powerful and spirited
Division of the North.12
The President responded to Villa's note by dispatch
ing to Mexico still another executive agent. New York
attorney Paul Fuller.

Fuller was instructed to confer

11Ibid., 241; Clendenen, The U.S. and Villa, 56.
12

Link, Wilson;

Struggle for Neutrality, 241.
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with both factional leaders and to impress upon them the
urgency of resolving their differences without resort to
bloodshed.

Proceeding immediately to northern Mexico,

Puller found Villa the very model of accommodation.

13

Moving on to the capital, he reported that Carranza, too,
appeared willing to cooperate.

The First Chief expressed

his readiness to abide by the Torreon Agreement, thereby
eliminating the ostensible point of contention between the
factions.^

Wilson and Bryan were elated.

Clearly,

Villista delegates would dominate the convention.

Very

soon the republic would be reunited under a legitimate
constitutional regime, one which the President assumed
would be well-disposed toward the United States and amen
able to suggestions from the White House.

l3Clendenen, The U. S. and Villa, 103-105.
^ F u l l e r to Bryan, September 5, 1914, Foreign Rela
tions , 1914, 594; Link, Woodrow Wilson and the Progressive
Era, 130. Despite Carranza's assurances of cooperation.
Fuller was distressed by the vindictiveness of Constitu
tionalist authorities towards their erstwhile opponents.
Equally disturbing to Wilson's agent was Carranza's deter
mination to execute broad social and economic reform by
revolutionary decree rather than through normal legislative
process. In his final report to the President, Fuller
questioned the ability of the Carrancistas to exert a posi
tive influence on the reconstruction of the republic. On
the other hand. Fuller was favorably impressed with Villa
and his lieutenants, and so informed the President. Teitelbaum, Wilson and the Mexican Revolution, 165-168, 173.
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Villa, however, put no stock in Carranza's promises.
Fearing that the First Chief intended to pack the conven
tion, as he himself was in the process of doing, Villa
abruptly called for national elections and the organiza
tion of a provisional government prior to the convening
of the revolutionary caucus.^
imminent.

Again civil war appeared

George Carothers, still attached to Villa's

headquarters, sought to preclude a rupture and to salvage
the pending convention through a new round of negotiations.
Accordingly, he arranged a conference between Villa and
Alvaro Obregon, the latter representing those commanders
still nominally loyal to Carranza.

The talks proved

fruitless, culminating in the seizure and near-execution
of Obregon.

Only the timely intervention of Carothers*

aide, Leon J. Canova, and other cooler heads saved Car
ranza's spokesman from the firing s q u a d . I n

the days

that followed, nothing more was said of national elections.
Villa prepared to fight.
By late September, hostilities had commenced.
Having concluded an alliance with Emiliano Zapata, leader

^Link, Wilson; Struggle for Neutrality, 248=249.
16Clendenem

The U.S. and Villa, lW-lie.
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of the southern agrarian movement, Villa turned on Carrancista outposts along the northern border.

17

In a bid for

popular support and doubtless with an eye toward Washing
ton, he pledged that neither he nor any of his generals
would seek the presidency of the republic or accept it if
offered.

18

Carranza responded to Villa's power play by

boycotting the revolutionary convention which had opened
as scheduled on October 1.

The First Chief, Silliman la

mented, had acted in good faith in agreeing to abide by
the Torreon Agreement.

He was bitterly disappointed by

Villa's duplicity and determined to deny him control of
the revolutionary movement.
was little remorse.

19

In Washington, however, there

Committed to a Villista victory,

either at the convention or in the field, Wilson and Bryan
had reason to be pleased with Carranza's decision.

His

self-imposed withdrawal from the convention seemed to all
but assure the triumph of their man.

^Silliman to Bryan, September 23, 1914, Foreign
Relations, 1914, 605; New York Times, September 26, 1914.
18

Carothers to Bryan, September 26, 1914, Foreign
Relations, 1914, 605; Letcher to Bryan, September 26, 1914,
Ibid., 607.
19

Link, Wilson; Struggle for Neutrality, 25.
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Shortly after Carranza's break with the Convention,
that body departed the capital to reconvene at the Villista
stronghold of Aguascalientes.

There, controlled by a coa

lition of Villista and Zapatista delegates, the Convention
proclaimed its sovereignty, repudiated Carranza’s authority,
and called upon the First Chief to step down.

20

A delega

tion led by the as yet uncommitted Obregon then proceeded
to Mexico City to obtain Carranza's resignation.
First

But the

Chief proved difficult.

He would resign and leave

the country, he declared, only

if Villa would follow him

into exile.

21

Frustrated, the Convention summarily deposed

Carranza and appointed General Eulalio Gutierrez provisional
president of Mexico.22

Gutierrez was to rule by decree

until national elections could be conducted and a new con
stitutional government organized.

At the same time. Villa

was confirmed as commander-in-chief of the Conventionist
armies, an act which assured him control of the new regime.
Despite the

proceedings at Aguascalientes and the

*wCanova to Bryan, October 23 and 30, 1914, Foreign
Relations, 1914, 612, 615.
21

Canova to Bryan, October 29 and November 16, 1914,
Ibid., 615, 623.
22
‘Canova to Bryan, November 2, 1914, Ibid., 617.
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emergence of a "legitimate" Conventionist government,
political stability remained as elusive as ever.

Power

still resided in the hands of the generals, and again the
generals were divided.

By early November, three of the

most important sub-chiefs had cast their lot with Carranza.
His son-in-law, Candido Aguilar, offered sanctuary in the
State of Veracruz, permitting the First Chief to occupy the
port shortly after Funston's force withdrew.

23

Also re

affirming his loyalty was General Pablo Gonzalez, master
of Tampico and commander of the large Army Corps of the
Northeast.

Last to commit himself, and certainly the most

important to do so, was Obregon.

And with the Sonoran came

the greater part of the veteran Army Corps of the Northwest.

23

From the very first, Wilson had regretted the
seizure and occupation of Veracruz. Following Huerta's
flight in July, 1914, the President became increasingly
anxious to withdraw the expeditionary force and in midSeptember initiated steps to that end. Garrison to Bryan,
September 15 and 21, 1914, Ibid., 597, 601-602. However,
the threat of Carrancista reprisals against persons who
had cooperated with the occupying authorities stayed his
hand. American forces remained in possession of the city
until the First Chief grudgingly agreed to an amnesty.
Cardoso de Oliveira to Bryan, November 10, 1914, Ibid.,
618-620. Satisfied, the President gave the order to with
draw.
In order to avoid charges of partiality, formal
surrender of the city to representatives of either faction
was prohibited. On November 23, 1914, Dunston's force
boarded transports in the harbor and sailed for home.
Breckinridge to Funston, November 20, 1914, Ibid., 625;
Canada to Bryan, November 23, 1914, Ibid., 626. Shortly
thereafter, General Candido Aguilar entered the city. Ibid.
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In opposition the Convention boasted Villa's vaunted Divi
sion of the North, Panfilo Natera's untested Central Divi
sion, and Zapata's ragged A m y of the South,

But at

Carranza's disposal was the bulk of the old Constitutional
ist forces and the superb generalship of Alvaro Obregon.
Thus by the end of November the lines were drawn.

The

Constitutionalist movement was irrevocably split.24
Although Carranza was officially deposed by the
Convention on November 10 and subsequently forced to with
draw first to Puebla and then to Veracruz, the odds remained
heavily weighted in his favor.

25

However, despite the pro

cession of executive agents in and out of Mexico and an
accompanying flood of highly informative consular reports,
Wilson and Bryan remained oblivious to the fact.

26

The

24Silliman to Bryan, November 13, 1914, Ibid., 620;
Quirk, The Mexican Revolution, 123-125; Clendenen, The U.S.
and Villa, 130.
25Link, Wilson; Struggle for Neutrality, 266; Quirk,
The Mexican Revolution, 151.
26Link, Woodrow Wilson and the Progressive Era, 131;
Link, Wilson; Struggle for Neutrality, 258. This erroneous
impression was created largely through the efforts of Leon
J. Canova. Carothers1 aide had arrived in Chihuahua in
September, 1914, and was later assigned to Aguascalientes
to observe the proceedings of the Convention. By the time
of the First Chief's deposition, Canova "was easily Villa's
strongest supporter among all the American representatives
in Mexico." Ibid.
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President, in particular, manifested a tendency to believe
only that which he wanted to believe, evidence to the con
trary notwithstanding.

So it had been from the moment he

became interested in Mexican affairs and so it would remain.
Thus neither Wilson nor Bryan was greatly concerned over
the breakdown of the Torreon Agreement or by news that the
First Chief was prepared to resist the Convention.

They

were convinced that Carranza's defeat was not only desirable
but inevitable.

27

Accordingly, when the First Chief with

drew from the capital, Wilson severed de facto relations
with the Constitutionalists and transferred Silliman to
Aguascalientes.

There the President's envoy opened de facto

relations with the Convention.

28

At the same time, Wilson

publicly expressed his confidence in Villa and Gutierrez
and extended his "moral support" to the new regime.

29

Wilson had no intention of again intervening mili
tarily in Mexico.

His preoccupation with the war in Europe

had increased steadily through the fall of 1914, and with
it his desire to withdraw as rapidly as possible from Veracruz

27Ibid.
2g

28Ibid., 456.

Bryan to Canova, November 16, 1914, Foreign Relations,
1914, 622; Link, Woodrow Wilson and the Progressive Era,
131.
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and to avoid any further commitment of American troops
below the border.

By late November, it appeared that he

would have his way.

Carranza was bottled up in Veracruz,

seemingly finished.

Great Britain and other European

powers with interests in Mexico were no longer capable of
independent intervention.

Even domestic agitation for

intervention had lessened considerably.

30

The oilmen, in particular, were subdued.

They were

skeptical of the Administration's professed desire to
assist them in their struggle with Aguilar.

Convinced

that truly effective assistance was, at least for the
moment, unobtainable, they sought to make the best of a
bad situation by negotiating directly with the Governor.
When, in early November, Bryan, on his own initiative,
again raised the question of Aguilar's objectionable de
crees, the oilmen were distressed.

They warned the Secre

tary that it was "unwise11 to press the matter, in effect
asking him to not interfere.

31

From their vantage point,

they were able to assess at least as well as Washington

^°Link, Wilson: Struggle for Neutrality, 259-260.
•^Bevan to Lansing, November 5, 1914, SDR 812.6363/
144.
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the trend of events in Mexico.

Moreover, as eminently

practical men with large personal stakes in the Mexican
oil industry, they could ill-afford to indulge in the sort
of wishful thinking that so distorted the President's
view of Mexican affairs.

Consequently, they shared none

of the Administration's optimism over the alleged imminent
collapse of the Carranza regime.

On the contrary, they

ruefully anticipated not only its survival but its ulti
mate triumph .32
Given Washington's negative attitude toward foreign
firms operating in Mexico and its refusal to intervene
effectively (militarily) on their behalf, the oilmen had
little choice but to seek to come to terms with the Gover
nor.

Understandably, they viewed Bryan's ineffective

(diplomatic), belated intervention, however well-intentioned,
as an embarrassing and potentially disastrous liability.

If

the Administration would not provide effective protection
for the companies, then it was better for all concerned
that it not become involved at all.
Following the Convention's deposition of Carranza,
Villa had divided his forces into three columns for

32McNamee to Bryan, February 2, 1915, SDR 812.6363/
163.

simultaneous drives against Guadalajara, Tampico, and
Mexico City.

Conventionist armies met little resistance

in the West and still less in their march on the capital.
Zn the Huasteca, however, the Conventionist advance ground
to a halt.

33

Failure to take Tampico and the oilfields

was due as much to the opposition of Pelaez as to the
presence of Pablo Gonzales' strong Army Corps of the
Northeast.

When Conventionist forces approached the

petroleum province, Pelaez suddenly proclaimed for Villa
and assured the invaders that he held the oilfields in the
name of the new regime.

Numerous, well-armed, and allegedly

backed by foreign oilmen and their respective governments,
the Pelaecistas presented a formidable front.

In the

negotiations that followed, an accommodation was reached
between the General and the Convention.

The Huasteca cam

paign was abandoned, and Pelaez* autonomy in the region
tacitly acknowledged.^

33j3evan to Bryan, December 19, 1914, SDR 812.00/
14046; Teitelbaum, Wilson and the Mexican Revolution, 213.
^Marvin, "The Jeopardy of Tampico," World's Work,
376-377. See, for example, Canada to Bryan, February 20,
1915, U.S., Department of State, Papers Relating to the
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1915 (Washington,
D. C.; Government Printing Office, 1924), 822 (hereafter
cited as Foreign Relations, 1915).

Early in December, Villa entered the capital.

Shortly

thereafter Gutierrez and other government officials arrived
in the city, and, on January 1, 1915, the Convention re
convened in the Chamber of Deputies to consider longawaited reforms.

Although the delegates did indeed have

plans for reform and sincerely sought to translate them
into meaningful programs, they were severely handicapped
by their dependence upon Villa.

No important decision

could be made without his approval.

35

Villa, however, was

far more enthused over completing the rout of the Carrancistas than over perusing legislation.

Consequently, the

Convention faced one deadlock after another.

The debates

between the Villista majority and Zapata's agrarian radicals
grew increasingly bitter, threatening to splinter the Conventionist coalition.

3G

Villa's baneful influence was

further manifested in the growing friction between the
Provisional President and Villista henchmen within the
administration.

On January 7, a frustrated and powerless

Gutierrez opened secret negotiations with Obregon with a
view toward eliminating both Villa and Carranza .37

Rebuffed,

3 5 Link,

Wilsons Struggle for Neutrality, 265; Quirk,
The Mexican Revolution, 153.
36Ibid.

37Ibid., 155-156.
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he and a small band of followers fled the capital on the
night of January 15 and made for Gutierrez' home state of
San Luis Potosi.

There in the North they hoped to re

establish the legitimate government of Mexico.
As Gutierrez fled into oblivion, the Convention
moved to assume all powers of government itself.

General

Rogue Gonzalez Garza, a Chihuahua political figure and
protege of Villa, was appointed president of the body.
Reorganization failed to produce harmony, however, and the
proceedings of the Convention were marked by increasing
acrimony.3®

By late January, it had become apparent that

the Convention was neither truly representative nor revo
lutionary.

Nor was it an effective instrument of reform.

For the moment, at least, it was little more than a vehicle
for Villa's personal pursuit of power.
In Washington, Wilson and Bryan watched developments
in Mexico with mounting dismay.
horse, and they knew it.

They had backed the wrong

The Conventionist Government was

a patent farce and the alleged invincibility of its armies
open to serious question.®®

On January 5, Obregon's new

38Ibid., 169, 179.
39
New York Times, January 6, 1915.
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Army of Operations had driven the Zapatistas from Puebla;
by the end of the month, it threatened Mexico City.

Al

ready weakened by the disaffection of Gutierrez, the Con
vention looked to Villa for assistance.
waited in vain.

But the delegates

Villa was fully preoccupied with the

struggle in the North and the West.

"Mexico City and the

South . . . played no part" in his immediate

plans, "either

military or political . " * 0 Like Wilson and Bryan, he was
prepared to write off the Convention, and on January 31,
he organized his own "government” in Chihuahua.*-*-

Abandoned

and unable to stand before Obregon, Gonzalez Garza led the
remnants of the Convention to Cuernavaca, the agrarista
stronghold in the State of Morelos.

There the Villista

majority rapidly dwindled away, and control of the body
passed to the Zapatistas.

Thereafter, it reflected the

Southerner's own parochial brand of revolution and
reform.*2

Within a matter of months it had ceased to be an

important factor in the struggle for control of the republic.

*°Quirk, The Mexican Revolution, 176.
*^The Confidential Agent of the Provisional (Conven
tionist) Government of Mexico to Bryan, March 8 , 1915,
SDR 812.00/14534.
*2Quirk, The Mexican Revolution, 179.
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II.
While the Convention was rending itself in the capi
tal, Carranza's advisers in Veracruz were drafting a com
prehensive blueprint for reform, a move aimed primarily at
winning the support of the Mexican

m a s s e s . 43

^e

so-called

"Additions to the Plan of Guadalupe" encouraged organized
labor, restored land to the villages, nullified foreign
contracts and monopolies, and promised a general restruc
turing of Mexican society.

The first of these reforms was

announced early in January, the rest following in short
order.

Although the authors of the "Additions" were ap

parently sincere in seeking genuine reform, the First Chief
himself was not.

"Never thereafter,” Quirk declares, "did

Carranza make any real effort" to put the program into
effect .44

The "Additions," then, ultimately served as

little more than a propaganda device, a measure designed to
ease the way for Obregon in the forthcoming contest with
Villa.
They served their purpose well, however, particularly

4 3Arredondo to Bryan, December 16, 1914, Foreign Rela
tions, 1914, 629-633; Parkes, A History of Mexico, 352.
44 Quirk,

The Mexican Revolution, 152.
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the labor decrees.

The latter led to an alliance between

Obregon and Luis Morones, head of the radical Casa del
Obrero Mundial, and won the invaluable support of the urban
worker.

As the campaign against Villa progressed, large

numbers of worker volunteers joined the Army of Operations
to fill the ranks of the so-called Red Battalions .45
The "Additions" had a profound effect on Constitu
tionalist relations with Washington as well.

They comprised

the most coherent program for reform yet promulgated.

More

over, by early 1915, it was evident that the Constitutional
ists

alone were capable of effecting the sweeping social

and economic changes which Wilson and Bryan were gradually
perceiving as essential for the regeneration of Mexico.
Thus the President could no longer afford to ignore Car
ranza.

Once again, he was forced to deal with the man he

had snubbed, insulted, and conspired to destroy.
Renewing amicable relations with Carranza was to
prove a trying and exceedingly difficult task.

The Presi

dent's earlier decision to back Villa and the Convention
had seriously jeopardized the Constitutionalist cause and
deeply embittered the First Chief and his followers.

45

Cline, The United States and Mexico, 166; Parkes,
A History of Mexico, 352.
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Silliman's transfer and the withdrawal of de facto recog
nition had added insult to injury.

Then, in early December,

with relations between Washington and the Veracruz regime
at an all-time low, developments along the border had
threatened to provoke still another round of American
military intervention . ^ 6
In the contest for control of the Mexican Northwest,
Jose Maytorena, Villista governor of Sonora, sought to
dislodge Carrancista forces from the border town of Naco.
During the lengthy seige of Naco, a number of American
citizens were killed or wounded by stray rounds, and the
American section of town suffered extensive physical damage.
On December 10, in stern notes to both Gutierrez and Car
ranza, Bryan demanded the immediate cessation of hostilities.
The United States, he warned, would take "positive action,"
if need be, to stop the fighting.

47

The Mexican response was discouraging.
ignored orders from the capital to withdraw.
too, refused to succumb to pressure.
Chief issued a warning of his own:

4 6 Clendenen,

47
13944.

Maytorena
Carranza,

Instead, the First
American military

The U.S. and Villa, 141-143.

Silliman to Bryan, December 11, 1914, SDH 812.00/
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intervention at Naco would be construed as an act of war
against the Mexican nation.
serious consequences.

48

Such a move could have very

Anxious to avoid a new crisis,

Bryan proceeded with greater caution.

Through Carothers

he arranged a series of Mexican-American conferences aimed
at defusing the explosive situation on the border.
mately his patience was rewarded.

Ulti

By mid-January, the

contending forces had disengaged and the town of Naco had
been neutralized.

49

During the course of the negotiations over Naco,
the President had again publicly abjured armed intervention as a means of settling disputes with Mexico.

50

None

theless, because of the development of still new MexicanAmerican tensions, the threat of intervention persisted
throughout the spring of 1915.

Serious differences grew

out of the Constitutionalist petroleum decree of January 7.
Determined as ever to obtain control of the domestic oil
industry, Carranza ordered a halt to all operations in the

^8Canada to Bryan, December 13, 1914, SDR 812.00/
13997.
49

Quirk, The Mexican Revolution, 163.

50

Link, Wilsons Struggle for Neutrality, 464.
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oilfields until such time as the Veracruz regime drafted
and promulgated a comprehensive petroleum code.

Drilling

and all surface construction, including work on pipelines
and additional storage facilities, were to cease at once.
And, according to the original interpretation of the order,
so, too, was production itself, physically impossible in
the high-pressure Huasteca fields.

Works continued in

contravention of the decree were to be destroyed by Con
stitutionalist soldiers at the expense of the delinquent
firms.

Crude oil produced subsequent to the decree was

subject to confiscation.

51

Strict enforcement of Carranza's order would re
sult in irreparable damage to the industry and force many
of the smaller operations to withdraw altogether.

For

all but the largest foreign firms the decree of January 7
portended ruin.

Within a week, word arrived from Tampico

that the Constitutionalists were indeed enforcing the de
cree in the districts under their control.

In addition, an

embargo on the export of petroleum products by the Doheny
and Cowdray companies had been announced by the First Chief,

51Canada to Bryan, January 8, 1915, SDR 812.6363/
146.
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a penalty for alleged failure to pay the production tax
to the Veracruz regime.

52

Desperate, the oilmen turned

again to the State Department for relief.

Bryan's response

to the new assault on the companies was restrained, how
ever, and in no way deterred Carranza's drive for control
of the industry.

53

Fortunately for the oilmen the unreasonableness of
the decree soon became apparent to Constitutionalist
officials.

Carranza himself ordered its amendment.

En

lightened by his Inspector of Petroleum at Tampico, the
First Chief retreated from his earlier extreme position and
agreed to permit the resumption of existing production.

54

On the other hand, drilling and surface works were to re
main in abeyance until the decree was r e s c i n d e d . Al
though commanders in the field were informed of the change,

52

Canada to Bryan, January 12, 1915, SDR 812.6363/

147.
53

Bryan to Canada, January 13, 1915, SDR 812.6363/

146.
54

Daniel Perez, Inspector of Petroleum at Tampico,
to Pastor Rouaix, Sub-secretary of Fomento, January 13,
1915, SDR 812.6363/161.
55
"'■'Bevan to Bryan, January 16, 1915, SDR 812.6363/
149.
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some chose to ignore it and to adhere to the original inter
pretation of the decree.

Moreover, production restrictions

against the giants of the industry— the Huasteca, the Aguila,
and the Royal Dutch-Shell's Corona-remained in force. ^
With the industry thrown into confusion, several
thousand American and some 20,000 Mexican workers were idle.
Consular officials at Tampico reported that local Constitu
tionalist commanders were ignoring the amended decree in
the belief that unemployed Mexican workers would flock to
their respective regiments.

More than likely, however, the

majority of workers would join Pelaez or one of the several
Villista bands in the Northeast, further aggravating the
unrest in the petroleum province.

Of much greater concern

to the Consulate was the potential for violence represented
by the hundreds of idle American workers,

Hthe element most

to be feared," currently congregating in Tampico.

Recently,

Bevan revealed, a "secret society for the mutual protection
of Americans" had been organized in the city.

The number

involved was undetermined, but they were known to have "a
large amount of arms and ammunition hidden."

Moreover,

they had stated that in case of rioting they intended to

56Bevan to Bryan, January 14, 1915, SDR 812.6363/161.

protect themselves,"

The Consul did not like it.

He urged

that the Government assist the companies in returning un
employed American workers to the United States until the
matter of the controversial decree was resolved.
The hardship borne by the three principal producers
in the Huasteca was made still more onerous by the selec
tive embargo on the export of their petroleum products.
Both European firms had paid all taxes required by law, and
the Doheny company had gone considerably further in seeking
to accommodate the Constitutionalist r e g i m e . D i r e c t i n g

5 7 Ibid.

58Early in 1914, Candido Aguilar made the first of
his several forays into the southern Huasteca, seizing the
port of Tuxpam and threatening to halt oil shipments there
from unless paid a large sum of money by the exporting
companies. Harold Walker, Doheny*s representative in Mexico
City, turned for advice to John Lind, then the President's
personal agent in the republic. Ultimately, with Lind's
and, by implication, Washington's approval, Walker complied
with Aguilar's demand.
It was the first time that the
Doheny interests succumbed to blackmail. Later, during the
spring, Doheny himself met in New York City with Felicitas
Villareal, Constitutionalist treasurer, and Rafael Zubaran
Capmany. He informed Carranza's agents that he had recently
refused to pay Huerta $100,000 in oil export taxes because
Washington refused to recognize the General's regime. At
the same time, he handed Villareal a draft for an equivalent
amount "for the purpose of helping to finance their needs."
Shortly thereafter, a Doheny spokesman was sent to Carranza
with instructions to assure him of "our friendship toward
the cause of the Constitutionalists and of our refusal to
pay taxes to Huerta and of our desire to act in accord with
our own Government's attitude in connection with Mexico . . .
Testimony of Doheny, IMA, 277-278.
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his statement to Bryan through Frederic R. Kellogg, attorney
for the Mexican Petroleum Company, Doheny dolefully recounted his relations with Carrancista officials.

59

In July, 1914, when Constitutionalist forces had
first occupied Tampico, representatives of the Huasteca
Petroleum Company had entered into an agreement with Car
ranza to deliver fuel oil for the Constitutionalist Rail
ways at a reduced rate, the deliveries to apply to current
and future taxes.

From July through December, the Huasteca

had furnished fuel valued at 375,000 gold pesos (c. $167,000).
Then, late in December, Constitutionalist officials "de
manded payment of taxes in cash and repudiated the agree
ment" concluded the previous summer.

In addition, the

National Railways of Mexico, taken over by Carranza in
the early fall, was indebted to the Huasteca Petroleum
Company some 400,000 gold pesos for fuel already delivered.
That obligation, too, had been repudiated by Veracruz.
Prior to concluding its agreement with the Constitution
alists, Doheny averred, the company had paid its taxes in
full.

He hoped that the Secretary would "see that we are

59Kellogg to Bryan, January 13, 1915, SDR 812.6363/
150.
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dealt justly with" by the government of Carranza .®0
On January 17, Eliseo Arredondo, Carranza's
spokesman in Washington, informed Bryan that the First
Chief had no intention of confiscating foreign oil pro
perties; rather, he was merely halting "unauthorized"
drilling and construction.

The questionable legal bases

for that action were ignored.

The embargo on oil exports

by industry leaders, Arredondo assured the Secretary,
would be lifted the moment the firms involved agreed to pay
their allegedly delinquent taxes.

61

Shortly after the

60

Ibid. Although several hundred American firms were
eventually involved in the Mexican oil play, American oilmen
as a group were by no means unanimously sympathetic with
the harried Mexican producers and exporters. In fact,
purely domestic producers were elated by the misfortunes
of their international competitors. Cheap Mexican crude
brought into the United States undercut American produc
tion and, in the words of a Texas independent, "has almost
put the little fellows out of business." R. E. Dodson to
Bryan, January 16, 1915, SDR 812.6363/155. Given the strong
antimonopolist views of Wilson and Bryan, statements such
as Dodson's were extremely damaging to the "free compe
titor" image which the large integrated firms sought to
project. Almost certainly they affected the Administration's
response to appeals for assistance from Doheny and other
oilmen with large stakes in Mexico.
61
Arredondo to Bryan, Janury 17, 1915, SDR 812.6363/
151. The embargo was indeed lifted late in January, but
only after both Bryan and Spring-Rice had strongly pro
tested. Bevan to Bryan, Janury 25, 1915, SDR 812.6363/156.
On the other hand, the matter of delinquent taxes was far
from settled.

20 3
Bryan-Arredondo conference, Carranza sent a special repre
sentative to Washington expressly to explain his petroleum
policy to Administration officials.
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Meanwhile, with new development work in the Huasteca
at a standstill, the First Chief issued three additional
decrees in rapid succession.

Each further extended Consti

tutionalist control over the industry.

Thereafter, com

panies petitioning the government for the "privilege" of
commencing new works, surface and subsurface alike, would
be required to sign a document pledging that those works
would be in full accord with the proposed but as yet nonexistent petroleum code.
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In conjunction with this announce

ment, an investigative commission was dispatched to Tampico
to conduct a thorough study of the industry and to submit
recommendations upon which to base the projected code.®^
The fact that the decree clearly violated the retroactivity
clause of the extant Constitution of 1857 was simply

62Canada to Bryan, January 20, 1915, SDR 812.6363/
153.
**2Bevan to Bryan, January 25, 1915, SDR 812.6363/
154.
6*Bevan to Bryan, January 19, 1915, SDR 812.6363/
159.
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disregarded.

Once again, Bryan's protest amounted to little
ge

more than a mild rebuke.
A second decree, issued late in January, opened the
way for confiscation of all buildings and other surface
structures standing in the Federal Zones unless specific
ally licensed by Constitutionalist officials.

All works

erected during the Huerta regime were to be automatically
confiscated, and permits for other structures were subject
to revision at any time by the Constitutionalist govern
ment .66

Since most storage and virtually all shipping,

docking, and loading facilities were located in one of the
Federal Zones, the decree not only imperiled millions of
dollars worth of foreign investment but threatened to
completely disrupt the industry.

In addition to striking

at the scores of crude producers, large and small alike, it
also jeopardized the position of big refining interests like
Standard Oil of Hew Jersey and the Pierce Petroleum Corpora
tion previously untouched by the feud between producing
companies and the Veracruz regime.
65Bryan to Canada, January 25, 1915, SDR 812.6363/154.
66Bevan to Bryan, February 13, 1915, SDR 812.6363/171.
The Federal Zone was a strip of land twenty meters in-shore
from the high-water mark; it extended as far inland as the
tide.
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A final decree went far towards revealing Carranza's
underlying motives in restricting the activities of the
oilmen.

In sum, it called for the submission of well logs

and other highly secret and invaluable subsurface geological
data to Constitutionalist officials .^

Once in possession

of such information, Carranza could enter the oil business
himself.

Companies seeking new drilling permits were ex

pected to comply with the decree.
i

By early February, after little more than a cursory
study of the petroleum industry* Carranza's investigative
commission had returned to Veracruz to report to the First
Chief in person.

For the moment, the industry was para

lyzed, and foreign oilmen feared that worse was yet to come.
A confidential report from the commander of the cruiser
Sacramento, standing off Tampico, was far from encouraging.
The oilmen themselves, he concluded, were in "a state of
general depression."

Most were of the opinion that the pro

posed new petroleum code would nationalize the Mexican oil
industry . ® 8

6^Bevan to Bryan, February 6 , 1915, SDR 812.6363/170.
®®McNamee to Bryan, February 2, 1915, SDR 812.6363/
163.

As if to confirm their fears. Constitutionalist
officials on February 19 suddenly called for adherence to
an all-but-forgotten petroleum decree of the previous
September.

According to the long neglected order, all

property owners were to submit a detailed list of their
holdings and the value thereof.

The announced purpose of

valuation was to enable the Government to determine the
exact wealth of the country and to distribute the tax burden
accordingly.

It was understood that the Government was em

powered, in the event of expropriation, to pay the interested
parties as an indemnity the value fixed on the tax lists
subsequent to valuation.

Parties failing to submit the

required data within the time prescribed were subject to
a fine of five per cent of the value of their holdings as
appraised by a special Assessment Committee.
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The time

alloted for filing valuation reports was much too short,
Bevan complained.

Moreover, the oilmen had no way of accu

rately appraising the value of their landed properties.
By far the greater portion of those properties had not
yet been tested for oil.

If the lands in question were

undervalued the companies risked expropriation by the

69Bevan to Bryan, February 21, 1915, SDR 812.512/556.
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Government; if, on the other hand, they were overvalued
the companies would be forced to bear an excessive tax
burden.^®

Again Bryan pr o t e s t e d . ^

While tension mounted over Carranza's campaign
against the oilmen, a new and potentially far more dan
gerous controversy grew out of Obregon's occupation of
Mexico City.

Martial law was declared, and the capital

transferred to Veracruz in hopes of forcing the reloca
tion of the foreign diplomatic corps and thus tacit recog
nition of the Constitutionalist regime.

In addition, both

Carranza and Obregon were determined to punish the resi
dents of Mexico City for their alleged disaffection and
hostility toward the Constitutionalist cause.

By early

February, the General was meting out that punishment with
a vengeance.

72

Food trains entering the city were turned

back by his order, and attempts by the foreign community to
relieve the hunger of the masses were likewise frustrated.
Within the city a controlled press repeatedly incited the
hungry to plunder private property, setting class against

70lbid.

^ B r y a n to Bevan, March 5, 1915, Ibid.

^ C a r d o s o de Oliveira to Bryan, February 3, 1915,
Foreign Relations, 1915, 649; Quirk, The Mexican Revolu
tion, 181ff.
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class.

Again and again, Obregon himself publicly encouraged

attacks upon merchants, foreigners and clergymen.

His

words did not go unheeded.

III.
In Washington, the President and Administration of
ficials followed developments in Mexico City with growing
revulsion and i n d i g n a t i o n . T h e callous and vindictive
behavior of the Constitutionalists was recognized for what
it was, part of a deliberate scheme to reduce the city to
anarchy.
anew.^

Domestic demands for armed intervention flared
Outrage mounted when Obregon jailed scores of

priests and threatened Mexican prelates in a heavy-handed
attempt to extort large sums of money from the Church.

A

simultaneous drive to wring funds from the foreign business
community drew angry criticism from abroad, increasing
pressure upon the Wilson Administration to intercede on be
half of the victims and to restrain the Constitutionalists

73Cardoso de Oliveira to Bryan, March 2 and 4, 1915,
Foreign Relations, 1915, 654, 656-657.
7A

Bryan to Cardoso de Oliveira, March 6 , 1915, Ibid.,
659-660; Bryan to Silliman, March 6 , 1915, Ibid., 660-661;
Quirk, The Mexican Revolution, 195-196.
7 5 Link,

Woodrow Wilson and the Progressive Era, 132.
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from further excesses."*®

As determined as the President

was to avoid new involvement in the internal affairs of
Mexico, daily reports from below the border rapidly eroded
his resolve.

Grudgingly acknowledging the necessity for a

thorough reappraisal of the revolutionary movement, he
dispatched still another personal representative to Mexico
to investigate and assess recent developments in that
troubled land.

77

Wilson's agent was Duval West of San Antonio, a
former federal attorney and a student of Mexican affairs.
On February 5, West received his instructions from the White
House:

he was to confer with the leaders of the several

revolutionary factions, observe their characters and at
tempt to discern their respective purposes, and render an
opinion on the prospects for a lasting resolution of the
Mexican problem.

The President, in his own words, was

"very anxious to know just what the moral situation" was
in Mexico, and "what it behooves us to do to check what is

76guirk, The Mexican Revolution, 193.
77Ibid., 209; Clendenen, The U. S. and Villa, 155;
Link, Wilson: Struggle for Neutrality, 459.
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futile and promote what promises genuine reform and set
tled peace."7®
Accordingly, West entered Mexico in mid-February,
remaining in the republic until the latter half of May.
There he conferred with Villa, Carranza, and Zapata, as
well as with a number of their respective aides.

From

time to time. West forwarded written reports to Washington.
Upon his return to the United States, he went directly to
the White House to summarize his findings for the Presi
dent.

West's evaluation of the political situation in

Mexico was of profound importance in determining subsequent
Mexican-American relations.

For sometime thereafter,

Wilson's approach to Mexican affairs was strongly influenced
by the West reports.

70

Meanwhile, through late February and early March,
conditions in the former capital steadily deteriorated .80
Communication with the outside world had virtually ceased.

7 ®Ibid.,
7 ®Ibid.,;

460.
Quirk, The Mexican Revolution, 254.

®°Silliman to Bryan, March 4, 1915, SDR 812.00/
14497; Bryan to Silliman, March 12, 1915, Foreign Relations,
1915, 671; Cardoso de Oliveira to Bryan, March 20, 1915,
Ibid., 672-673.
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Some 25,000 foreign nationals, among them approximately
2,500 Americans, were stranded in the city.

Pledged to

protect foreign lives and property in the republic, the
Wilson Administration was under increasing pressure from
both at home and abroad to fulfill its obligation.

81

In

the weeks following Obregon*s occupation of the city,
Bryan repeatedly called upon Carranza to restrain his
vengeful subordinate.

His entreaties were ignored.

Fin

ally, on March 6 , in identical notes to the First Chief and
his General, the Secretary delivered a virtual ultimatum.
Drafted by the Department's counselor, Robert Lansing, it
was couched in "strong and insulting" language.

Constitu

tionalist leaders were accused of deliberately persecuting
the inhabitants of Mexico City while inciting them to acts
of violence against foreigners, the clergy, and the pro
pertied classes.

The Government of the United States,

Lansing bluntly warned the recipients, would hold them
personally responsible for any harm that might befall Ameri
can citizens in Mexico as a result of the policies currently
82

being pursued by the Veracruz regime. *

®^Bryan to Silliman, March 3, 1915, SDR 812.00/14477.
®2Bryan to Silliman, March 6 , 1915, SDR 812.00/14501.
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By early March, the President's patience with Con
stitutionalist leadership had worn thin indeed.

Antipathy

toward Obregon in particular was very strong in Washington.**3
Once again, the question of armed intervention arose.
tant, Wilson and Bryan turned to Lansing for advice.

Hesi
On

March 8 , the Counselor recommended the dispatch of an Ameri
can expeditionary force to Mexico City to restore order and
to relieve the foreign community.

Every effort should be

made, however, to obtain ABC participation in the venture.8^
Despite his grave concern over the situation in Mexico City,
the President was not prepared at the moment to take such
drastic action.

Lansing's recommendation was rejected in
O C

favor of a naval display off Veracruz.

It was hoped that

83Quijrk, The Mexican Revolution, 196.
^^Lansing to Bryan, March 8 , 1915, SDR 812.00/14664 1/2.
®^Link, Wilson; Struggle for Neutrality, 462. Wil
son's position was publicly expressed on March 15, in an
address by Vice President Thomas R. Marshall:
"Wholesale
bloodshed would follow intervention in Mexico, and when we
conquered we would have another Philippine Islands on our
hands— something we would have trouble letting loose of.
Veracruz with its snipers taught us only in a small way what
armed intervention in Mexico would mean . . . .
It would, be
years after we captured the cities before we could subdue
the country . . . .
While we were intervening how would the
republics to the south of us look upon it? Might they not
regard us with distrust— as an invader armed with a big
club who might push on into their provinces if successful?"
New York Times, March 16, 1915.
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a show of force would be sufficient to bring Carranza to
heel.
With relations between Washington and Veracruz
already seriously strained by Carranza's petroleum decrees
and by the developing crisis over Mexico City, still
another dispute arose over closure of the Yucatecan port
of Progreso.

The city was the exclusive outlet for Mexi

can heneguin or sisal hemp, the sole source of binding
twine used in the North American wheat harvest.

Thus un

restricted trade with Progreso was of vital importance not
only to grain producers in the United States but to the
general public as well.

Some 200,000 bales of hemp, much

of it already purchased by American firms, rested in dockside warehouses awaiting transportation to the United States.
The port, however, was in the hands of elements hostile to
the Veracruz regime, and a Constitutionalist blockade had
been in effect for some time.
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®6"Memorandum Re Situation at Progreso," undated memo
randum in the Papers of Woodrow Wilson, Division of Manuscripts,
Library of Congress, Series VI, File 95 (hereafter cited as
Wilson Papers). The memorandum apparently originated in the
State Department was was forwarded to the President in the
latter half of March, 1915. In late February, 1915, Consti
tutionalist gunboats began seizing American and British ves
sels calling at Progreso.
On Several occasions, ships and
their officers were detained and, in at least one instance,
an American vessel was fired upon. Appeals to the Department
of State by American shippers prompted the dispatch of the
cruiser Des Moines to Progreso early in March. Ibid.

As the spring wheat harvest approached, American
agricultural and shipping interests pleaded with Carrancista officials to allow release of the hemp.

Rebuffed by

Veracruz, they turned in desperation to Washington.

By

March 12, the President felt that he could no longer stay
his hand.

Now determined to use force if necessary to

reopen Progreso, he began preparation of a new ultimatum
to Carranza.
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Before it was completed, however, the First
Q Q

Chief himself inexplicably lifted the blockade.
well that he did.

It was

Armed intervention at Progreso, particu

larly if resisted, would very likely have prompted Adminis
tration officials to reconsider the Lansing plan for the
relief of Mexico City.

Given the state of Mexican-American

relations at the moment, a second round of hostilities
would doubtless have followed,
Carranza, meanwhile, had responded to Lansing's

87ibid.; Link, Wilson; Struggle for Neutrality, 462.
8 ^In announcing the reopening of Progreso, Carranza
expressed an opinion which doubtless embarrassed and irri
tated Administration officials: Washington's reaction to
the closure of Progreso, he observed, was comparable to a
hypothetical British demand during the American civil war
to lift the Union blockade of New Orleans because British
manufacturers needed cotton. Silliman to Bryan, March 14,
1915, Foreign Relations, 1915, 824.
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sharp note of March 6 with anger and indignation, berating
Silliman, who delivered the note, and Bryan, who had signed
it.

Refusing to correspond with the Secretary, Carranza

addressed Wilson personally.

Despite his outrage, his note

to the President was cordial and reassuring.

He denied the

charges made against Obregon and himself, promising effec
tive protection for Americans and other foreigners residing
in areas under Constitutionalist jurisdiction. 89

Before

this communication reached Washington, Obregon had relin
quished control of Mexico City to municipal officials and
withdrawn the last of his troops.

Ostensibly, at least,

the principal source of friction between Washington and
Veracruz had been eliminated, and with it the rationale
for armed intervention.
Wilson's reply to Carranza, which failed to reach the
First Chief for several weeks, reflected the President's
considerable impatience over the closure of Progreso and
over the continued harassment of foreigners and clergymen.
Expressing approval of the First Chief's pledge to change
his ways, Wilson nonetheless closed by bluntly warning Car
ranza that further abuse of foreigners and ecclesiastics
threatened the future sovereignty of the republic.

World

®9Carranza to Wilson, March 9, 1915, SDR 812.00/14550.
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opinion would not stand for it.

And that factor, in turn,

might well force the United States to intervene once again.
"To warn you concerning such matters is an act of friend
ship, not of hostility," the President assured Carranza,
"and we cannot make the warning too earnest.

To speak less

plainly or with less earnestness would be to conceal from
you a terrible risk which no lover of Mexico should wish
to run."

90

Wilson meant what he said.

Shortly thereafter,

when Lansing suggested that the Administration prepare
itself for possible full-scale military intervention in the
republic,

91

the President readily concurred.

92

Despite the unusually frank exchange of views in
March, tension between Washington and Veracruz persisted.
Although Obregon had indeed withdrawn from the former
capital, he continued to interdict communications between
the city and the surrounding countryside.

Supply trains

bound for the city were stopped and turned back at the out
skirts.

Hunger and hardship spread.

Moreover, in areas

90Wilson to Carranza, March 11, 1915, SDR 812.00/14573.
91Lansing to Bryan, March 8 , 1915, U. S., Department
of State, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the
United States, the Lansing Papers, 1914-1920 (2 vols.;
Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1939-1940),
II, 529-531 (hereafter cited as The Lansing Papers) .
92Ibid., 532.
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under Constitutionalist control the mistreatment of clergy
men and foreigners continued, Carranza's pledge notwith
standing ,93

Finally, in the Huasteca, Aguilar and Con

stitutionalist bureaucrats persisted in their insidious
campaign to wrest control of the Mexican petroleum industry from foreign interests.

94

The cumulative effect of

these developments on Administration officials and on an
ever larger segment of the American public was mounting
hostility toward the Veracruz regime.

In addition to their

general antipathy toward the Constitutionalists, neither
Wilson nor Bryan believed that that faction possessed

9 3 J. M. Cardoso de Oliveira to Bryan, March 20,
March 22, and May 7, 1915, SDR 812.00/14657, 14669, and
15087. Cardoso de Oliveira, the Brazilian Minister in
Mexico City, had assumed responsibility for protecting
American interests in the republic when Huerta severed re
lations with the United States in April 1914. For some
time thereafter he continued to serve as Washington's
formal representative in Mexico City.

94

Early in March, 1915, Carrancista forces occupied
the Huasteca Petroleum Company's headquarters at Ebano in
southern Tamaulipas, threatening to burn the wells and
destroy production and storage facilities in the event of
their defeat by approaching Villistas.
Bevan to Bryan,
March 5, 1915, SDR 812.6363/174.
In early April, during
skirmishing around Ebano, Carrancistas deliberately fired
several 40,000-barrel storage tanks. Bryan was angered.
He lodged a strong protest with Carranza, demanding im
mediate orders to military commanders in the Huasteca to
prevent further damage to company property. Bryan to
Silliman, April 3, 1915, SDR 812.6363/179.
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either the strength or the ability to overcome Villa,
much less to impose a lasting peace in Mexico.

95

That

conviction was unquestionably enhanced by the reports of
Duval West.
Early in February, the President's agent had made
his way to Villa's headquarters in Chihuahua, subsequently
following Washington's favorite south to Guadalajara.

Like

his predecessors, West was immensely impressed with Villa.
In mid-March, he assured the Secretary that Villa alone was
capable of settling the Mexican question, apparently con
firming what Bryan and Wilson alike had long been disposed
to believe.
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Within a matter of weeks, however, Washing

ton's illusions were rudely shattered.

In a sanguinary

struggle at Celaya, the "turning point of the revolution,"
Obregon administered a crushing defeat to Villa's Division
of the North.
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It never recovered.

"From then on,"

Quirk declares, "Villa's fortunes ebbed.

Obregon at

Celaya not only blasted the legend of Villa's invincibility,
[but] drove a Constitutionalist spearhead into the vitals

95Link, Wilson;

Struggle for Neutrality, 465.

96.Ibid.
97

New York Times, April 9, 1915.
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of Villa's own territory . . . .

in addition, it forced

Villa to withdraw his units from much of northern and cen
tral Mexico, relieving pressure on Tampico and on other hardpressed Constitutionalist outposts in the Northeast.
Bryan, perhaps sooner than the President, grasped
the full significance of Celaya and the possible effect
of Obregon's victory on the Administration's Mexican policy.
On April 18, three days after the battle, the Secretary
observed that Villa's reversal had "about convinced"
officials in Washington "that the men upon whom hopes had
been pinned for the pacification of Mexico cannot be relied
upon to save the situation."**9

From that point on, Quirk

contends, "there was no likelihood that the United States
would either support Villa or recognize the Convention as
the de facto government in Mexico."

Instead, Washington

began to work for a peaceful compromise among the various
factions, a settlement aimed primarily at ending the fighting
once and for all.^00
In spite of Obregon1s success and the apparent

98Quirk, The Mexican Revolution, 221.
**9New York Times, April 20, 1915.
100Quirk, The Mexican Revolution, 226.

220
eclipse of Villa, Wilson still had little faith in the
ability of the Veracruz regime to both terminate the war and
unify the Mexican nation.

The President's position was due

in large part to West's analyses of the several revolutionary
factions.

And almost certainly it was affected by his dis

like for Obregon and his mounting exasperation with the
intransigent Carranza.

Shortly after Celaya, at a critical

moment in Mexican-American relations, the President received
from West a lengthy and extremely important dispatch.

In

it Wilson's agent contrasted the Chihuahua and Veracruz
regimes.

It was a disconcerting report.

West believed that

neither faction possessed the capability to both win the war
and secure the peace as well.*0*
There were "striking" differences between the two
groups, West observed.

In Chihuahua "the entire business

of the government seems to be devoted to the prime object
of military successes . . . ."

The civil administration,

"being temporary in character, had to await the final
domination of the country."

The vital questions of recon

struction and reform appeared to be of little consequence

10*West to Bryan, April 5, 1915, SDR 812.00/20721

to the Northerners.

In Veracruz, on the other hand, "the

atmosphere is entirely saturated with the idea of orderly
and systematic civil administration, the main energy being
apparently devoted to the study and successful working out
of the laws and reforms referred to in the Plan of Guadalupe . . .

But the campaigns of Obregon in central Mexico

and of Pablo Gonzalez in the Northeast received little
attention in Veracruz, a fact which disturbed the agent.
Although Carranza had "the look of a hard thinker," he
was not a "man of action," and West doubted his ability to
lead the Constitutionalists to ultimate military victory.
It was unfortunate, West lamented:

The men around the

First Chief were of a "much higher order" than those around
Villa.

If Carranza were somehow able to win the war, West

believed, his aides "would probably be able to develop the
ability necessary to carry on a Civil Administration."*'®2
Continuing his pessimistic assessment of the Constitutionalist movement. West expressed his conviction that
"under its present leaders” the Veracruz regime could not
establish peace in Mexico "because of the failure of its
military leaders to obey the orders and decrees of the

102Ibid
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First Chief."

Law and order had first to be established

by force, but, he reiterated, Carranza, "personally, has
not the qualifications for military leadership."

And even

if the Constitutionalists were to somehow achieve military
victory, West warned,

"the military leaders themselves

would, undoubtedly, set General Carranza aside and bring
about further differences."*0*
Wilson's agent had little regard for the majority
of Carranza's aides despite their relative attractiveness
when compared to Villa's lieutenants.

Although the Con**

stitutionalist hierarchy believed itself "actuated by
patriotic motives," nothing could be further from the
truth.

The "main factor in the revolutionary game is

pure selfishness," West declared, and the victims were
the "common people."

The Mexican masses "are paying the

price and their interests are not being advanced by the
revolution.

The leaders thus far met are not capable of

bringing about the reform indicated in the Plan of Guada
lupe, even if they were actuated by patriotic motives."
seemed, he glumly concluded, that "the outlook for any
good results in Mexico under this revolutionary movement
is most discouraging."*0*

103Ibid.

104Ibid.
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In addition to West's sobering analysis of conditions
below the border, there were still other factors which p r e - •
eluded a rapprochement between Washington and Veracruz.
Constitutionalist anticlericalism was among the most im
portant.

Organized Roman Catholic opinion in the United

States had for some time denounced Carranza's aggressive
campaign against the Mexican Church.

105

Due largely to

Obregon's diligent persecution of clergymen in Mexico City,
Roman Catholic protest in the United States reached a new
high in the spring of 1915.

Considerable indignant criti

cism was aimed at the White House in the mistaken belief
that Wilson favored Carranza and condoned the policies of
the Veracruz regime.

Roman Catholic prelates made it

abundantly clear to the President that they were adamantly
opposed to recognition of, or support for, the Carranza
government.

107

Although the staunchly protestant Wilson

*05I.ink, Wilson: Struggle for Neutrality, 468. See,
for example. The Reverend R. H. Tierney to Bryan, October
17, 1914, SDR 812.404/22. Tierney was chairman of the
Committee of the Federation of Catholic Societies.
See
also Father Francis C. Kelley to Wilson, April 17, 1915,
SDR 812.404/85 and 98. Kelley was president of The
Catholic Church Extension Society of the United States of
America.
106Teitelbaum, Wilson and the Mexican Revolution, 141.
*07Link, Woodrow Wilson and the Progressive Era, 135.
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did indeed sympathize with Constitutionalist efforts to re
duce the power and prestige of the Mexican Church, he, too,
was distressed by the methods employed to that end.***8
Thus humanitarian and domestic political considerations, par
ticularly the desire to placate aroused American Catholics,
prompted the President to protest vigorously and repeatedly
the zealous anticlericalism of the Veracruz regime.
The most important factor, however, in Wilson's de
cision to withhold recognition from Carranza in the spring
of 1915 was his "deepening conviction" that the First Chief
was incapable of pacifying the republic.
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Moreover,

Villa still controlled vast areas of central and northern
Mexico, including those states in which the bulk of American
investment was concentrated.

Recognition of the Constitu

tionalist Government might well provoke a disgruntled and
vengeful Villa to retaliate against American citizens and
properties in those areas under his d o m i n a t i o n . S h o u l d
such a situation develop, it would be next to impossible to
restrain interventionist sentiment in the United States.
Pressure for a full-scale invasion of northern Mexico would
become intense and exceedingly difficult to resist.

10 8ciendenen,
The U. S. and Villa, 151-152; Link,
Wilson; Struggle for Neutrality, 468.
109Ibid., 469.

110Ibid.

Chapter 5

COUNTERREVOLUTION:

THE ITURBIDE CANDIDACY

I.
In late April and early May, 1915, conditions in
Mexico, already deplorable in the eyes of Administration
officials and the American people alike, took a sharp turn
for the worse.
alarming.1

The plight of Mexico City was particularly

Reoccupied by Conventionist forces following

Obregon's withdrawal in March, the city was again subject
to a Constitutionalist food blockade.

Once more the specter

of anarchy hung over the former capital.

Consular reports

from provincial cities described conditions no less dis
couraging.

By the end of May it appeared to most observers

of the Mexican scene that the country was on the brink of
chaos.2
The President's policy of watchful waiting, revived
the previous summer and doggedly pursued through the trying

C a r d o s o de Oliveira to Bryan, May 7, 1915, SRD
812.00/15087.
2Quirk, The Mexican Revolution, 253-254; Cline, The
United States and Mexico, 172; New York Times, May 31, 1915.
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months that followed, was open to serious question.

While

it had indeed precluded direct American involvement in the
Mexican civil war, it had singularly failed to terminate that
struggle and had done little to mitigate its horrors.

Increas

ingly distracted through the spring of 1915 by the intensifi
cation of German submarine warfare, Wilson and Bryan were
unable to respond effectively to the rapidly deteriorating
situation below the border.3

The sinking of the Lusitania on

May 7 and the crisis that followed further delayed a long over
due reappraisal of the Administration's Mexican policy.

There

were those, however, who took advantage of the President's
relative neglect of Mexican affairs to advance their own scheme
for settlement of the Mexican question, a scheme sharply at
odds with White House plans for pacification and regeneration
of the republic.^
Prior to the spring of 1915, Administration officials,
in their search for a Mexican strong man, had restricted them
selves to consideration of revolutionaries alone.

Certainly

the President would countenance none but the heirs of Madero.

^Link, Wilson:

Struggle for Neutrality, 470-471.

4lbid., 471; Teitelbaum, Wilson and the Mexican
Revolution, 228-229.
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By March of that year, however, official resolve had begun to
waver.

Disillusion with the Revolution and disgust with its

feuding chieftains were widespread both in and out of
Washington.

Perhaps nowhere were those sentiments more

evident than among the personnel of the State Department's
Latin American Division, that branch of the Government most
deeply concerned with Mexican affairs.

Thus while Wilson and

Bryan procrastinated, unwilling or unable to commit themselves
irrevocably to one or the other of the several revolutionary
factions, a group of influential persons both in and out of
the Administration introduced still another candidate for
recognition, the reactionary General Eduardo Iturbide.5
The origins of the Iturbide intrigue are obscure,
apparently dating from December, 1914, but possibly consider
ably earlier.

Grandson of the ill-fated Mexican Emperor

Agustin I (1821-1824) , Iturbide had spent his youth in exile
as the ward of a wealthy American insurance executive J. A.
Braniff of Oklahoma City.

By the time of the Huerta coup,

however, he had re-established himself in Mexico as a large
hacendado with extensive holdings south of the capital.
Shortly after the assassination of Madero, Iturbide was

Sibid.j Link, Wilson:

Struggle for Neutrality, 471.
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commissioned a general in the Federal Army and appointed
Governor of the Federal District.®
In January, 1914, Daniels recalls, Iturbide suddenly
turned up in Washington; "whether by arrangement or not,"
the Secretary could not determine.7
a most opportune moment.

The general arrived at

Wilson's policy of watchful waiting

was under determined attack, both at home and abroad, and a
number of his own advisers were urging decisive action to
expedite settlement of the Mexican question.

At that point

Franklin K. Lane suggested to the President that he extend
the full support of the United States Government to a single
Mexican leader, preferably Iturbide.

The Secretary then

proceeded vigorously to promote the General's candidacy, but
to no avail.®

Seemingly undismayed, Iturbide boldly returned

to his post in Mexico City.
Following the flight of Huerta in July, 1914, and
that of his successor, Carbajal, early in August, control of
the capital fell to Iturbide.

For some time prior to those

developments. State Department Officials had been concerned
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®Teitelbaum, Wilson and the Mexican Revolution, 217''“
7Daniels, The Wilson Era;
8Ibid.

Years of Peace, 184.
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over the fate of the city in the event of Huerta's defeat.
It was generally though erroneously believed that the
Zapatistas were savages, and that to permit them to occupy
Mexico City would be the height of folly.

Teitelbaum suggests

that Washington's fears were conveyed to Iturbide, prompting
the General to repel an advance column of the Army of the
South and, subsequently, to open negotiations with Obregon
for surrender of the city to the Constitutionalists.9

What

ever the case, the Department of State thereafter exhibited
an unusual solicitude for Iturbide, going to great lengths
to assure his personal safety.
The General had need of powerful friends.

He was

charged by the Zapatistas with ruthless exploitation of the
peons on his estates and with responsibility for the deaths
of a number of his workers.19

Moreover, his spirited defense

of the capital against advancing agraristas had further
marked him for vengeance.

Nor despite that service could he

look to the Constitutionalists for clemency.

He had supported

Huerta, and that alone sufficed to condemn him in the eyes of
most revolutionaries regardless of faction.
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.

That the General

9Teitelbaum, Wilson and the Mexican Revolution, 219

l°Silliman to Bryan, December 14, 1914, SDR 812.00/
14010.
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was able to survive the Constitutionalist occupation suggests
that he did indeed enjoy Washington's protection.

Early in

September, Paul Fuller, Wilson's personal agent in Mexico,
sought to obtain Iturbide's release.
the request.

Carranza himself denied

He would spare the General's life, but no m o r e . ^

Iturbide's fortunes plunged in late November when
Conventionist forces occupied the capital.

While the General

hid in the home of an American resident, Bryan in Washington
and State Department agents in Mexico City bargained for his
life and sought to obtain for him a guarantee of safe conduct
out of the country.

On December 13, the Secretary instructed

Silliman to "do everything in his power to save Iturbide."
It would be "most unfortunate," Bryan declared, if the General
"were to be dealt with harshly,"12
When Zapata insisted upon trying Iturbide, Silliman
and Leon Canova secretly approached President Gutierrez on
the General's behalf.

Without consulting the Zapatistas,

Gutierrez acquiesced in Iturbide's escape by rail to the
United States.

Arrangements were made for Canova to accompany

llFuller to Bryan, September 18, 1914, SDH 812.00/
14236.
12Bryan to Silliman, December 13, 1914, SDR 812.00/
14009a.
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the General to the border in a sealed compartment.13

How

ever, no sooner had the train departed the city, early on
December 22, than the secret was out.

The leak, due in

large part to the garrulousness of Canova himself, very
nearly proved the death of Iturbide.14

Again and again, the

train was stopped and boarded by Conventionist police.

13Teitelbaum, Wilson and the Mexican Revolution, 221.
Canova, a Floridian, had little formal education. Prior to
joining the staff of the Associated Press in 1898, he had
been variously employed as a carpenter, printer, bank clerk,
and publicity manager for the Plant railways and hotel chain.
One of scores of reporters assigned to cover the Cuban cam
paign, Canova stayed on in Havana after the war. In 1899, he
became editor of the Havana Herald; from 1906 to 1911, he
edited La Lucha. In 1909, Canova was appointed chief of the
Cuban Government's Bureau of Information. Four years later,
for reasons undisclosed, his service was suddenly terminated.
When, at a later date, Canova was under consideration for
head of a proposed Division of Cuban Affairs within the
Department of State, Cuban officials objected strongly and
declared him non grata. Unemployed following his dismissal
from Cuban service, Canova drifted to New York.
In June 1914,
Republican, Roman Catholic, and of questionable integrity,
Canova inexplicably attracted the favorable attention of the
Secretary of State. Soon he was on his way to Mexico, com
missioned as a special agent to assist Carothers. His
advancement thereafter was phenomenal, due in large part to
a facile pen and tongue and the naivete of his superiors.
U. S., Department of State, Register of the Department of
State, 1918 (Washington, D. C . : Government Printing Office,
l9l9), 9 3 (Herafter cited as Register, 1918); Who's Who in
America,.1920-1921 (Chicago: A. N. Marquis & Company, 1920),
471; Teitelbaum, Wilson and the Mexican Revolution, 163, 179.
14lbid., 222.
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Canova's diplomatic status alone prevented entry into the
compartment and the forcible removal of his charge.

Finally,

during the night of the 24thf far to the north of the capital,
Iturbide leaped from the train and made his way to the home
of a friend.

Some days later, using a passport prepared for

him by Silliman, he entered the United States.15

Almost

immediately he began to plot his return.18

II.
One can only guess at what passed between Iturbide
and his escort during their perilous journey.

There is

evidence that Canova was greatly impressed with the General;
it goes without saying that Iturbide was grateful to Canova.17
With his eye ever on the main chance, it was characteristic
of the agent to attempt to capitalize on the relationship.18

iSibid., 223-226.
16Link, Wilson:

Struggle for Neutrality, 471.

17Teitelbaura, Wilson and the Mexican Revolution, 223224, 270.
18The Iturbide rescue was widely publicized in the
United States, and Canova made the most of it. Bryan was
impressed. He shrugged off serious charges against his sub
ordinate, including the accusation by Conventionist officials
that Canova had accepted a large bribe from Iturbide. Ibid.,
227-228. In April, 1915, Bryan appointed the agent, by then
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Clearly, Iturbide was favored by Canova's superiors.

Given

the utter confusion in Mexico at the moment, it was not at
all unreasonable to suppose that an impatient Wilson and
Bryan might be persuaded to back the General in hopes of
pacifying the republic once and for all.

If Canova were to

succeed in arranging Administration support for Iturbide,
the General's debt to the agent would be great indeed.
too, one suspects would be the reward.

So,

While acknowledging

that the connection between the two "cannot be clearly
defined," Link believes that by the early spring of 1915 it

a self-professed authority on the Mexican Revolution,
Assistant Chief of the Division of Latin American Affairs.
It was a grievous error. Canova was already distrusted by
the Carrancistas for his earlier advocacy of Villa. The
subsequent Iturbide rescue had deepened that distrust and
antagonized other revolutionary factions as well. Then fol
lowed the notorious association of Canova and the General in
an avowedly counterrevolutionary scheme. By the time of his
appointment to the Latin American Division, Canova was
anathema to all revolutionary leaders. Unfortunately for
future Mexican-American relations, Bryan's blunder was com
pounded by his successor. In midsummer, 1915, Lansing
appointed Canova head of the new Division of Mexican Affairs.
Personally hostile to Wilson and an outspoken critic of the
President's Mexican policy, Canova proved a serious liability
to the resumption of amicable relations between the United
States and Mexico. Ibid., 300-301. Canova remained at his
post until December, 1918. Then, as in 1913, he suddenly
resigned under mysterious circumstances.
Ibid., 269. Recog
nizing his late subordinate as a potential mischief-maker,
Lansing attempted to keep track of him. When in November,
1919, Canova embarked for South America on an emerald venture,
the Secretary had him placed under surveillance. Ibid., 411.
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was "altogether likely that Canova was working behind the
scenes to open official doors" for his c l i e n t . A n d so it
would seem.
Early in January, Canova requested and received
permission from Bryan to postpone his return to Washington
in order to confer once again with Iturbide.

When Canova

finally departed for the capital, the General followed.
Throughout the remainder of the month they maintained close
contact.

On January 30, doubtless through Canova*s efforts,

Iturbide conferred in secret with Bryan.20

Encouraged, he

then sought out Chandler P. Anderson, Lansing's assistant in
the Office of the Counselor, and attempted to procure his
services.

Although Anderson professed to have refused the

retainer, he, like Canova, became a fervent partisan of the
General within Administration c i r c l e s . 21
On February 6, four days after Iturbide's conversation
with Anderson, the General's supporters in San Antonio, Texas,

19Link, Wilson;

Struggle for Neutrality, 471.

20Teitelbaum, Wilson and the Mexican Revolution, 228.
21Diary of Chandler P. Anderson, Division of Manu
scripts, Library of Congress, February 2, 1915 (hereafter
cited as Anderson Diary)* Anderson was a distinguished
international lawyer who served on numerous government com
missions to settle international disputes. He was special
counsel for the Department of State under Elihu Root from
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sponsored a so-called "pacification conference."

There, with

the appointment of a counterrevolutionary junta, the Iturbide
movement was formally initiated.

Its adherents included

exiled Mexican bishops, old Maderistas, former Huertista
commanders, and most of the important Mexican political
refugees then in the United States.22

in addition, the

movement enjoyed the support of a number of prominent
American Roman Catholic leaders.

With organizational details

behind him and the assurance of a favorable hearing in
Washington, the General proceeded to New York City to estab
lish his headquarters and to solicit the requisite financial
support for his venture.
Apparently Iturbide had little difficulty in finding
interested backers.

His progress was checked, however, when

his anonymous benefactors insisted that he obtain from the
Administration recognition and approval of his movement.23
Accordingly, on April 23, Manuel Calero, former Maderista

1905 to 1909 and, again, for Philander Knox from 1909 to
1910. Who's Who in America, 1920-1921, 84. Anderson was a
close friend of Robert Lansing, serving as special assistant
to the Counselor from the fall of 1914 through October, 1915.
According to Link, Anderson "had some influence upon the
thinking of the President and the formation of foreign
policies." Link, Wilson: Struggle for Neutrality, 48.
22ibid., 471

23ibid., 472.
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ambassador to the United States, contacted Chandler Anderson
on the General's behalf.^4

shortly thereafter, Anderson

went to New York to confer directly with Iturbide.

Upon his

return to Washington, Anderson used his influence to arrange
a meeting between the General and top officials of the
Department of State.

On May 19 Anderson and Iturbide met

with Bryan and Lansing.

The General claimed to have at his

disposal in Mexico some 20,000 armed men.

They would rally

to his support when he recrossed the border.

Moreover, he

was confident that the great majority of the Mexican people,
desperate for an end to the ruinous factional strife, would
do likewise.

Success, however, depended upon the acquisition

of funds; and that, in turn, was contingent upon his obtaining
the moral support of the Wilson Administration.25
Bryan, like so many others who met the personable
Iturbide, had been very favorably impressed with the General
in January.
met again.25

The Secretary was "cordial and jocose" when they
Nonetheless, he could not condone the General's

24Anderson Diary, April 23, 1915.
25Ibid., May 19, 1915.
^6Ibid. iturbide's personality was apparently his
greatest asset. Even those who opposed his plans and de
nounced him as a reactionary found him personally charming and
extremely persuasive. Quirk, The Mexican Revolution, 255;
Daniels, The Wilson Era; Years of Peace, 185; O'Shaughnessy,
A Diplomat's Wife in Mexico, 240.
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plans.

Bryan was suspicious.

He was well aware of the close

tie between Iturbide and Mexican and American Roman Catholic
leaders.

If the General did succeed in terminating the

civil war and imposing his authority upon the republic, his
ecclesiastical allies would almost certainly demand repeal
of the old Juarista religious laws.2?

Staunch Protestant

that he was, the Secretary could hardly be expected to rush
to the defense of Rome.
Furthermore, Bryan had learned that "certain British
and American investors" were interested in the Iturbide move
ment and eager to finance it if Washington approved.28

The

Secretary had not forgotten the Pierce-Cowdray struggle for
control of the Mexican oil industry.

Like the President, he

remained firmly convinced that European and American firms
continued to interfere in the internal affairs of the republic.
And "evidence" to that effect abounded:

the clandestine El

Paso negotiations between Villista agents and representatives
of the Guggenheim and Rockefeller interests; Doheny's
$100,000 "gift" to Carranza; the ambiguous relationship

2?Link, Wilson:

Struggle for Neutrality, 472.

28Ibid.; Paolo E. Coletta, William Jennings Bryan:
Progressive Politician and Moral Statesman, 1909-1915 (Lincoln:
University of Nebraska Press, 1969), 177 (Hereafter cited as
Bryan) .
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between the oilmen and Hanuel Pelaez; and perhaps most
important, the recurring rumors of intense Anglo-American
competition for control of the great Huasteca oilfields.29
The alleged alliance of bishop and banker in a thinly dis
guised counterrevolutionary cabal was more than Bryan could
bear and was bound to arouse his ire.

In no uncertain terms

he informed the conferees that he opposed the General's scheme
and that no member of the Wilson Administration would be
permitted to do otherwise.30
Iturbide was not easily discouraged, however; nor
were his friends in Washington.

Trying a different tack,

they turned to the General's original sponsor, Secretary of
the Interior Franklin K. Lane.

On or about May 25, Iturbide

conversed at length with Lane.

The Secretary, who thought

29Little more than a month before the Bryan-Iturbide
meeting. Administration officials were again reminded of the
fierce, behind-the-scenes struggle for control of Mexico's
subsurface wealth. On April 12, shortly before spending an
evening at the White Bouse discussing the Mexican question,
Cleveland H. Dodge outlined to Joseph Tumulty the gist of his
advice to the President:
"My own opinion is that no group of
men can ever settle up the trouble in Mexico as long as the
contending oil interests are putting up money for the con
tending parties. If Lord Cowdray and the other interests who
are opposing him in trying to secure the Tampico oil fields
could be brought together, I think peace would be restored in
Mexico very promptly." Dodge to Joseph P. Tumulty, April 12,
1915, Wilson Papers, .VI, 95D.
30Anderson Diary, May 19, 1915.
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himself "something of an expert on Mexico," was "completely
enchanted.1,31

Revealing considerably more to Lane than he

had to Bryan, Iturbide outlined a plan to organize a new
constitutional government under Manuel Bonilla, the sur
viving member of the Madero Cabinet and the sole legitimate
claimant to the presidential succession.32

No mention was

made of money, however, and the delicate matter of the
General's anonymous backers was wisely eschewed.

Iturbide

had learned his lesson well.
The critical factor in the plan presented to Lane was
food.

Already many of his countrymen were starving, Iturbide

lamented, and supplies grew scarcer by the day.

If, however,

he could somehow obtain a large amount of food to be distri
buted by his followers in Mexico, many thousands of his people
would be saved and the masses would rush to support him.

At

that point, presumably, a disinterested Iturbide would pre
side over the restoration of legitimate constitutional govern
ment under the respected Manuel Bonilla.32

Good-hearted and

gullible. Lane dashed off a glowing account of the meeting to
Wilson.

In it he praised Iturbide highly, endorsed his plan

3lLink, Wilson;
32Ibid., note 55.

Struggle for Neutrality, 473
33ibid.
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for food relief, and urged the President to give it serious
consideration.34
Having thus gained the President's ear, Iturbide's
sponsors renewed their efforts to win over the Secretary of
State.

Canova was aware that Wilson and Bryan alike were

deeply moved by the suffering of the Mexican people; also
that they had sought for some time to employ the American
Bed Cross in mitigating that hardship.

Playing upon his

superiors' compassion, Canova drafted a memorandum proposing
that the Administration work through the existing Iturbide
organization to alleviate the misery of the Mexican masses.
First, however, it would be necessary to embargo arms ship
ments to all revolutionary factions, at the same time in
forming their respective leaders that the United States
meant to save the Mexican people from starvation.

Having

taken those precautions, the Government could turn at once
to the business of saving lives.

Iturbide's followers in

Mexico, assisted by American consular agents and perhaps
even by American soldiers, would be mobilized to distribute
American food and Red Cross supplies to the needy.35

34Ibid., 473
35Ibid., 474; Anderson Diary, June 1, 1915.
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Canova discussed his plan with Anderson on May 28;
Anderson, in turn, conveyed it to Bryan on June 1.36

The

Secretary expressed great enthusiasm for a program of
organized relief for starving Mexicans.

However, he firmly

refused to consider the employment of reactionary elements
to that end.37

Almost certainly he was by then aware of the

Iturbide conspiracy, although apparently oblivious to the
degree of complicity among his own subordinates.

Whatever

the case, Canova*s subterfuge was pathetically transparent.
The Secretary was not prepared to encourage counterrevolution,
however great his concern for the Mexican people.

Bryan's

rejection of the food relief scheme was a serious setback for
the Iturbide movement.

III.
By the end of May, the President was again free to
turn his attention briefly to Mexican affairs.

After con

ferring with Duval West, recently returned to Washington, he
determined to "take a more personal hand" in terminating the
struggle in Mexico.38

West, who visited the White House on

36Ibid., May 28, June 1, 1915.
37Ibid., June 1, 1915.
38Quirk, The Mexican Revolution, 253.
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May 24, reiterated what he had earlier reported by dispatch:
the republic was in chaos, conditions were growing worse,
and not one of the revolutionary factions was capable of
*
39
restoring order.

Several days later, Wilson received a

letter from the correspondent David Lawrence, "who was on
intimate terms with the Carrancista representatives in
Washington and whose judgement Wilson deeply respected.1,40
Lawrence confirmed the West report and warned that if the
situation in Mexico continued to deteriorate, massive Ameri
can intervention would become unavoidable.

West had already

suggested that the President use his influence to promote a
reconciliation between the various factional leaders; now
Lawrence made a similar proposal.

The newsman urged Wilson

to open negotiations with Carranza, Villa, and Zapata, as
well as with the more important of their respective sub
chiefs.

Having done so, the President should insist that the

^ Mew York Times. May 26, 1915. A serious considera
tion in the President's decision to work for a speedy settle
ment of the Mexican conflict was the threat of European
joint intervention at the end of the World War. England,
France, and Germany as well were known to be contemplating
such action. Coletta, Bryan, 176; Philip Holt Lowry, "The
Mexican Policy of Woodrow Wilson" (unpublished Ph.D.
dissertation, Yale University, 1949), 145.
40Link, Wilson: Struggle for Neutrality, 475.
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principals resolve their differences and organize a pro
visional government worthy of recognition by the United
States.4^
Wilson had heard enough.

Concurring with West and

Lawrence, he drafted a message embodying his advisors'
proposals to be sent to the more important revolutionary
civil and military leaders.

On June lr the same day that

Bryan received and rejected Canova's food relief plan, he
presented the draft to the Cabinet.

In the "heated dis

cussion" which followed, Lane again raised the question of
support for Iturbide.

AO

He spoke well of the General and

urged official encouragement of the Iturbidista movement.
As before, however, his efforts on behalf of Iturbide came
to naught.

Again, Bryan proved his undoing.

The Secretary

of State denounced the General as a reactionary.

The

Government, he argued, should recognize none but a true
revolutionary.

His own choice, he concluded, was Carranza.4^

41Ibid.
42David P. Houston, Eight Years with Wilson's
Cabinet, 1913-1920 (2 vols.; Garden City: Doubleday,
Page, 1926), I, 133.
4^Ibid. Bryan also considered extending recognition
to General Felipe Angeles, Villa's artillery chief and one
of his principal lieutenants. Bryan to Wilson, June 2, 1915,
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Meanwhile, throughout the meeting, Wilson merely
listened.

He refused to take sides.

Choosing to proceed

with his plan, he ordered Bryan to polish the draft and
send identical copies to the several revolutionary leaders.^
The Administration's future course of action would depend
upon their respective replies.

The Lansing Papers, 11, 533. Angeles, at least for a time,
was another serious contender for Washington's support
although there is some question as to whether or not he was
actually pursuing the presidency for himself or for another
party. A former Federal army officer, he had backed Madero
during the Decina Tragica and barely escaped with his life.
Ross, Francisco 1. Madero, 288ff. He had then joined
Carranza's cabinet as Sub-secretary of Defense, but his
aristocratic background and high level of personal integrity
soon aroused the resentment of the First Chief's inner cir
cle. Early in 1914, Angeles was attached to Villa's head
quarters and placed in charge of the artillery of the
Division of the North, in that capacity, he became Villa's
most important advisor, putting at his chief's disposal
"his immense knowledge of the art of war." It was indeed
"a strange partnership," as Parkes observes, "Don Quixote
serving as the squire of Sancho Panza." Parkes, A History
of Mexico, 342, Angeles' ability was generally acknowledged
by Mexican and American alike. John Lind considered him a
candidate for the presidency and Villa recommended him to
Duval West in March, 1915. Teitelbaum, Wilson and the
Mexican Revolution, 266; Quirk, The Mexican Revolution, 210.
Late in June, 1915, Angeles came to Washington to confer
with Lansing and Wilson. The purpose of his mission has
never been clearly ascertained. For a brief moment, however,
in mid-July, the General was very much in the running for the
provisional presidency of Mexico. Teitelbaum, Wilson and
the Mexican Revolution, 260-276; Wilson to Lansing, July 8,
1915, The Lansing Papers, II, 540-541. For a less favorable
portrayal of Angeles see Womack, Zapata, 192.
4^Link, Wilsons

Struggle for Neutrality, 476
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The President's message, dispatched on June 2,
reviewed recent developments in Mexico and described the
deplorable conditions existing therein.

It disclaimed

Washington's right to intervene in the internal affairs of
the republic but declared that the American people and
government could no longer tolerate the anarchy and human
suffering which prevailed throughout the greater part of
the country.

Therefore, the statement continued, the Govern

ment of the United States "must presently do what it has not
hitherto done or felt at liberty to do:

[It must] lend

its active moral support to some man or group of men" who
could "rally the people of Mexico to their support," abide
by the constitution, and establish a government which the
nations of the world could "recognize and deal with."
Moreover, that government must be one "with whom the program
of the revolution will be a business and not merely a plat
form."

Virtually an ultimatum, the message closed with a

call for factional reconcilation and a grim and unmistakable
warning:

If the several leaders failed to resolve their

differences and unite "within a very short time," the
Government in Washington would be "constrained to decide
what means should be employed by the United States in order
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to help Mexico save herself and serve her people.1'45

The

policy of watching and waiting, pursued since the summer
of the previous year, had suddenly come to an end.
In Mexico, the President's message elicited a mixed
response.

Zapata, concerned primarily with affairs in and

around the State of Morelos, never replied.4^

The disin

tegrating Conventionist coalition, no longer a serious
contender for power, defiantly rejected the proposal.4^
Villa, on the other hand, proved most receptive.

On June 1,

he had again been defeated decisively by Obregon at Leon
de las Aldamas.

With the end near at hand, he had little

to lose and possibly much to gain by going along with the
President.

Accordingly, he at once called upon his opponents

to accept the American proposal.

Cooperation with the

United States, he contended, would forestall American mili
tary intervention and preclude its probable concomitant,
the resumption of power by former Porfiristas or other
4Q

reactionary elements.

Despite the sensibleness of Villa's

45New York Times, June 3, 1915.
4<*Quirk, The Mexican Revolution, 257.
47Link, Wilson;
48

Struggle for Neutrality, 478.

Carothers to Lansing, June 11, 1915, Foreign
Relations, 1915, 703-704.
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appeal, it failed to sway his rivals.

Voluntary reconcilia

tion was out of the question.
In Veracruz, Carranza equivocated, either failing
to grasp or choosing to ignore the significance of Wilson's
words.

On June 7, Silliman reported that Carranza appeared

willing to cooperate with Washington.

49

Four days later,

however, the First Chief issued a manifesto to the Mexican
nation proclaiming imminent military victory, urging his
opponents to submit, and pledging national elections and a
rapid return to constitutional g o v e r n m e n t . F o l l o w i n g
this confident declaration, Carrancista forces, under General
Pablo Gonzales, launed a determined drive on Mexico City.
Little opposition was expected from either the remnants of
the Conventionist army or from the scattered bands of
Zapata's agraristas still operating in the Valley of Mexico.
Wilson, already having learned of Obregon's triumph in the
North, was duly impressed.

51

Thus as much as he despised

Carranza, the President was prepared to extend recognition

4^Link, Wilson;

Struggle for Neutrality, 478.

50Venustiano Carranza, "Manifesto to the Nation,"
June 11, 1915, Foreign Relations, 1915, 705-707.
■*^Link, Wilson;

Struggle for Neutrality, 478-479.
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to the Veracruz regime if the First Chief would make a
co

"genuine effort to unite all groups and p a r t i e s . A c 
cordingly , Silliman was instructed on June 18 to inform
Carranza of the President's decision.

At the same time,

however, he was to warn the First Chief that failure to
"go the full length of conciliation and conference with
all the principal factions" would negate any chance of
recognition.^3
Carranza would have none of it:

"The intimation of

recognition," Silliman reported, "did not in the least
affect his impassive face."^

And with good reason.

The

Constitutionalists clearly dominated the struggle in Mexico.
The end was indeed in sight.

Moreover, their victory had

been achieved in spite of the overt hostility of the Wilson
Administration.

For Washington to adopt any course other

than the "recognition and support of the Constitutionalist
cause," Carranza declared, "would be a regrettable injustice

52
Wilson to Lansing, June 17, 1915, The Lansing
Papers, XI, 535.
^ Lansing to Silliman, June 18, 1915, Foreign
Relations, 1915, 715-716.
^Silliman to Lansing, June 22, 1915, Ibid., 718719.
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and a great calamity for two friendly nations."

He asked

only that the United States remain neutral and allow his
armies to complete the pacification of the republic.

His

tory, he reminded the President, offered no example of
civil war "terminating by the union of the contending
EC

parties."

One or the other must ultimately triumph.

Wilson reacted to Carranza's rebuff with "disgust
and a n g e r . "^6

More concerned than ever over the war in

Europe, he was extremely anxious to halt the strife in
Mexico and to disengage as much as possible from Mexican
affairs.

57

However, the proposal of June 2, which Wilson

believed to be eminently reasonable, had backfired.

Car

ranza's refusal to work for factional reconciliation placed
the President in an awkward and embarrassing position:

the

^^Ibid. Carranza justified his position thusly:
"Villa represents the reactionary tendency which, without
having achieved the ideals of the Revolution reserves for
some future time the reformation of the laws. On the other
hand the Constitutionalists represent the revolutionary
tendency which proposes to obtain the reforms needed by
the people prior to the establishment of constitutional
order. Any combination of the two," he warned, "will pro
duce only a temporary peace which could only result in new
conflict." Ibid., 719. It was a sound and irrefutable
argument.
5 6 Link,

Wilson;

Struggle for Neutrality, 481.

57Quirk, The Mexican Revolution, 264; Link, Woodrow
Wilson and the Progressive Era, 133.
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United States now stood committed to an imposed settlement
of the Mexican civil war.
of the question.

Further procrastination was out

Wilson had to act.

IV.
Some three months earlier, when conditions in the
former Mexican capital had very nearly prompted the dis
patch of an American relief expedition to the city, Lansing
had drafted and submitted to Wilson a plan for multi
lateral Pan-American intervention.^®

The President had

expressed interest in the proposal at the time, but had
dismissed it as too drastic.

On June 16 Canova, who com

prehended the situation in Mexico far better than his
superiors, resurrected the Lansing p l a n . ^

It is clear

that he anticipated the President's embarrassment.

It

is equally clear that he had by no means abandoned hope
for his client.

Almost certainly Pan-American interven

tion would be opposed by all revolutionary factions, par
ticularly by the Constitutionalists.

The sole possible

exception was Villa; but Villa was very likely finished.

58Lansing to Bryan, March 8 , 1915, The Lansing
Papers, II, 529-531.
5^Link, Wilson;

Struggle for Neutrality, 481.
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Thus, in the event of armed intervention, the odds were
quite good that the allies would be forced to turn ulti
mately to one or the other of the exiled conservative
leaders . ® 0

With Bryan gone and with proven friends in

both the Cabinet and the Department of state, Iturbide
would stand an excellent chance indeed of securing PanAmerican support.
Reassured by Canova of the feasibility and per
haps also of the timeliness of the plan, Lansing resub
mitted it to the President shortly before the arrival of
Carranza's negative reply to the proposal of June 2.
Wilson expressed interest in the plan. A

Again

It appealed to

him primarily because it would permit the United States to
escape the onus of unilateral intervention, at the same

GOQuirk contends that Wilson's threat of June 2
"to look elsewhere" in the event that the rival revolu
tionary factions failed to reconcile their differences "is
a clear indication that Wilson was at least toying with the
idea of going outside the ranks of the revolution to find
a compromise candidate, a man such as Iturbide or Manuel
Vazquez Tagle," Quirk, The Mexican Revolution, 256. De
spite the rejection of Iturbide in the cabinet meeting of
June 1 the General was still highly regarded both within
the cabinet and within the Administration generally. New
York Times, June 6 , 1915.
®*Wilson to Lansing, June 22, 1915, The Lansing
Papers, II, 536.

252
time bestowing a sort of quasi-legitimacy upon such an
operation .62

All things considered, it was perhaps the

least objectionable of the options at the President's
disposal in the event that factional reconciliation should
prove unobtainable.

Thus on June 22, when Carranza's

unequivocal rejection came in over the wire from Veracruz,
a disappointed and exasperated Wilson turned at once to the
Lansing plan .62

Despite indisputable evidence of the First

Chief's preeminence, the President could not stomach the
triumph of the man he had come to detest so utterly.

For

some time thereafter, Wilson and State Department officials

6 2 Link,

Wilson;

Struggle for Neutrality, 481.

6 2 Ibid.
Armed intervention by United States forces,
albeit under Pan-American auspices, was by no means out of
the question. Some time earlier, the War Department had been
instructed to prepare an estimate of the cost of maintaining
a 500,000-man army in Mexico for one year. The completed
report and accompanying editorial comment appeared in the
June edition of The Army and Navy Register. According to
the editors:
"It begins to look as if there might be an
emergency requiring the military occupation of Mexican ter
ritory for the benefit of that republic and its citizens."
The cost of such a venture was estimated at $800,000,000 for
the first year of operations.
It would be a difficult task.
At the time, there were some 100,000 Mexicans under arms,
all of whom were veterans of the civil war and thus con
sidered to be capable soldiers. The War Department, in turn,
had only 30,000 men of the Regular Army in the continental
United States and 100,000 men in the organized militia. It
would be necessary, then, to raise an additional 300,000
volunteers. As no funds for such a project existed, a spe
cial appropriation would have to be obtained. New York
Times, June 20, 1915.
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alike were committed to a Mexican settlement which eliminated
Carranza once and for all . ® 4
Lansing took the initiative.

On July 5, he wrote

to the President, then vacationing in New Hampshire, out
lining a course of action by which the Administration might
eventually realize its objectives in Mexico .65

It was not

at all what Iturbide's partisans had hoped for, and doubt
less caused some consternation among them.

The Government

of the United States, Lansing began, should do nothing to
encourage the various conservative and reactionary exile
groups then angling for Washington's support.

The revolu

tionary element alone, he believed, was capable of re
establishing genuine constitutional government in the re
public.

It was "manifest," however, that because of "per

sonal animosities, jealousies, and ambitions of the factional
leaders nothing [could] be accomplished through them to
restore peace and stable government."

The United States,

then, must insist upon the retirement of Carranza, Villa,
and other principal revolutionary chieftains.

64 Quirk,

65

Furthermore,

The Mexican Revolution, 278-279.

Lansing to Wilson, July 5, 1915, The Lansing
Papers, II, 538-539.
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it must withhold recognition and withdraw moral support
from any government headed or controlled by any one of
these leaders.

Having taken those preliminary steps, the

Government should then invite subchiefs of the several
factions to "meet in conference . . .

for the purpose of

organizing a coalition provisional government," one truly
representative of the majority of the revolutionary element.
Once established, the new regime would be accorded the
recognition of the United States and its Pan-American part
ners.

American authorities would prevent arms and ammuni

tion from reaching dissidents in Mexico, at the same time
"employing such other means as it may properly employ to
insure the stability and permanency" of the provisional
government until constitutional government was restored.64*
However disappointing the Secretary's elimination
of the exiles may have been to Canova and those of like
mind, Iturbide's chances for intervention were by no means
diminished.

Lansing's proposals were grounded not upon

fact but upon wishful thinking.

The Secretary had failed

to take into account some hard realities.

First and fore

most, none of the principal factional leaders were disposed

66Ibid
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to step down without a fight.

Second, an attempt by the

United States alone or by a coalition of powers to forcibly
retire any one of those leaders would almost certainly
provoke a patriotic uprising against the invader and an
all-out war with an aroused and temporarily united Mexican
nation.

Mexican leadership in the wake of a Pan-American

victory would have to come from without.

Again, one or the

other of the several exile leaders would be the logical
choice.

Oddly, despite repeated reminders, most Adminis

tration officials somehow remained oblivious to the inten
sity of Mexican patriotism.

They still failed to comprehend

the determination of all revolutionary leaders to resist
foreign intervention, particularly North American inter
vention, in what those leaders held to be an exclusively
Mexican contest.

Lansing and Wilson were no exceptions.

The President himself for some time had been con
sidering the adoption of a plan similar to that outlined
by the Secretary of State.
Lansing plan .67

Accordingly, he endorsed the

He then instructed the Secretary to sound

out diplomatic representatives of several Latin American
nations and bring them together to consider joint

67Wilson to Lansing, July 8, 1915, The Lansing
Papers, II, 539-541.
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Pan-American intervention in Mexico.

At the same time, he

suggested that Lansing employ Paul Fuller to serve as
liaison between the Administration and the Washington
representatives of the various Mexican factions.®®

Fuller

arrived in the capital soon after he was called, quickly
establishing lines of communication between the Department
of State and the several Mexican agents.

Some weeks went

by, however, before the Secretary was able to arrange the
proposed Pan-American conference on Mexico.

69

During the

interim, lobbying on behalf of the various candidates for
Pan-American recognition and support reached a fever pitch.
The stakes were high.

70

The recipient of Washington's bene

diction appeared to have a very good chance of ultimately
controlling the Mexican republic.

6 8 Ibid.
6 ®Link,

Wilson;

Struggle for Neutrality, 483.

^°Quirk, The Mexican Revolution, 279-281; Teitelbaum,
Wilson and the Mexican Revolution, 262, 268-275.

Chapter 6

STATE DEPARTMENT ANTIREVOLUTIONISTS:
THE LONG-CANOVA FACTION

I.
Neither Wilson nor Lansing in the summer of 1915 was
able to devote his undivided attention to a settlement of
the perplexing Mexican question.

Absent from the capital

from June to September, the President was largely pre
occupied with the war in Europe.

The struggle in Mexico

paled by comparison and its relative importance to Wilson as
well as to most other members of his administration steadily
diminished .1

Because of the European war Lansing, too, had

less time for Mexican matters.

Moreover, having only re

cently assumed the direction of his department, the new
Secretary faced the task of familiarizing himself with a
multitude of pressing problems, only one of which was the

■^-Quirk, The Mexican Revolution, 264j Daniel M. Smith,
"Robert Lansing, "An Uncertain Tradition: American Secre
taries of State in the Twentieth Century, ed7, Norman A.
Graebner (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1961), 105-106 (hereafter
cited as "Lansing, "An Uncertain Tradition?.
257

258
civil strife in Mexico.

Due to these distractions, high-

level formulation and direction of Mexican policy tended to
drift throughout the latter part of June and July.

During

this critical period in Mexican-American relations, initi
ative in the making and execution of Mexican policy reverted
to lower-echelon officials in the Department of State .2
Particularly influential in that endeavor was the staff of
the Division of Latin American Affairs and, after July 28,
that of the new Division of Mexican Affairs.
Head of the Latin American desk in the summer of 1915
was Boaz W. Long, one of Bryan's "deserving Democrats . " 2

His

Assistant Chief, from April through July of the same year,
was the ubiquitous Leon J. Canova.

During the latter month,

the new Division of Mexican Affairs was established, and
Canova was moved up to head it.

Prom the beginning, however,

the two divisions worked in concert, and correspondence of
mutual interest passed freely between them.
When Bryan assumed office early in 1913, he had dis
missed not only the First and Second Assistant Secretaries of
State, but the head of the Latin American Affairs Division

2Cline, The United States and Mexico, 171-172.
2Link, Wilson;

Struggle for Neutrality, 498.

as well.

Long, a businessman and proprietor of a large San

Francisco commission house, was appointed Chief of Division
in May, 1913.

Link concedes that Long was "not without con

siderable intelligence," but notes that the appointee's
"reputation as an expert on Latin America rested solely
upon the fact . . . that his company had a branch office in
Mexico City."

Long had no prior diplomatic experience and

he "knew no more about Caribbean affairs than his superiors
did."

Nor, since Bryan had also dismissed the professional

Assistant Chief of Division, could he turn to anyone for
advice.

"In [Latin American] policy," Link concludes, " . . .

it was a case of the blind leading the blind ." 4

Nonetheless,

Long had taken over the Division shortly after the Huerta
coup, a major turning point in Mexican-American relations.
Virtually every important official communiccition coming out
of Mexico since that time had crossed his desk.

No one in

4 Ibid., 498-499.
Long was appointed Minister to El
Salvador in July, 1914, but apparently remained in Washington
on special detail to the Department of State until February,
1916. From the latter date through December, 1917, he served
in San Salvador. Returning to Washington early in 1918, he
was again assigned to the Department of State.
In June, 1919,
Long was appointed Minister to Cuba, serving in that capacity
until his retirement in February, 1922. Register, 1918, 135;
Who's Who in America, 1920-1921, 1751.
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the Wilson Administration was in a better position to obtain
a comprehensive grasp of Mexican affairs, and as time went
by. Long did indeed become something of an expert.
Canova, of course, was fluent in Spanish and had
considerable knowledge of Cuban politics.
Cuba.

But Mexico was not

Conclusions drawn by Canova from his Cuban experience

seldom applied with regard to M e x i c o . 5

still, Canova had

been on the scene during that critical stage of the Revolu
tion when the anti-Huerta coalition had disintegrated.
Moreover, he had been assigned, albeit briefly, to Carranza's
Saltillo headquarters, to Villa's stronghold in Chihuahua,
and to the Convention at Aguascalientes and Mexico City.

He

had met and conversed with Villa, Carranza, and other impor
tant revolutionary chieftains.

In addition, by the time of

his appointment to Long's staff, he was in frequent contact

5 in early July, 1915, the Division of Latin American
Affairs prepared a detailed memorandum on the political situ
ation in Mexico. One of the more important recommendations
called for the negotiation of a Mexican-American treaty
similar to the Cuban-American treaty of 1901 embodying the
notorious Platt Amendment.
Long to Lansing, July 8 , 1915,
SDR 812.00/20688. Almost certainly that proposal came from
"the old Cuban hand." Such a scheme was patently inappli
cable to the Mexican situation. The subsequent failure to
conclude a much milder pact with the republic made it
abundantly clear.
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with Iturbide and familiar with the activities of several
other prominent conservative and counterrevolutionary
leaders.

Equally important, Canova had worked closely with

the Administration's principal representatives in Mexico,
Silliman and Carothers, and had made the acquaintance of
a number of lesser American agents, consular and otherwise.
He was thus able to assess with some accuracy the credibi
lity of the Department's primary sources of raw intelligence
on Mexico.

In short, if the Administration had a Mexican

expert, it was Canova.
Both Long and his assistant, however, had serious
shortcomings.

Neither was particularly knowledgeable with

regard to Porfirian Mexico or the origins of the Madero
Revolution.

Nor did they have first-hand knowledge of the

preceding Administration's response to the latter develop
ment.

A critical continuity with the recent past in Mexico

was lacking.

Furthermore, Canova had spent barely a half-

year in Mexico, and Long scarcely more time than that.
Possessed of such limited perspective, their view of the
revolutionary movement was bound to be a distorted one.
Finally, both men were conservative, if not reactionary,
politically and strongly biased against the several Mexican
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revolutionary factions .6

Compounding the problem was Canova's

relationship with Iturbide.

The agent brought to his post a

serious and unresolved conflict of interest.
Thus while the purely factual data passed on by Long
and Canova to their superiors was doubtless accurate enough,
the accompanying analysis or interpretation of that data was
on occasion highly subjective.

Consequently, the ultimate

authors and executors of Washington's Mexican policy not in
frequently arrived at important decisions based wholly or
in part upon false assumptions.
perceived the situation.

Eventually the President

Thereafter, he was skeptical of

^Long's position is clearly defined in the following
memorandums:
Long to Lansing, July 8 , 1915, SDR 812.00/
20688 and Long to Lansing, August 10, 1918, U. S., Department
of State, Records of the Department of State Relating to
Political Relations Between the United States and Mexico,
1910-1929 (National Archives Microfilm Publication M-314)
Pile No. 711.12/130 (hereafter cited as SDR 711.12). Ap
parently Long had opposed the Revolution from its inception:
"Long was an admirer of Porfirio Diaz,detested Madero, and
regarded the Mexican people as political 'infants , " 1 Grieb,
Huerta, 72. Canova's intrigue with the counterrevolutionary
iturbide leaves no doubt as to his position. Nor did his
hostility to the Revolution diminish with time.
In April,
1926, as a private citizen, he addressed President Calvin
Coolidge on the subject of Mexico, sharply criticizing
Wilson's Mexican policy and urging the conquest and lengthy
occupation of the republic by American forces. Canova to
Coolidge, April 9, 1926, SDR 812.00/27752.
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advice on Mexican matters emanating from the Divisions.?

in

time he seems to have ignored it altogether.
By April, 1915, and possibly somewhat earlier, there
had emerged within the Department of State a small but in
fluential group of lower-echelon officials mutually suspi
cious of and antagonistic to the goals, tactics, and princi
pal leaders of the Mexican revolutionary movement .8

Long,

Canova, and Anderson formed the nucleus of this antirevolu
tionary clique.
were:

Others of importance who shared their views

Jordan H. Stabler, appointed Assistant Chief of the

Latin American Division in September, 1913, and Chief of
Division following Long's resignation in October, 1916;9
Roger C. Tanis, originally a staff assistant in the Latin
American Division but promoted to Assistant Chief of the

?Teitelbaum, Wilson and the Mexican Revolution. 277;
Arthur Link, Wilson the Diplomatist; A Look at His Major
Foreign Policies (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1957), 24
(hereafter cited as Wilson the Diplomatist) . See also
Challener, "Bryan," An Uncertain Tradition, 85.
8 Link, Wilson:
Struggle for Neutrality. 483-484;
Teitelbaum, Wilson and the Mexican Revolution. 268, passim;
Clendenen, The United States and Villa, 206.

®Prior to joining Long's division. Stabler had served
as secretary of legation in Quito, 1909-1911, and in Guatamala
City, 1911-1912. Assignments in Stockholm and London pre
ceded assignment as Long's assistant in 1913. Stabler headed
the Latin American Division from October, 1916 to August, 1919.
Register, 1918, 165.
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Mexican Division in July, 1915;1° C. M. Hitch, appointed a
staff assistant in Long's division in July, 1913;H

and Ira

H. Patchin, also a staff assistant, assigned to the Office
of the Counselor as well as to the Mexican and Latin American
Divisions.
In addition to the aforementioned, who were con
cerned primarily or exclusively with Mexican affairs, there
were other officials who frequently cooperated closely with
the Divisions and appear to have shared to a greater or
lesser degree the sentiments of the Antirevolutionists:
Herbert C. Hengstler, Chief of the Consular Bureau, and
Wilbur J. Carr, Director of the Consular Services, who were
often called upon to advise the Divisions, along with the
Department Solicitor, Cone Johnson; Assistant Solicitor
Joseph R. Baker; and staff assistant Leland Harrison of the

^ Register, 1924, 195.
•^Register, 1916, 100.
*2 Patchin, formerly an insurance agent and an employee
of the New York City Administration, was hired in October,
1915, to assist in important drafting. U. S., Department of
State, Register of the Department of State, 1916 (Washington,
D. C.: Government Printing Office, 1917), 121 (hereafter
cited as Register, 1916).

265
Office of the C o u n s e l o r . T o g e t h e r these officials
constituted a formidable and effective obstacle to the
Wilson Administration's acceptance and formal recognition
of a bona fide revolutionary regime in Mexico.

II.
The Antirevolutionists were far less tolerant of the
chronic unrest in Mexico than were Wilson and Bryan, especi
ally when American lives and property were in jeopardy.
They were inclined to deal with it firmly.

Although the

majority of them were Bryan appointees, they shared none of
their benefactor's pacifism and little of his patience.

The

collapse of the anti-Huerta coalition in the fall of 1914
served to exacerbate their differences with the Secretary.
The mounting threat to foreign lives and property in Mexico,
along with the inexcusable callousness of Constitutionalist
leaders in encouraging the abuse of foreigners, the clergy.

13Johnson and Baker were regularly consulted by the
personnel of the Latin American and Mexican Divisions on
matters involving questions of international law. Their
initials and marginal comments appear on many important in
coming messages from State Department representatives in
Mexico as well as on much inter-departmental correspondence
pertaining to conditions in the republic. Their views, while
not so vehemently expressed as those of Canova and Long, were
in general concurrance with those of the division chiefs.
Biographical data on Baker, Carr, Harrison, Hengstler, and
Johnson are in Ibid., 71, 79, 97, 100, and 105.
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and the inhabitants of Mexico City, aroused alarm and indig
nation among them.

By the time of Canova's appointment to

the Latin American Division, their disillusion with the
Revolution and its principal leaders was all but complete.
Thereafter, animosity toward almost all revolutionary
leaders and particularly toward Carranza and his lieutenants
was much in evidence

4

Although the Antirevolutionists frequently adopted
positions coinciding with those of the various domestic
interventionist groups, there is little evidence that collec
tively they were inspired by the same motives.

Personal

economic interest, outrage over the persecution of the
Mexican church, and simple jingoism do not adequately explain
their opposition to the revolutionary movement.

Rather, they

appear to have been moved by disgust and disappointment with
the Revolution and by apprehension over its future course.
They were convinced that the contending revolutionary factions,
if left to their own devices, would continue the struggle
indefinitely.^

That prospect, in turn, was intolerable to

^4Long to Lansing, July 8 , 1915, SDR 812.00/20688;
Anderson to Lansing, May 24, 1917, SDR 711.12/47 1/2; Long to
Lansing, August 10, 1918, SDR 711.12/130.
15Ibid
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State Department officials.

They had a surpassing pro

fessional interest in the rapid restoration of peace and
order in Mexico, a primary objective of Wilsonian foreign
policy since the Huerta usurpation.
The West reports, which revealed the corruption and
ineptitude of revolutionary leaders, had a profound effect
upon the staff of the Latin American Division.

West's final

evaluation of the situation in Mexico confirmed what they
had already suspected for some time .16

By the early summer

of 1915, those persons within the Department of State most
influential in shaping Washington's Mexican policy had lost
all confidence in the ability of the revolutionary chieftains
either to terminate the fighting or to organize a viable
reform government.1^

For that reason, if for no other, they

opposed- recognition of any of the several revolutionary re
gimes.

Even after Carranza had subdued his principal rivals

16West to Bryan, April 5, 1915, SDR 812.00/20721;
New York Times, May 26, 1915.
1 7 Link, Wilsons
Struggle for Neutrality, 480.
Writing to Lansing on June 19, Carothers declared:
"I
don't see how existing conditions can last much longer with
out a collapse. If any agreement can be brought about, . . .
it will have to be soon, or the country will be confronted
with an anarchy that only military intervention could stop."
Quoted in Quirk, The Mexican Revolution, 262. See also Long
to Lansing, July 8 , 1915, SDR 812.00/20688.
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and succeeded in establishing a modicum of authority over
much of the republic, their hostility toward him did not
abate.

As far as the personnel of the Latin American and

Mexican Divisions were concerned, the Revolution was a farce
and its leaders ruthless and cynical opportunists .^8

Both

the movement and its adherents stood thoroughly discredited.
For the balance of the Wilson Administration, despite
a near complete turnover in the personnel of the two divi
sions, strong antirevolutionist sentiment persisted within
the Department of S t a t e . T h i s phenomenon was due in
large part to the generally negative attitude toward Carranza
and the Constitutionalist regime manifested by the Depart
ment's correspondents in Mexico:

the Embassy staff, consular

officials, secret agents, and a multitude of random
informers - mostly Americans or Europeans long resident in
the republic.

Their hostility toward the revolutionary

government was provoked, in turn, by first-hand, day-to-day
contact with its officials and programs.

The unenviable

record of the Carranza regime speaks for itself.

There was

little about it that immediately benefited anyone, Mexican

1 8 Ibid.f Anderson to Lansing, May 24, 1917, SDR
711.12/47 1/2.

^ L o n g to Lansing, December 12, 1919, SDR 711.12/
229 1/2.
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or non-Mexican, other than members of the Constitutionalist
hierarchy.
For the most part conservative in outlook. State
Department officials in Washington and Mexico alike were
dismayed by Constitutionalist disregard for property rights.
Given the contemporary context of Dollar Diplomacy and ag
gressive American economic expansion abroad, the sudden and
largely unforeseen assault upon foreign investment in Mexico
understandably alarmed and outraged the legalistic and
business-oriented individuals who staffed both the Department
of State and its adjuncts in M e x i c o . F r o m their point of

20Charles B. Parker, who replaced Cardoso de Oliveira
as Washington's representative in Mexico City in August, 1915,
reported some months later that the most serious problem con
fronting the Carranza regime was graft:
"The whole government
he observed, 'rests upon a rotten foundation and, therefore,
can endure no longer than the force of arms which placed it
in power.'" Edwin Lieuwen, Mexican Militarism, the Political
Rise and Fall of the Revolutionary Army. 1910-1940 (Albu
querque: University of New Mexico Press, 1968), 40 (here
after cited as Mexican Militarism). Nor did conditions
improve with the passage of time:
"Military rulers and mili
tary bureaucrats continued to enrich themselves at public
expense. In many communities," consular agents reported
early in 1919, "the officers were looked on as 'the worst
kind of robbers instead of protectors of the peace.1" Ibid.
21With few exceptions, officers of the Department of
State both in Washington and in Mexico had pursued careers in
business or the law prior to entering government service. The
incidence of attorneys among them was markedly high. See
Register, 1916; Register, 1918; and U. S. Department of State,
Register of the Department of State (Washington, D. C . :
Government Printing Office, 1922),passim (hereafter cited as
Register, 1922).
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view, an extremely dangerous precedent was in the making,
one that jeopardized all American overseas investment .22
To be sure, the Veracruz regime did pave the way
for future reform by restoring a semblance of order over
large areas of the republic.

However, its contemporary

critics, lacking unusual foresight, can hardly be faulted
for failing to appreciate that accomplishment.

In fact,

one of the most effective criticisms of the revolutionary
government was its alleged unwillingness or inability to
complete the task of pacification and the restoration of
law and order in provinces distant from the capital .23

It

was a damaging indictment and one which served to strengthen
the conviction within the Department of State that the
Carranza regime was ephemeral and thus undeserving of
Washington*s recognition and support.24
Further causes of disenchantment with the revolution
ary movement were widespread and generally acknowledged
grafting by Carrancista officials and the excessive harshness

22Long to Lansing, July 8, 1915, SDR 812.00/20688.
23Long to Lansing, August 10, 1918, SDR 711.12/130;
Polk to Wilson, March 1, 1919, SDR 711.12/187.
2*Long to Lansing, August 10, 1918, SDR 711.12/130;
Long to Lansing, December 12, 1919, SDR 711.12/229 1/2.
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of Constitutionalist commanders in the field .25

These

practices were repugnant to State Department representatives
in Mexico, most of whom had at least some first-hand
knowledge of them.

Accordingly, reports from those repre

sentatives to their superiors in Washington were frequently
highly critical of the Carrancistas and, to a somewhat
lesser degree, of Villistas and other regional revolutionary
factions as well .26

Without doubt, those reports strongly

influenced the personnel of the Latin American and Mexican
Divisions and through them the Secretary of State.
Lansing's attitude toward the revolutionary movement,
particularly as it was manifested by the Carrancista regime.

2 Womack, Zapata, 193; Parkes, A History of Mexico,
259.
"Out of the revolutionary experience," Lieuwen explains,
"had grown up a new respect for force, and revolutionary
chieftains were quick to appreciate the Machiavellian dictum
that a commander should not mind being thought cruel, for the
reputation for cruelty served the dual purpose of instilling
fear in one's enemies and terror, mingled with respect,
amongst one's troops." Lieuwen, Mexican Militarism, 38.
Carranza's principal general, Alvaro Obregon, regularly
executed captured officers; so, too, did Villa. "Such battle
field practices by military men soon extended to civilian
opponents” as well. Ibid.

26See West to Bryan, April 5, 1915, SDR 812.00/
20721; Miller to Lansing, June 16, 1915, SDR 812.6363/189;
Garrett to Lansing, December 3, 1916, SDR 812.00/20035; Cobb
to Lansing, April 24, 1917, SDR 812.00/20874; Hanna to
Lansing, December 26, 1918, SDR 812.00/22440; Chamberlain
to Lansing, January 31, 1919, SDR 812.00/22509.
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was of extreme importance.

Had he been favorably disposed

toward it, the Antirevolutionist clique within the Depart
ment of State would not long have survived his promotion to
Secretary.

The dispersal of that group, in turn, would have

seriously inhibited the activities of Mexican counter
revolutionaries residing in the United States and certainly
discouraged domestic interventionists.

The Secretary, how

ever# was no friend of the R e v o l u t i o n . 2 ?

27Despite his suspicion of and antagonism towards
certain aspects of the revolutionary movement, Lansing
differed significantly from the Antirevolutionists in that
he early recognized and accepted, albeit grudgingly, the
President's irrevocable committment to the Mexican Revolution.
Accordingly, on July 5, 1915, while the Antirevolutionists
were determinedly if deviously pursuing counterrevolution,
the Secretary acknowledged to Wilson that "the old aristo
cratic party must not be recognized in a settlement of the
present situation (in Mexico) and . . . the restoration of
responsible government must come through the revolutionary
element now composed of hostile factions.
The problem is,
therefore, the harmonizing of factions representing the
Revolution." Lansing to Wilson, July 5, 1915, The Lansing
Papers, II, 538.
Implicit in that statement was the under
standing that Carranza and his principal aides must go.
Lansing's antipathy toward the Carrancistas was in no way
diminished, and in his distrust of and dislike for the
Carranza regime he differed little if at all from the Anti
revolutionists. The salient point is that from the fall of
1915 through the spring of 1920, the Revolution was mani
fested through the actions of the Carranza Government, the
one revolutionary faction which the Secretary could not
abide. Consequently, Lansing found it ever more difficult
to support the President's position on Mexico. By December,
1919, he could no longer do so. Shortly thereafter he
resigned.
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Lansing was appointed Counselor to the Department
of State in April, 1914.2®

in that capacity, as Bryan's

principal assistant, he handled "the bulk of the technical
work," questions involving international law and u s a g e . 29
He worked closely with the chiefs of the respective area

2 8 As a young New York attorney, Lansing married the
daughter of John W. Foster, Secretary of State in the
Harrison Administration from 1892 to 1893. Through the
influence of his father-in-law, Lansing turned to the prac
tice of international law. In 1892, he served as associate
counsel for the United States in the arbitration of the
pelagic seal dispute with Canada. From that year to 1914,
he "represented the United States in more international
arbitrations than any other American lawyer." During the
same period, he represented private interests in a number of
international cases and served as counsel for the Chinese
and Mexican legations in Washington.
Julius W. Pratt,
"Robert Lansing, Secretary of State," American Secretaries
of State, ed. S. F. Bemis (New York: Pageant Book Company,
1958), X, 47-48.
2 9 ibid.
Lansing's promotion to Secretary was due in
large part to the fact that he had made himself indispensible.
Bryan's purge of the professional staff in 1913 and the sub
sequent resignation of the veteran John Bassett Moore had
left the State Department without a competent advisor on
international law. Lansing - "thoroughly trained in inter
national law and practice, keenly intelligent, and completely
loyal to the President" - was ideally suited for the job.
Arthur Link, Wilson the Diplomatist, 26. Yet Lansing's ten
ure as Secretary was an unhappy one, indeed. His political
philosophy was "distinctively conservative." Upon his
appointment as secretary, Beers notes, "his conservative
record caused some to suspect that he did not sympathize with
the 'New Freedom' programs of his chief." Burton F. Beers,
Vain Endeavor:
Robert Lansing's Attempts to End the AmericanJapanese Rivalry (Durham: Duke University Press, 1962), 13
(hereafter cited as Vain Endeavor). His political views and
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desks and relied upon them for regional intelligence and
specific policy recommendations.

Like Long and the staff

of the Latin American Division, he too, in time, became
disgusted with the struggle in Mexico, questioning both
the viability of the revolutionary movement and the inte
grity of its leaders .30
As a prominent international jurist, Lansing had
little patience with the shoddy legal briefs introduced by
Carrancista officials in their attempt to rationalize the
dispossession of foreign investors.3^

Perhaps more clearly

the fact that he had replaced Bryan aroused the distrust and
antagonism of his progressive colleagues,
"if all Democrats
were of his type,” Josephus Daniels remarked, "Taft instead
of Wilson would be President." Daniels, The Wilson Era:
Years of Peace, 436. Nor were Lansing's relations with the
President much better:
"He was too independent in his think
ing to follow Wilson slavishly and too reserved in his manner
to fight for what he believed. As a result the President
consistently underestimated his talents. . . . ” Richard W.
Leopold, The Growth of American Foreign Policy: A History
(New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1962), 244. Time has vindi
cated Lansing. Smith observes that he "was one of the
ablest and most experienced American Secretaries of State
of this century. . . . "
It is now "generally agreed" that
his role in the years 1914 to 1920 "was one of great impor
tance." Smith, "Lansing,” An Uncertain Tradition, 101.
30Lansing to Wilson, July 5, 1915, The Lansing Papers,
II, 538-539.
3^Lansing to Wilson, June 27, 1918, SDR 711.12/104;
Lansing to Fletcher, June 29, 1918, SDR 711.12/109a; New York
Times, May 28, 1918 and August 16, 1918.
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than anyone in the Wilson Administration, he grasped the
full significance of surrendering to the Constitutionalist
Government in the matter of expropriation.

The precedent

established by the successful confiscation of foreignowned properties in Mexico could conceivably initiate a
chain reaction disastrous to foreign investment everywhere.
For American investors alone, billions of dollars worth of
property was at stake.

Personally, however, Lansing seems

to have had little sympathy for the plight of Guggenheims,
Rockefellers, Dohenys, and the like .32

His persistent

32In 1917 and early 1918 when the Carranza regime
began to extend its control over the operations of foreign
oil companies, American oilmen sought intervention. Lansing
"took a generally cold view” of their appeal. Only when
actual nationalization of the industry was threatened did he
contemplate occupation of the Huasteca. Cline, The United
States and Mexico, 186-187. Like Wilson, Lansing believed
that there were "interested persons" who desired American
intervention in Mexico as a guarantee for jeopardized in
vestments. Link, Wilsoni Confusions and Crises, 219-220.
Unlike the President, however, Lansing was not entirely in
different to the hardships of American investors in Mexico.
He readily accepted legitimate complaints and urged, often
in vain, action on behalf of the aggrieved parties. In 1922,
some two years after his resignation, Lansing drafted a memo
randum in which he expressed his concern over the failure of
the State Department to stand behind American investors
abroad:
It was time, he declared, that the Department
"looked at business from the point of view of the American
businessman, seeking practical ways to help and volunteering
such help whenever possible, rather than spending its time in
formulating reasons why it should refuse assistance of any
sort, and making those who appeal to the State Department feel
that their chief difficulty is in persuading their own Govern
ment that they are honest and acting in good faith." Quoted
in Beers, Vain Endeavor, 152n.
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efforts to forestall expropriation of American and European
investments in Mexico was hardly the work of a Wall Street
lackey .33

Rather, it appears that Lansing was obsessed with

the preservation of something which to him was of far
greater significance than oilfields, copper mines, or the
momentary prestige of the United States - the principle of
the sanctity of private property.

The Secretary well under

stood the relationship between expropriation of foreign
investments and retaliatory foreign intervention.

A basic

tenet of his general policy was the assurance of hemispheric

33Some of Lansing's progressive contemporaries were
not so sure.
It was Daniels' opinion that the Secretary was
"not in sympathy with Wilson's policies but rather held to
the old diplomacy that encouraged exploitation of small
countries by American industrial captains.1' Lansing "shared
the Root-Poster Big Stick and Dollar Diplomacy policy."
Daniels believed that Lansing's "mind ran along in harmony
with that of J. Pierpont Morgan and others in Big Business."
Daniels, The Wilson Era; Years of Peace, 438. It is an
unduly harsh judgment.
Daniels seems to have misunderstood
Lansing's motives completely. See Lansing to Wilson,
November 24, 1915, and Lansing, "Present Nature and Extent
of the Monroe Doctrine," memorandum dated November 24, 1915,
both in The Lansing Papers, II, 466-470; Smith, "Lansing,"
An Uncertain Tradition, 102, 113. However, in the same
assessment, Daniels did make an astute observation.
Lansing,
he acknowledged was not at the beck and call of Big Business,
"He was above that. He just naturally believed that the
strong ought to rule. He was a disciple of Root." Daniels,
The Wilson Era; Years of Peace, 438. And so he was. Smith,
"Lansing," An uncertain Tradition, 102.
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security through the total preclusion of European inter
vention .34
During the five-and-a-half years of the Wilson
Administration subsequent to Bryan's resignation, the Anti
revolutionists drafted and submitted for presidential perusal
a succession of plans for the pacification and reconstruction
of Mexico.3^

Several of those proposals called for direct

34In June, 1914, Lansing had expressed his concern
over the necessity to restate the Monroe Doctrine in terms
"more in accord with modern ideals and conditions." Lansing
to Bryan, June 11, 1914, The Lansing Papers. II, 459. Accord
ingly, in late 1915, he submitted to the President a memo
randum dealing with the Monroe Doctrine and the "possible
extension of the principle in a way to constitute a policy
which may be termed a 'Caribbean Policy'. . . . "
It was,
in effect, a vigorous reassertion of the Roosevelt Corollary.
Recently, Lansing stated, "the financing of revolutions and
corruption of governments of the smaller republics by
European capitalists have frequently thrown the control of
these governments into the hands of a European power." The
situation constituted a "menace to the national safety" of
the United States.
In addition, "possession of the Panama
Canal and its defenses" gave to the Caribbean states "a new
importance from the standpoint of our national safety."
It
was "vital to the interests of the United States that European
political domination should in no way be extended over these
regions. Considerations of national security required that
the United States "should intervene and aid in the establish
ment and maintenance" of stable and honest governments "if
no other way seems possible to attain that end." Lansing to
Wilson, November 24, 1915, Ibid., 466-467. Wilson was favor
ably impressed with Lansing's argument and "approved the
memorandum as a guide to future national action." Smith,
"Lansing,” An Uncertain Tradition, 113.
35Anderson to Lansing, May 24, 1917, SDR 711.12/
47 1/2; Long to Lansing, August 10, 1918, SDR 711.12/130;
Long to Lansing, December 12, 1919, SDR 711.12/229 1/2.
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American military intervention and virtually all of them
involved a greater or lesser degree of coercion.

The

President, chastened by the Veracruz episode and haunted by
fears that "the interests" might somehow capitalize on a
new intervention to seize large portions of northern Mexico,
repeatedly rejected those plans.3®

Despite the gravest pro

vocation, he steadfastly refused to impose a settlement of
the Mexican question.

His reluctance to use force in resol

ving Mexican-American differences understandably increased
as the United States drifted ever closer to participation in
the World War.

Once engaged in that contest, Wilson dis

missed altogether the option of armed intervention in
Mexico.
As the war in Europe drew to a close, a fresh outburst
of anti-foreign incidents below the border again drew the
attention of the American people to the interminable unrest

3 ®Link,

Wilson; Confusions and Crises, 219-221; Baker,
Woodrow Wilson, VI, 72-74.
■^Wilson was so preoccupied with the war in Europe,
Cline contends, "that almost never did he personally notice
what was going on in the neighboring southern republic. His
general attitudes toward Mexico, good for the duration of
European hostilities, were known by his subordinates: no use
of force under any circumstances or provocation.
Threats,
yes; force, no." Cline, The United States and Mexico, 185.

in Mexico.

State Department officials urged anew the

adoption of a hard line in dealing with the Carranza govern
ment.

The radical Constitution of 1917, the strong pro-

German bias so recently displayed by a number of prominent
Constitutionalists, and the alleged Bolshevist leanings of
high-ranking Carrancista officials all served to intensify
Antirevolutionist antagonism toward the Carranza

r e g i m e . 38

As before, however, the President forbade intervention.
Almost completely engrossed in the Peace Conference and
thereafter in the bitter and taxing ratification struggle,
he had neither the time nor the disposition to pursue a new
quarrel with Carranza.

Again he withstood strong inter

ventionist pressure from both within and without the
Administration.

The upshot was the resignation early in 1920

of both Lansing and the United States Ambassador to Mexico,
Henry Prather Fletcher .33

Thereafter, it was abundantly

clear that for the remainder of the Wilson Administration
American armed intervention in Mexico was out of the question.

3 8 Ibid.,

186; J. Lloyd Meecham, A Survey of United
States-Latin American Relations (New York: Houghton Mifflin
Company, 1965], 361; Long to Lansing, December 12, 1919, SDR
711.12/229 1/2.
39Josephus Daniels, The Wilson Era; Years of W a r ,
1917-1923 (Chapel Hill: University of1 North Carolina Press,
1946), 529 (hereafter cited as The Wilson Era; Years of War).
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III.
Unfortunately for Mexican-American relations, dis
sension within the Wilson Administration over official
response to the disturbances in Mexico was an open secret.
From the summer of 1914 through the aforementioned resigna
tions, the President's determination to adhere to a policy
of minimal interference in Mexican affairs drew criticism
from the Department of State and the Cabinet alike.

In

addition to Lansing and his subordinates, both Lane4** and
Garrison4^- were hostile to the Constitutionalist movement
and repeatedly urged forcible suppression of the civil strife
in Mexico.

As long as discord over Mexican policy persisted

within the Administration, there remained an outside chance
that the President might one day succumb to interventionist
pressure and reverse his position.

That possibility, in turn,

served to sustain the hopes of exiled Mexican reactionaries
and various domestic interventionists as well.

Consequently,

those groups persevered in their counterrevolutionary acti
vities both north and south of the border, thereby prolonging

4 0 Ibid.,

522; Daniels, The Wilson Era: Years of Peace,
184; Baker, Woodrow Wilson, VI, 72n; Lane -bo Lansing, November
28, 1919, SDR 711.12/229 3/4.
4 ^Daniels,

The Wilson Era: Years of Peace, 184, 445;
Quirk, An Affair of Honor, 104. 123.
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the disorder in Mexico and further exacerbating the already
strained relations between Washington and the Carranza
regime . 42
Within the United States, Mexican reactionaries for
a time enjoyed considerable success in obtaining the support
of sympathetic Administration officials.

Through such men

as Canova, Anderson, and Lane, they sought to reach the
President and win him to their cause.

Simultaneously,

private American investors in Mexico and the representatives
of large American corporations with holdings in the republic
tirelessly pressed Administration officials to take a firmer
stand on behalf of property rights .42
influence the President:

They, too, sought to

through formal appeals to the

Department of State, through personal entreaties to congress
men and highly-placed members of the Administration, and
finally, through an informed and aroused public opinion.
Meanwhile, an obtuse and stubborn Carranza proved an

4 2 Cline,

The United States and Mexico, 190.

4 2 Ibid., 185-186; Parkes, A History of Mexico, 355;
Bernstein, Mexican Mining Industry, 106-114. See, for example,
Doheny to Lansing, February 17, 1918, SDR 812.6363/342;
Williams to Lansing, July 11, 1917, SDR 812.6363/291; Associ
ation of Producers of Petroleum in Mexico to Senator Knute
Nelson, December 8 , 1919, SDR 812.6363/599; Smith to Bryan,
April 15, 1915, Foreign Relations, 1915, 899-900; The Mining
and Smelter Operators* Association to Bryan, August 6 , 1915,
Ibid., 933.
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invaluable assist, seemingly determined to play into the
hands of those who wished to destroy him.

For five years,

from the reoccupation of Mexico City early in 1915 through
the collapse of his regime in the spring of 1920, hardly a
month passed during which the First Chief failed to provide
his enemies abroad with additional excuses for intervention.
Had all Administration officials, particularly those
of the Department of State, concurred with the President’s
position on Mexico or had they turned a deaf ear to the
pleas of interventionists and counterrevolutionaries, the
supplicants would soon have resigned themselves to the tri
umph of the Revolution and ceased agitating for its overturn.
On the other hand, had the President surrendered to inter
ventionist pressure, the United States might well have suc
ceeded in forcing a negotiated settlement of the Mexican
civil war.

In keeping with earlier proposals, American

authorities might then have conducted free elections, with
drawn American forces, and thrown the moral and financial
support of the United States Government behind whichever
party emerged victorious at the polls,

in either case, there

was at least a fair chance that the struggle in Mexico might
have been shortened appreciably.
But neither condition prevailed.

Instead, because

of widely varying assessments of the revolutionary movement
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within Government circles, a consistent response to developments in Mexico failed to evolve until the last year of the
Wilson Administration.

For some seven years, the United

States policy with regard to Mexico was characterized by
vacillation, indecision, and uncertainty.44

with few excep

tions, the Administration failed to take the initiative in
attempting to resolve the many Mexican-American differences
arising from revolutionary unrest.
reacted.

Instead of acting, it

The options as well as the audacity to exercise

them belonged not to the government in Washington, but to
Carranza and Villa and bold regional caudillos like Manuel
Pelaez.

44Link notes that in areas that Wilson considered
"vitally important" (Mexico), he "took absolute personal
control. He wrote most of the important notes on his own
typewriter, bypassed the Secretary of State by using his own
private agents, ignored his secretaries of state by con
ducting important negotiations behind their backs, and
acted like a divine-right monarch in the general conduct of
affairs." Link, Wilson the Diplomatist, 23-24. The
President's personal diplomacy frequently produced pro
found embarrassment, i.e. the Tampico and Veracruz incidents.
"Time and again," Link concludes, "Wilson used the same
methods and almost always with the same results:
the for
mation of faulty policy through sheer ignorance, men working
at cross-purposes, confusion in the State Department and in
the embassies and legations, and the like." Ibid., 24. See
also Challener, "Bryan," An Uncertain Tradition, 92; John
Morton Blum, Woodrow Wilson and the Politics of Morality
(Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1956), 85-89.
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Fundamental to the Wilson Administration's failure
to cope satisfactorily with recurring Mexican crises was a
lack of consensus with regard to the nature and meaning of
the Revolution.

Wilson, Bryan, Daniels, and those of like

mind, conscious of the desperate need for sweeping social
and economic reform in Mexico but far removed from the scene,
sympathized strongly with the announced goals of the move
ment,

Essentially idealistic progressives, they were

inclined to rationalize or overlook revolutionary excesses.
Lansing, Lane, Garrison, and State Department officials both
in Washington and in Mexico were certainly no less conscious
of the need for reform.

However, they, and particularly the

personnel of the Latin American and Mexican Divisions and
the Department's representatives in the republic, were far
more familiar with the true state of affairs in Mexico.
Whatever illusions they once may have had as to the nobility
of the revolutionary movement and the selflessness of its
leaders were clearly dispelled by the summer of 1915.
did not like the trend of events in Mexico.

They

And, as time

^ 5 Cronon, Josephus Daniels, 10-11; Coletta, Bryan,
160; Blythe, "Mexico: The Record of a Conversation with
President Wilson," Saturday Evening Post, 4, 71.
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went by, their opposition to that trend hardened percep
tibly . 46

IV.
On July 8 , while Lansing awaited Wilson's response
to his and Canova's proposal for Pan-American intervention
in Mexico, the Secretary received from Long a lengthy, de
tailed memorandum on the contemporary Mexican political
situation.

The greater part of the Long Memorandum was

devoted to a discussion of the various Mexican factions,
revolutionary and reactionary alike, and to a consideration
of the several options open to the Wilson Administration
in pursuing its objectives of peace and order in Mexico.
Included was a blunt and highly critical analysis of the
underlying dynamics of the Mexican Revolution.4^

To what

extent the Long Memorandum influenced the Secretary and
through him the future course of the Wilson Administration's
Mexican policy is difficult to determine.
it did.

But influence him

Throughout the balance of Lansing's tenure of office

his response to new Mexican-American differences arising from

46Anderson to Lansing, May 24, 1917, SDR 711.12/47
1/2; Long to Lansing, December 12, 1919, SDR 711.12/ 229 1/2;
Cline, The United States and Mexico, 188-191.
4?Long to Lansing, July 8, 1915, SDR 812.00/20688
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unrest in the republic reflected a constant reaffirmation
of the views espoused by Long in the July Memorandum .4 8
Long opened by recalling that the United States had
extended moral support to Madero in 1911, thereby enabling
the "original" Constitutionalists to oust Diaz and assume
control of the republic themselves.

Regrettably, the

Maderista "party" had been unable to establish peace and
order.

In view of that disappointing episode. Long queried,

what assurance did Washington have that any other faction
of the Constitutionalist "party" could "do any better?"

On

the other hand, the Cientificos, while including some of the
"best men of Mexico," did not occupy any territory within

48In regard to Latin American affairs generally, Long
and Lansing differed little. On June 11, 1914, Lansing
drafted a memorandum calling for a "restatement" of the
Monroe Doctrine. Lansing to Bryan, June 11, 1914, The Lansing
Papers, II, 460-465. The following day, Long submitted to
Bryan a memorandum on political conditions in northern Latin
America.
Like the Lansing memorandum it expressed concern
over the relationship between the fiscal irresponsibility
of Latin American republics and European intervention. Long
recommended American assumption of fiscal control in
"revolution-ridden" Latin American states. Link, Wilson:
Struggle for Neutrality, 521-522. Long's memorandum on
Mexico was essentially a restatement of the views set forth
in regard to northern Latin America. Those views were
embodied in Lansing's "Present Nature and Extent of the
Monroe Doctrine," drafted and submitted to the President on
November 24, 1915. Lansing to Wilson, November 24, 1915,
The Lansing Papers, II, 466-470.
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the r e p u b l i c . 49

To extend support to one or the other of

the old Porfiristas would "merely mean a new revolution with
no guarantee of what would e m e r g e . "5°
Given the aforementioned circumstances, Long sug
gested, the United States should extend support to whichever
group offered "the most guarantees of being able to establish
needed reforms and give reasonable effect thereto."

The

previous year( there had existed a "reasonable hope" that
Carranza and Villa would establish the opinions they professed.
At the moment, however, those who were "intimately informed"

49in the 1890's, there emerged within the Diaz
Administration a small but influential elite composed of
attorneys and intellectuals who rejected the revolutionary
liberalism of the Juarez Reform and attempted to apply to the
governing of their country the principles of French Positivism.
The Cientificos were "always a clique," never a political
party with a popular following. Some became bankers, indus
trialists, and corporation lawyers; others became cabinet mem
bers or state governors. Eventually they dominated Diaz and
became in effect the real rulers of Mexico. Almost wholly
creole, they regarded the Mexicans as a "backward and bar
barous race who needed to be coerced along the path to civili
zation . . . ." They placed greatest stress upon material
development and vigorously solicited foreign capital to that
end.
"As their wealth and power increased, they abandoned
their early idealism and aspired toward complete political
and economic control of the country." Under the Cientificos
the government of Mexico did indeed become more honest and
efficient. But the price was high. By 1910, the wealth of
the republic was largely in the hands of foreign investors.
As for the Cientificos;
"If they preached honesty, it was
partly because they were clever enough to make fortunes with
out violating the law." Parkes, A History of Mexico,299-301.
5(>Long to Lansing, July 8,1915, SDR 812.00/20688. All
information in the next eight pages comes from this citation
unless otherwise noted.
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and who judged all Constitutionalist factions "by deeds and
not by words" were confident that neither leader could
restore order in Mexico.
An improvement of the Mexican situation might be
hastened. Long believed, if the President would remind
Congress of the "long-suffering endurance and patience" of
the American people and request of that body authorization
to use the armed forces to establish "peace and order" below
the border.

If that permission were granted, the contending

Mexican factions would realize "at last that we mean to
intervene, if that be necessary."

They would be forced to

"get together and jointly, on their own account, do . . .
what they have to date refused to do— that is to carry out
their promises to establish a good government in Mexico."
If, indeed, the United States did owe a "duty" to
Mexico or to American and other foreign investors in Mexico,
then it must work for the establishment of an "acceptable
government" in the republic.

If no such "duty" existed, it

should remain neutral "and leave Mexico to her fate."

How

ever, Long reminded, "we gave the world powers the impression
that the United States would care for the Mexican situation
without their aid . . . ." In the light of recent developments
in Mexico, it seemed to him that the United States did have
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an obligation to act decisively in that country.

American

financial control within the Mexican Government would sat
isfy both foreign powers and their respective nationals
resident in Mexico, he believed.

Moreover, it would also

assure "just treatment” of American citizens and "remove
prizes from the reach of future revolutionists . 11
The Mexicans, he continued, had shown themselves
"unable to solve their own problems.”

Because of that fact

there were many statesmen "of all nationalties," who knew
Mexico well, who had reached the conclusion that "the United
States alone" could give to that country a "new and regener
ated government."

They believed, he declared, that armed

intervention was the only solution.
There was an alternative, however.

In accord with

the President s declaration of June 2, 1915, Washington
might extend to a single leader or faction "the support . . .
necessary to bring success.

..."

But timing was critical:

"We do not wish to delay in taking effective action until
some other world power should feel called upon to solve
Mexico's problems."

Moreover, "careful regard" must be shown

for "amply safeguarding the interests of those . . . nations
that leave this matter in our hands."
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Long was more than a little apprehensive lest the
President decide to recognize Villa or Carranza.

Apparently

the Latin American Division had been called upon to con
sider the feasibility of simultaneously recognizing Villa's
Chihuahua regime in the North and Carranza's Veracruz regime
in the South.

Aside from an obvious distaste for both revo

lutionary leaders. Long feared that execution of such a plan
would lead inevitably to new fighting.

Felix Diaz or some

other prominent reactionary with influence among the sub
stantial remnants of the old Federal army would almost
certainly launch a new revolution.

Owing to the "very strong

sentiment in Mexico against a division of the country," he
warned, separate recognition of a faction in the North and
another in the South "would produce great and active
hostility."

Still worse, such would probably be interpreted

by most Mexicans "as indicative of our intention to endeavor
to take over the northern portion."

It might well "destroy

all belief in the good intentions of the United States."
Turning to the men around Villa and Carranza as
possible candidates for Washington's support, Long summarily
dismissed the lot of them.

None was capable of "giving good

administration" to the republic.

Most were holdovers from

the inept Madero Administration and were, in Long's opinion,
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largely to blame for the disaster which had befallen it.
Madero had failed principally because he had "entrusted the
details of the administration . . .

to those incompetent,

inexperienced and avaricious revolutionists who fought or
connived to put him in power."

If, Long predicted, either

the Carrancista or the Villista wing of the old Madero coa
lition were ever to assume full control of the republic,
"their necessities" would compel a repetition of Madero's
distribution of patronage.

Unfortunately, there was no reason

to believe that as lieutenents of Carranza or Villa the old
Maderistas "would do better" than before.

Quite the contrary,

he implied.
It appeared to Long that the pitfalls accompanying
the recognition of Villa or Carranza might be avoided for the
most part by installing a coalition government composed of
several factions.

But Long would go considerably further

than either Lansing or the President.
be installed.

The "right men" must

And that, in turn, would require the "active

insistence of the United States."

As a bare minimum. Long

contended, Washington must be empowered to approve prospec
tive cabinet officers.
Reviewing recent developments in Mexico, the division
chief turned to Wilson's declaration of June 2.

The message
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was clear to him, he observed, yet "some very important
Mexicans" were in doubt as to its meaning.

Prior to dis

patch of the President's note most Mexican leaders, re
gardless of faction, "believed implicitly that the United
States would not intervene."

They had "predicated their

whole course on that belief and campaigned accordingly."
Villa had responded favorably to the President's
proposal, but Carranza had bluntly rejected it.

Meanwhile,

General Huerta, who had entered the United States some weeks
earlier, had moved at once to crystalize an intrigue that had
"been in formation for m o n t h s . " 5 1

The General evidently

interpreted Wilson's declaration to mean that someone must
set Mexico aright.
so.

Clearly he intended to be the one to do

Long understood that Huerta had succeeded in subverting

the Carrancista garrison at Nuevo Laredo and the critically
important Villista garrison at Ciudad Juarez as well.

Both

were to rally to his standard when he crossed the border.
Still another important counterrevolutionary chieftain known
to be plotting a comeback was Felix Diaz .52

Like Huerta,

S^Grieb, Huerta, 180-186; Meyer, Orozco, 120-124.
52

During the half-decade after the splintering of the
Constitutionalist movement, Diaz was a major contender for
the leadership of the counterrevolutionary movement. He was
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Diaz had stepped up his activities following the President's
June 2 statement.

At the moment, he was known to be pur

chasing large quantities of arms and ammunition.
were a number of "military men

Backing him

[even] more powerful than

himself."

especially favored by American interventionist groups and was
held in high esteem by the Antirevolutionists.
Nephew of the
dictator, Diaz served successively as Chief of Staff of the
Federal Array, diplomatic representative to Chile, and General
Inspector of Police. According to his principal agent in the
United States, former New York Congressman William S. Bennett,
Diaz was neither close to his uncle nor in sympathy with his
policies. Bennett to Long, July 13, 1915, SDR 812.00/20688.
In 1910, Diaz resigned from the Administration and was
elected Governor of the State of Oaxaca. Shortly thereafter,
he was elected to the Chamber of Deputies.
In 1912, as the
Madero Administration grew increasingly unpopular, Diaz re
signed from both Congress and the army. Later in the year,
he seized Veracruz and proclaimed against Madero.
Captured
and sentenced to death, he was transferred to the peniten
tiary in Mexico City. There in February, 1913, in accordance
with a prearranged plan, he was freed by opponents of Madero
and joined Bernardo Reyes and Huerta in overthrowing the
President. Bennett insisted that Diaz was not involved in
Madero1s murder and that he had refused to form a government
in the absence of a popular mandate.
Ibid. Consequently,
Huerta emerged as interim chief-of-state.
In the subsequent
elections, Bennett alleged, Diaz drew the largest number of
votes but lost to Huerta due to the latter's control of the
election machinery. Ibid. Huerta turned immediately on his
erstwhile allies, sending Diaz on a "mission" to Japan and
similarly exiling or jailing his followers.
Despite harass
ment by Huerta and later by Carranza, the Oaxaca-based
Felicista movement spread to adjoining states. By 1915, Diaz
professed to control some 3000 Felicista political clubs
throughout the republic. He was, he contended, the only
Mexican leader backed by a "true political party." Moreover,
the election of 1913, stolen by Huerta, had confirmed him as
the sole legitimate contender for the presidency. Ibid. In
March, 1916, Diaz returned to southern Mexico and proclaimed
against Carranza.
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In order to Impress upon Lansing the dearth of
responsible revolutionary leaders with whom Washington
might cooperate. Long drew a highly unflattering comparison
between the Constitutionalists and the displaced Porfirian
Cientificos.

Under the dictatorship a mere handful of the

more powerful Cientificos had raked off the lion's share
of the graft.
lights."

Only the crumbs were left for the "lesser

Disappointed and embittered, many of the frustrated

spoils-seekers had eventually made common cause with the
idealistic Madero.

But they had never intended to keep

Madero's promises to the Mexican people:

"Their platform was

designed to get in on, not to travel on."
Much the same element, "thrown out by Huerta,"
presently constituted the backbone of the revolutionary
movement.

"While proclaiming their own ambitions to be clear

and worthy,1' Long charged, "they have applied the term
'Cientifico' to every Mexican of means who does not support
them."

To that group the term was synonymous with "political

grafter."

In truth, the Constitutionalists were motivated

to a far greater extent than their predecessors by the pro
spects of political graft.

And their acts had proven it.

The aims of both groups were essentially the same:
gain and power.

personal

The principal difference between them lay
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in the fact that the Cientificos were not guilty of the
“outrages against property justly chargeable to the
Constitutionalists."

The former had done much for the mate

rial welfare of Mexico; the latter had accomplished "nothing
but ruin."

Although the leaders of both groups had enriched

themselves, the Cientificos had done so while building up
the country;

the Constitutionalists, while destroying it.

It was obvious, Long declared, that the significance of the
term "Cientifico" depended entirely upon "the one who uses
it."
Returning to a consideration of the contemporary
situation in Mexico, Long revealed a deep pessimism:

"If

it is desired to entrust the destiny of Mexico to a man of
purity and force, who can surround himself with a cabinet
and administrative officers of his own kind, we are doomed
to disappointment."
be realized."

Fulfillment of that hope could "never

However, if a solution to the Mexican problem

was to be left solely to Mexicans, "we must take them as we
find them."

To Long it meant supporting "the least objec

tionable and the most experienced in the science of
government."
At the time, Long's division had under consideration
several possible conservative coalitions which appeared to
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meet the aforementioned requirements.

The first, tenta

tively headed by Madero's Minister of Justice, Manuel
Vazquez Tagle, was the only one with a trace of legitimacy
about i t . V a z q u e z Tagle, residing quietly in Mexico City,
allegedly had refused to resign when Huerta usurped the
presidency in 1913.

Long, however, personally preferred

another of the former Maderistas, Angel Garcia P e n a . ^
"Stubborn but virile," Garcia Pena, was capable of commanding
the respect and support of former Federal army officers, a
factor which Long apparently believed to be indispensible
for success in restoring order in Mexico.

A decision by the

Administration to back either of these men would mean a
return of the Madero wing of the original revolutionary co
alition and an extension of the Madero Cabinet.
A second group under consideration by Long's division
was that headed by Canova's favorite, General Eduardo Iturbide.
Some of the "leading men" among the old Porfirian Cientificos,
Long contended, "would rally to sustain" the General.

So,

53Manuel Vazquez Tagle was among the more conser
vative of Madero's ministers.
Ross, Madero, 221.
54Angel Garcia Pena was Minister of War in the Madero
Cabinet. He had remained loyal to his chief during the
Ciudadela, Ibid.
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too, would most of the great hacendados.

Support of that

faction, he acknowledged, would mean returning control of
the republic to "those who in the past were known to have
clearly defined Cientifico tendencies,"

Nonetheless,

Iturbide and his adherents had recently expressed "a
willingness to enforce Constitutionalist ideas,"
The third possible conservative coalition consisted
of a potentially powerful alliance of former Federal officers
under Felix Diaz.

An important factor in considering the

Felicista movement was the participation of General Manuel
Mondragon, the old dictator's chief of artillery and one of
the principal conspirators in the Huerta coup.

Long noted

that Mondragon had done "many constructive and creditable
things' during the Porfirian period and that he commanded a
considerable following among the remnants of the disbanded
Federal a r m y . 55

The Diaz-Mondragon group claimed the support

S^Long's praise notwithstanding, there was a dark side
to the career of Mondragon. The General had initiated the
coup against Madero, leading the Tacubaya garrison into the
capital, freeing Felix Diaz, and placing his force at the
latter*s disposal according to a prearranged scheme. Grieb,
Huerta, 12. There is evidence that Mondragon personally
ordered the executions of Madero and his brother Gustavo*
Ibid., 29. Long acknowledged that Mondragon had "grafted
shamefully" while serving as Huerta's Minister of War and
Marine and believed that to be the reason for the General's
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of the Catholic Party and might well obtain it if it appeared
that they stood a fair chance of triumphing over the revolu
tionaries.

Long believed that this faction could quickly

revive and reorganize the old Federal army and "draw to their
standard . . . many excellent men of the younger generation."
The Felicistas would not begin a new revolution, however,
unless assured of American support.

Such assurances would

entail "ignoring the preparations, to be made on American
soil, necessary to put the group managers back into Mexico
with sufficient force to overcome those now in the
field . . . .”
Long was convinced that a movement embodying all of
the aforementioned conservative elements would "offer strong
possibilities of success . . . ."

Although the United States

was indeed committed at the moment to the establishment of
a revolutionary government in Mexico, it had been clearly
demonstrated that the several revolutionary factions "could

break with Huerta and subsequent exile to France. Long to
Lansing, July 8 , 1915, SDR 812.00/20688. Actually, Mondragon,
a protege of Diaz, was sent to France on a "mission" as part
of Huerta's move to isolate Diaz politically.
Grieb, Huerta,
57. Long's apparent ignorance of this episode some two years
after its occurrence raises some question as to the accuracy
of the information received by his division from its sources
in the republic.
In June, 1915, Mondragon arrived in New
York, apparently with the intention of joining Diaz or
Huerta in a counterrevolutionary venture. Ibid., 188.

not be united by any Mexican influence or pressure.”

Still,

it was obvious that "no man or group of men" would be able
to ignore those factions and restore order in Mexico without
strong support from the United States.
Returning anew to the revolutionaries, Long again
rejected the Carrancistas.

"Little could be expected" of

the First Chief or his aides, he contended.

On the other

hand, an alliance between Villa and Vazquez Tagle or, perhaps
between Villa and Francisco Vasquez Gomez, one-time Maderista
vice presidential candidate, would "make a good initial start
in solving the Mexican problem.

The principal drawback lay

in the fact that such an alliance would soon be "subverted"
by various opposition groups unless it was "strongly backed"
by Washington.
Zt was rumored, for instance, that Diaz, Mondragon,
General Aureliano Blanquet, and a "great number of Federal
army men" who were well known in Europe, might seek to
"enlist the support of the victor in the present European
war."^6

That group would "gladly support" any of twenty or

56General Aureliano Blanquet, like Mondragon, was one
of the principal conspirators in the overthrow of Madero.
Blanquet personally arrested Madero and was a party to the
decision to execute him. Ibid., 19, 29. Loyal to Huerta, he
succeeded Mondragon as Minister of War in Huerta's provi
sional cabinet. Blanquet was instrumental in assuring the
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thirty "high class Mexican gentlemen" such as Pedro
Lascurian, Madero*s Minister of Foreign Affairs.57

or it

might just as well rally around Diaz, Mondragon, or
Blanquet.

Whatever the case, it was a formidable alliance,

based upon a "very powerful following" among the officer
corps of the former Federal army.

Moreover, it was probable

that such a coalition could count upon the support of
Guillermo Meixueiro, able governor of the autonomous Oaxaca
regime, and that of Higinio Aguilar, a powerful, independent
caudillo operating southeast of the capital.5*3

success of the Huerta coup of October, 1913. When Huerta
resigned in July, 1914, Blanquet followed him into exile. In
June, 1915, he arrived in New York with Mondragon.
Ibid.,
107, 179, 188.
5?Lascurian, a prominent wealthy moderate, replaced
the conservative Manuel Calero as Minister of Foreign Rela
tions in the Madero Cabinet in April, 1912. The following
December, he was appointed Ambassador to the United States.
By early 1913, however, he had returned to his former post
in the Mexican capital.
Upon the resignation of Madero and
Pino Suarez, Lascurian succeeded to the Interim Presidency.
He served for 56 minutes. Acting under pressure, he ap
pointed Huerta Minister of Government and then submitted his
own resignation. Huerta "automatically assumed the executive
power." Ross, Madero, 317-318, passim. At the Niagara Con
ference in June, 1914, Lascurian was under consideration for
provisional president of the republic. At that time, he was
acceptable to the Wilson Administration. Grieb, Huerta, 171172.
58Meixueiro retained firm control of the important
southern state of Oaxaca throughout the greater part of the
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A final group from which Washington might select a
candidate for provisional president of the republic was
composed of younger revolutionary subchiefs such as Felipe
Angeles.

Although aligned with one faction or another,

those men were "essentially neutral."

They were patriots,

known to be concerned primarily with terminating the fighting
and regenerating their country.
Assuming that the Administration would ultimately
choose to back one or the other of the several aforemen
tioned groups. Long warned that mere passive "moral support"
would be insufficient to assure its survival.

He urged in

stead an extension of the "active moral support" pledged by
the President in the declaration of June 2.

It was a "very

useful phrase," Long observed, since its ambiguity and
"threatening overtones impressed Mexican leaders."

It was

hoped that the Administration would send "a really good man"

civil war. Nominally a Felicista, he was in reality an inde
pendent conservative.
Diaz and his followers were nonetheless
granted sanctuary in Oaxaca, and that state remained the
domestic stronghold of the Felicista movement. Aguilar had
been a brigadier general in the old Federal Army, had served
Huerta, and eventually cooperated with Zapata against the
Carrancistas. Like a number of other regional caudillos,
he was first and foremost an opportunist.
Shifting his
"allegiance" from Zapata to Diaz to Manuel Pelaez, he finally
settled in the border area between the states of Puebla,
Oaxaca, and Veracruz where he engaged in desultory raids on
Constitutionalist towns and railroads. Womack, Zapata, 4041, passim.

302
to Mexico City as ambassador, "a man understanding the
Latin mind."

Such an official would be able to "apply with

subtle force the influence of this government."

It was

assumed, of course, that the new ambassador would exercise
more discretion than did his controversial predecessor,
Henry Lane Wilson.
Real success in dealing with Mexico, Long stressed,
depended not so much upon the personnel of the new regime as
upon their "accord" with the United States and their willing
ness to follow Washington's recommendations.

What Long

appears to have had in mind was the negotiation of a Platt
Amendment treaty with the Mexican Government.

The conditions

which he sought, he explained, could best be obtained "through
a treaty or convention: which clearly spelled out the "rights
and obligations of both countries."
Having dealt with the political aspects of an induced
Mexican settlement. Long turned to the matter which seems to
have been uppermost in his mind:

American fiscal control

within the proposed provisional government.

There existed

throughout much of Latin America, he declared, a direct and
fateful relationship between treasury receipts and revolui

tion.

Condemning the Constitutionalists for fighting for

plunder while pretending to fight for principle. Long
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unabashedly called for American direction of Mexican finances.
Following the collapse of the Huerta government, the
Constitutionalists had had every opportunity to put their
alleged principles to practice.

They had failed to do so,

however, "because there remained something of profit for
which to fight."

Nor would they ever put those principles

to practice, he contended, unless "forced to do so or until
the profits were consumed, a condition which meant the
country laid waste and utterly ruined.”
It was generally acknowledged, Long declared, that
nearly all factional leaders had "stolen in proportion to
their opportunities."

Villa was believed to have more than

two million dollars in gold, and Carranza a little more.
Huerta was said to have twenty millions in gold.

The pecula

tions of other lesser caudillos "were known to have been
limited only by the opportunities which came to them."

The

sums involved, however, were of little consequence to Long;
what concerned him was the fact that dishonesty in the hand
ling of public funds had been "general” and promised to
continue so unless the United States took steps to halt the
p r a c t i c e . T h e greater part of the "stolen wealth” had come

^Eventually even Carranza himself was suspect. In
19 20, the Spanish author and journalist Vincente Blasco Ibanez
noted that in Mexico "They call him the 'First Chief . . . of
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from plundering foreign investors in the republic, but much
of it had come from native Mexicans as well.

It appeared.

Long lamented, that patriotism in Mexico was rapidly be
coming little more than the desire to hold the country
"enriched by foreign capital, for personal exploitation."
Long was adamant in his insistence upon American
fiscal control as a prerequisite for Mexican political sta
bility.

If an accord were eventually reached between

Washington and a new coalition government in Mexico, he
predicted, the United States would pump millions of dollars
into the republic to hasten economic recovery.

It would

also demand a number of reforms which would enable Mexico to
meet its considerable financial obligations.

However,

similar programs implemented first in Cuba and more recently
in the Dominican Republic had proved less than satisfactory.
Long was far from optimistic.

Mexico's fiscal problems, were

formidable, indeed.

those who come in the night . 1 Long ago," he recounted, "the
wags of the capital began to use a new verb, 'to carranza,'
the exact humor of which may not appear in English.
'To
carranza , 1 in the cafes and vaudeville theaters of Mexico
City, means 'to steal , 1 and you can hear people conjugating
it on every hand:
'I carranza, thou carranzest, he carranzasthey all carranza.'" Vincente Blasco Ibanez, Mexico in
Revolution, trans, Arthur Livingston and Jose Padin (Mew
York: E. P. Dutton & Company, 1920), 84.
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Fundamental to the Chief's position was the con
viction that "most Latin American revolutions
conducted for gain."

[were]

If, he believed, revenues were placed

in American hands there would be "little left to fight for
except principles."

With the withdrawal of "cash prizes,"

legitimate reforms would eventually be realized through
normal legislative procedure.

Recalling that Washington had

allowed full fiscal control to "slip by" in the Dominican
treaty, he strongly urged that any similar agreement subse
quently concluded with Mexico."provide an absolute economic
domination of t h a t .country1s finances . " 60

In an enlight

ening display of candor. Long vowed that were he a Mexican
"and had opportunity, through revolution, to amass, within
a comparatively short time, millions of money," he would
find it most "distasteful . . .

to see any foreigner

60Long believed that the United States had erred
gravely in failing to obtain firm control of Cuban and
Dominican finances.
That failure, in turn, had led to re
current unrest in both republics. In Cuba it had produced
"very corrupt administrations," and revolutions would have
occurred "but for the Platt Amendment.” In the Dominican
Republic that failure had led to revolutions and chronic
unrest. Long was distressed because both countries, "at
the time of making treaties with us," would have accepted
"any financial arrangement suggested by the United States."
Long to Lansing, July 8 , 1915, SDR 812.00/20688. Clearly
Long hoped to avoid the "mistakes" of his predecessors and
to obtain full control of Mexican finances through the pro
posed Mexican-American treaty.
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frustrate so brilliant a possibility."

Nonetheless, he

believed that his recommendations could be executed without
unduly ruffling Mexican pride.

It was essential, however,

that the concurrence of the other Latin American republics
be obtained.
In sum. Long argued, regardless of which group the
United States ultimately chose to support, that group would
"have its hands very full" measuring up to all that was
expected of it.

"If we handle the cash box," he assured the

Secretary, "there will be but little leakage, little op
portunity for graft, and consequently little thought of new
principles and new revolutions."

Entrusting fiscal control

to American officials. Long concluded, appeared to offer the
most promising solution to the Mexican problem "short of
armed intervention ." 6 1

61Ibid

Chapter 7
THE RECOGNITION OF CARRANZA
I.
It is clear from the Long Memorandum that the Anti
revolutionists, while deferring to Lansing's insistence upon
the selection of a revolutionary chieftain as head of the
proposed Mexican coalition government, still preferred one
of the several exiled conservative leaders.

It is equally

clear that the Secretary's subordinates had by no means
abandoned hope for a reversal of the Administration's
Mexican policy.

The forceful arguments advanced by Long on

behalf of the various conservative coalitions were intended
to produce just such a shift.

Moreover, Long's advocacy of

a Mexican-American treaty similar to existing interventionist
agreements between the United States and several of its
Caribbean and Central American neighbors was a further in
dication of his division's hostility to the revolutionary
movement and the Antirevolutionists' determination to gain
and maintain control over the future course of events in
Mexico.^

^Long to Lansing, July B, 1915, SDR 812.00/20688.
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The proposed treaty was a means to that end.

In the

event that the Antirevolutionists failed in their attempt
to place a conservative in the National Palace, they still
would retain through the treaty authority to monitor the
policies of whatever government did eventually emerge as a
result of Pan-American mediation and to frustrate those pro
grams they opposed.

As acknowledged authorities on Mexico

and primary interpreters of developments therein, the per
sonnel of the Mexican and Latin American Divisions would be
in a position to exert immense influence over the internal
affairs of the republic.
Canova took the lead.

On July 17, he advised Lansing

that he was in "close communication" with Iturbide and other
important conservative leaders.

"All of them," he averred

"had promised to 'unite under the standard of any man or
group of men who would be countenanced by President Wilson.'"
He then offered to suggest the "names of leaders who could
unite all factions except the inner group around Carranza."
The proposed conservative coalition, he assured the Secretary,
would control the greater part of northern Mexico from the
moment it took the field.

Moreover, as its forces moved

southward, they would be joined by "most of the Carrancistas."
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The exile leaders, Canova declared, were ready to cooperate
fully with the President. 2
Lansing, who shared both his subordinate's distaste
for the Veracruz regime and his apprehension lest the First
Chief emerge at the head of a unified Mexican nation, needed
no prompting from Canova to work for Carranza's demise .3
Accordingly, during the latter half of July, the Secretary
worked closely with Paul Fuller and the Antirevolutionists
in drafting a "comprehensive plan for intervention," a scheme
which they intended to submit to the pending Pan-American
conference on Mexico .4

Although there did exist a funda

mental contradiction in their respective objectives - Lansing
having committed himself to a revolutionary settlement of the
Mexican question and his aides to counterrevolution - the
planners were in wholehearted agreement on both the necessity
and the desirability of eliminating Carranza .5
completed on July 30, so provided.

2 Link,

Wilson;

The draft plan,

Neither the First Chief

Struggle for Neutrality, 483-484.

3Lansing to Wilson, July 5, 1915, The Lansing Papers,
II, 538-539; Quirk, The Mexican Revolution, 285.
4 Link,

Wilson:

Struggle for Neutrality, 484.

5Ibid.; New York Times, August 4 and 5, 1915.
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nor any of his principal lieutenants would be permitted to
participate in the proposed provisional government.

And, in

a move designed to further minimize resistance to an imposed
settlement of the Mexican question, the planners explicitly
extended that prohibition to Villa and Zapata as well -6
Ostensibly, the way would be clear for maximum cooperation
between the Pan-American mediators and those lesser Mexican
chieftains whom they ultimately chose to support.
The unanimity manifested in the planners' decision
to exclude Carranza was lacking in their deliberation upon a
suitable candidate for the provisional presidency.

Puller

preferred one of the lesser chieftains in Villa's retinue:
Manuel Vazquez Tagle, Felipe Angeles, or Manuel Bonilla, the
latter a prominent Maderista and close associate of the
former president.?

Canova, too, was willing to consider

Bonilla, but both he and Anderson were concerned primarily
with advancing the interests of their protege, Agustin
Iturbide .8

6 Ibid.,

August 3 and 5, 1915.

?Link, Wilson:

Struggle for Neutrality, 484.

Q

Anderson to Lansing, July 22, 1915 and Anderson memo
randum, July 22, 1915, SDR 812.00/23140; Canova memorandum,
July 23, 1915, SDR 812.00/23141.
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In mid-July the General was still a formidable
contender .9

Reports from the border indicated that large

numbers of soldiers would desert the belligerents then in
the field and join Iturbide if and when he crossed the border
into Mexico.

The participation of Braniff, the General's

wealthy patron, assured adequate financial backing.*'9

All

that was lacking was the moral support of the United States
and the several Latin American republics.

Apparently still

unaware of the strength of Lansing's committment to a revo
lutionary settlement, the Antirevolutionists were confident
of attaining that end as well.

Thus with the matter of

leadership seemingly resolved the planners turned to the more
immediate problem of reconciling the other American republics
to an imposed multilateral settlement of the Mexican civil
w a r .11
II.
While State Department representatives worked with
Latin American diplomats in Washington to organize a conference

^Lane to Lansing, July 31, 1915, SDR 812.00/17538; New
York Times, August 3, 1915; Teitelbaum, Wilson and the Mexican
Revolution, 288.
1 0 Ibid.

11Lansing to Wilson, July 31, 1915, The Lansing Papers,
II, 541-542. See also Paul Fuller, "Conference of South
American Republics," August 3, 1915, SDR 812.00/17561.
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on Mexico, a new series of incidents below the border engen
dered still another serious Mexican-American crisis. Suddenly
the Lansing-Canova plan was in jeopardy.

By mid-summer,

American armed intervention had become a distinct possibi
lity.

Obviously such a course would fatally undermine any

attempt at peaceful Pan-American mediation.

Nonetheless, in

early August, Lansing called for a naval demonstration off
Veracruz.*2

Although the President had already approved the

Lansing-Canova plan and strongly opposed further armed inter
vention in Mexico, relations between Washington and the
Carrancistas had so deteriorated that he readily acquiesced
in the Secretary's request.
ships were ordered to

Once again United States war

V e r a c r u z . 1 *^

Some months earlier, upon Lansing's recommendation,
Wilson had briefly considered dispatching an expedition to
Mexico City to protect the foreign community.

Fortunately,

diplomatic pressure had produced the desired results, and the
Secretary's plan was set aside.

By early summer, however,

the Valley of Mexico had again become the focal point of

*2New York Times, August 3 and 5, 1915.
^Ibid., August 11, 1915; Lansing to Wilson, August 10,
1915, SDR 812.00/15736a; Wilson to Lansing, August 10, 1915,
SDR 812.00/17558.
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fighting.

Mexico City, torn by looting and rioting, changed

hands repeatedly.

Threats against Americans and other for

eign residents multiplied.

And the crisis was aggravated

by reestablishment of the Constitutionalist food blockade.
By late July, a state of anarchy existed within the city.*4
Outraged, Lansing demanded an immediate restoration
of communications between the city and the surrounding
countryside . * 5

Doubtless influenced by contemporaneous

developments in Washington, Carranza moved at once to relieve
the former capital.

On August 3, General Pablo Gonzalez

reoccupied the city, restored order, and reestablished rail
communications with Veracruz.*®

Again, armed intervention

had been narrowly averted by diplomacy.
A second confrontation, potentially more explosive
than the first, stemmed from the xenophobia of Carranza's sonin-law, Candido Aguilar.

Early in June, 1915, the Governor

of the State of Veracruz had resumed his harassment of

*4New York Times, July 1, 6 , 20, 24, and 27, 1915;
Cardoso de Oliveira to Lansing, July 11, 18, 22, 29, and 30,
1915, Foreign Relations, 1915, 721-727.
*5New York Times, July 31, 1915.
*®Cardoso de Oliveira to Lansing, August 3, 1915,
Foreign Relations, 1915, 732.
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foreign oilmen operating in the Huasteca.

By mid-summer the

British-owned Aguila Oil Company had become his principal
target .17

The Cowdray firm, upon which the embattled Royal

Navy still relied for a significant proportion of its fuel
oil requirements, was a poor choice.

Nor was it a propi

tious time to twist the lion's tail.

Aguilar's game was a

dangerous one, indeed, and might well have ended in disaster
for the Constitutionalist regime.
persisted.

Nonetheless, the Governor

He publicly denounced foreign oil interest in

Mexico, particularly the Aguila, holding them responsible
for all of the republic's international "difficulties;"

The

oilmen, he charged, were solely responsible for the failure
of the Constitutionalist regime to obtain recognition abroad.
Anticipating an attempt by foreign governments to seize the
oilfields, he solemnly warned that the moment "foreign
marines" set foot on Mexican soil he would "set fire to all
the wells."

The "cause of Mexico's troubles," would thereby

be eliminated.1®
he said.1®

From all accounts, the Governor meant what

Officials in Washington and London alike were

shaken.

1 7 Spring-Rice

to Lansing, June 12, 1915,SDR 812.6363/

196.
18Ibid.
19Silliman to Lansing, June 24, 1915, SDR 812.6363/197.
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Deeply alarmed by Aguilar's threat, Sir Cecil SpringRice appealed to the Department of State for assistance.
Aguilar, the Ambassador urged, should be informed in no un
certain terms that he would be held "personally responsible"
for destruction of the oil

f i e l d s .

20

The British Government

would not tolerate interdiction of its fuel oil supply.
Shortly after the Department's receipt of Spring-Rice's
ominous note, a consular report from Tampico confirmed
Lansing's fears:

Aguilar's troops were indeed in control of

the greater portion of the oilfields and in sufficient force
to carry out the Governor's threat.21

"The Gentleman

(Aguilar]

mentioned," Silliman cabled from Veracruz, was "fully equal
to such conduct in the event of

i n v a s i o n .

"22

The Huasteca

situation had become very grave.
The Governor1s antipathy toward foreigners was by no
means restricted to the oilmen alone.

Late in June, Consul

Canada at Veracruz reported to Lansing that Aguilar was per
sonally inciting the natives to attack Americans and other

20spring-Rice to Lansing, June 12, 1915, SDR 812.6363/
196.
23,Miller to Lansing, June 1.6, 1915, SDR 812.6363/189.
22silliman to Lansing, June 24, 1915, SDR 812.6363/
197.

foreigners in and around the c i t y . 22

The Secretary re

sponded with a sharp note to Carranza in which he demanded,
among other things, Aguilar's resignation as governor.

The

First Chief refused even to acknowledge Lansing’s highly
irregular communication.

A second note, dispatched on

July 3, again called for Aguilar's dismissal and threatened
dire consequences in the event that the demand was not met.
Silliman was "appalled at the severity of the ultimatum . 1,24
He requested and eventually received permission to soften
its tone.

Having done so, he then submitted it to Carranza.

Perhaps as a result of the agent's editing, the First Chief
misjudged Lansing's mood and again refused to reply .25

Out

of patience, Lansing reacted by calling upon the Secretary
of the Navy to dispatch two battleships and supporting naval
units to the waters off Veracruz.2®
The following day, August 11, Silliman reported that
threats against foreigners in Veracruz had ceased.

Further

more, Aguilar had publicly expressed his regret that such

2 3Link,
2 4 Ibid.

Wilson;

Struggle for Neutrality, 486.
2 5 lbid.

2®Lansing to Wilson, Agust 10, 1915, SDR 812.00/
15736a; New York Times, August 11, 1915.
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threats had ever been made.2^

Almost certainly the Governor's

apology was prompted by pressure from Carranza himself.

It

was a humiliating reversal for Aguilar and doubtless increased
his enmity towards the United States.
sequent behavior suggested as much.

To be sure, his sub
Although friction be

tween Washington and the Veracruz regime momentarily declined,
the threat to foreign control of the oilfields persisted.

In

the months and years that followed, Aguilar pressed unremit
tingly for confiscation of foreign holdings in the Huasteca.
Throughout the balance of the Carranza regime, he remained
strongly anti-American and the implacable foe of the oilmen.
While officials of the Department of State fenced
with the Carrancistas through the summer of 1915, new and
unexpected difficulties with Villa further complicated rela
tions with Mexico.
jeopardized.

Again, Pan-American mediation was

Villa, retiring before the rapidly advancing

Obregon, was hard pressed for money and supplies.28

Late in

2^Link, Wilson: Struggle for Neutrality, 486. Barely
two weeks earlier, Wilson had ordered the seizure of Port-auPrince, the Haitian capital, ostensibly for the purposes of
protecting foreign lives and property and to forestall pos
sible European intervention. New York Times, July 28, 1915.
The similarity between the Haitian situation and the crisis
developing at Veracruz was unmistakable.
Doubtless the oc
cupation of Port-au-Prince served as an object lesson for the
Carrancistas.
2 8 Quirk,

The Mexican Revolution, 283-284.
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July, he seized the property of foreign merchants in Chihua
hua and announced his intention to impose a confiscatory tax
on foreign mining operations in northern Mexico.
was apprehensive.

29

Lansing

He fully appreciated the seriousness of

a confrontation with Villa.

Yet failure to curb Villista

plundering of foreign interests might well lead to armed
intervention by the United States.

In addition to under

mining the Lansing-Canova plan, intervention would almost
certainly spell Villa's defeat.

The last effective obstacle

to a complete Carrancista victory would thereby be removed,
a prospect distressing to Lansing and the Antirevolutionists
alike.

30

Consequently, the Secretary moved at once to miti

gate Villa's hardship.
Turning to the President and to Secretary of Agri
culture David F. Houston, Lansing persuaded them to permit
the inspection and importation of Mexican beef at El Paso.

2 ^Ibid., 284; Carothers to
Letcher to Lansing, July 31, 1915,
Operators' Association to Lansing,
Relations, 1915, 926-933; New York

Ol

Lansing, July 26, 1915,
and The Mine and Smelter
August 6 , 1915, Foreign
Times, August 5, 1915.

30Lansing to Wilson, August 9, 1915, The Lansing
Papers, II, 547-548; Quirk, The Mexican Revolution, 285.
^Lansing to Wilson, August 6
Papers, II, 545-548. The Secretary's
and thereby restrain Villa were first
Clendenen, The U. S. and Villa, 185.

and 9, 1915, The Lansing
measures to assist
suggested by Carothers.
Wilson was "puzzled"

Villa was thus able to obtain desperately needed funds
through the sale of stolen cattle to American buyers.
Next, Lansing sent to the border General Hugh Scott,
Chief of Staff and Villa's principal advocate within Adminis
tration circles.32

Scott was to personally inform his

Mexican friend of Washington's concession and prevail upon
him to abandon his plan for a confiscatory mining

t a x . 33

in

addition, the General was to assure Villa that the United
States had no intention of extending recognition to Carranza.
Scott, however,

"had a lucid interval" during his meeting

by Lansing's suggestion that the United States act to relieve
Villa:
"Do you think it is wise," he queried, "to put Villa
in the way of getting money just at the moment when he is
apparently weakest and on the verge of collapse? What will
be gained by that, if, should he be left alone, he may be
eliminated by the force of events?" Wilson to Lansing, Au
gust 7, 1915, The Lansing Papers, XI, 546. Lansing explained
"We do not wish the Carranza faction to be the only one to
deal with in Mexico. Carranza seems so impossible that an
appearance, at least, of opposition to him will give us an
opportunity to invite a compromise of factions.” The Sec
retary thought it "politic, for the time, to allow Villa to
obtain sufficient financial resources to allow his faction
to remain in arms until a compromise can be effected."
Lansing to Wilson, August 9, 1915, Ibid., 547-548. Quirk
concludes that Lansing "wanted the elimination of Carranza
more than he wanted peace" in Mexico. Quirk, The Mexican
Revolution, 285.
*)0

Ibid. Again, the suggestion to use Scott to
control Villa came from Carothers. Clendenen, The U. S.
and Villa, 185.
33Link, Wilson:

Struggle for Neutrality, 487.
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with Villa and chose to withhold from him the Secretary's
guarantee.

It was the General's conviction that "matters

of that kind should be held back when dealing with primitive
people."

34

It was a fortunate decision.

Both Lansing and

the Wilson Administration generally were spared considerable
embarrassment when the President a short time later chose
to extend recognition to the Veracruz regime.

Meanwhile,

Scott's initiative in no way interfered with the success of
his mission.

35

Villista depredations in northern Mexico

fell off sharply after the border conference, and tension
between the Chihuahua caudillo and the Government of the
United States diminished accordingly.

III.
While Lansing, through a combination of threats on
one hand and concessions on the other, sought to forestall
serious trouble with Carranza and Villa, representatives of
six Latin American nations met with the Secretary in Washington to consider joint action on the Mexican problem.

36

3 4 Ibid.

35Carothers to Lansing, undated. Foreign Relations,
1915, 935; New York Times, August 11, 1915.
36The participating nations were Argentina, Brazil,
Chile, Bolivia, Uruguay, and Guatemala.
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Opening the talks on August 5, Lansing expressed the opinion
that not one of the incumbant factional leaders was capable
of forging a lasting peace.

He then suggested that the

conferees recognize and actively support one of the several
secondary chieftains around whom all revolutionary elements
might rally.

Doubtless astonishing his subordinates, the

Secretary closed by insisting that the Pan-American designee
be a revolutionary.

The true will and sovereignty of the

Mexican people, he explained, were vested in the Revolution.
For that reason, if for no other, consideration of a con
servative or counterrevolutionary leader was out of the
q uestion.^
The Latin American response to Lansing's proposal
was unexpectedly encouraging.

38

Although the assembled

diplomats represented conservative governments hostile in
varying degree to the Mexican Revolution, they feared the
effects of unilateral American intervention.

Seemingly the

only acceptable alternative to that course was a scheme such
as the one suggested by the Secretary of State.

In addition,

Lansing was calling for elimination of the troublesome
Carranza.

39

It was an important feature of the American

3?Lansing to Wilson, August 6 , 1915, The Lansing
Papers, II, 543-544.
3 8 Ibid.

3 8 Ibid.
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plan and certainly one of the principal reasons for Latin
American acquiescence in it.

Among the conferees there was

from the start "unanimous agreement" that the First Chief
was "impossible, that even if he triumphed it would mean
continued disorder . " 40

Thus by the close of the first

session, consensus had been reached on three points:

First,

none of the incumbent factional heads would be eligible for
Pan-American recognition; second, representatives of all
revolutionary factions were to be invited to an "immediate
conference" at Washington to consider a compromise settlement
of the Mexican civil war; and, third, the conferees them
selves were to draft a plan for installing a Mexican pro
visional government of their own choosing in the event that
voluntary compromise could not be reached.^
At a second session, held the following day, it was
decided that invitations to attend a conference in Washing
ton would shortly be dispatched to prominent revolutionary
leaders.

It was further agreed to reconvene in New York to

consider the composition of the proposed provisional govern
ment .42
All the while, Lansing both anticipated and desired

40Ibid

42Ibid

323
Mexican opposition to Pan-American mediation .43

Manifesting

his concurrence with the convictions expressed in the Long
Memorandum, he preferred to impose upon the republic a regime
of his own making . 44

From its inception, the Lansing-

Canova plan had been predicated on the assumption that
the composition of the new provisional government would be
determined by officials of the Department of State.

Latin

American participation was merely an artifice intended to
allay the fears and cultivate the confidence and good will
of the several Latin American republics, an attempt to cloak
an essentially unilateral American intervention in the
sanctity of responsible Pan-Americanism.

It was the

Niagara maneuver all over again.
At that critical juncture in Mexican-American rela
tions, it suddenly became evident that the President was by
no means irrevocably committed to execution of the LansingCanova plan.

The situation in Mexico remained fluid, and

rapidly unfolding events below the border forced Wilson,
however, grudgingly, to reassess his position on Pan-American
mediation.

43

The President was deeply impressed by the growing

Link, Wilson:

44Ibid,

Struggle for Neutrality, 488.
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military might of the Constitutionalist armies and by the
ease with which Carrancista commanders rolled back the
opposition through the latter half of the summer.

By early

August, it was clear to Wilson that Villa's days were
numbered .45

Zapata and the remnants of the Convention, of

course, had long since been dismissed as serious contenders
for Washington's recognition and support.

Furthermore, the

President had no intention whatsoever of encouraging any of
the exiled leaders .45

Gradually, then, Wilson was moving

toward acceptance of the Veracruz regime.
Link believes that, in addition to Constitutionalist
success in the field, a partial explanation for the re
markable reversal of presidential policy lies in an inex
plicable strengthening of Wilson's "faith" in the Revolution.
Despite his disgust with its leaders, by midsummer the
President was convinced that the movement was "a bright
chapter in the history of mankind's struggle for freedom and
democracy."47

Under no circumstances, then, would he will

ingly become a party to its frustration.

Nor, by late summer,

45Wilson to Lansing, August 7, 1915, The Lansing
Papers, II, 546.
4®Link, Wilson;

Struggle for Neutrality, 489.
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was he prepared to stand in the way of the leader, whoever
he might be, who seemed best able to bring the movement to
fruition.

Clearly, by early August, Carranza appeared to

be that leader.
There were, in addition to the aforementioned, still
other factors which stiffened Wilson's resolve.

First,

several politically significant groups within American
society strongly favored the Constitutionalist cause.

The

revolutionary decrees of January, 1915, and conclusion of
the alliance between Carranza and the radical Casa del
Obrero Mundial had duly impressed American labor leaders.
Samuel Gompers, influential president of the American
Federation of Labor, was particularly partial to the First
Chief and had repeatedly petitioned the White House to
extend recognition to the Veracruz regime.

48

Many influential

Protestant clergymen and laymen were equally enthusiastic in
their support of the Constitutionalist movement.

They wel

comed the humbling of the reactionary Mexican Church and
anticipated the opening of a fertile new field for Protestant
missions.

Finally, large numbers of progressive and liberal

4 8 Ibid.,

642; Clendenen, The U. S. and Villa, 205;
Gompers to Wilson, September 22, 1915, Wilson Papers, VI,
95A.
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reformers were taken in by the very effective Carrancista
propaganda which began to make its appearance in the United
States in the fall of 1 9 1 4 . They, too, were vigorous advo
cates of recognition.

Roman Catholic opposition notwith

standing, the political dividends which might be expected to
accrue to the Wilson Administration through recognition of
the First Chief were considerable.
A second factor of great importance in reconciling
both the President and large numbers of the American people
to Constitutionalist hegemony in Mexico was the aforemen
tioned Carrancista propaganda.

It was instrumental in

bringing about American recognition of the Veracruz regime,
and was to remain that government's most effective defense
against the activities of counterrevolutionaries and foreign
interventionists throughout the balance of the Carranza era.
Constitutionalist propaganda, Clendenen observes, "was
voluminous and was conducted with a skill and attention to
the current prejudices of the American people that indicated

4 9 Clendenen, The U. S. and Villa, 199-200. The acti
vities of Carrancista propagandists are well documented in
the record of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee's inves
tigation of Mexican affairs conducted in the autumn of 1919
and the spring of 1920. See Testimony of Dr. Samuel G.
Inman, September 8 and 9, 1919, and Testimony of L. J. de
Bekker, September 15, 1919, IMA, 4-141 and 331-370.

327
that the managers knew exactly what they were doing."

It

bore evidence "of having been actually written by highly
skilled Americans, rather than Mexicans."

Funding was never

an obstacle.5®
In the autumn of 1914, shortly after the rupture
between Villa and the First Chief, Carrancista agents had
established the Mexican Bureau of Information in New York
City.

Thereafter, "a stream of pamphlets, press releases,

and interviews" — all designed to discredit Villa or extol
Carranza and the Constitutionalist cause — issued from that
office.

Initially, Villa was portrayed as simple, naive,

and badly misled.

Upon the eruption of hostilities, however,

the campaign of vinification took a nastier turn.
Carrancista propagandists were quick to exploit Villa's out
law past.

At the same time, they shrewdly catered to the

ideological prejudices of the Wilson Administration.

Relying

upon unsubstantiated newspaper accounts as evidence, they
charged that Villa had sold out to Wall Street, that in ex
change for arms and money he had pledged fabulous concessions
to Rockefeller and other giants of American industry.

In

creasingly, Villa was cast in the role of arch-reactionary.

5®Clendenen, The U. S. and Villa, 195-197.
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Again and again, it was alleged that he was working handin-glove with Huertistas and the old Cientifico faction.
"No opportunity was ever lost," Clendenen declares, "to
couple Villa*s name and party with the rich who stood to lose
by the Revolution and with the predatory capitalists who were
vaguely, but genuinely, feared in both the United states and
Mexico.
While Carranza's opponent was being thus maligned,
the First Chief himself was "being depicted by liberal
writers," both Mexican and American, as "the very incarnation
of the ideals and aspirations of true liberalism."

The muck

raking journalist, Lincoln Steffans, "in whom . . . Wilson
placed great confidence," was perhaps the most effective of
Carranza's eulogists.

Following a visit to Constitutionalist

headquarters early in 1915, Steffans returned to New York to
become "one of the most enthusiastic of the pro-Carranza and
anti-Villa propagandists.

To all intents and purposes,"

Clendenen concludes, "he became a Carrancista public relations
o f f i c e r .

"52

Equally close to Wilson and to his principal

advisor. Colonel Edward M. House, Steffans discussed Mexican
matters with both men during the critical summer and early
fall of 1915.

Unquestionably, his efforts and those of other

5 1 ibid., 197-199.

52Ibid., 200-201.
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propagandists on behalf of the Constitutionalist cause
played a major role in tempering the President's antipathy
toward Carranza and in winning White House support for the
Veracruz regime.
Indication of a marked shift in the President’s atti
tude toward the political situation in Mexico first came to
light on August 8.^3

jn a telegram to Lansing, Wilson

approved both the draft invitation to revolutionary leaders
and the decision to prepare an alternate plan for an imposed
Pan-American settlement of the Mexican conflict.

He ques

tioned, however, the conferees' emphasis on elections and a
rapid return to constitutional government.

It was his opinion,

he informed Lansing, that "the first and most essential step
in settling [the] affairs of Mexico" was "not to call general
elections."

Rather it was "necessary that a provisional

government essentially revolutionary in character should take
action to institute reforms by decree before the full forms
of the constitution [were]

resumed."

Such, he contended, was

the "original program of the revolution" and "probably an
essential part of it."S4

The President had come a long way,

indeed.

53wilson to Lansing, August 8, 1915, The Lansing Papers,
II, 547.
54ibid.
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IV.
Once resigned to a revolutionary rather than consti
tutional solution of the Mexican problem, Wilson naturally
began to question the expedience of the Lansing-Canova plan.
On August 11, he revealed just how far he had moved from his
original position:

"I think," he cabled Lansing, "it would

be unwise for the conference to take for granted or insist
upon the elimination of Carranza."
ignore some very big facts."

To do so would be "to

It was "very important" that

the plan then under consideration by the Pan-American con
ferees "should leave the way of action open in any direction
and not assume a beginning over again with a clean sheet of
paper to write on."

Doubtless with some anxiety, the

President finally acknowledged Carranza's ascendency:

the

First Chief, he declared would "somehow have to be digested
into the scheme."

At the same time, he stressed, it was

essential that "the object of the revolution . . .

be

conserved .1,55
Lansing received Wilson's message in Mew York,
shortly before he was to open the third round of talks with
the Latin American diplomats.

Unquestionably deeply

S^Wilson to Lansing, August 11, 1915., Ibid., 549.
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disappointed, he nonetheless accepted the change with
equanimity .56

Going before the conferees, he bluntly an

nounced that the Constitutionalists were obviously the do
minant faction in the republic and that, for the moment at
least, it was impractical to consider the establishment of
an imposed coalition government.

In the face of determined

Carrancista opposition, he warned, there would be little or
nothing that the conferees could do to force mediation.

The

only course open to them was to extend the invitations as
planned and hope for a favorable response from all
factions.57
Fuller, who had not been informed of the President's
sudden reversal, was incredulous.

What, he inquired, was to

become of the many Mexicans who had opposed or failed to
support the revolution?

Certainly they too were to be

accorded representation in the new government.
Lansing countered.

Not so,

The proposed provisional government

would be "founded on the revolution."

Those Mexicans who

had resisted the Madero movement, supported the Huerta revolt,
or opposed "the principle of reform of the revolution" were

56x,ink, Wilson:
5?Ibid., 492-493.

Struggle for Neutrality, 492.

"not entitled to participate in the initial reestablishment
of government in Mexico."

The fate of the dissidents was to

be determined solely by the provisional government.

The

conferees, Lansing insisted, had no right to interfere with
that government on behalf of the exiles.
Administration.

Nor did the Wilson

The United States would not encourage

counterrevolution.

The Conference, he contended, would ac

complish nothing unless the conferees accepted the fact that
the revolution was "triumphant" and that "the Mexican people
were the "ones who for the present possess the right of
sovereignty and the right to establish a provisional
government."5®
Lansing's defense of Mexican self-determination
struck a responsive chord among the Latin American diplomats
Fuller objected, but to no avail.^9

Accordingly, the deci

sion was made to proceed with the dispatch of invitations to
revolutionary leaders.

The matter of recognition was post

poned, to be taken up again only after all the recipients
replied.

Thus, on August 13, invitations to attend a

conference at Washington under the auspices of the PanAmerican conferees were sent to dozens of prominent civil

58ibid

5®Ibid., 492
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and military officials.

The announced purpose of the

conference was “to exchange ideas and to determine the fate"
of the Mexican Republic.

It was hoped that frank discussion

at a neutral site would lead to voluntary organization of a
new provisional regime preparatory to the restoration of
peace and constitutional government.

The Pan-American con

ferees stood ready upon request to make the necessary arrange
ments for the meeting.

Replies were expected within ten

days .60
Within or shortly after the alloted time, Villa,
Zapata, and Rafael Borrego, spokesman for the disintegrating
Convention, each expressed his willingness to consider a
mediated settlement.6^

Similar assurances came from their

respective lieutenants.6^

Constitutionalist leaders, however,

reacted almost exactly as Lansing had feared they might.

To

a man they referred their invitations to the First Chief,
pledging themselves to abide by his decision.6^
discouraging response.

It was a

Effective mediation was obviously

6 0 l»ansing to Parker, August 13, 1915, Foreign
Relations, 1915, 735-736.

6^Llorente to Lansing, August 19, 1915, and Parker to
Lansing, August 29, 1915, Ibid., 737-738, 739-742.
62Note, Ibid., 753-754.

63Ibid.
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out of the question.

Equally disheartening was the pro

longed silence of Carranza himself.

Chagrined, the President

sent David Lawrence to confer with Eliseo Arredondo,
Carranza's principal spokesman in Washington . ® 4
Lawrence, on August 15, assured Arredondo that the
conferees had no intention of intervening militarily in
Mexico.

Nor, he declared less candidly, were they hostile

to the First Chief.

In fact, he implied, Constitutionalist

participation in the proposed Mexican conference would defi
nitely enhance Carranza's chance of winning Pan-American
recognition.

On the other hand, if the First Chief persisted

in pursuing total military victory, it was highly unlikely
that he would ever be recognized by the United States.
Washington, Lawrence stressed, was committed to a compromise
settlement of the Mexican civil war.

The President would

countenance nothing else . ® 5
Encouraged by Arredondo's response, Wilson and Lansing
decided to send Lawrence on to Veracruz to discuss the matter
of a mediated settlement with the First Chief himself. Despite
the fact that the newsman did not officially represent the
Administration, his assignment remained a closely guarded

®4Link, Wilson:
65Ibid., 630-631.

Struggle for Neutrality, 631.
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secret.

66

It would have been difficult, indeed, to reconcile

his mission with Washington's professed commitment

to Pan-

Americanism.
Lawrence arrived at the Constitutionalist capital on
August 28, and the same day spoke with Carranza.

Despite a

virtual guarantee of American recognition in exchange for
cooperation with the Pan-American conference, the First Chief
again expressed his opposition to foreign interference in
Mexican affairs.
proposal .®7

He unequivocally rejected the American

A realist, Lawrence then advised Wilson to accept

the preeminence of the Constitutionalists and to extend recog
nition to that faction regardless of whether or not Carranza
chose to go along with the conferees.
practical recommendation.

It was a bold and

It was not, however, what the

President wanted to hear .68
Nor was Lansing pleased.

The Secretary was concerned,

and rightly so, over the reaction of the Latin American diplo
mats to Lawrence's recommendation.
opposed" he warned the President .69

They would be "strongly
Moreover, unilateral

American recognition of Carranza would constitute a serious

6 6 Ibid.,

68Ibid.

631n.

6 7 Ibid.,

69Ibid.

632.
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breach of faith with the Latin American conferees and nullify
whatever benefits had accrued as a result of Pan-American
cooperation.

Indeed, the Lawrence mission itself violated

the spirit of Pan-Americanism, and doubtless the Secretary
was apprehensive lest it be discovered.

Wilson, on the other

hand, appears to have been annoyed by Lawrence's initiative
and piqued by the First Chief's obstinance.

It was "clear,”

he fumed, "that nothing can be done either with or through
Carranza."7 0

And so it seemed.

That same day the First

Chief informed reporters at Veracruz that "under no con
sideration" would he "permit interference in the internal
affairs of Mexico. . . . "

Any nation attempting to meddle,

he warned, would "meet resistance.
On September 1, the date of his departure from
Veracruz, Lawrence engaged in a final, brief conversation
with Carranza.

General Obregon, the First Chief revealed, was

about to launch a major offensive against demoralized Villista
forces in northern Mexico.
fident of victory.

The Constitutionalists were con

When he had crushed his opponent,

Carranza assured Wilson's envoy, he would open communications

7 0 Ibid.,

633.

7^New York Times, September 1, 1915.
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with the Pan-American conferees.

At that point, there would

no longer be any doubt as to who was the master of Mex ico.^
Forthwith the campaign in the North began.

On or

about September 4, Saltillo, capital of the State of
Coahuila, fell to General Carlos Trevino.

Shortly there

after, General Francisco Murguia seized Torreon, the communi
cations hub of northern Mexico and longtime Villista strong
hold.

Meanwhile, other Constitutionalist columns occupied

the city of Durango and Piedras Negras, an important border
port opposite Eagle Pass, Texas.
melted away.

Villa's army rapidly

His soldiers deserted en masse, and a number

of his generals opened negotiations with Obregon.

By mid-

September, Villista forces held only the State of Chihuahua
and Ciudad Juarez opposite El Paso.

Villa's power was

b r o k e n . A l t h o u g h he continued to dominate large areas of
north-central Mexico for four more years, he no longer repre
sented a serious threat to Constitutionalist control of the
republic.
On September 10, having swept his opponent from the
field, Carranza finally chose to reply to the Pan-American

72Link, Wilson:

Struggle for Neutrality, 633.

^^New York Times, September 5, 10, 19, 1915; Quirk,
The Mexican Revolution, 287.
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conferees.

He would not discuss the internal affairs of the

republic, he explained, because to do so would be to violate
Mexican sovereignty and "set a precedent for foreign inter
vention” in the settlement of future internal disorders.
Constitutionalist forces, he observed, now controlled all of
Mexico except the State of Chihuahua, a small part of Sonora,
and the Zapatista stronghold in the State of Morelos.
Clearly the opposition was finished.
had passed.

The need for mediation

Instead, Carranza proposed, the conferees might

join him at some point along the northern border for the
purpose of discussing de facto recognition of the Veracruz
regime.74

V.
Some two weeks earlier, while recommending the exten
sion of American recognition to Carranza, Lawrence had urged
the President to "accept the facts of Mexican life."7^
mid-September, Wilson had no choice.

By

While he and Lansing

pondered their next move, reports from two of the Adminis
tration's "most trusted agents" on the border forced them
to reconsider Lawrence's recommendation.

George C. Carothers,

74Silliman to Lansing, September 10, 1915, Foreign
Relations, 1915, 746-748.
^ L i n k , Wilson;

Struggle for Neutrality, 632.
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formerly attached to Villa's headquarters, and Zachary Cobb,
Collector of Customs at El Paso, both noted the rapid dis
integration of the Villista movement and predicted its
imminent collapse.

On September 10 and 11 respectively,

they too urged recognition of the Veracruz regime.
Lansing was converted.

On September 12, he forwarded

to Wilson a copy of Carranza's firm but conciliatory rejection
of Pan-American mediation.

With it he enclosed his own anal

ysis of the drastically altered political situation below the
border.77

The First Chief's position, Lansing opened, was

"not unreasonable."

In fact, his proposal to meet with the

conferees to discuss recognition was most encouraging.
Although the Secretary was concerned primarily with the con
sideration of Mexican internal affairs, he was nonetheless
pleased with Carranza's apparent willingness to cooperate at
all with the conferees.

The First Chief's proposal, he

remarked, reflected a "better disposition" than any previously
manifested by the Veracruz regime.
The Carrancistas, Lansing informed the President,
were "undoubtedly stronger and more cohesive" than ever before.

76Ibid., 636.
77Lansing to Wilson, September 12, 1915, The Lansing
Papers, II, 550-552.
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"In fact," he admitted, "I have almost reached the conclusion
that they are so dominant that they are entitled to recog
nition."

The Secretary "could not see what

by recognizing any other government."

[would] be gained

The war would simply

"continue and be prolonged" by any attempt to strengthen
Villa.

The First Chief, he believed, was certain to "win in

the end."
The situation in Mexico had "changed materially”
since the conferees had first addressed the several factional
leaders.

As long as Villa had been able to offer "stubborn

resistance" to Carranza, the "desirable thing” had been "to
stay the strife by harmonizing factional differences."

That,

of course, had been the original purpose of the proposed
conference of revolutionary leaders.
"rapidly waned."

But Villa's power had

He was clearly finished.

"Now," the

Secretary declared, "the problem is whether or not peace in
Mexico will not be more quickly restored by giving moral
support" to the triumphant Carrancistas*
Certainly the course suggested by Lansing was the
most practical of the several options open to the President.
However, consideration of that recommendation automatically

^®Ibid
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raised some embarrassing questions.

Leaders of those fac

tions opposed to Carranza had by then agreed to attend the
proposed conference.

"Can we," Lansing mused, "consistently

or honorably refuse to call such a conference?"

And if it

were called, "what would be the value of its deliberations?"
Given the "utter demoralization" of Carranza's opponents it
seemed to him "absurd to assert" that any government which
they might organize would truly represent the "sovereignty
of the Mexican people."79
Still another "difficulty" raised by Lansing's pro
posal was the attitude of the Latin American conferees.

They

remained strongly opposed to the Mexican Revolution and were
especially antagonistic toward the Constitutionalists.

At

the meeting of August 6, they had unanimously expressed both
their antipathy toward Carranza and their determination to
eliminate him from Mexican politics.

Lansing, at the time,

had wholeheartedly agreed, and the President himself had only
belatedly questioned the decision.

Now, however, the

Secretary proposed to go far beyond Wilson's subsequent sug
gestion that Carranza somehow be included in a mediated
settlement.

In fact, Lansing was calling for a complete

79Ibid.
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reversal of the course so enthusiastically adopted by the
conferees barely a month past.

It was an awkward situation,

indeed, and one which threatened to efface entirely the
spirit of Pan-American trust and cooperation so painstakingly
pursued by the Wilson Administration.
Nonetheless, Lansing was determined to proceed.

It

was "necessary," he believed, to call the Latin American con
ferees together, "lay before them the replies of the Mexican
chiefs," and reveal to them "the present state of affairs in
Mexico."

At the same time, he would impress upon them the

"continuing successes of the Carrancista arms."

Before doing

so, however, the Administration should have a definite course
of action to present to the conferees.8**

It was essential

that Washington retain the initiative.
The following day, Wilson called Lansing to the White
House to discuss the Secretary's proposal.

It was decided

that Lansing would meet again with the Latin American confer
ees and "suggest" to them a conference with Constitutionalist
repesentatives in Washington to consider the recognition of
Carranza.

It was to be made very clear to the conferees that

the Wilson Administration held "acceptance of the Revolution

8°ibid
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absolutely necessary."

In addition, the conferees were to

"keep faith" with the other factions by later meeting with
their respective representatives at some point in Mexico.
There, the First Chief's opponents were to be informed that
"the best and most helpful thing for them to do" was to dis
close "confidentially" to the conferees "the terms upon which
they [would]

submit to Carranza."

It was then to be explained

to them that because of the recent "utter alteration of
conditions" in Mexico the conferees could do no other than
recognize the Veracruz r e g i m e .

VI.
Although the preeminence of Carranza stood as the
obvious rationale for extending de facto recognition to his
government, there was another factor of equal if not greater
importance in determining the Administration's course.

Some

two months earlier, quite by accident, Lansing had stumbled
upon the clandestine activities of the German Intelligence
apparatus in North America.82

Justice Department officials

took over the investigation and, on or about July 21,

8^Wilson to Lansing, September 13, 1915, Ibid., 552.
82Anderson Diary, July 9, 1915; Barbara Tuchman, The
Zimmermann Telegram (New York: Dell Publishing Company,
1963), 66ff.
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rendered a preliminary report to the Secretary.

According

to Assistant Attorney General Charles Warren, an extensive
network of agents directed by Captain Franz Rintelen von
Kleist, a member of the General Staff of the German
Admiralty, was engaged in interdicting the export of war
material to the Allies.83

In addition to fomenting strikes

and otherwise interfering with the traffic in arms, Rintelen
was believed to be involved in a plot to embroil the United
States in a war with Mexico.

The object of the latter scheme

was to force Washington "to commandeer for its own use"
against Mexico the great quantities of arms and ammunition
being exported to the Allies.®-*

Subsequent investigation by

Justice Department agents and the cooperation of British
Counterintelligence, into whose hands Rintelen ultimately
fell, revealed much more*
In February, 1915, the Captain had gone to Spain,
sought out the exiled Huerta, and promised German support for

83Anderson Diary, July 22, 1915.
®^New York Times, December 5, 1915. In May, 1915,
Gottlieb von Jagow,secretary in the German Foreign Ministry,
explicitly approved a plan to provoke American armed inter
vention in Mexico. It was "very much to be desired," von
Jagow declared, "that America should get involved in a mili
tary action, and distracted from Europe, where it is friendly
to England." Quoted in James A. Sandos, "German Involvement
in Northern Mexico, 1915-1916: A New Look at the Columbus
Raid," HAHR, L (February, 1970), 85 (hereafter cited as
"German Involvement in Northern Mexico").
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a Huertista counterrevolution.

The General had accepted.

Traveling separately, both men arrived in New York early
in April.

Rintelen immediately contacted Huerta and soon

opened negotiations with the representatives of other pro
minent Mexican reactionaries.88

Alarmed by the General’s

presence in the United States, Villista and Carrancista
agents alike protested to State Department officials.86
Apparently unaware of the German intrigue, Bryan took no
action; and, indeed, as long as the General remained away
from the Mexican border it would have been difficult to do
so.8?

Meanwhile, throughout the month of May, Rintelen and

two members of the German Embassy staff. Military Attache
Franz von Papen and Naval Attache Karl Boy-Ed, conferred
almost daily with Huerta.
ment had been reached.88

By the end of the month an agree
Having made the necessary prepara

tions, both in the United States and Mexico, Huerta was to
cross the border, rally conservative elements and disaffected

86New York Times, June 30 and August 4, 1915; George
J. Rausch, Jr., "The Exile and Death of Victoriano Huerta,"
HAHR, XLII (May, 1962), 134-135.
88I>lorente to Bryan, April 10, 1915, Foreign Relations,
1915, 827; Note, Ibid., 828.
8^Clendenen, The U. S. and Villa, 182-183.
op
Rausch, "The Exile and Death of Victoriano Huerta,"
HAHR, 136-137.
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revolutionaries, and move against the Constitutionalist
regime at Veracruz.

At the same time, Felix Diaz was to rise

against Carranza in the South.89
In return, the exiles demanded arms and money; they
received both in abundance.

Rintelen had at his disposal an

estimated $30,000,000 to invest in the Mexican venture and
appears to have expended some $12,000,000 before the scheme
aborted.90

Large numbers of Mauser and Winchester rifles

were purchased and successfully delivered to Huerta's follow
ers along the border.

Another large shipment, destined for

Felix Diaz, was discovered and seized by Justice Department
agents at New Orleans.

Rintelen also purchased huge quanti

ties of ammunition in St. Louis and placed orders for still
more in New York.

Responding to Huerta's demand for funds,

German agents deposited $800,000 to the General's account in
the Deutsche Bank in Havana and another $95,000 in a Mexican
account.9 *■
Shortly before the counterrevolution was to begin,
the attaches made trips to Los Angeles, El Paso, San Antonio,

89New York Times, December 5, 1915.
90Ibid., December 8, 1915.
9^Ibid., December 5, 1915.

and several other Southwestern cities, distributing funds,
recruiting fighting men, and completing plans for the
i
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Then, late in June, Huerta proceeded to the

There he was arrested by American authorities,

allowed to post bond, and kept under close surveillance.
Early in July, he was again arrested and confined at Fort
Bliss, Texas.

In time, he turned to the bottle, his chronic

weakness, and subsequently fell seriously ill.

When he was

eventually released in January, 1916, his moment was long
passed.

Shortly thereafter he

d i e d . 9 ^

The terms of Rintelen's agreement with Huerta were
vague.

Apparently, however, there was some discussion of a

formal military alliance aimed at the United States.

Huerta

Rintelen later recalled, ascribed his earlier downfall to
Washington's meddling in the internal affairs of Mexico.
hungered for vengeance.94

He

Again according to Rintelen, the

General expressed his willingness to wage war against the

92n>id.
93Rausch, "The Exile and Death of Victoriano Huerta,
HAHR, 139-151; Grieb, Huerta, 187-192.
94Franz Rintelen von Kleist, The Dark Invader; War
time Reminiscences of a German Naval Intelligence Officer
(New York: The Macmillan Company, 1933), 175 (hereafter
cited as Dark Invader).
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United States if Germany would continue to provide him
military and financial assistance and guarantee his personal
safety in the event of failure.95

Execution of the alleged

alliance was, of course, contingent upon successful counter
revolution in Mexico.
By late July, the Huertista movement was obviously
dead.

Discouraged, but by no means defeated, the Kaiser's

agents abandoned the unfortunate Huerta and began anew,
first with Felix Diaz and then with Pancho Villa.96

Fol

lowing Huerta's confinement, control of the Mexican project
passed from Rintelen to von Papen and Boy-Ed.

They, in turn,

received their orders from the German Ambassador in
Washington, Count Johann von Bernstorff.97
Early in August, British Counterintelligence had
succeeded through a clever ruse in luring Rintelen abroad.
He was subsequently captured and interrogated,99

Much of the

information extracted from him was immediately passed on to
American authorities.

On September 15, shortly before Lansing

"ibid.; Grieb, Huerta, 184-185.
9^Mew York Times., August 4 and December 5, 1915;
Tuchman, The Zimmermann Telegram, 92-97; Sandos, "German
Involvement in Northern Mexico;" HAHR, 83-88.
97Link, Wilson:

Struggle for Neutrality, 563-564.

98Tuchman, The Zimmermann Telegram, 83-84.
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was to meet again with the Latin American conferees, Warren
forwarded to him the latest developments in the Rintelen
case.

Included was the British report on the Captain's

activities in America.^®
Lansing was alarmed.

Although the Huertista movement

had indeed been frustrated and the General himself effec
tively neutralized, Diaz, Blanquet, Mondragon, and a number
of other prominent Mexican reactionaries were still at large.
Thus a serious counterrevolutionary uprising, inspired by
German agents and supported by German arms and money, re
mained a distinct possibility.

Should such occur, all hope

of a speedy settlement of the Mexican question would be lost.
At best, Administration officials could expect another dismal
round of bitter civil strife below the border; at worst, the
emergence of a new pro-German reactionary regime hostile to
both the United States and the European Allies.

In either

case, Washington's diligent efforts to stabilize the repub
lic and withdraw from the Mexican morass would be all for
naught.
Strongly biased in favor of the Allies, Lansing was
deeply concerned over the prospect of a new revolution in

^Link, Wilson;

Struggle for Neutrality, 650-651.

350
Mexico."^00

The great Huasteca oilfields, vital to the

Allied war effort, and the mines of Northern Mexico, upon
whose production American munitions-makers heavily depended,
would become prime targets for expropriation by a proGerman regime.

Still more sobering was the prospect of

extensive sabotage or even outright destruction of the
Mexican mining and petroleum industries by the losing faction.
Given the recent deterioration of German-American relations,
Washington could ill-afford either development.

Almost

certainly, then, execution of the German plan would provoke
American armed intervention in Mexico - precisely what
Berlin desired.

That act, in turn, would have a profoundly

negative effect upon the Allied war effort, to say nothing
of the incipient Pan-American movement.
determined to prevent intervention.

Lansing, then, was

The most immediate

effective deterrent, he believed, was de facto recognition
of Carranza and subsequent American support of the
Constitutionalist Government.

^

Already all but committed to such a course, the
Secretary was moved to haste by Warren's report.

Accordingly,

lGOsmith, "Lansing,” An Uncertain Tradition, 105;
Link, Woodrow Wilson and the Progressive Era, 134n.

101Ibid.
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on September 18, anxious to obtain rapid Pan-American
recognition of the Veracruz regime, he met again with the
Latin American diplomats.
Lansing.

The session did not go well for

Inexplicably, he.had earlier informed reporters

that the conferees welcomed Carranza's invitation to discuss
recognition of the Constitutionalist Government,^02
statement, of course, was untrue.

uis

Equally indiscreet was

his admission that State Department officers in Mexico were
already warning American citizens to evacuate at once those
areas still under the control of Carranza's opponents.
There could be no mistaking Washington's intent:

the

Wilson Administration meant to recognize Carranza.
The Latin Americans, particularly the Brazilian
Ambassador, Domicio da Gama, were understandably indignant
and in no mood to cooperate with Lansing.

The American pro

posal to recognize Carranza and placate his opponents was
rejected.

Failure, Lansing believed, was due largely to

the Brazilian.

De Gama, he complained to Wilson, was

"apparently opposed to all the revolutionary factions in
Mexico" and "unwilling to be in any way responsible for the

■^■Q^New York Times, September 16, 1915.
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recognition of any of them*"

In the end, Lansing was able

to obtain no more than the other conferees' assurance that
at a later date they would make some recommendation to their
respective governments regarding recognition of the
Veracruz regime.

During the interim the Secretary was to

meet once again with the Washington representatives of Villa
and Carranza.

He was then to resubmit his recommendations

at a final session of the Pan-American conference.^4
Expressing his disappointment to the President,
Lansing nonetheless urged Wilson to accept the conferees'
decision and to "follow out" the scheme proposed by them.
It was obvious that Carranza had won the civil war, he
explained, and he was confident that the Latin Americans,
however distressed they might be by that fact, would sooner
or later accept it.^05

By October 9, the date of the final

meeting, all had done so.

Following a lengthy session in

his Washington office, Lansing announced to reporters that
the conferees had found the Carrancistas the "only party
possessing the essentials for recognition as the de facto
government of Mexico."*0®

Accord with Veracruz was imminent.

*04Lansing to Wilson, September 18, 1915, The Lansing
Papers, II, 552-554.
*05Ibid.

J-O^New York Times, October 10,1915..
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VII.
Discovery of Germany's Mexican intrigue was the
decisive factor in convincing Administration officials that
the United States must come to terms with the First Chief.
To be sure, both Wilson and Lansing were already of the
opinion that the revolutionary aspirations of the Mexican
people were best represented by the Constitutionalist party.
Moreover, Obregon's victories in the North left no doubt as
to which of the contending factions was dominant.

Nonethe

less, while President and Secretary alike acknowledged both
the preeminence of the Constitutionalists and the prudence
of recognizing the Veracruz regime, they balked at accepting
Carranza as chief of state.

Only after receipt of the

Justice Department report of September 15 did they begin to
relent.

Full disclosure of Rintelen's Mexican venture left

them little choice.

Thereafter, the Wilson Administration

was committed to recognition of the Constitutionalist Govern
ment with Carranza as its head.
On October 10, the day after the Pan-American deci
sion to recognize the First Chief, Lansing set forth in his
diary both a statement of the Administration's current
position vis ja vis Mexico and guidelines for its relations
with that country for the duration of the war in Europe.
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"Looking at the general situation," he wrote, he had come to
the "following conclusions:
Germany desires to keep up the turmoil in Mexico
until the United States is forced to intervene;
therefore we must not intervene.
Germany does not wish to have any one faction
dominant in Mexico; therefore, we must recognize one
faction as dominant in Mexico.
When we recognize a faction as the government,
Germany will undoubtedly seek to cause a quarrel
between that government and ours; therefore, we must
avoid a quarrel regardless of criticism and complaint
in Congress and the press.
It comes down to this," he closed:

"Our possible relations

with Germany must be our first consideration; and all our
intercourse with Mexico must be regulated accordingly."-*-0 7
Lansing's position on future Mexican-American
relations was unquestionably well taken.

To have pursued

the aggressive interventionist scheme of the Antirevolu
tionists would have been to run the risk of a major MexicanAmerican conflict and the attendant deterioration of rela
tions between Washington and the other Latin American
republics.

Moreover, to have succumbed to the passions and

pressures engendered by the civil strife in Mexico would
have been to play the German game to perfection.

Clearly,

then, it was in the best interest of the American Government

lO^Quoted in Link, Woodrow Wilson and the Progressive
Era, 134n.
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to adopt the Secretary's position.

And so it did, albeit

not without grave misgivings and ill-concealed disappoint
ment in some quarters.-^88

Accordingly, on October 19, 1915,

the United States joined eight other American republics in
extending de facto recognition to the Constitutionalist
Government of Mexico.

108villa's friend and sponsor,. General Hugh Scott,
was particularly upset. Clendenen, The U. s. and Villa,
193-194. So, too, for different reasons, were Canova and
the Antirevolutionists. Teitelbaum, Wilson and the Mexican
Revolution, 300-301. Prom its inception, the new policy
was subject to great stress and on more than one occasion
was very nearly abandoned. In time, Lansing himself was
prepared to repudiate it. Cline, The United States and
Mexico, 187. Thereafter, its retention was due almost
entirely to the President. Despite Lansing's eventual
return to an interventionist position, his initial analysis
of the objectives and possible consequences of the German
intrigue in America proved irrefutable. Ibid., 184-185.
That fact plus Wilson's unswerving committment to the
Revolution more or less assured Washington's adherence to
the new Mexican policy through the end of the war in Europe.
Ibid., 185.
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I.
Relieved if not jubilant over the Mexican settle
ment, Wilson and Lansing anticipated speedy disengagement
from the internal affairs of Mexico and an extended respite
from further serious differences with the revolutionary
government.

Their optimism was premature.

Indeed, rela

tions with Carranza, as well as with Villa and with the
Mexican people generally, shortly took a sharp turn for the
worse.

Villa, of course, was embittered by recognition of

the Veracruz regime.

His violent response to that and to

subsequent American acts injurious to his cause in turn
provoked the Wilson Administration to pursue a course which
ultimately brought both nations to the brink of war.

Conse

quently, from early 1916 through the spring of the following
year, Mexican-American relations remained at a nadir.
Although neither Wilson nor Carranza wanted war,
there were forces at work on both sides of the border which
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rendered it highly unlikely that peace would prevail.1
Moreover, throughout the greater part of that critical
period, neither leader was in a position to altogether
neutralize those elements working for war.

Election-year

^■Cline, The United States and Mexico, 177. Formi
dable domestic opposition to the unexpected shift in the
Administration's Mexican policy had arisen some time prior
to its official adoption. Press releases following the PanAmerican conference of September 18 had hinted strongly at
approaching recognition of the Veracruz regime. New York
Times, September 19, 1915. Roman Catholic reaction was
vehemently negative. Both in the press and in private com
munications to top Administrative officials spokesmen for
American Roman Catholicism expressed dismay and indignation.
The first wave of protest, however, was "all merely a prelude
to the violent denunciation" that followed the Pan-American
conference of October 9. Lansing's statement to newsmen at
the close of that decisive meeting set off a "storm of almost
unprecedented magnitude . . . a violent last-ditch campaign"
by American Roman Catholics "to thwart the final act of
recognition of the Constitutionalist regime." Link, Wilson:
Struggle for Neutrality, 640-641. See, for example, Edward
P. Allen, Bishop of Mobile, to Wilson, October 4, 1915, and
J. H. Carey, Auxiliary Bishop to Ogdensburg, to Wilson,
October 5, 1915, SDR 812.00/16415. Wilson and Lansing were
taken aback. Although neither sympathized with the Mexican
Church, foreign and domestic political pressures had prompted
them to press Carranza for a cessation of religious perse
cution.
The First Chief had responded with "broad guarantees
of religious freedom" for the Mexican people. Administration
officials, therefore, were satisfied with the religious set
tlement and not a little annoyed at the impassioned protest
of the Roman Catholic community. In fact, Link concludes,
the overall effect of that protest was "to harden their de
termination to proceed to the final stages of the policy
already announced." Link, Wilson: Struggle for Neutrality,
641-642. Roman Catholic resistance to that policy persisted,
however. See, for example, the statement of James Cardinal
Gibbons in New York Times, October 30, 1915.
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political considerations unquestionably embarrassed Wilson
and limited the options at his disposal.2

Nonetheless, he

possessed far greater domestic political power and consider
ably more freedom of action in the conduct of foreign affairs
than did his Mexican counterpart.

At no time did Carranza

match the President of the United States in the degree of
influence each enjoyed over his respective government and
people.
The crux of the Mexican problem, as the Antirevolu
tionists had repeatedly advised their superiors, was the
moral and political weakness of the Constitutionalist regime.
It lacked the resources, the cohesiveness, and the unity of
purpose to complete the all-important task of pacification.
Although that government had indeed experienced notable
success in the field, it singularly failed to exploit its
momentary military ascendancy.

Instead of eliminating Villa

and systematically reducing the remaining regional caudillos,
it allowed the former to escape and recover and the latter
to thrive as never before.

Nor was that government

^Cline, The United States and Mexico, 175.
^Lieuwen, Mexican Militarism, 34-35; Long to Lansing
August 10, 1918, SDR 711.12/130; Long to Lansing, December 12,
1919, SDR 711.12/229 1/2. For specific examples see Bevan
to Lansing, October 12, 1915, Foreign Relations, 1915, 767 and
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successful in winning and retaining the allegiance of the
Mexican people as a whole.

Consequently, large areas of

the republic remained disaffected throughout the Carranza
era.4
Still more important, the First Chief exercised little
more than nominal control over his commanders in the field.
Away from the capital each Constitutionalist general operated
as a law unto himself.

It was only with the greatest diffi

culty that Carranza was able to impose his will upon them.5
Thus if Villa and the several regional caudillos were no
longer serious contenders for mastery of Mexico, the First
Chief himself was by no means in control of the entire repub
lic.

It was, then, patently impossible for the Constitu

tionalist Government to restore order throughout Mexico.
That fact, in turn, precluded the establishment of lasting
amicable relations with the United States.

Bevan to Lansing, November 18, SDR 812.00/16857 (Pelaez in
the Huasteca Veracruzana); Guyant to Lansing, October 25,
1915, SDR 812.00/16668 (Cantu in Baja California); Roosevelt
to Lansing, November 29, 1915, SDR 812.00/16889 (Meixueiro
and Santibanez in Oaxaca)•
4Long to Lansing, August 10, 1918, SDR 711.12/130;
Lieuwen, Mexican Militarism, 34-36.
5Ibid., 36-37, 45-48.
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II.
On October 19, 1915, the Wilson Administration for
mally

extended de facto recognition to the Constitutionalist

Government, agreed to exchange ambassadors with Veracruz,
and halted the shipment of arms to all other Mexican
factions.®

In return for those important concessions,

Carranza was expected to deal "promptly and effectively"
with eighteen outstanding issues between the two countries.7
Although as Louis Kahle observes, Washington's demands "were
not in any sense unreasonable, some of them placed Carranza
in a difficult position . . . .

And so they did.

Fore

most among them were a guarantee of American and other
foreign property rights in Mexico and the immediate cessation
of Mexican "bandit" raids north of the Rio Grande.

In the

first instance, the American demand clashed with one of the

®Lansing to Arredondo, October 19, 1915, Foreign
Relations, 1915, 771; Wilson to Secretary of the Treasury,
October 19, 1915, Ibid., 781.
7Lansing to Arredondo, October 19, 1915, SDR 812.00/
16548 1/2.
®Louis G. Kahle, "Robert Lansing and the Recognition
of Venustiano Carranza," HAHR, XXXVIII (August, 1958), 368.
The aforementioned demands were originally drafted by Canova
and subsequently approved by his superiors. Canova memo
randum, October 13, 1915, SDR 812.00/16546 1/2.
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primary objectives of the Revolution; in the second, the
matter was not altogether within Carranza's power to control.
In neither case, then, did the Wilson Administration obtain
satisfaction.
In the months that followed, abuse of foreign prop
erty

rights in Mexico intensified.

At the same time, unrest

along the border, although somewhat diminished, continued to
poison relations between the neighboring republics.

Moreover,

there was mounting evidence to the effect that prominent
Carrancista officials, perhaps even the First Chief himself,
were deeply involved in both a determined assault on foreign
property rights and in a well-organized campaign of terror
against the Southwestern border states.

Although Carranza

repeatedly denied Constitutionalist collusion in either
endeavor, he appears to have been as unwilling as he was
unable to curb the excesses of his more zealous antiAmerican subordinates.^

By the end of 1915, then, relations

between the First Chief and the Wilson Administration had

9Carothers to Canova, March 7, 1916, SDR 812.00/20668;
Funston to Newton D. Baker, June 7, 1916, Foreign Relations,
1916, 568-569; Charles C. Cumberland, "Border Raids on the
Lower Rio Grande Valley - 1915," Southwestern Historical
Quarterly, LVI (1954) , 298, 308-309 (hereafter cited as
"Border Raids," SHQ).
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already begun to sour.

Early the following year, a vengeful

Villa administered the coup de grace to the short-lived
reconciliation between Washington and the government of
Venustiano Carranza.

III.
The causes of friction between the United States and
Mexico during the immediate post-recognition period were
manifold.

One, however, was paramount - the failure, for

whatever reason, of the Constitutionalist Government to
restore order in northern Mexico.

The weakness or culpa

bility of that government, in turn, seriously exacerbated
three highly volatile Mexican-American disputes:

the first

stemming from the bizarre Plan of San Diego; the second,
from the sanguinary Yagui Indian uprising in the states of
Sonora and Sinaloa; and the third, from the depredations of
Pancho Villa on both sides of the Rio Grande.

By the spring

of 1916, none of the aforementioned disputes, each in its
own way a potential casus belli, had been settled.

A new

Mexican-American crisis of major proportions was in the
making.
The movement engendered by the Plan of San Diego was
perhaps the most dangerous and potentially explosive of all
Mexican-American disputes during the Carranza era.

Cutting
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across regional and factional lines, the movement apparently
enjoyed widespread popular support throughout much of the
Mexican n a t i o n . ^

For large numbers of Mexican patriots on

both sides of the Rio Grande it was a veritable crusade, the
long-awaited opportunity to settle a lengthy list of griev
ances against the Colossus of the North.

Although initially

favored by the First Chief and enthusiastically endorsed by
many of his subordinates, the plan was not of Constitu
tionalist origin. ^

Certainly it was never acknowledged

as official policy of the Constitutionalist Government,
quite the contrary ,.-^ Nonetheless, the movement could not

^ Conq. Rec., 64 Cong., 1 sess., 1916, LIII, 4847;
Funston to the Adjutant General, October 28, 1915, SDR
812.00/16667; Carothers to Canova, March 7, 1916, SDR 812.00/
20668; Testimony of L. C. Hill, January 22, 1920, IMA, 1263;
Testimony of S. C. Kile, January 22, 1920, Ibid., 1247.
Kile, a captain in the United States Army, was a military
intelligence officer assigned to Southern Department Head
quarters at Fort Sam Houston, Texas,
He was called upon to
verify a published account of the 1915-1916 border distur
bances as presented in Frank Cushman Pierce's A Brief
History of the Lower Rio Grande Valley.
■^Funston to Baker, June 7, 1916, Foreign Relations,
1916. 568-569; Randolph Robertson to Lansing, June 9, 1916,
Ibid., 570.
Robertson, a Texan was appointed Vice-Consul
at Monterrey in December, 1915. From August to December,
1916, he was on special assignment in Washington with the
Division of Mexican Affairs. In September, 1918, he was
appointed Vice-Consul at Nuevo Laredo. Register, 1918, 156.
^Arredondo to Wilson, September 6, 1915, Foreign
Relations, 1915, 807-808; Arredondo to Lansing, October 6,
1915, Ibid., 814; New York Times, September 8 and 14, 1915.
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have survived without the sympathy and assistance of
Carrancista officials in northern Mexico.

In time, however,

the First Chief was embarrassed by the San Diego revolution
and sought to suppress it.

He was not immediately successful.

The demise of the movement was due ultimately to its obvious
futility and to the vigorous countermeasures adopted by both
American and Constitutionalist authorities on both sides of
the international boundary.
The circumstances surrounding the promulgation of
the Plan of San Diego, a fifteen-point blueprint for revo
lution, were not at all auspicious.

The document itself

was drafted and signed on January 6, 1915.

The signatories

were nine obscure Huertista veterans, all imprisoned in
Monterrey for a variety of political offenses against the
Constitutionalist Government.

The name of the plan, in

turn, derived from the prospective headquarters of the move
ment, a tiny rural community located some one hundred miles
north of the border in Duval County, Texas.
In accord with the Monterrey statement, on February
20, 1915, partisans of the plan were to "rise in arms against
the Government and country of the United States . . . ."

^Robertson to Lansing, June 9, 1916, Foreign
Relations, 1916, 570.
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They were to proclaim both "the liberty of the black race1'
from "Yankee tyranny" and the "independence and segregation"
of the following states:

Texas, New Mexico, Arizona,

Colorado, and Upper California — all of which had been stolen
from the Mexican Nation by "North American imperialism."
Revolutionary chiefs, waging a "war without quarter," were
to seize "by whatever means possible" the arms and funds of
certain predesignated Southwestern cities.

Prisoners, mili

tary and civilian alike, were to be "shot without pretext."
So, too, were all North American males over sixteen years
of age.

Upon seizure of the aforementioned states, the con

quered territory was to be reorganized as an independent
republic.

Union with Mexico, "if thought expedient," might

then be considered .^
Having completed the initial stage of the plan, the
revolutionists were to proceed to their secondary objective—
independence for American Negroes and the establishment of
a black republic.

The Negro state was to be contiguous with

the San Diego republic and was to consist of six western
states wrested from the North American Union.

Common cause

was also to be made with the Apaches of Arizona and with

14Cong. Rec., 64 Cong., 1 sess., 1916, L I U .

4848.
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other Southwestern tribes, and their ancestral lands returned
to them.
tion.

Japanese, too, were to receive special considera

Under no circumstances, the statement concluded, was

the revolutionary party to accept aid, "either moral or
pecuniary," from the incumbent government of Mexico.

Nor

was that government to consider itself under any obligation
to intervene on behalf of the movement.^-5
Almost immediately the Plan of San Diego became
known to American authorities.

In mid-January, 1915, Basilio

Ramos, secretary of the movement and one of the original
signatories, was arrested as an illegal entrant at McAllen,
Texas.-1-6

In his possession were a copy of the plan, a code,

and a pass through the Constitutionalist lines signed by the
Carrancista commander at Matamoros, General Emiliano
Nafarrate ,^

Taken before the United States Commissioner at

Brownsville, Ramos was bound over to await the action of the
Federal grand jury.

On May 13, that body returned seditious

15Ibid.
16Robertson to Lansing, June 9, 1916, Foreign
Relations, 1916, 570.
17Testim©ny of Tom Mayfield, January 22, 1920, IMA,
1295. Mayfield, a Special Ranger and Hidalgo County, Texas,
deputy sheriff, was one of the arresting officers in the
Ramos case.
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conspiracy indictments against Ramos and the other signa
tories of the Plan of San Diego.1®

Inexplicably, the case

against Ramos was shortly dismissed.^

Although ostensibly

an exile from Mexico at the time of his arrest, Ramos re
crossed the border and was subsequently amnestied by
Constitutionalist authorities.

He was then "banqueted and

feted by Carrancista officials at Nuevo Leon, Monterrey, and
Tampico and proclaimed a great h e r o . "2°
Upon his return to Mexico, Ramos was joined by
Augustin Garza, another of the original conspirators and
commander of the incipient revolutionary army .21

Together

they moved at once to execute the Plan of San Diego.

Accord

ingly, late in May, a large band of armed Mexicans was dis
patched across the Rio Grande on what appears to have been

^ Conq. Rec.. 64 Cong., 1 sess., 1916, LIII, 4848;
Testimony of John A. Vails, January 22, 1920, IMA, 1210.
Vails, district attorney of the 49th judicial district of
Texas since 1902, prosecuted a number of San Diego revolu
tionaries captured during the Texas raids of June, 1916.
Ibid., 1203.
^Robertson to Lansing, June 9, 1916, Foreign
Relations, 1916, 570.
20lbid.; Testimony of Vails, IMA, 1205.
21Robertson to Lansing, June 9, 1916, Foreign Rela
tions , 1916, 570. Prior to his involvement in the Plan of
San Diego, Garza, a Texas Mexican and an American citizen,
had been a schoolteacher at San Diego, Texas. Upon sup
pression of the irredentist movement, he became an agent of
the Carrancista secret service. Testimony of Vails, IMA,
1210 .
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primarily a reconnaissance and recruiting mission .22

Texas

authorities expressed little concern over the incursion and
apparently failed to relate it to the intrigues of Basilio
Ramos.23

In

American Southwest the Plan of San Diego

had been dismissed as preposterous and rapidly forgotten.
In the words of New Mexico Senator Albert B. Fall:

"It was

so fantastic and struck every American as being so childish
and ridiculous that no one with ordinary intelligence be
lieved at the time that any responsible Mexican could be
cognizant of it, or at least could propose to assist in
carrying out the plan ."24
But Fall and others like him failed to comprehend
the intensity of anti-American sentiment among border
Mexicans, particularly among those residing in the Lower
Rio Grande Valley .23

in that district grievances against

the Anglo-American population generally and against state

22Testimony of Kile, IMA, 1243.
2 3 Cong. Rec., 64 Cong., 1 sess., 1916, LIII, 4847;
Cumberland, "Border Raids," SHQ, 291.

24Fall to Wilson, December 5, 1919, IMA, 843F.
^Frederick c. Turner, "Anti-Americanism in Mexico,
1910-1913," HAHR, XLVII (November, 1967), 502-505; Cumber
land, "Border Raids," SHQ, 286-287; Testimony of Hill, IMA,
1262-1263; New York Times, June 3 and August 31, 1915.

369
law-enforcement agents in particular were long-standing and
for the most part legitimate.

Moreover, the passions aroused

by revolutionary propaganda, intensified by the seizure and
occupation of Veracruz and sustained by an interminable suc
cession of minor incidents along the border, could not be
contained indefinitely.

It was inevitable that sooner or

later the pent-up bitterness of the border-dwellers would
explode in violence north of the Rio Grande.

What is truly

remarkable about the San Diego uprising is not that it
actually occurred but that it was so long in coming.
Early in the summer of 1915, another irredentist
movement was started by two Texas Mexicans, Luis de la Rosa
and Aniceto Pisano.

2g

Both were former residents of Cameron

County, Texas, where the former had been a deputy sheriff at
Rio Hondo and the latter a highly respected and "well fixed"
rancher "related to a number of the leading Mexican residents
of southwest Texas."2^

In its immediate objective, "libera

tion" of the territory between the Nueces and the Rio Grande

2®Robertson to Lansing, June 9, 1916, Foreign
Relations, 1916, 570.
2 ^Ibid.;

Testimony of Hill, IMA, 1263. Hill, who
had leased his Los Tulitos ranch to Pisano for some fifteen
years prior to the border uprising, described the latter as
"honorable . . . high-class and as straight a Mexican citizen
as there was in that country." Ibid.
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rivers, the new movement differed significantly from the
more ambitious Plan of San Diego .2 8

its long-range ob

jectives, however, appear to have been identical with those
of the Monterrey conspirators.

By mid-summer, the two

groups were closely allied and, for all practical purposes,
had become one and the same.

Their respective leaders, in

turn, were in general agreement that the main effort of
their combined forces should be directed against the Lower
Rio Grande Valley .29

Thus was launched the so-called Texas

rebellion.
It was the logical move.

A large segment of the

preponderantly Mexican-American population of that district
was either totally disaffected or deeply dissatisfied with
Anglo-American political and economic ascendancy.

Several

of the more prominent leaders of the irredentist movement
and perhaps the majority of their following were themselves

2 ®Ibid., 1264; Funston to the Adjutant General,
October 22 and 28, 1915, SDR 812.00/16567 and /16667. The
raiders referred to themselves as the Army of Liberation
for Mexicans in Texas. New York Times, August 12, 1915.

29Robertson to Lansing, June 9, 1916, Foreign
Relations, 1916. 570-571; Cumberland, "Border Raids,"
SHQ, 291.
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Texas Mexicans .30

Thus they would be operating on familiar

ground and could anticipate the active collaboration or at
least the sympathetic neutrality of the majority of the in
habitants.

In that respect they do not appear to have been

disappointed .3 1

The critical factor, however, in the deci

sion to initiate the revolution in the south Texas counties
was the attitude of Carrancista officials in the adjacent
Mexican states of Tamaulipas and Nuevo Leon.
Apparently aware of the Plan of San Diego from the
very beginning, Constitutionalist authorities at Monterrey,
Matamoras, and Nuevo Laredo not only refused to suppress the
movement but gave it their wholehearted support .32

Evidence

30New York Times. August 12, 1915; Testimony of W. E.
Vann, January 23, 1920, IMA. 1296. Vann was Sheriff of
Cameron County, Texas during the border disturbances of 19151916; Testimony of Kile, Ibid., 1247.
^Testimony of Hill, Ibid., 1254, 1263.
32Robertson to Lansing, June 9, 1916. Foreign Rela
tions, 1916. 570-572; Testimony of R. L. Barnes, January 22,
1920, IMA, 1232-1234. Barnes, a major in the United States
Army, was chief intelligence officer for the Southern Depart
ment and had served in that capacity since receiving his
commission in the fall of 1917. Prior to that time, from
December, 1913 to October, 1917, he was head of the San
Antonio Division of the Justice Department's Bureau of
Investigation. His jurisdiction included the States of
Arizona, New Mexico, and Texas.
Ibid., 1231-1232. Obvi
ously, Barnes was in a position to know a great deal both
about developments along the border and within Mexico itself.
No one in the Wilson Administration was more advantageously
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indicates that during the late summer and early fall of 1915
and again in the spring and summer of 1916 those officials
provided not only sanctuary but invaluable material assistance to the San Diego revolutionaries.

Weapons, ammunition,

and horses were supplied by Carrancista commanders, and both
the Constitutionalist railways and telegraph service were
placed at their disposal .33

on more than one occasion

Carrancista officers and enlisted men escorted the revolu
tionaries across the border into the United States, partici
pated in their raids, and provided protective cover during
their withdrawals south of the Rio

G r a n d e . 3^

Almost all of

the strikes against the lower Texas counties in the summer
and fall of 1915 were organized and launched from territory
under the control of the aforementioned General Nafarrate.

placed to observe the course of the Revolution; nor did
anyone, excepting perhaps the staff of the Division of
Mexican Affairs, have access to such a wealth of information
on the internal affairs of Mexico.
^Testimonies of Barnes and Vails, Ibid., 1232-1234
and 1203, 1212-1214; Robertson to Lansing, June 9, 1916,
Foreign Relations, 1916, 570-571.
34New York Times. August 12 and September 5, 25, and
30, 1915; Alonzo B. Garrett to Lansing, June 11, 1916,
Foreign Relations, 1916, 573; Lansing to Rodgers, June 13,
1916, Ibid. 575; Garrett to Lansing, June 17, 1916, Ibid.,
576. Garrett had been United States Consul at Nuevo Laredo
since 1901.
Register, 1918, 112.

373
A close friend of both Pisano and de la Rosa, Nafarrate was
intensely anti-American and deeply involved in the Texas
rebellion .35

At the height of the disturbances along the

border, he is alleged to have publicly boasted that he would
personally "plant the Mexican flag on top of the Brownsville
Post Office . " 35
In addition to Nafarrate, there were other prominent
Constitutionalist officials, both in the Northeast and at
Carrancista headquarters itself, who actively supported the
Plan of San Diego.

Niceforo Zambrano, former Treasurer

General of the Constitutionalist Government and Governor of
the State of Nuevo Leon during the Texas rebellion, raised
both men and money for the movement .37

So, too, did General

Portunato Zuazua 38 and General Mario Mendez, chief of the
government telegraphic

s e r v i c e . 39

Generals Candido Aguilar

and Pablo Gonzalez were also alleged to have provided arms

35Robertson to Lansing, June 9, 1916, Foreign Rela
tions, 1916, 571; Punston to Baker, June 7, 1916, Ibid., 568.
35New York Times, August 12, 1915.
^Testimonies

Qf Barnes and Vails, IMA, 1232 and 1203.

38Testimony of Barnes, Ibid., 1232-1234.
35Testimony of Vails, Ibid., 1213.
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and money to the revolutionaries, the latter officer some
10,000 rifles and a large quantity of ammunition.4°

in

addition, a number of colonels and junior officers assigned
to Constitutionalist garrisons along the international
boundary provided logistical and in some instances tactical
support for the raiders .4 1

When in late summer, 1916, the

San Diego revolutionary forces were finally disbanded,
several of the leaders — some of whom were American citizens—
were given Constitutionalist commissions and "incorporated
into the Mexican army ."42

Unquestionably, then, the Texas

rebellion enjoyed something more than the limited clandes
tine support of a handful of anti-American zealots.
Carranza himself was fully cognizant of the Plan of
San Diego and took advantage of the movement to advance the
interests of the Veracruz regime .42

The First Chief,

Cumberland contends, was determined to win American recogni
tion for his government and was prepared to resort to "any

4 0 Ibid.; Robertson to Lansing, June 9, 1916, Foreign
Relations, 1916,**572.

41Lansing to Rodgers, June 13, 1916, Ibid., 575;
Garrett to Lansing, June 17, 1916, Ibid., 576; New York Times,
September 25 and 30, 1915.
42TestiAony of Barnes, IMA, 1233. De la Rosa and
Pisano, both American citizens, were cases in point. Ibid.;
Bundy to the Adjutant General, November 26, 1915, SDR 812.00/
16890.
42Carothers to Canova, March 7,1916,SDR 812.00/20668.
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means at his disposal" to obtain that end .44

The distur

bances along the border "fitted in well" with his plans.
Carranza viewed the unrest as a "means of applying pressure"
on the Wilson Administration .45

On the other hand, Cumberland

questions whether or not the First Chief actually encouraged
Nafarrate .46

It is a moot point.

Simply by failing to

restrain the General and other supporters of the Texas rebel
lion, Carranza implicitly approved their activities; explicit
encouragement was unnecessary.
Carranza's tolerance of the Lower Valley raids was a
shrewd calculated risk.

He was well aware both of the

President's strong aversion to further intervention in Mexico
and of the intense pressure to intervene which the raids
would ultimately bring to bear upon the White House.

Gam

bling on Wilson's forebearance, the First Chief convincingly

4 4 Cumberland,

"Border Raids," SHQ, 298.

4 5 Ibid.
In the Lower Rio Grande Valley that fact was
recognized by Mexicans and Americans alike. According to one
irate American border-dweller:
"The belief is universal
among the Mexicans that they have bluffed the United States
into recognizing Carranza, that the wholesale murder of
Americans and destruction of American property has forced
the United States to accept the so-called Carranza Government,"
H. L. Yates to Lansing, October 19, 1915, SDR 812.00/16523.

46Cumberland, "Border Raids," SHQ, 298.
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protested his innocence and insisted "that he could not
cope properly with the raiders as long as there was no
legally recognized government in Mexico . " 47
tion was clear:

His implica

recognition of the Veracruz regime would

be attended by dispersal of the raider bands and the re
storation of order along the border.
Actually, Carranza could have halted the raids at
any time "had he made the effort in cooperation with
American officials."4®

Indeed, shortly after Pan-American

recognition of the Constitutionalist Government, the raids
all but ceased.

That fact, Cumberland concludes, "indicates

quite clearly" that the First Chief had deliberately con
doned the Plan of San Diego and had used that movement as
an "instrument of policy" in hastening recognition of the
Veracruz regime.4®

IV.
The initial Mexican reconnaissance of May, 1915, was
followed by further probes in July.

At least twice those

4 7 Ibid.
See, for example, Arredondo to Lansing,
September 6 , 1915, Foreign Relations, 1915, 808.
4 ^Cumberland,

"Border Raids," SHQ, 308.

4®Ibid.- Robertson to Lansing, June 9, 1916, Foreign
Relations, 1916, 572.
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forays culminated in sharp clashes between the intruders
and local Anglo-American

p o s s e s ,

5°

Then, early in August,

there was a virtual "invasion of Texas,"51

on the sixth

of that month, a large band of raiders, many of them former
residents of the Brownsville area, struck Sebastian, Texas,
looting the settlement and kidnapping and executing the
president of the local Law and Order League .52

The fol

lowing day, far to the west, a large party of Mexicans
crossed the border near Duguesne, Arizona, and made off with
hundreds of head of cattle and horses.53

Meanwhile, in the

scrub country around Brownsville, civilian posses, Texas
Rangers, and elements of the Twelfth Cavalry repeatedly made
contact with parties of armed Mexicans.
sides mounted.

Casualties on both

On August 8 , another band of thirty to fifty

raiders fell upon the Las Norias Ranch, some sixty miles
north of Brownsville, and a day-long battle ensued .54

Two

5®Testimony of Kile, IMA, 1243; New York Times, July 6 ,
7, and 9, 1915.
5iC o n g . Rec., 64 Cong., 1 sess., 1916, LIII, 4847.
52New York Times, August 7, 1915.
^ 3 Ibid., August 8 , 1915.
54Ibid., August 9, 1915; Testimony of Kile, IMA, 1244.
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days later, in pursuit of the Norias raiders, the first
American soldier was killed.
On August 11, Texas Governor James E. Ferguson ap
pealed to the President for reenforcements.

Conditions

along the border were "perilous and grave," he declared:
"Every twelve hours a loss of life or wounding of American
citizens occurs.

Texas citizens have been murdered. Post

Offices have been robbed, and rangers and soldiers have
been killed within the last week."

The offenders were

"mostly Mexicans from across the border," the Governor
charged, although some were undoubtedly American citizens.
Ferguson feared that he could not long control the situation.
"I do not overdraw the picture," he closed, "when I say that
a reign of terror exists on the Mexican border and that any
unusual occurrence now would cause a disastrous invasion of
Texas from Mexico."5^
Reports from the border tended to corroborate the
Governor's statement.

General Frederick Funston, commander

5% e w York Times. August 11, 1915.
5 ®Ibid., August 12, 1915.
Conditions in the Lower
Valley in August, 1915, were "veryi.bad indeed," according to
a contemporary witness, Cameron County Deputy Sheriff Mike
Monohan:
"People felt unsafe- except in our . . . biggest
towns, all the little towns were being crowded by soldiers
and by civilian posses, . . . people were moving, and dis
satisfied and it was about as fierce as you could expect."
Testimony of Mike Monohan, January 22, 1920, IMA, 1266.
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of the Southern District, confirmed the existence of the Plan
of San Diego and reported that for some time Texas Mexicans
had been spreading the plan on both sides of the Rio Grande.
His intelligence indicated that the rash of raids in Cameron,
Hidalgo, Starr, and Willacy counties was being directed by
partisans of the plan with headquarters located in Browns
ville itself.5?
Unconfirmed reports from other official sources
revealed that since the first of the month numerous bands
of thirty to forty armed Mexicans had crossed into Texas.
Furthermore, many of the men were believed to be Constitu
tionalist soldiers from the Matamoros garrison of General
Nafarrate.

There no longer appeared to be any doubt as to

their objective:

preposterous as it seemed, it was indeed

the conquest of south Texas and possibly the entire South
western United States.5®
Meanwhile, in Laredo, "loyal" Mexican-Americans were
warning officials there that "a dangerous sentiment had been
fomented among Mexicans across the border."

It was due, they

explained, to the "alleged harm done to Mexico by the failure

57wew York Times, August 12, 1915.
58ibid.
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of the United States to recognize Carranza."

It was their

opinion that "it needed only a good opportunity for this
sentiment to break into violence against the American border."
Taking no chances, Federal and State authorities maintained
a close watch along the Rio Grande for a considerable dis
tance above and below Brownsville .59
For the most part their efforts were fruitless.
Strong parties of raiders continued to cross and recross the
Lower Rio Grande almost at will.

They struck repeatedly at

rural settlements, isolated ranches, and railroad and tele
graph facilities.

Running fights between the intruders and

cavalrymen or civilian posses were almost daily occurrences
throughout the months of August and September.

Consequently,

many ranches and outlying settlements in the southermost
Texas counties were virtually abandoned by the Anglo-American
population, the men joining posses and their families going
to Corpus Christi or other havens to the north for the dura
tion of the disturbances .50

The rural Mexican-American

community did not fare so well.

Caught between the demands

5 9 Ibid.
6 0 Ibid.,

August 24, 1915; Testimony of W. B. Hinkly,
January 21, 1920, IMA, 1183? Cumberland, "Border Raids,"
SHQ, 301-302.
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of the raiders on one hand and the indiscriminate vengeance
of their Anglo-American neighbors on the other, large numbers
fled to Matamoros and Nuevo Laredo, thereby exacerbating the
already virulent anti-American sentiment on the south bank
of the Rio Grande. ^
Tension soon gripped west Texas as well.

On August

11, some 300 men in Carrancista uniforms crossed the river
above Del Rio and burned a strategic railroad bridge near
Langtry, Texas . 62

days later, another party struck the

settlement of Polvo, just east of El Paso, calling the
Postmaster to his door and shooting him down before his
family . 6 3

Thus, by mid-August, Governor Ferguson's con

tention that a "reign of terror" existed along the border
was by no means an exaggeration.
Despite knowledge of the Plan of San Diego, Federal
officials in Washington and on the border were at a loss to

6 ^Ibid., 300-302; New York Times, September 3 and 7,
1915; Testimony of J. I. Kleiber, January 23, 1920, IMA,
1278-1279. Kleiber, a resident of Brownsville, Texas, had
been district attorney of the 28th judicial district of Texas
since 1894. He was one of several Americans killed or criti
cally wounded by members of De la Rosa's band in the hold-up
of a passenger train near Brownsville on October 18, 1915.
Ibid., 1269-1274.

62New York Times, August 12, 1915.
6 3Ibid., August 15, 1915.
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explain the disturbances .64

For Wilson and Lansing, then

engaged in highly sensitive negotiations for a compromise
settlement of the Mexican civil war, the matter was ex
tremely unsettling.

By early August, it had become apparent

that the Constitutionalists, if not Carranza himself, would
soon dominate the greater part of the republic.

It was

equally clear that the Veracruz regime was the only faction
qualifying for recognition, and that sooner or later
Washington would have to acknowledge that fact.

Yet from

the very beginning of the Texas rebellion it had been per
sistently rumored that prominent Carrancista officials and
perhaps even the First Chief himself stood behind the move
ment.

por the Wilson Administration it was indeed a

perturbing situation.
On August 14, it became still more so.

On that date,

General Funston, theretofore convinced that the disturbances
were almost wholly the work of Texas Mexicans, met with a
committee headed by Congressman John Nance Garner of Texas
to examine new evidence shedding light on the causes of the

®^Ibid., August 12, September 26, and October 23,
1915; Cumberland "Border Raids," SHQ, 292-293.
65New York Times, August 12 and 15, 1915.

383
rebellion.

Funston emerged from the meeting convinced that

the uprising "had been fostered by Mexican authorities."
Affidavits submitted to the War Department indicated that
General Nafarrate was both encouraging and actively as
sisting the raiders and that "a date had actually been set
by the Mexicans for the sacking of

B r o w n s v i l l e . "66

The same

day, a War Department press release revealed "that a consi
derable portion" of the party that struck Las Norias Ranch
on August 8 had been "officers and soldiers of Carranza's
forces."

It was assumed, however, that they had acted with-

out the "authority of their chiefs."
indignant Arredondo hotly denied the

67

In Washington, an

charge.**8

By mid-August, the situation on the border had be
come very ugly.

On the night of the 14th, a serious riot

erupted in the streets of Nogales, Arizona, when a group of
Mexicans attempted to disarm American soldiers.

One soldier

was killed in the melee, and an aroused mob of Anglo-Americans
forced some 200 Mexicans to flee across the boundary.

Spokes

man for the crowd demanded that "all Mexicans" be driven out
of the country .**9

6 *Ibid.,
6 7 Ibid.

August 15, 1915.
6 ®Ibid.

6 9 Ibid.
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South of the border feelings were equally high, and
with good cause.

For days, cavalry patrols, Texas Rangers'

and other law enforcement officers had been systematically
disarming Mexican-American residents in the embattled
southern counties.

The Rangers, in particular, seem to have

gone about their task with excessive zeal; so much so, in
fact, that scores of Mexican-American families fled the
State of T e x a s . F u r t h e r m o r e , following the Las Norias
raid, certain Rangers were photographed dragging the bodies
of Mexicans behind their horses.

Almost immediately the

photographs reappeared in the form of postcards and were
widely circulated throughout northern Mexico.

As a result,

American citizens in the interior of the republic were
threatened repeatedly by Carrancista soldiers outraged over
the alleged lynching and abuse of their countrymen north of
the b o r d e r . ^

7 0 Ibid.,

August 17 and September 7, 1915; Cumberland,
"Border Raids," SHQ. 301. One contemporary observer noted
that "the killing of Mexicans through the borderland in these
last four years is almost incredible. Some Rangers have
degenerated into common man-killers. There is no penalty for
killing, for no jury along the border would ever convict a
white man for shooting a Mexican." Ronald Atkin, Revolution;
Mexico 1910-20 -{New York: The John Day Company, 1969) , 272.
^ Hew York Times, August 17 and September 7, 1915.
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V.
On August 16, perhaps because o£ the aforementioned
incidents, the raiders changed their tactics.

Near Mercedes,

Texas, a band of some 100 Mexicans pursued and surrounded
a cavalry detachment, killing one soldier and wounding
several others .73

Thereafter, looting and the destruction

of property largely gave way to aggressive strikes against
Texas lawmen and the United States Army.

Although their

casualties rose sharply, the raiders persisted in those
attacks.

At the same time, overriding foreign policy con

siderations prompted officials in Washington to urge the
utmost restraint in suppressing the Texas rebellion.

The

Administration, Funston was advised, was /'making an earnest
effort" to compose the Mexican situation by "diplomatic
means."

The President, his superior informed him, "wishes

to impress upon you the necessity of exercising the greatest
moderation and caution . . . lest his plans of peaceful
solution be nullified by . . .

an armed conflict on the

border . " 73
The third week in August was marked by relative calm
in the south Texas counties.

7 2lbid.,

Near Lochiel, Arizona, however.

August 17, 1915.

73Breckenridge to Funston, August 17, 1915, Foreign
Relations, 1915, 803-804.
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cavalry units were fired upon by raiders who fell back into
territory controlled by Carrancista General P. E. Calles #74
Although unlike Nafarrate, Calles does not appear to have
actively supported the irredentist movement, he nonetheless
did nothing to discourage it.
Arizona continued . 76

Consequently raiding into

It did not, however, approach the

intensity of the campaign in the Lower Rio Grande Valley.
The following week, violence again erupted along the
Texas border.

Evidence of Carrancista participation was now

conclusive .76

Every day American soldiers patrolling the

Rio Grande drew fire from the opposite bank.
and wounded.

Men were killed

Mexican-American negotiations notwithstanding,

Washington could no longer afford to ignore the Texas rebel
lion.

On August 28, Lansing ordered the United States consul

at Matamoros to impress upon General Nafarrate the gravity

7^New York Times, August 21, 1915.
^Frederick simpich to Lansing, September 15, 1915,
Foreign Relations, 1915, 811. Simpich, a journalist with
experience in both Europe and Asia, joined the consular ser
vice in 1909. He served thereafter.as consul or vice-consul
in a succession.of Mexican posts. He was at Nogales from
November, 1912 through July, 1917. In the latter month, he
was assigned to Guaymas, Sonora. Register, 1918, 162.
76According to General Funston: Nafarrate "has taken
pains to leave (the) impression that these bands are deserters
from his forces. It is noticed, however, that when pursued,
they cross the river and rejoin their commends.w Lansing to
Silliman, August 28, 1915, Foreign Relations, 1915, 805.
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of the situation and to warn him that the matter "might
easily lead to most serious consequences ."77

It is doubtful,

however, whether at that moment Nafarrate or any other
Carrancista official on the border could have immediately
extinguished the rebellion.

By the end of August, the

movement had developed a powerful momentum of its own.

Its

supporters on both sides of the border were legion .78
Pressure upon Washington to take more effective
action to suppress the uprising steadily mounted.
Ferguson was particularly insistent.

Governor

He continued to call

for further Federal assistance and, upon the discovery of
a plot to seize El Paso, threatened to call out the Texas
National Guard.7^

Funston, too, expected more serious dis

turbances along the border .80

As if to confirm his fears,

the very day that he appealed to the War Department for
additional troops rioting broke, out in San Antonio.

Federal

77Lansing to Jesse H. Johnson, August 28, 1915,
Ibid., 802.
^8Funston to the Adjutant General, November 17, 1915,
SDR 812.00/16842;
Testimonies of Kile and Hill, IMA, 1247
and 1263; New York Times, August 12 and 31, 1915.
7 8 Ibid., August 25, 27, and 29, 1915.
The Army was
already in a strong position on the border with some 17,000
men under Funston's command. Ibid., August 12, 1915.

80punston to Garrison, August 30, 1915, Foreign
Relations, 1915, 806.
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and state authorities there subsequently announced the
frustration of a revolutionary uprising and the arrest of
twenty-six partisans of the Plan of San Diego.
The General was explicit:

"Owing to the great

preponderance of the Mexican over the American population
all along the border, to the excitable character of the
£

Mexicans and to the vengeful feeling that exists among
Americans due to the recent outrages committed by . . .
bands . . . composed partly of Mexican soldiers, the situ
ation . . .

is now likely to give rise to such serious

consequences that further delay is dangerous."

If a wide

spread uprising should occur without sufficient troops to
put it down, he warned, "it will mean the murder of hundreds
of defenseless people, the destruction of millions of prop
erty

and a loss of prestige."

A single "act of indiscretion

by a subordinate commander on either side [could] start a
conflagration that [would] extend along the entire border
and result in an international crisis."

He had been hesitant

to call for additional troops, the General explained, because
he hoped to avoid unnecessary expense."
economy," however, had passed.

The "time for

"More troops should be

8% e w York Times, August 31, 1915.

supplied regardless of expense.

Whatever action it may be

proposed to take,” he concluded, "should be taken at once ."82
For the moment, at least, the Wilson Administration could
do little more than it had already done to suppress the
rebellion.

Determined as ever to avoid intervention and

increasingly anxious since the discovery of Germany's Mexican
intrigue to regularize relations with the neighboring repub
lic, the President dared not risk a serious rupture with the
Veracruz regime.

Thus the Administration's response to con

tinuing unrest on the border was limited to strengthening
the forces under Funston's command and to requesting anew
the cooperation of Carrancista authorities in quelling the
Texas rebellion.
ineffective.

Those measures, however, proved largely

Although the former did result in higher

Mexican casualties, the latter brought nothing but empty
promises.

Neither appears to have had the slightest effect

in deterring the San Diego revolutionaries.
The month of September opened with an apparent
attempt to isolate Brownsville and other border communities.
On September 2, raiders led by Aniceto Pisano destroyed a
bridge and track on the St. Louis, Brownsville and Mexico

82punston to Garrison, August 30, 1915, Foreign
Relations, 1915, 806.

Railroad.

Two Anglo-American prisoners taken during the raid

were executed; a third, pretending to be a German citizen,
was released u n h a r m e d . T h e following day another bridge
was burned between Harlingen and the border, further iso
lating Brownsville and appearing to confirm American fears
that a large-scale invasion of south Texas was in the offing.®^
While bands of raiders renewed attempts to recruit Texas
Mexicans as far north as Duval County, Carrancista soldiers
in Matamoros repeatedly fired on American airplanes flying
over Brownsville and exchanged shots with troops guarding the
city's power p l a n t . T e n s i o n on the American side of the
border mounted daily.
On September 4, near Hidalgo, Texas, cavalrymen and
Rangers fought a major engagement with raiders and

8 ®New York Times, September 3, 1915; Testimony of
S. S. Dodds, January 22, 1920, IMA. 1250-1253. Dodds was
the surviving prisoner. Again, the question arises as to
the degree of German involvement in Mexican-American dif
ferences from early 1915 through the end of the First World
War. Cumberland notes that "there was a suggestion of proGerman motivation" in several of the border raids. Cumber
land, "Border Raids," SHOf 311n. His contention would appear
to be verified by Dodds' testimony and by that of Marcus Hines,
a mounted customs inspector and a participant in several
skirmishes with the raiders. Testimony of Marcus Hines,
January 23, 1920, XMA, 1311-1312.

®^New York Times, September 3, 1915.
8 5 Ibid.,

September 3 and 4, 1915; Lansing to Arredondo
September 10, 1915, Foreign Relations, 1915, 809-810.
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Carrancista soldiers along a two-mile stretch of the Rio
Grande.

Fearing that the anticipated invasion was at hand.

Colonel A. P. Blocksam, commander of the Brownsville garrison,
called out all troops at Fort Brown and sent them to the
river . 86

That same night, armed civilians in dozens of south

Texas settlements braced themselves for the shock.
came.

It never

Instead, Nafarrate recalled his men from the south

bank of the river and promised American authorities that they
would not again assist the raiders.8^

At the same time, he

lodged a bitter protest against the harsh treatment of MexicanAmericans by Rangers and other state law enforcement offi
cers . 88

In the future, he pledged, his men would not inter

fere with American soldiers patrolling the river.

Rangers

and civilian posse-men, however, were another matter; they
would be shot on sight .88
Despite Nafarrate*s admission that his men had been
involved in the clash of September 4, both Arredondo in
Washington and the First Chief himself continued to vigorously
deny Constitutionalist collusion in the Plan of San Diego.

86New York Tiroes, September 5, 1915.
8 ^Ibid.,

September 6 , 1915.

8 8 Ibid.,

September 7, 1915.

8 9 Ibid.,

September 14, 1915.

Texas Mexicans alone, they insisted, were responsible for
the border disturbances . 99

Meanwhile, taking Nafarrate at

his word, American authorities temporarily withdrew all
civilian lawmen from the Rio Grande.

At the same time, they

called upon the General to arrest and submit to them Pisano
and De las Rosa, both of whem resided in Matamoros and moved
freely about the city . 91
comply.

Nafarrate, however, refused to

Shortly thereafter the raids began anew.
On September 13, a cavalry patrol was attacked by

Mexican-Americans near Santa Maria, Texas.

A house-to-house

search subsequently conducted in and around the settlement
produced an alarming number of weapons .9 2

Soon it was

rumored and widely accepted by Anglo-Americans in the South
west that Mexican-Americans from Texas to California would
rise in revolt on September 16, the anniversary of Mexican
independence .93

Near panic swept the border .94

On the 14th,

in response to a mass meeting of the Anglo-American citizenry

"ibid., September 8 , 1915; Arredondo to Wilson,
September 6 , 1915, Foreign Relations, 1915, 807-808.
91Garrison to Lansing, September 13, 1915, Ibid., 810
New York Times, September 14, 1915.
9 2 Ibid.
9 4 Xbid.,

"ibid., September 15, 1915.
Cumberland, "Border Raids," SHQ, 302.
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of Tucson, troops from Fort Huachuca occupied that city for
the duration of the traditional independence celebration .95
The following day, Frederick Simpich, United States Consul
at Nogales, reported that "raids into Arizona" and the theft
of livestock by Villista and Carrancista troops alike had
sharply increased.

General Calles, he protested, refused

even to discuss the matter.

At the moment, civil authorities

alone were attempting to police the countryside and meeting
with little success.

Simpich urged that troops from the

Nogales garrison be used to supplement civilian patrols.
Unless "immediate action" was taken, he warned, "a situation
similar to that existing on the Texas border might soon
develop.
It was a grim prospect.

Throughout the Lower Rio

Grande Valley, Anglo-Americans were again organizing in armed
bands to put down the anticipated uprising.

Still more dis

turbing, abusive treatment of Mexican-Americans by state lawenforcement officers and local vigilantes had reached alarming
proportions.

For the first time, it was revealed in the

national press that a number of suspected raiders had been

95New York Times, September 15, 1915.
96Simpich to Lansing, September 15, 1915, Foreign
Relations, 1915, 811.
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summarily executed or shot "while attempting to escape."^
Nor, Cumberland observes, were the "lynchings and executions
the only indications of fear and vengeance."

Homes in which

raiders "purportedly held meetings" were burned by posses;
families of Latin extraction were forcibly disarmed; and
"self-appointed law-enforcers" coerced "Latin families in
outlying regions to move into populated centers where they
could be more effectively watched."
exodus" from south Texas.

The result was a "mass

Hundreds of Mexican-American

families crossed the border into Mexico, many never to return.
By the time that order was finally restored in the Lower
Valley, more than half of the region's population had fled
and the economy of the south Texas counties was "practically
ruined."®®
Meanwhile, as the fateful day approached, large
parties of Mexicans displaying the red banner of the San

®?New York Times, September 15, 1915; Testimony of
Kile, IMA, 1248*1249. According to Pierce, between August,
1915 and June, 1916, some 100 suspected raiders were executed
by Rangers and deputy sheriffs "without process of law."
Other authorities estimated the- number of summary executions,
to be as.high as 300. Ibid. Funston believed that more than
150 such killings had occurred by late October, 1915.
Cumberland, "Border Raids," SHQ, 303n.
^®Ibid., 300-302; Testimonies of Kile and Kleiber,
IMA, 1247 and 1279; Funston to the Adjutant General, November
4, 1915, SDR 812.00/16752.
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Diego Revolution were sighted along the south bank of the
Rio Grande.

Ominously, they were in the company of Carran*

cista soldiers."

Perhaps at no other time during the entire

period of unrest was tension on the border as high as it was
on the night of September 15.

Whether or not a general up

rising had indeed been planned to coincide with the celebra
tion of Mexican independence has never been determined.
Whatever the case, September 16 passed without incident.
The raids, however, continued.

So, too, did serious

confrontations between American soldiers and the men of
Nafarrate's command,

on September 17, cavalrymen and

Carrancista soldiers in Matamoros itself engaged in a twohour exchange of gunfire across the Rio G r a n d e . A week
later, a large party of raiders, including many in Carran
cista uniforms, struck Progreso, Texas, killing and wounding
a number of American soldiers.

Pursuing cavalrymen were

turned back from the riverfront by intense fire from several
hundred Mexicans entrenched on the south b a n k . 3- Funston

" New York Times, September 15, 1915.
100Funston to Garrison, September 17, 1915, Foreign
Relations, 1915, 812.
^Funston to the Adjutant General, September 24, 1915
SDR 812.00/16302; Testimony of Kile, IMA, 1245; New York Times,
September 25, 1915.
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and Garrison alike considered the Progreso raid and the
ensuing engagement to be the most serious provocation since
the disturbances along the border began.

The following day,

September 25, the Secretary of War announced his intention
to lay the matter before the Cabinet.
Following the Progreso strike, violence along the
border came to a "momentary halt; for the first time since
July a full week passed without a single raid or exchange
of shots."103

Nonetheless, rumors of an invasion from

Mexico again began to circulate throughout the south Texas
counties.

Funston responded by reinforcing Brownsville and

the other border posts.

For the first time, too, high-

ranking army officers on the border openly discussed the
possibility of pursuing raiders across the river into
Mexico.1®^
such a move.

The President, however, would not countenance
Instead, the Administration continued to

adhere to its original position:

The raiders were mostly

Texas Mexicans, the Veracruz regime was not involved in the
disturbances, and Washington would continue to rely upon

1 0 2 Ibid.

■

1

*® 2 Cumberland, "Border JRaids,” SHQ, 299.
104New York Times, September 29, 1915.
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that government for assistance in restoring order on the
Lower Rio G r a n d e . W i l s o n still hesitated to force the
issue.
There were sound reasons for the President's forebearance.

On September 13, four days before the Progreso

raid, Wilson and Lansing had finally agreed to extend recog
nition to the Veracruz regime and to accept Carranza as its
head.

Two days later that decision was reaffirmed when the

British Government revealed to officials in Washington full
details of the Huerta-Rintelen scheme.

There existed, how

ever, both within and without the Wilson Administration,
a strong and determined opposition to recognition.

Public

acknowledgement of a serious dispute with Veracruz, to say
nothing of a clash of arms with Constitutionalist forces,
would embolden that opposition and almost certainly enable
it to frustrate or delay the reestablishment of normal rela
tions with Mexico.

Furthermore, the Administration's new

policy would remain in jeopardy until its adoption and
execution by the governments of the other Pan-American
conferees.

Until such time, then, it was expedient for

Washington to minimize the gravity of the situation on the

105Ibid.
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border.

Unquestionably, high Administration officials

sought to do just that.
difficult task.

It proved, however, to be a most

The initiative belonged to the raiders.

VI.
On September 29, equivocation in Washington suddenly
ceased.

On that date, the War Department received a shock

ing report from the border.

According to the affidavit of

a captured raider, on the night of September 23 a Carrancista
officer and a detachment of troops from Matamoros had attacked an American patrol at Los Peladoes crossing.

One

American soldier had been killed and another seized and
taken to the south bank of the Rio Grande.

There the captive

was executed, his ears and head cut off, and his body thrown
into the river.10®

Unconfirmed reports indicated that the

head of the deceased was subsequently placed on a pole and
paraded through the rural settlements between Reynosa and
M a t a m o r o s . I t was precisely the sort of inflammatory
incident that Wilson and Lansing dreaded.
Indignant and angry, Acting Secretary of State Frank
L. Polk immediately protested the atrocity.

Special Agent

106Testimony of Mayfield, IMA, 1288-1289; Polk to
Belt, October 1, 1915, Foreign Relations, 1915, 812-813.
^•^New York Times, September 30, 1915
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J. W. Belt, then assigned to Carranza's headquarters, was
instructed to deliver Polk's rebuke and to impress upon
Carrancista officials the seriousness of the incident.
The Veracruz regime, Polk declared, had repeatedly professed
to control the Northeast.

Because of that fact the Govern

ment of the United States could not view such "outrages” as
other than acts in which the soldiers had participated
voluntarily or "because of instructions from headquarters."
In either case, he charged, the responsibility rested upon
the First Chief.108
Expanding his indictment of Carrancista involvement
in the border disturbances, Polk cited the recent heavy flow
of ammunition from Monterrey to the small garrison at
Matamoros.

That traffic was inexplicable "when the movement

of supplies had invariably been" in the opposite direction,
and was a circumstance which had "serious bearing on the
case."

In closing, Polk demanded that Carrancista authorities

10®Polk to Belt, October 1, 1915, Foreign Relations,
1915, 813. Belt, trained as* an attorney, entered government
service in 1907 as a deputy collector of customs in the Canal
Zone. From July, 1914 through October, 1916, he was employed
by the Department of State as a special agent in Mexico. From
the latter month through January, 1917, he was assigned to
the Department of State in Washington, presumably to the
Division of Mexican Affairs. Thereafter, he held a succession
of minor diplomatic posts in Central and South America.
Register, 1918, 86.
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order an immediate halt to such "reprehensible acts" as the
Los Pelados incident.

Failure to do so# he declared, would

"imply total lack of authority in a section long claimed to
be under the complete control of the Carrancistas."109
There was no mistaking his meaning:

if the First Chief

could not maintain order on the south bank of the Rio Grande,
the United States would be obliged to do so.
Significantly, following the strong American protest
of October 1, incidents along the border ceased as suddenly
as they had begun.

By that date, it was an open secret that

American recognition of the Veracru 2 regime was imminent.
For Carranza, at least, the raids had served their purpose
and now became a definite liability.

Accordingly, on or

about October 3, the First Chief replaced Nafarrate and his
entire c o m m a n d . T h e new commander at Matamoros, General
Eugenio Lopez, "had no strong feelings against the United
States and was apparently willing" to cooperate fully with
American authorities in halting the raids.

Moreover, Lopez*

lO^Polk to Belt, October 1, 1915, Foreign Relations,
1915, 813.
I*-0Cumber land, "Border Raids," SHQ, 302. According
to Philip C. Hanna, the American Consul-General at Monterrey,
Carranza himself had sent General Jacinto B. Trevino to
Matamoros to "set Nafarrate right." Hanna to Lansing,
October 6, 1915, SDR 812.00/16469.
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command "consisted primarily of enlisted men from southern
Mexico (in contrast to Nafarrate's men, who were native to
the border)."

Within days of the change, it was learned

that Lopez1 men had forced the raiders to withdraw from the
river and to retreat into the interior.

American autho

rities on the border were elated.
On October 9, Lansing announced the decision £>f the
Pan-American conferees to extend recognition to the Veracruz
regime.

For the more enthusiastic partisans of the Plan of

San Diego, particularly for those among them who were citi
zens of the United States, the announcement came as a bitter
disappointment.

The reestablishment of formally amicable

relations between the United States and Mexico meant the
loss of sanctuary, the imminent withdrawal of all Constitu
tionalist support, and an effective end to the Texas rebel
lion.

Their dream of an independent Mexican-American

republic shattered and the very existence of their organi
zation in jeopardy, the San Diego revolutionaries pursued
the one course left open to them.

Unquestionably acting

alone and in defiance of higher Carrancista authorities,
they renewed their raids into Texas in hope of undoing the

lllCumberland, "Border Raids," SHQ, 303
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recently concluded Mexican-American rapproobeaent.
On the night of October 18, Luis de la Rosa and a
band composed largely of Texas Mexicans derailed and looted
a passenger train between San Benito and Brownsville, Indi
cating to the passengers that they were Carrancistas, the
raiders shot down three unarmed American soldiers and
several Anglo-American civilians.

Persons of Latin ex

traction were not h a r m e d . S h o r t l y after the band's
departure, a posse under Cameron County Sheriff J. E. Vann
arrived at the site of the wreck.

As soon as Vann himself

had left in pursuit of De la Rosa, remaining possemen exe
cuted a young Mexican-American passenger on suspicion of
having assisted the raiders.

His death was followed by

that of another Mexican-American reputed to be a friend of
the f i r s t . o t h e r

retaliatory acts occurred during the

night, some of them far from the site of the raid.

Four

Mexican-Americans were hanged to trees along the river and
four others were shot to death in the same vicinity.
According to the New York Times, Anglo-American posses were
responsible for the lynchings, and possemen "made no secret"

H 2Testimony of Kleiber, IMA, 1269-1274; New York
Times, October 19, 1915.
^ 2Ibid., October 20, 1915.
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of the fact that an identical fate awaited all other
"suspected bandits."

Only in the Brownsville jail were sus

pects secure from the wrath of the aroused Anglo-American
community.

It was the reporter's opinion that few if any

Mexican prisoners taken in the Lower Valley would ever reach
that haven alive.**4
On October 21, raiders struck again, attacking a
cavalry patrol near Ojo de Agua.

Three American soldiers

were killed and several others wounded. **5, Funston "was
beside himself with anger and frustration."-*-*6

The following

day, he reported to Garrison that De la Rosa had been seen
on the streets of Reynosa on the 20th and that Carrancista
authorities had made no attempt to arrest him.1*7

The

initial enthusiasm for Nafarrate-1s replacement at Matamoros
had turned to "gloomy pessimism."**6

It was "increasingly

**4Ibid.
115

Ibid., October 22, 1915; Testimony of Kile, IMA,
1246; Funston to the Adjutant General, October 22, 1915,
SDR 812.00/16567.
116Cumberland, "Border Raids," SHQ, 304.
**7Garrison to Lansing, October 22, 1915, Foreign
Relations, 1915, 815-816.
**®Cumberland, "Border Raids," SHQ, 304.
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evident," Funston concluded, that his commanders on the
border could "expect no help" from General Lopez.
Accordingly, Funston was prepared to adopt drastic
measures to halt the raids.

He would completely close the

Lower Valley to "all intercourse with Mexico."

Bloodhounds

would be employed to track down raiders, thereby making it
"almost certain death" to participate in such forays.

The

General also sought authorization to pursue raiders across
the river into Mexico and "to order 'no quarter' for the
enemy."

Funston's superiors, Cumberland observes, were "not

only startled?" they were "aghast."
refused the General's requests.

Garrison unequivocally

Instead, he dispatched

additional reinforcements to the border.

By late October,

"practically all the armed forces available for duty" had
been ordered to the Rio Grande.
Lansing, meanwhile, had responded to Funston"s dis
tress by demanding that Carranza immediately issue "positive
orders to his commander at Matamoros to disperse the raiders
and apprehend Luis de la Rosa.l^l

At the same time, the

119Garrison to Lansing, October 22, 1915, Foreign
Relations, 1915, 816.
120Cumberland, "Border Raids," S H Q , 304-305.
121

Lansing to Belt, October 23, 1915, Foreign
Relations, 1915, 816.
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President authorized Attorney-General Thomas Gregory to send
a large squad of Justice Department agents to the border to
determine "the real cause and origin of the disturbances. "■*•2 2
Publicly, however, Administration spokesmen continued to
disclaim Carrancista complicity in the raids*

Officials in

Washington, the New York Times reported on October 23, "are
convinced that the Carranza authorities have no connection
with the disturbances and are anxious to step them."

Indeed,

it was believed "that influences on the American side of the
line . . . had much to do with a conspiracy to cause
trouble."123

yjho or

what those "influences" were, the

journal did not reveal.
Having finally obtained formal Pan-American recogni
tion for his government on October 19, Carranza w a s 'indeed
anxious to terminate the Texas rebellion.12^

Accordingly,

he assured Lansing that he would "personally investigate"
the situation on the border.

Troops that were "inclined to

make trouble" would be replaced with "reliable soldiers."

122New York Times. October 23, 19.15; See also Testi
mony of Barnes, IMA, 1234.
*23New York Times, October 23, 1915.
124

Robertson to Lansing, June 9, 1916. Foreign
Relations, 1916, 572.
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In addition, he revealed, secret service agents had been
ordered to cooperate with military authorities in arresting
and punishing Luis de la Rosa and other known raider-..125
Lansing, in turn, sought to reduce the sources of
friction on the American side of the line.
in time.

He acted just

Anglo-American response to the latest raid;; in the

Lower Valley had been "prompt and vehement. 125

A worried

Colonel Blocksam reported from Erownsville that the citizens
of that city were "seriously considering pursuing thn raiders
into Mexico."

An organization of south Texes ranchers ap

pealed to both state and federal officials

-iirst for author

ization to cross the border and second for the imposition
of martial law in the beleaguered counties.

Still more

alarming, Texas Senator Morris Sheppard, "after a personal
investigation of conditions on the border, found evidence
of an impending 'race' war."12^

125eelt to Lansing, November 1, 1915, Foreign
Relations, 1915, 818.
125Cumberland, "Border Raids," SHQ, 305.
1^^Ibid.; Sheppard to Lansing, November 4, 1915,
SDR 812.00/16700. Funston, too, was concerned:
"The wide
use of arms by white citizens and the extreme difficulty of
the civil authorities supervising their use* leading to
personal aggression, revenge and terrorism by white upon
Mexican citizens, are certainly complicating the situation
. . . There is unquestionably a growing separation and
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Lansing did not mince words.

Governor Ferguson was

urged to use his influence with state and county officials
to allay "race prejudice" and restrain "indiscreet conduct.1'
The officials and residents of the Lower Valley, Lansing
charged, had seriously embarrassed the Wilson Administration
through their irresponsible behavior.

They should be made

to "realize the responsibility” which they had "unconsciously
imposed upon the National Government by tthoirl

failure" to

appreciate the "seriousness of the situation."*28

In short,

lynchings, vigilantism, and the indiscriminate abuse of the
Mexican-American population must cease at once.
Although Carranza did not fully adhere to his pledge
to Lansing, he did temporarily suppress the activities of
the San Diego revolutionaries.

The last serious strikes

for many months against the south Texas counties occurred
on October 25 and 29.*28

On the latter date, troops from

distrust between white and Mexican races. Some intelligent
citizens of Mexican blood are beginning to realize that
existing conditions in this district cannot probably last
a great deal longer without resulting in a race war . . .
Funston to the Adjutant General, November 4, 1915, SDR
812.00/16752.
128Lansing to Ferguson, October 30, 1915, Foreign
Relations. 1915, 817.
129New York Times, October 26 and 30, 1915
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General Lopez* command fought a pitched battle with raiders
near Matamoros, killing fifteen and driving the remainder
from the field.130

Early in November, municipal officials

in Reynosa "organized a force of rurales . . . and within
three days their activities had driven many bandits from
the border."13*

Deprived of vital Carrancista logistical

support and confronted with the aggressive opposition of
new field commanders unsympathetic to their cause, the San
Diego partisans dispersed.
Late in November, Carranza himself came to the
border.

Conferring with both Governor Ferguson and Colonel

Blocksam, he assured them that no further disturbances in
the Lower Valley would emanate from the Mexican side of the
line.132

Shortly thereafter. General Alfredo Ricaut.t "who

had a reputation for friendliness to the United States,"
replaced Lopez as commandant of the Northeastern military
district.

"During the succeeding months," Cumberland notes,

"Ricaut lived up to his reputation by dispersing several
potential raider bands . . . ,"123

l30Ibid., October 30, 1915.
13Cumberland, "Border Raids," SHQ,307;Funston to the
Adjutant General,. November 17, 1915,SDR 812.00/16842.
132New York Times, November 21 and December 1, 1915.
Cumberland, "Border Raids," SHQ, 307-308.
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Nafarrate, meanwhile, was transferred to Tampico,
there to vent his xenophobia on American and other foreign
oilmen.-1-34

Accompanying him were Pisano, Oe la Rosa, and

an undetermined number of erstwhile raiders.I 35

His pledges

to Lansing and Ferguson notwithstanding, Carranza had no in
tention of delivering those capable and experienced guerrilla
leaders to American authorities.136

Given the uncertainty

of future Mexican-American relations, such men might again
prove useful.

And indeed they did.

Although for some time,

relative calm prevailed along the Lower Rio Grande, the
movement engendered by the Plan of San Diego did not expire.
Dormant throughout the winter months, it flared anew in the
spring and summer of 1916 .137

3,34Testimony of Buckley, IMA, 833-835.
^•35Funston to Baker, June 7, 1916.Foreign Relations#
1916, 568; Testimony of Barnes, IMA, 1233.
-1-3® Robertson to Lansing, June 9, 1916,Foreign Rela
tions, 1916. By late 1915, both Pisano and De la Rosa were
under indictment for murder in Texas. Carranza had personally
promised Governor Ferguson that both men upon their appre
hension would be summarily shot or turned over to Texas
authorities. Shortly thereafter, Pisano, was arrested and held
in Matamoros by General Ricaut. New York Times, March 24,1916.
He was not delivered to Texas authorities; instead, by order
of Carranza himself, the prisoner was sent to Carrancista
headquarters at Queretaro and subsequently released. He then
returned to the State of Tamaulipas, joined De la Roaa, and
under the protection of General Nafarrate resumed hit- acti
vities on behalf of the Plan of San Diego. Funston to Baker,
June 7, 1916, Foreign Relations, 1916, 568-569. De 1& Rosa,
too, received favored treatment from Constitutionalist offi
cials, later obtaining a general's commission in the Consti
tutionalist Army and a staff assignment in Mexico City. Testi
monies of Fall and Kleiber, IMA, 1227-1228 and 1275.
137Robertson to Lansing,June 9, 1916, Foreign Rela
tions, 1916. 572.

Chapter 9

THE YAQUI QUESTION

I.
American recognition of the Carranze* regime and the
subsequent temporary suppression of the San Diego revolu
tionary movement did much to improve theretofore strained
relations between Washington and the Constitutionalists.
Nonetheless, serious Mexican-American differences remained.
Unresolved, they posed a grave threat to maintenance of the
new accord.

Although Carranza was indeed successful in

momentarily halting Mexican raids in the Lover Rio Grande
Valley, he proved somewhat less effective in quelling the
serious Yaqui and Mayo Indiem uprisings in the northwestern
states of Sonora and Sinaloa.

While primarily a Mexican

domestic affair, Indian unrest in those states eventually
threatened the lives and property of hundreds of American
citizens and jeopardized the considerable investment of a
number of American and foreign corporations..

From its in

ception, it was a source of serious friction between the
Wilson Administration and successive revolutionary regimes.
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On more than one occasion local crises arising from Indian
unrest very nearly precipitated the landing of United States
naval forces on the west coast of Mexico.

Evidence indicates

that local military commanders, Villista and Carrancista
alike, would have vigorously resisted any such incursion.
Under the circumstances, American intervention in the Yaqui
and Mayo Indian uprisings might well have culminated in a
much more serious Mexican-American conflict.

Fortunately

Villista and later Carrancista authorites as well were them
selves able to contain if not entirely to suppress the rebel
lion.

As a result, the threat to American end foreign lives

and property was considerably diminished.

So, in turn, was

the primary rationale for American armed intervention along
the Gulf of California.
The underlying causes of the Yaqui rebellion lay
some thirty years or more in the past.

During the 1880's,

Ramon Corral, Porfirista governor of the State of Sonora,
had seized from the Indians the fertile Yaqui River Valley
and much of the adjacent territory.

The Yaquis, it was

argued, were not making profitable use of the land.

Mexican

and foreign colonists, on the other hand, would establish
great cotton and rice plantations which would enrich the
entire state.

In the ensuing struggle for control of the
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Indian lands the Yaquis were defeated and sold by the
thousand to the planters of the Yucatan.

Corral and his

successor, Luis Torres, then disposed of the lands to
wealthy Mexican and foreign investors interested in 3argescale development of the region's agricultural potential.
At the same time, they continued to pursue Indian slaving
until the advent of the Revolution in 1910.^
Fierce fighters, the Yaguis took advantage o £ the
turmoil to free themselves from the oppression of Mexican
rule.

They allied themselves with first one faction and

then another in hope of recovering their ancestral lands.
They were sorely disappointed.

By the end of 1914, despite

repeated Mexican promises to the contrary, those lands re
mained in other hands.

Out of patience, the greater part

of the Yagui Nation, the so-called wild or ftroncho Yaquis,
rose in revolt.2

Well-armed and capably led, they were

determined to drive Mexicans and foreigners alike from the
Yaqui Valley and from all other tribal lands.
they very nearly succeeded.4

Initially,

Intermittent hostilities

■1-Parkes, A History of Mexico, 296.
2New York Times, May 15, 16 and June 22, 1915.
Frederic

^Xbid., May 16 and June 19, 1915; Testimony of
N. Watriss, IMA, 467.
4Ibid., 482-483.
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continued for more than a decade.

Final pacification of the

Yagui Nation was not completed until the spring of 19 27.5
The largest of the aforementioned foreign concerns
operating in the Yaqui country and the focal point of
Washington's interest in the Indian uprising was the American
owned Richardson Construction Company.

A Mexican corpora

tion/ the firm was controlled by the Yaqui Delta Land, and
Water Company/ an American holding company capitalized at
twelve million dollars.®

Principal bond-holders of the

latter concern were New York financiers John Hays Haivtmond
and Harry Payne Whitney.^

The operating company owned in

fee 750,000 acres in the Yaqui River Valley of southern
Sonora.

Almost all of its holdings had been acquired by

5Dulles, Yesterday in Mexico, 312.
®Testimony of Watriss, IMA, 426-429.
^New York Times, June 23, 1915. Hammond, a prominent
Republican and a mining engineer of world renown, was "asso
ciated with some of the most important financial "groups" in
the United States. In addition, he had a significant stake
in the Mexican petroleum industry and owned and promoted some
of the most valuable mining properties in Mexico and the
United States. Whitney was an influential New York Democrat
and capitalist with interests in investment banking, mining,
real estate, and public utilities. A protege of the Guggenheiras, he was a director of the Guggenheim Exploration Com
pany, another firm with large interests in Mexico. Who's
Who in America, 1916-1917 (Chicago: A. N. Marquis u Company,
1916), 1055,.2658. Obviously, then, powerful and politi
cally influential interests stood behind the Yaqui Valley
venture.
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direct purchase from local Mexican landowners.

Very little

of its property was held under concession from the Mexican
Government.®
In accord with its original contract with the govern
ment of Porfirio Diaz, the company was to have limited use
of the waters of the Yaqui River.

In return, it was to

construct and operate certain irrigation facilities in the
valley and to irrigate all lands, regardless of ownership,
bordering its canals.

Following the ouster of Diaz, the

company renegotiated its contract with the revolutionary
Q

government of Francisco I. Madero.
unquestionably legitimate.

Its claims, then, were

Moreover, until revolutionary

factional strife and the Yaqui uprising halted all construc
tion in the Valley, the company earnestly endeavored to
fulfill its contractual obligations.

In addition to

erecting a "complete plant for the construction of an irri
gation system of very large dimensions," it had expended
more than a million dollars on roads, dams, canals, and an

testimony of Watriss, IMA, 429.
^The original contract was negotiated in 1803. Ibid.,
430. A copy of the renegotiated contract, executed in
August, 1911, is included in Ibid., 469-472.
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agricultural experiment station, and had converted some
45.000 acres from grazing to cultivable land.^-0
Although the company subdivided and sold more than
30.000 acres of irrigated land to Mexican, German, and
American settlers, it failed to realize a profit.

As of

the end of 1919, neither dividends nor interest on the
company's six million dollar bonded debt had been paid.**'*According to Frederic N. Watriss, president of the parent
organization, the Yaquis had struck especially hard at the
Richardson Construction Company,^2
However, if the stockholders of the Yaqui Delta Land
and Water Company stood to lose their considerable invest
ment, the several hundred independent colonists in the Valley
stood to lose much more.

Established on irrigated farms and

ranches around Esperanza, a small settlement some ninety
miles southeast of Guaymas, they had come to the Valley to
stay.

It was their home, and, if necessary, they would

fight to protect it.

However, foolhardy that decision may

10Ibid., 429-430.

11Ibid., 430.

■^The Yaquis, Watriss declared, "are savages and they
think they have been robbed and they are taking it out on us.
They think that it (the land) belongs to them. X don't know
the history of that." Ibid., 435.
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have been, they nonetheless adhered to it.13

Moreover,

they both expected and demanded the assistance of the United
States Government in that endeavor.

Consequently, the

Yaqui Valley colony was to prove a source of considerable
concern and embarrassment to officials in Washington through
out the remainder of the Wilson Administration.

II.
Yaqui discontent exploded in January, 1915, in
widespread attacks on Mexican and foreign settlements alike.
By the end of the month, most of the mines of central Sonora
were shut down and its ranches and farms deserted.

Aural

residents fled to Hermosillo, the state capital, or to other

*3According to John M. Bishop, president of an
American mining company with interests in southern Sonora,
the problem in that area was not the Yaqui Indians, but the
attitude of the American colonists. There was no need to
send American forces to the Yaqui Valley, Bishop informed a
New York Times reporter.
The Americans at Esperanza could
"get out" if they wanted to do so. "The trouble with them,11
he concluded, "is that they bought their farms and don't
want to leave them. The trouble is not in the getting out,
but in the staying . . . ." New York Times, June 20, 1915.
^Protection was sought first against Yaqui raids
and later against both Yaquis and attempts by Constitution
alist authorities to confiscate foreign holdings in the
Yaqui Valley. See, for example, Ibid., June 11, 22, and 23,
1915; McPherson to Lansing, November, 1915, and Winslow to
Daniels, November 13 and December 11, 1915, Foreign Relations, 1915, 839 and 857; W. E. Richardson to Lansirig^
November 13, 1916 and Watriss to Lansing, February 17, 1919,
Testimony of Watriss, IMA, 491-493.
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fortified towns, abandoning the countryside to the Indians.
Villista governor Jose Maytorena, dependent upon a local
garrison composed in large part of "tame11 Indians, was
unable to quell the uprising.

Indeed, on January 29 r Yaqui

soldiers mutinied at Guaymas, turning on their Mexican
counterparts.15

Thereafter, Yaqui soldiers refused to serve

against their rebellious kinsmen.15

Thus, by the spring of

1915, when raiding spread southward into the Yaqui River
Valley, Villista authorities at Hermosillo were virtually
powerless to stop it.

The colonists were on their own.

On May 11, an estimated 500 Indians struck for the
first time at the foreign settlements in southern Sonora.
Based in the Batamete Mountains, some forty miles north of
Esperanza, they suddenly fell upon the colonists in the
Yaqui Valley.
were killed.

Three Americans and a large number of Mexicans
At the same time, American consular officials

at Nogales, Guaymas, and Hermosillo reported that several
thousand Yaquis, as well as other "lawless elements," were
pillaging and murdering at will in the interior of the state.
Many small towns had been raided and scores of persons killed

15New York Times, February 5 and 6, 1915.
15Ibid., May 16, 1915.
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or abducted.

Throughout the greater part of the state all

livestock had been driven off and the property of Americans
and other foreign residents looted or destroyed.

Only

Cananea and a few of the larger mining communities had es
caped unscathed.^

Villista authorities, meanwhile, could

offer little effective resistance.

Maytorena's Indian

troops, at best useless, might at any time have chanced
sides.

The burden of defense, then, rested entirely upon

the Governor's undermanned Mexican units.

Those troops, in

turn, were barely able to hold their own against the Yaquis.
Thus by mid-May, 1915, conditions in central and southern
Sonora were "little short of appalling."I8
Alarmed by the consular reports from Sonora, offi
cials in Washington acted at once to relieve and, if neces
sary, to evacuate the foreign colony in the Yaqui Valley.
On May 14, Secretary Daniels dispatched the cruisers Raleigh
and New Orleans to the vicinity of Guaymas to investigate
and report on the Indian uprising and to “look after American
IQ

interests" in the area. 3

Two days, later, both vessels

17ibid.. May 14 and 16, 1915.
l8Ibid., May 14, 1915. Maytorena repeatedly warned
Simpich that he could not afford protection to Americans in
that region. Daniels to Lansing, November 22, 1915r SDR
812.00/16843.
l^New York Times, May 15, 1915.
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arrived at Tobari Bay, midway between the mouths of the
Yaqui and Mayo Rivers and the closest point on the coast
to the settlement of Esperanza.2®
The same day, word arrived in Washington that
Maytorena's troops had entered the Yaqui Valley.

The Indians

had subsequently withdrawn to the mountains, and, according
to the Governor, the situation was "well in hand."

Further

reassurance came from the superintendent of the Richardson
Construction Company.

The colonists, the latter informant

disclosed, had at all times had access to a branch line of
the Southern Pacific Railroad of Mexico.
coast had been possible all along.

Escape to the

The colonists, however,

had no intention of abandoning the Valley.

Instead, they

had concentrated their forces in a strong defensive position
at Yaqui Pueblo.2*- For the moment, at least, evacuation was
out of the question.
On May 18, it was learned that the Yaqui Nation had
formally declared war against Germany, the United States,
and all Mexican factions.22

For. several weeks, however,

relative calm prevailed throughout the state.

Taking advan

tage of the lull, colonists in uhe Yaqui Valley returned to

20Ibid., May 16, 1915
22Ibid., May 19, 1915

21Ibid., May 17, 1915.
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their ranches.

But peace was shortlived.

Early in June,

600 Indians again moved into the Valley, and the raids began
anew,

in desperation the colonists appealed for assistance

to both Maytorena and the Government of the United States.23
Although the Governor again sent a force to the
Valley, it was too small to be effective.

Consequently, the

Wilson Administration itself adopted a "vigorous policy" for
the protection of American citizens in southern Sonora.

In

communications to both Maytorena and his chi.ef, Lansing
insisted that the Governor dispatch additional troops to the Yaqui Valley and take whatever measures were necessary to
secure the foreign colony from further attack.

Failure to

comply, the Secretary warned, would force the United States
to land a relief expedition at Tobari Bay.24
Lansing was not bluffing.

On or about June 16,

Admiral Thomas B. Howard, Commander of the Pacific Fleet,
was ordered to proceed at once from San Diego to Guaymas.
Accompanying him aboard the cruiser Colorado was a special
force composed of 600 marines and bluejackets.

The flagship

was to be joined at Guaymas by the cruisers Raleigh, New
Orleans, and Chattanooga, with a combined complement of

23Ibid., June 11, 1915

24Ibid., June 17, 1915.
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1100 men.

The crucial decision to disembark and march in

land to relieve Esperanza was left to Howard's discretion.
It was understood, however, that the Admiral was not to
land his force unless conditions in the Yaqui Valley ren
dered such drastic action "absolutely necessary*"2^
Washington wanted no new Veracruz.
Villa, meanwhile, had ordered Maytorena to dispatch
every available soldier to the Yaqui Valley.

His fortunes

on the wane since the disaster at Celaya, Carranza's rival
was more anxious than ever to accommodate the Wilson Admin
istration.

He was prepared, he informed Carothers, to "do

everything possible" to quell the Yaqui uprising.2** Villa,
however, was in no position to make good his pledge.

At

that very moment, he was manuevering desperately to escape
still another confrontation with the pursuing Obregon.
Moreover, Villa had little influence over his subordinate
at Hermosillo.

Far away across the sierra, Maytorena was

very much his own man.27

And with 6000 Yaquis roaming at

will over the greater part of his state, he could ill afford
to spare a large body of troops for garrison duty at

25ibid., June 17 and 18, 1915.

26Ibid.

27Clendenen, The U. S. and Villa, 160.
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Esperanza.

28

Nonetheless, doubtless because of Lansing's

ultimatum, the Governor grudgingly agreed to send reinforcements to the south.

29

On June 18, General Sosa and 150 men. entrained at
Guaymas for Esperanza.

They never reached their destination.

Yaquis attacked the train just north of the American strong
hold, killing and wounding most of its occupants and forcing
Sosa to withdraw,

tinder the circumstances, the New York

Times solemnly intoned, the "only hope" for the Yaqui Valley
settlers was Howard's marines.3*1
Officials in Washington evidently concurred.

The

commander of the Raleigh. whose vessel rode at anchor in
Tobari Bay, was instructed to send a heliograph team twelve
miles inland to Esperanza.

The moment the colonists were

threatened, word was to be flashed to the Raleigh.

A

landing party would move immediately to the rescue.
Similar instructions were given to Howard at Guaymas.

The

2**New York Times, June 22, 1915.
29

Ibid., June 19, 1915. On June 19, Maytorena an
nounced that 850 soldiers would be sent to the Yaqui Valley
to protect the settlers and their crops from the Indians.
At the same time, however, he warned that those troops would
also resist any attempt to land United States naval forces
in Mexican soil. Ibid., June 20, 1915.
30Ibid., June 22, 1915

31Ibid
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Admiral was to proceed at once to Tobari Bay.

In the event

of an attack upon Esperanza, he was to relieve the colonists
and escort them safely to the coast.

Under no circumstances,

however, was he to linger in the Yaqui Valley? nor was he to
remain on Mexican soil any longer than was absolutely neces
sary.^2

Although the colonists had repeatedly requested

that an expeditionary force be stationed in the Valley to
protect them, officials in Washington unequivocally rejected
their appeal.

Occupancy of Mexican territory, they feared,

might well give rise to "complications that would result in
armed intervention."23
They had some cause for concern.

On June 21, the

day after the Colorado arrived at Guaymas, Howard conferred
at length with General Leyva, commander of the Villista
garrison.

State authorities, the General conceded, sym

pathized with the American dilemma and would "understand"
the dispatch of a relief expedition to Esperanza.

The

Mexican people, however, would unquestionably "misunderstand"
such action and deeply "resent" it.

Moreover, Leyva declared

even minimal intervention in the Yaqui Valley was certain to
provoke even more Indians to take up arms against the

32Ibid

33Ibid

424
foreign colony*

There would be "trouble" for Americana "all

along the coast," he warned.3^
The following day, Howard went ashore to confer once
again with the General.

There he learned that communications

with Esperanza had been restored and that General Sosa and
a large body of Villista troops had again moved into the
southern part of the state.
quiet.

For the moment, the Valley was

Leyva, however, was apprehensive.

He expressed

impatience and anxiety at the settlers1 adamant refusal to
abandon their holdings.

Their very presence on Mexican soil,

he contended, had become a major source of unrest in Sonora.
Ultimately, he feared, it would lead to a serious MexicanAmerican confrontation.

Sosa's command, composed largely of

"tame” Yaquis, was unreliable and could not be depended upon
to defend Esperanza.

Sooner or later, then, Howard would be

forced to intervene.

The General believed that Sosa'1
*

troops would resist.35
There was little that Howard could do to alter the
situation.

He had his orders and, on June 23, he proceeded

to Tobari Bay.

The settlers, meanwhile, continued to spurn

Washington's offer of evacuation.

34lbid., June 23, 1915.

Instead, they persisted

35Ibid
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in their demand that the Wilson Administration send troops
to protect t h e m . B y

the time that Howard arrived at

Guaymas, they had already sent their families out of the
country.

Of the original 300 American settlers in the Valley,

only some seventy-five remained.

They were well-armed, how

ever, and in a strong defensive position.
leave voluntarily.

They would not

Doubtless their doggednsss was as

exasperating to Lansing as it was to Leyva.

By the summer

of 1915, then, the Yaqui Valley colony had become a serious
liability to Washington and Hermosillo alike.
Just how serious soon became evident.

Early in July,

Yaqui chieftains presented a sobering ultimatum to Maytorena.
Villista authorities, they declared, must return all tribal
lands to the Yaqui Nation and immediately expel all foreigners
from the Yaqui Valley.

Failure to meet their demands, they

warned, would result in a new round of hostilities, an allout, no-quarter campaign of extermination against foreigners
and Mexicans alike.38
to comply.
menced.

Maytorena, of course, was powerless

Consequently, late in the month, raiding recom

Fortunately for the colonists at Esperanza heavy

rains and subsequent flooding of the Yaqui delta acted as an

36ibid.
3®lbid., July 8, 1915

37Ibid.
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effective deterrent to invasion of the Valley for the
remainder of the summer.39

III.
Early in August, 1915, in the face of the Constitu
tionalist advance, Maytorena withdrew his troops from
southern Sonora.^®
incident.

Weeks passed, however, without serious

Then, in early October, unable to come to terms

with either revolutionary faction, the Yaquis returned to the
offensive.'*1

Shortlyjthereafter, they concluded an alliance

with the powerful Mayo Indians of the Sonora-Sinaloa border
district:.

By the end of the month, then, the rebels had ex

tended their zone of operations from central Sonora to
northern Sinaloa.

Raiding parties were active as far south

as the valley of the Rio del Fuerte, some 300 miles down the
coast from Guaymas.42

39lbid., July 26, 1915.
40Ibid., August 5, 1915.
'*1Ibid., October 2, 1915,
42ibid., October 23, 1915. The Mayos had been restive
for some months, having already attacked the foreign colony
at Los Mochis, Sinaloa, on June 21. Ibid., June 23, 1915.
Not until the fall, however, did really serious trouble recur
in the Fuerte Valley. Daniels to Lansing, November 22, 1915,
SDR 812.00/16843.
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On October 22, Yaquis and Mayos decisively defeated
a Constitutionalist force near San Bias, Sinaloa, and began
a slow advance down the Fuerte Valley to the coast.4^

por

the next two months, bands of Indians, frequently cooperating
with Villista guerrillas, terrorized the west coast of Mexico
from Guaymas to Topolobampo.

Once again, as along the north

eastern border, local Carrancista authorities manifested an
unwillingness or inability to bring the disturbances to a
halt.

Nor would they cooperate with United States naval

forces dispatched to the area to protect American and other
foreign interests.

Consequently, late in 1915, the possibi

lity of American armed intervention in Mexico arose once again.
During the first week in November, in a series of
separate incidents, Indians killed two American settlers in
northern Sinaloa and struck again at American-owned ranches
in the valley of the Rio del Fuerte .44

Shortly thereafter,

Consular Agent John McPherson reported from Guaymas that
hostile Indians had re-entered the Yaqui Valley as well.
According to a spokesman for the Richardson Construction Com
pany, a number of Mexicans there had already been murdered by

4 3New

York Times, October 23, 1915.

44Alger to Lansing, November 19, 1915, Foreign Relations, 1915. 842-843.
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Yaqui raiders.

The latter source considered the situation

in the Valley "very grave," and warned that additional
protection was "absolutely necessary" in order to prevent a
recurrence of the crisis of the previous spring.^5
Admiral Cameron M. Winslow, Howard's successor as
Commander of the Pacific Fleet, strongly concurred.

On

November 13, the Admiral conveyed his fears to the Secretary
of the Navy.4** The danger to the Yaqui Valley colony, he
contended, was greater than ever before.

Recent disbandment

of Maytorena's Indian units and a scarcity of food in the
Northwest had swelled the ranks of the insurgents and in
creased the likelihood that they would renew their raids into
the Yaqui delta.

In other respects, however, the situation

remained essentially unchanged.

Because of the distance

inland, Winslow's forces could do nothing to protect the
colony at Esperanza.

At the moment, the Admiral could do no

more than "afford refuge at the coast line."

But the settlers

still refused to countenance withdrawal.4^

45McPherson to Lansing, November, 1915, Ibid.., 839.
John A. McPherson, Consular Agent at Guaymas, had been en
gaged in business in Mexico for twenty-five years. In 1915,
he was proprietor of the Guaymas Bottling Works, a candy and
soda factory. Register, 1918, 138.
46winslow to Daniels, November 13, 1915, Foreign
Relations, 1915, 839.
4?Ibid
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Under the circumstances, the Admiral saw but two
solutions to the problem;

First, Washington might compel

the Constitutionalists to permanently garrison the Yaqui
II

Valley; or, as an alternative, he himself might be given
"discretionary orders" to land an expeditionary force if the
occasion demanded.

Whatever the case, Win 3 low advised, prompt

action was essential.

Matters were complicated, however, by

the fact that General Manuel Dieguez, Carrancista commander
in Sonora, was at the moment fully preoccupied with operations
against the Villistas in the northern portion of the state.
The General, then, would be most reluctant to send a detach
ment south to the Yaqui Valley.

For that reason, Winslow

explained, Washington would have to exert "extreme pressure"
upon t h e .Constitutionalist Government in order to obtain ade
quate protection for the colonists at Esperanza ^ 8 Time was to
prove him correct.

IV.
By mid-November, unrest on the west coast of Mexico
had assumed serious proportions.

On the 17th, the Secretary

of the Navy received an alarming dispatch from the port of

48lbid
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Topolobampo.

Commander Kavanaugh of the gunboat Annapolis

reported that on the previous day Mayo Indians and Villista
guerrillas had attacked Los Mochis, Sinoloa, sacking the
town and killing a number of its inhabitants .49

Located

some twenty miles from the coast, Los Mochis had a sizable
foreign population.

Several hundred American citizens resided

in or near the town, and much of the surrounding land was
owned and worked by the big American-owned United Sugar
Companies.
At first, Kavanaugh had considered sending an armed
expedition to relieve the colony.

Ultimately, however, he

had decided against such a move, but only because of the rela
tive weakness of the forces at his disposal.

Instead, working

through the representative of the United Sugar Companies, he
had arranged for the evacuation of all American citizens to
Topolobampo.

There a number of the refugees had been taken

aboard the Annapolis.

Those Americans remaining ashore

established armed outposts around the town and organized
patrols to maintain internal security.

Under the circum

stances, friction with the Mexican population was inevitable.
Although Kavanaugh himself sent no armed men ashore, a landing

49Winslow to Daniels, November 17, 1915, Ibid., 840841.
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party was kept in readiness to counter any threat to the
town from either within or without.5®
On November 18, news of the raid reached Consul
William E. Alger at Mazatlan.

Alger immediately wired

General Mateo Munoz, military commander of Sinaloa, re
questing that he rush assistance to the survivors ,51
Munoz, then at San Bias, no more than twenty miles distant
from the colony, might easily have complied.

Instead, he

CO

did nothing.

Clearly unsympathetic, he had by his actions

prior to the raid actually encouraged the attack on Los
Mochis .55

Moreover his subsequent behavior unquestionably

54
invited new strikes at foreign holdings in the Fuerte Valley.

5 ®Ibid.; Alger to Lansing, November 26, 1915, Ibid.,
851; Winslow to Daniels, December 11, 1915, Ibid., 863.

51Alger to Lansing, November 19, 1915, Ibid., 842.
Alger entered the consular service in 1891, serving at
various posts in Honduras until his appointment as consul
at Mazatlan in December, 1909. He remained at the latter
post until June 1916. Register, 1916, 69.
52

Winslow to Daniels, November 21 and December 11,
1915, Foreign Relations, 1915, 845 and 863.
55Alger to Lansing., November 23, 1915, Ibid., 849;
Winslow to Daniels, November 18 and December 11,-1915, Ibid.,
841-842 and 863.
5^Winslow to Daniels, November 18 and 21, 1915,
Ibid., 841-842, 845.
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Replying to Alger on the 19th, Munoz accused the
colonists of collaborating with the enemies of the Consti
tutionalist regime.

They had armed the Indians, he declared,

and so had no one to blame but themselves for the disaster
which had befallen them.55

^he following day, in a second

message to Alger, the General charged that Kavanaugh had
landed marines at Topolobampo.

The Commander, it was al

leged, had already sent an expeditionary force inland to Los
Mochis and had grievously insulted Constitutionalist author
ities at Topolobampo.

His subordinates, Munoz warned the

Consul, had been ordered to repel the invader.

There must

be no recurrence of the outrage .55
Alger was frankly puzzled.

He knew of no landing at

Topolobampo or anywhere else along the coast .57

Yet in the

days that followed Munoz reiterated the charge.5®
to explain the General's behavior?

How, then,

It soon became apparent:

Because of the alleged American presence in the Fuerte Valley,
Munoz was relieved of responsibility both for the raid on
Los Mochis and for the future defense of foreign interests

55Alger to Lansing, November 23, 1915, Ibid., 849.
5 6 Ibid.

5 7 Ibid.,

850.

5®Alger to Lansing, November 26, 1915, Ibid., 851.
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therein .55

For more than a week, then, during a critical

period for the colony, the General deliberately withheld
protection.

At the same time, he continued to vociferously

protest the alleged violation of Mexican sovereignty and to
warn both Alger and Kavanaugh that further violations would
be met by armed resistence.
In the interim, the Mayos struck again.

Returning

to the undefended settlement, the Indians destroyed private
residences, burned the warehouses of the United Sugar Com
panies, and killed or abducted a number of the Mexican
inhabitants.

American and other foreign residents fled for

their lives.

Behind them, Los Mochis lay in ruins.

"A

reign of terror” existed in the Fuerte Valley, Kavanaugh
reported to Alger, and Munoz was directly to blame .55
Winslow, meanwhile, had learned that General Dieguez
had ordered Munoz to relieve Los Mochis.
ever, suspected that Munoz would not obey.

The Admiral, how
Accordingly, he

again urged Daniels to press the Carranza Government for a
"strong guaranty" that it would permanently garrison the Yaqui
and Fuerte Valleys.

A "general massacre of all foreigners

55Winslow to Daniels, December 11, 1915, Ibid., 863.
50Alger to Lansing, November 26, 1915, Ibid., 851.
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may occur at any time," Winslow warned.

Prevention could

be assured only by the presence of large bodies of Mexican
troops or by the assignment of American expeditionary forces
to the respective colonies.

The Admiral anticipated further

disturbances, particularly in.the Fuerte Valley.

Conse

quently, he informed the Secretary, he had already ordered
the cruiser Raleigh to reenforce the Annapolis at Topolo
bampo.
On November 18, Daniels received further discouraging
news from Kavanaugh.

Despite Dieguez 1 pledge of assistance

for Los Mochis, the Commander reported, none had been forth
coming.

Munoz remained at San Bias.

It was his opinion,

Kavanaugh declared, that the General's campaign against the
Mayos "was a farce from beginning to end."

Its sole ob

jective appeared to have been the seizure of "loot already
collected by the Indians."

Having accomplished that end,

Munoz' men had withdrawn, "as it appeared always to have
been their intention to do."

The Americans in the Valley

were left at the mercy of the Indians.

Carrancista author

ities, the Commander charged, "must have known" that the
withdrawal of their forces "would result in great Indian

61Winslow to Daniels, November 17, 1915, Ibid. 840841.
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raids on the Americans."

The consequences of that irres

ponsible action were a "shameful loss of property” and the
terrorizing of a large number of American citizens.

It was

essential, Kavanaugh closed, that Munoz be forced to garrison
Los Mochis and to wage a "real" campaign against the I n d i a n s ^
The following day, Lansing instructed Silliman to
take up the matter of the American colonies with Carranza
himself and to impress upon the First Chief the importance
of providing adequate protection for American lives and prop
erty at Esperanza and Los Mochis.63
but promises resulted.64

Again, however, nothing

indeed, on November 20, as noted

earlier, the Mayos returned to Los Mochis.

Far from driving

them off, Munoz 1 command actually joined the Indians in
looting surrounding American properties.

"It is hard to say

which are the worst," Kavanaugh complained, the Indians or
the Carrancistas.66
Conditions were little better in the north.

On

November 22, McPherson reported that hostile Indians had

62uinslow to Daniels, November 18, 1915, Ibid., 841842.
63

Lansing to Silliman, November 19, 1915., Ibid., 843.

6^Belt to Lansing, November 20, 1915, Ibod., 844.
6^Winslow to Daniels, November 21, 1915, Ibid., 845.

436

again entered the Yaqui Valley, and that despite repeated
assurances to the contrary Dieguez had failed to drive them
out.6®

Despairing of cooperation from either the General

or his chief, Lansing turned to Alvaro Obregon, the one other
Constitutionalist commander then in a position to render
effective assistance.6?

However, like Dieguez, Obregon was

wholly committed to the campaign against Villa.

The final

defeat of Carranza's rival remained the primary objective of
the Constitutionalist Government.

For the moment, at least,

all other considerations were of secondary importance.

There

was nothing, then, that Obregon could do either for the Yaqui
Valley colony or for the settlers at Los Mochis .68
Lansing had come full circle.

Out of patience and

heartily disgusted with the procrastination and apparent
duplicity of Constitutionalist authorities, the Secretary
grew belligerent.

Following Obregon's rebuff, he assumed

the hard line so vigorously espoused by Winslow and other

66McPherson to Lansing, November 22, 1915, Ibid.
^Lansing to Simpich, November 22, 1915, Ibid., 845846.

to
He
of
to

68Obregon replied that orders had already been given
subordinate commanders to "crush the rebels" at Los Mochis.
had done what he could. Ultimate execution of the order,
course, fell to the uncooperative General Munoz. Simpich
Lansing, November 23, 1915, Ibid., 847.
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naval commanders in Mexican waters.

Addressing the First

Chief on November 23, Lansing bluntly informed him that if
the Mexican Government could not protect American interests
at Los Mochis then American marines would do so.

Only

recently, he reminded Carranza, the Wilson Administration
had permitted the passage of Constitutionalist troops across
American territory.

The First Chief, then, should have "no

objection" to the employment of United States naval forces
in restoring order in the Fuerte Valley.

Emphasizing his

determination to act unilaterally if necessary, the Sec
retary concluded with the information that still another
American warship had been ordered to Topolobampo "to meet
any emergency" that might arise .69

Carranza had been warned.

Lansing moved at once to make good his threat.

On

the same day that he admonished the First Chief, he re
quested the Department of the Navy to prepare the battleship
Maryland for dispatch to Topolobampo.

A force of no less

than 300 marines was to be embarked "for the purpose of
affording protection” to the Americans at Los Mochis.

Upon

arriving on station, the marines were to be "kept in readi
ness" to go ashore.

There would be no landing, however.

69Lansing to Garrett, November 23, 1915, Ibid
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unless specific orders to that effect came directly from
Washington.70
Having thus initiated the organization and dispatch
of an expeditionary force, Lansing then sought Congressional
approval of his actions.

On November 24, he conferred at

length with Congressman James R. Mann of Illinois, Repub
lican minority leader in the House of Representatives.
Mann, too, was disturbed by recent developments in Mexico
and, like the Secretary of State, was prepared to adopt
extraordinary measures to protect the colonists at Esperanza and Los Mochis.

71

Thus assured of bipartisan support,

Lansing went ahead with his plans.

On the same day, Daniels

transmitted to San Francisco Lansing's and his own supple
mentary instructions to the Commander of the Pacific Fleet.
Winslow, accompanied by a force of 275 marines, was to
proceed at once to the troubled area aboard the cruiser San
Diego.

The Maryland and supporting units were to follow as

soon as possible.72

on November 25, Winslow sailed.

Taking

70Lansing to Daniels, November 23, 1915, Ibid., 847848.
7lNew York Times, November 25, 1915.
72

Daniels to Winslow, November 24, 1915, Foreign
Relations, 1915, 850.
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aboard an additional two companies of marines at San Diego,
he arrived off Topolobampo on the last day of the month.
Carranza, meanwhile, had received the ominous Ameri
can note within hours of its dispatch.

Perceiving the ur

gency of the situation, he acted at once to mollify the
aroused Secretary of State.

Adopting an unusually concili

atory tone, the First Chief expressed appreciation for the
"offer" of American assistance in quelling the Mayo revolt.
He could not, however, consider such a proposal.

Instead,

he suggested, until the rebellion was suppressed, the
colonists at Los Mochis might move to territory already
controlled by Constitutionalist forces or remain aboard one
of the American warships off Topolobampo.

Meanwhile, he

assured the Secretary, he had already written to Obregon,
urging the General to hasten occupation of the Fuerte Valley.
When that operation was completed, he declared, the lives
and property of Americans residing therein would be fully
guaranteed.^
Carranza earnestly endeavored to make good his pledge.
On November 27, four days after his exchange with Lansing,

?3New York Times, November 27, 1915; Winslow to
Daniels, December 11, 1^15, Foreign Relations, 1915, 862.
74

Garrett to Lansing, November 23, 1915, Ibid., 848.
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some 1200 Constitutionalist troops entered the Fuerte
Valley .75

The Indians, in turn, withdrew to the mountains.

Although the lives of the colonists were no longer in jeo
pardy, their property was by no means secure.

Upon en

tering Los Mochis, Munoz* soldiers again ransacked the
settlement, looting private homes and committing many acts
of vandalism.7®

Responding immediately to Lansing's sharp

protest, Carranza ordered the return of all American and
other foreign property then in the hands of Constitutionalist
forces.

77

His subordinates, however, refused to obey.

Kavanaugh and spokesmen for the foreign community protested
in vain to Munoz.7®

Tension mounted.

By the end of the

month, relations between the colonists and the Carrancistas in the Fuerte Valley were very poor indeed .75
On November 30, Winslow arrived off Topolobampo.
The following day, the Admiral made an inspection tour of

75Alger to Lansing, November 29, 1915, Ibid., 854.
7®winslow to Daniels, November 28, 1915, Ibid., 853.
77

Lansing to Daniels, December 2, 1915, and Arre
dondo to Lansing, December 3, 1915, Ibid., 855 and 855-856.
78

Winslow to Daniels, November 28 and December 11,
1915, Ibid., 853 and 862-864.
79Ibid.
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the American colony and the lower Fuerte Valley .80
duly alarmed by what he saw.

He was

Inviting Munoz and other local

Carrancista authorities aboard the San Diego, he carefully
explained to them the American position vis-a-vis the colony
at Los Mochis and tactfully but firmly insisted upon their
cooperation.

Concentrating on Munoz, Winslow informed the

General that in the future he would be expected to prevent
the recurrence of situations which strained relations be
tween their respective governments.

Failure to do so, the

Admiral implied, would almost certainly precipitate the
landing of an American expeditionary f o r c e . 8^
Munoz buckled.

Overawed,

Immediately thereafter, he ordered all

Constitutionalist commanders in the state "to assist in the
recovery of stolen property" and the return of same to the
rightful owners . 82

The crisis in the Fuerte Valley had

passed.

V.
Winslow was by no means sanguine.

He had witnessed

firsthand the deep antagonism manifested by Carrancista
officials toward the Americans at Los Mochis.

The position

80Winslow to Daniels, December 11, 1915, Ibid., 862863.
81Ibid., 863-864.

82Ibid., 864.
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of the Fuerte Valley colony was precarious indeed, and the
Admiral knew it.

Something more substantive than promises

would be required to assure its safety.

The moment Munoz 1

command was needed elsewhere or threatened by a large force
of Indians, he wrote Daniels, it would be "promptly with
drawn with little or no warning to Ithe]

settlers . . . ."

For that reason, then, he urged, permission should be ob
tained from the Mexican Government to land American marines
on Mexican territory "in cases of great emergency."

Unless

some such provision were made, and soon, he warned, a
massacre of Americans on the west coast of Mexico was inevi
table.

The Indians acted far too quickly, he explained, "to

admit of the delay necessary to obtain permission . . .

to

land . " 83
Despite the validity of the Admiral's argument, there
was little chance that he would obtain the authorization
that he sought.

Both the President and the Secretary of

the Navy, to say nothing of Constitutionalist authorities,
were adamantly opposed to further armed intervention in
Mexico.

Daniels would not again grant the discretionary

powers bestowed upon Winslow's predecessor.

83Ibid

Only under the
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direst circumstances would intervention again be permitted,
and then the decision would be made in Washington.

To have

again extended to a subordinate commander carte blanche to
intervene would have been to assure that sooner or later
intervention would indeed recur.

Accordingly, Winslow's

proposal was rejected.®^
It was just as well.

No sooner had the Fuerte

Valley disorder subsided than a new and even graver crisis
arose in the Yagui delta.

ftR

On December 9, an estimated

500 Yaguis fought a three-hour battle with Constitutionalist
troops along the railroad between Esperanza and Cocorit.
The following day, another sharp clash occurred at Corral.
At the same time, several hundted Yaguis struck at foreignowned farms and ranches, burning the harvests and threaten
ing the Richardson Construction Company's experimental
station at San Pedro.

Sporadic skirmishing between Yaguis

and armed bands of colonists spread throughout the settled
portions of the Valley.

Calling upon Consul McPherson for

assistance, a Company representative reported that Americans
in the vicinity of Esperanza had been left "entirely without

®4Daniels to Winslow, December 21, 1915, Ibid., 860.
®®Winslow to Daniels, December 11, 1915, Ibid., 856857.
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military protection."

It was "imperative," he insisted,

that American armed forces be sent to the Yaqui Valley
at once.®®
Admiral Winslow concurred.

Constitutionalist troops

at Corral, he informed Daniels, had withdrawn "without
warning," just as they had at Los Mochis.

If the soldiers

at Esperanza behaved in like manner, a raid on that settle
ment was bound to follow.

The Yaquis, he believed, would

"not only destroy property, but murder settlers" as well.
Still at Topolobampo, Winslow was deeply concerned.

The

expeditionary force under his command, he reminded the
Secretary, was "none too strong."

Moreover, the reenforce

ments that he had earlier requested would not reach Tobari
Bay in time "to take part in early operations" ashore.
Clearly, the Admiral believed that the worst was in store.
Describing the situation in the Yaqui Valley as very serious,
he urged his superiors "to bring pressure to bear" upon
Dieguez and other Constitutionalist authorities to "compel"
them to garrison Esperanza .®7
Again, however, the Admiral revealed his predeliction for armed intervention,

86ibid

it was "possible," he

87Ibid., 857
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declared, "that under certain conditions Mexican authorities
might grant permission for us, or even request us, to land
and protect our own people.”

General Munoz, he stressed,

had "freely admitted" that "in the event of sudden attack
by Indians on unprotected American settlers we would be
justified" in intervening.

As a precaution, then, he had

already ordered the cruisers Raleigh and Denver to Tobari
Bay.

In closing, Winslow again urged the Secretary to

obtain from Carranza "authority" to employ American forces
in the defense of the Yaqui Valley colony.®®

The Admiral

was spoiling for a fight.
Although Lansing himself apparently was not averse
to landing an expeditionary force in the event of a genuine
emergency, he refused to consider Winslow's audacious pro
posal.

He preferred, instead, to pursue the cooperation of

the Constitutionalist Government.

Accordingly, on December

12, in communications to both Carranza and Obregon, he
requested that additional troops be sent to the Yaqui
Valley to relieve the American colony.®®

The following day

8 ®Ibid.

®®Lansing to Parker and Simpich, December 12, 1915,
Ibid., 858.
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Simpich reported from the border that reinforcements from
Guaymas were even then on their way to Esperanza .90
Within a week, the crisis in the Yaqui Valley
appeared to have passed.

On December 20, General Dieguez

and Obregon .himself arrived in Guaymas for conferences with
the Yaqui chieftains.9*- Then all went awry.

On the very

day that negotiations were to begin, some 1500 Indians again
invaded the Valley.

The American settlements at Ontogata

and Cajeme and the Richardson Construction Company's station
at San Pedro all came under attack.

Constitutionalist

troops at those locations first refused to fight the Yaquis
and then deserted.
fell .92

Shortly thereafter the settlements

Although no Americans were killed, damage to

foreign-owned property was extensive .93

Those Americans

that failed to escape down the valley barricaded themselves
at isolated ranches in country already overrun by the Indians.
"When we left Ontogata," retreating colonists wired McPherson,

90Simpich to Lansing, December 13, 1915, Ibid.
3*~New York Times, December 20, 1915.
92Winslow to Daniels, December 21, 1915, Foreign
Relations, 1915, 859-860.
" s i m p i c h to Lansing, December 22, 1915, Ibid., 861.
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"block 33 and 36 were fighting to hold out for help and
help is needed quick."9^

Events were unfolding much as

Winslow had predicted.
The Admiral, having recently arrived at Guaymas,
was ready to intervene.

Although Obregon had already ordered

General Estrada to the Yaqui Valley and had assured American
consular officials that an even larger force would follow,
Winslow placed little stock in the promises of Constitution
alist authorities .95

On December 21, he advised Daniels

that despite the rapidly deteriorating situation in the
Yaqui Valley

the Americans there were not being evacuated.

He feared for their lives.

"Am I," he queried, "to land

troops if General

is willing?"

lObregonj

answer" was requested.9*’

An "immediate

Daniels needed no prompting.

There would be no landing, he tersely replied.

The decision

to intervene would be made in Washington and nowhere else .97
It was fortunate that Winslow was restrained.

Hun

dreds of Constitutionalist soldiers and a large number of
deserters no less hostile to Americans and other foreigners

9^Winslow to Daniels, December 21, 1915, Ibid., 860
95lbid.

96Ibid., 859.

^7Daniels to Winslow, December 21, 1915, Ibid., 860
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on Mexican soil remained in the Yaqui Valley.9** Given
the existing tension, the sudden appearance of an American
expeditionary force at Esperanza might well have had dis
astrous

consequences.

Moreover, at the very moment that

the Admiral was prepared to intervene, the Constitutionalists
themselves were in the process of launching a major offen
sive against the Yaquis.

Some 10,000 soldiers under five

Constitutionalist generals were already converging on the
Valley from both north and south.

Dual headquarters for the

campaign were to be established at Guaymas and Esperanza."
Under the circumstances, there was no justification
for the landing of American marines at Tobari Bay.
the contrary.

Quite

Such a move would have greatly intensified

the already widespread anti-American sentiment in northern
Mexico.

In addition, it would have seriously exacerbated the

existing complex and volatile international dispute arising
from foreign control of some of the most highly productive
agricultural lands in the republic.

In the midst of a

xenophobic, nationalistic agrarian revolution, few acts by
the United States could have proved more dangerously provo
cative .

" w i n s l o w to Daniels, December 21, 1915, Ibid.
" s i m p i c h to Lansing, December 22, 1915, Ibid., 861.
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Chastened, Winslow did not again suggest inter
vention.

And, indeed, for some time thereafter, there was

no reason to do so.

On December 22, the Admiral reported

an encouraging conference with Obregon.

The General, he

informed Daniels, "stated that it would take two or three
days for his plans to develop, but that he would then proceed
seriously against the Indians."

Winslow seemed satisfied.

"Apparently," he observed, the General was "making good on
what he said he would do."

Rather soon, the Admiral closed,

"I look for an improvement in the Yaqui Valley situation.
Corroborative reports came from both Simpich at Nogales and
Consul Louis Hostetter at Hermosillo.

Obregon "assures me,"

the latter wrote Lansing, "that within a very short time the
State will have no Yaqui question . " - ^ 1

The General, however,

was overly optimistic.

VI.
In the weeks that followed, Obregon's subordinate
commanders inexplicably failed to press home the offensive.
Although the Indians were indeed put to flight and the

lOOwinsiow to Daniels, December 22, 1915, Ibid.
^ ^Simpich to Lansing and Hots tetter to Lansing,
December 22, 1915, Ibid., 861-862.

security of the Yaqui Valley colony apparently assured, the
"Yaqui question" was by no means eliminated.

Even under

optimum conditions - given the nature of the terrain, the
hardiness of the Indians, and the limited resources at
Obregon's disposal - it would have proved a most difficult
task to complete.

Then, early in 1916, there emerged a

succession of serious new challenges to the preeminence of
the revolutionary regime.

Each took priority over suppres

sion of the Yaqui rebellion.

Of primary importance was the

resurgence of Villista activity in north-central Mexico.
That development, in turn, led directly to armed intervention
by the United States in March, 1916.

Thereafter, for the

better part of a year, Constitutionalist forces in northern
Mexico were held in readiness to meet whatever new crisis
might arise from the presence of American troops deep in
Mexican territory.

Under the circumstances, the campaign

against the Indians was all but abandoned.

Consequently, by

the spring of 1916, the "Yaqui question" had emerged anew.

102

Again it became a source of friction between Washington and
the revolutionary government of Mexico.

102geef jor example, New York Times, March 27,
April 13.and 21, and May 18, 1916.

Chapter 10

THE DEFEAT OF FRANCISCO VILLA

I.
Although border raids and Indian uprisings seriously
strained Mexican-American relations during the immediate post
recognition period, the principal threat to the incipient
reconciliation of October 1915 was a disillusioned and em
bittered Pancho Villa.

Deeply disappointed by Washington's

recognition of the Constitutionalist Government, he became
enraged at subsequent American cooperation with Carrancista
field commanders»

Believing himself basely betrayed, he and

his lieutenants turned upon Americans and other foreigners
with a vengeance.

Villista bands struck repeatedly at

American-owned mines and ranches throughout north-central
Mexico.

At the same time, there was a marked increase in the

number of ugly incidents along the border between the United
States and territory under Villista control.

Carranza, as

anxious now to reduce Mexican-American friction as he was to
complete the ruin of his rival, countered by dispatching
Obregon to the border.

The General, in turn, quickly broke
451
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organized Villista resistance in the North and hounded Villa
himself deep into the western sierra.

By the end of the year,

then, at least to casual observers of the Mexican scene, it
appeared that the First Chief might at last be master in
his own house.

II.
The decision to recognize the Constitutionalist
Government, taken at the White House conference of September
13, was a calculated risk.

That trouble with Villa would

follow was a foregone conclusion.

Anticipating retaliatory

strikes against American residents in Villista or Conventionist territory, the Wilson Administration took the one
step it could to preclude violent reprisals.*

As early as

September 11, Lansing, apparently on his own initiative,
began to lay the ground for a general evacuation of American
citizens from the affected areas.

"In view of [the] particu

larly dangerous condition arising from revolutionary crisis,"
he explained to pertinent consular officials, Mit is of the
utmost importance that you induce all Americans and inci
dentally other foreigners in your district to leave Mexico
without any delay whatsoever."

Dissemination of that advice

•*-New York Times, September 20 and November 28, 1915.
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was to be effected "as thoroughly and quietly as possible,
requesting discretion of parties informed."

Should the

consuls themselves feel endangered, they too were to proceed to the border.
For the rest, the Administration looked to Carranza.
So impressive was the September offensive in the North that
higher officials in Washington fairly assumed that Villa,
Zapata, and lesser Conventionist chieftains would soon be
swept from the field.

The momentary danger of reprisals

against Americans and other foreign nationals in Mexico
would thereby be minimized if not altogether removed.

Dire

predictions to the contrary and a sobering survey of existing
conditions in the republic, both emanating from the Division
3
of Mexican Affairs, were cavalierly dismissed.
Officially,
at least, the mood of the moment was optimism.
Following the Pan-American conference of October 9,
at which time the Latin American conferees endorsed Washing
ton' s decision to recognize Carranza, a second, more urgent

2

Lansing to certain American Consuls, September 11,
1915, Foreign Relations, 1915, 837.
3 See,

for example, Canova "Brief Statement of Present
Political Situation in Mexico Based on Official Reports,”
October 6 , 1915, SDR 812.00/16962.
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note was sent to the aforementioned consular officials
ordering them to confidentially advise all Americans and
foreigners in their respective districts to "withdraw
immediately" to the border.^

The gradual retirement of

Americans from northwestern and north-central Mexico,
prompted by Lansing's initial warning, turned into a rush
in early October.
was necessary.

By then, however, no official warning

Imminent American recognition of the Car

ranza regime was an open secret, and foreigners and Mexicans
alike prepared as best they could for the tempest that was
sure to follow.
In the State of Sonora, in which American and other
foreign mining and agricultural interests were heavily rep
resented, Villista civil government suddenly collapsed.

On

September 30, Maytorena crossed into the United States,
leaving a deputy, Carlos Randall at Nogales in nominal con
trol of the state.®

In western Sonora, isolated from the

rest of the republic by the massive Sierra Madre Occidental,

^Lansing to certain American Consuls, October 9,
1915, Foreign Relations, 1915, 838.
^New York Times, October 16, 1915.
^Funston to the Adjutant General, October 7, 1915,
SDR 812.00/16457.
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near anarchy prevailed.

"Here at Hermosillo," Hostetter

reported from the state capital, "there is absolutely no law
or order and everything is in the hands of the Yaquis."
Maytorena, he charged, had made the Indians "immune to all
laws," so that no one dared to interfere with them.

Condi

tions there were rapidly deteriorating, and the population
of the western portion of the state was completely "demora
lized."

Even more than they feared the Yaquis, however, the

people there dreaded the reported approach of Villa.

It

was widely rumored that Carranza's rival planned to cross
the mountains to punish the Maytorenistas for their insub
ordination and to establish himself at Hermosillo for a last
stand against Obregon.^
Some days later, Simpich reported from Nogales that
the new Randall regime was "encountering grave difficulties."
In addition to bankruptcy, it had been seriously weakened by
the resignation and flight of large numbers of civil and
military officials.**

Then, as anarchy spread to eastern

^Hostetter to Lansing, October 6 , 1915, SDR 812.00/
16468.
8Simpich to Lansing, October 8, 1915, SDR 812.00/
16470.
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Sonora as well, rioting erupted at Cananea, headquarters of
the big American-owned Cananea Consolidated Copper Company
(CCCC) and site of the largest concentration of foreigners
in the state.

Inhabited by some 700 Americans and perhaps

12,000 Mexicans, most of the latter sympathetic with Villa
and strongly influenced by the radical Industrial Workers
of the World (I. w. W.), Cananea was a powder keg.*®

The

consular agent there, Simpich informed Lansing, "daily
reports . . . the continuation of street brawls, murder, and
fighting."
order*

Nothing, however, was being done to restore

The few remaining constituted authorities in the

state were simply standing by, awaiting "some new develop
ment,"^*
Conditions in the neighboring State of Chihuahua were
for the moment, at least, somewhat better.
Fidel Avila was in firm control*

Villista Governor

And, by early October,

Villa himself had arrived in Chihuahua City.

There, at the

q
^Consular Agent Montague to Lansing, undated, re
ceived October 1, 1915, Foreign Relations, 1915, 1095.
*°Lansing to Belt, October 12, 1915, SDR 812.00/
16485.
**Siropich to Lansing, October 8, 1915, SDR 812.00/
16470.

headquarters of the Villista movement, the General was busily
engaged in "reorganizing and regrouping his forces."

Despite

heavy losses and "large-scale desertions," he "still com
manded a formidable army."

His "complete control over the

troops under his direct command and observation" was indisputable.

12

Consequently, the civil disorder that wracked

Sonora had not yet spread to Chihuahua.

Moreover, for some

time, foreign lives and property in the latter state had
been reasonably secure.

Although in the past Villa himself

had extorted forced loans from foreign merchants and corpo
rations, he had foregone the practice since his conference
with General Hugh Scott the previous August.

Thus in early

October, the State of Chihuahua was relatively stable.

None

theless, foreigners generally and Americans in particular
were apprehensive.

Since mid-September, it had been in

creasingly evident that the Wilson Administration was moving
toward recognition of the Carranza regime.

And few Americans

in Mexico doubted that Villista reaction would be ugly.
Unquestionably, Villa himself was cognizant of
developments in Washington.

In addition to his own sources

of information in the capital, the disclosures of the American

12Clendenen, The U. S. and Villa, 207.
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press left little to the imagination.

13

Lansing's secrecy

in advising the withdrawal of foreigners from northern
Mexico was all for naught.

Almost immediately, then. Villa

learned the results of the final Pan-American conference of
October 9.

"First reports," Clendenen notes, "indicated

that he took the news quietly."

The struggle had only

begun, Villa declared stoically, adding that "a dozen nations
could not keep Carranza from f a i l u r e . M o r e o v e r ,

the

United States still had not recognized the Constitutionalist
regime.

The full impact of Washington's decision had yet to

be felt.
Unwilling, for whatever reason, to precipitate the
now inevitable break with the United States, Villa behaved
initially with considerable self-restraint.

Although by

the second week in October, it was learned that Villista
bands were "making a clean sweep of American property" in
some parts of Chihuahua, the lives of Americans resident in
the state did not appear to be in serious jeopardy.

15

For

13
-“ Villa's principal spokesman in Washington was
Enrique C. Llorente, the Confidential Agent of the Provisional
Government of Mexico.
^Clendenen, The U. S. and Villa, 207.
15
Edward L. Hamilton to Lansing, October 14, 1915,
SDR 812.00/16479. Hamilton, a Republican congressman from
Michigan, wrote to the Secretary of State on behalf of con
stituents with holdings in Mexico.

the moment, at least, Villa's aim appears to have been to
strengthen his own hand while denying supplies to the ad
vancing Constitutionalists . 16

Most distressing to State

Department officials, however, were an alleged order pro
viding for the confiscation of certain large American mining
properties in Chihuahua, including the ASARCO smelting plant
in Chihuahua City, and Villa's threat to "leave nothing" in
the state that could "be of service to Constitutionalist
forces."

American investors, Lansing complained to Carranza

on October 14, feared that "millions of dollars worth of
property will be destroyed.”

It was essential, then, the

Secretary declared, not only that the Constitutionalist
Government protect American holdings in Chihuahua, but that
Carranza send troops to eastern Sonora as well to protect
the "vast mining interests” at Cananea.

17

Under the circumstances, Lansing's demands were
excessive.

In the first place, the United States had not

yet extended de facto recognition to the Constitutionalist
Government.

And, until it did so, Carranza was in no way

16Lansing to Belt, October 14, 1915, SDR 812.00/
16509a.
17Ibid.; Lansing to Belt, October 12, 1915, SDR 812.00/
16485.

460
responsible for the lives and property of Americans and other
foreigners in territory not under his immediate control.
Secondly, there was no powerful Constitutionalist force near
enough to the districts in question to provide the requisite
protection.

Finally, Villa, with a disciplined army of some

13,000 men, was, for the moment, the unchallenged master of
the Mexican North.

It was patently impossible, then, for

the First Chief to provide the degree of protection for
foreign lives and property insisted upon by Washington.
Furthermore, to have attempted to comply with the
American demands would have been to drastically reduce the
forces at Obregon's disposal, thereby delaying indefinitely
or frustrating completely attainment of the Government's
primary objective - the defeat and destruction of Villa's
army.

Consequently, as long as organized resistance to the

Constitutionalist Government remained, Carranza could offer
no more than token compliance with Lansing's insistence upon
protection of foreign interests in the republic.

18

With the

very survival of the Constitutionalist regime itself at
stake, he could ill afford to do otherwise.
persisted in his demands.

Yet Lansing

With the sole exception of the

^ H e w York Times, October 24, 1915.
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President, officials in Washington manifested little under
standing of the Constitutionalist dilemma and even less
sympathy for the harried Carranza.

Thus even before the

United States formally extended de facto recognition to the
Constitutionalist Government, new seeds of mutual discord
and misunderstanding were sown.

III.
By mid-October, Villa was ready to resume operations.
Cut off from the sea, his only openings to the outside world
were the border ports of Nogales and Ciudad Juarez, neither
of which were really secure.

His immediate objective, then,

was Agua Prieta, a small border settlement opposite the
American city of Douglas, Arizona.

The only remaining Con

stitutionalist outpost in the Northwest, it was na standing
threat to Villa's rear."

Seizure of Agua Prieta, Clendenen

observes, "would simultaneously eliminate that danger, make
an additional port of entry available, and destroy the only
vestige of Carranza's authority in northern Sonora.

An

extended base, from which new operations could be launched,
would thus be consolidated."

19

19

Villa, then, could not afford

Clendenen, The U. S. and Villa, 208.
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to fail at Agua Prieta.

The survival of the Villista move

ment hung in the balance.
Yet fail he did, largely because of the benevolent
interference of the United States Government on behalf of
the Constitutionalists.

As far as Washington was concerned,

following the decisive Pan-American conference of October 9,
Villa was just another rebel in arms against the legitimate
government of Mexico.

Administration officials had no in

tention of permitting Villa to prolong his resistence by
establishing himself in strength at still another of the
strategic border ports.

Although unwilling to extend mili

tary or financial assistance to the de facto Government, they
were by no means averse to helping it in other ways.

Conse

quently, they responded positively to Carranza's appeal for
cooperation in the defense of Agua Prieta.

Late in October,

the President himself authorized the passage of Constitutionalist troop trains across the southwestern United States.

20

Completely cut off from other Constitutionalist
forces. General P. E. Calles 1 command at Agua Prieta con
sisted of no more than a few hundred ill-equipped recruits,
hardly a match for Villa's seasoned veterans.

20

During the

Ibid., 209? New York Times. October 27, 1915.

last week in October, however, thousands of troops, artillery,
and large quantities of war materiel rolled into Agua Prieta
from Constitutionalist bases at Piedras Negras and Nuevo
Laredo.2^

Soon extensive defensive works, bristling with

cannon and machine guns, ringed Calles position to within a
few feet of the international boundary.

22

Meanwhile, in

response to urgent appeals from Senator Henry F. Ashurst and
other Arizona public officials, the Secretary of War had
instructed General Funston to reinforce the garrison at
Douglas and to take whatever steps he deemed necessary to
protect American lives and property in that city.

93

In

short, Funston was authorized to intervene in the ensuing
contest for Agua P r i e t a . B y October 30, then, when Villa
reached the border, the Constitutionalist outpost had become
a near-impregnable fortress.

What but two weeks earlier had

promised to be a quick and easy victory, the critical first
step in the anticipated resurgence of the Villista movement,
now loomed as a potential debacle.

2 1 Ibid.,

October 27 and 29, 1915.

2 2 Ibid.,

October 27, 1915.

2 *Ibid.,

November 2, 1915.

2 3 Ibid.
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The Villista response to American accommodation of
Carranza was understandably heated.

On October 29, Governor

Randall, then at Nogales, Sonora, vehemently protested the
passage of Constitutionalist troops through United States
territory.

Because of that unfriendly act, he informed

Consul Simpich, he could no longer guarantee the safety of
American lives and property in Sonora.

25

It was an alarming

statement and one which caused as great a stir in New York
and Washington as it did along the southwestern frontier.

26

Meanwhile, during the latter half of October, as
Villa himself led the march on Agua Prieta, his subordinates
in the interior of Sonora intensified their harassment of
American and other foreign business interests.

By the third

week of the month, Villista bands had occupied most of the
American mining communities in the northern portion of the
state and stripped them of arms, horses, and provisions.

27

As a result, virtually all activity in the mining districts

25

Ibid., October 30, 1915; Funston to the Adjutant
General, November 4, 1915, SDR 812.00/16752.
2 6 Ibid.;

L. W. Mix to Ashurst, October 28, 1915,
SDR 812.00/16643. Mix was mayor of Nogales, Arizona.
27New York Times, October 24# 1915.
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came to a sudden halt.

Only the great copper mines at

Cananea maintained production and they too were soon shut
,
28
down.
Destruction of the Southern Pacific Railroad of
Mexico (SPM) spur line between Cananea and the border and the
refusal of company officials to repair it so long as the
campaign in the North continued, ultimately forced the clo
sure of the mines at Cananea.

As of October 23, then,

operations cleased and thousands of workers were idle and
unpaid.

At Nogales, Governor Randall was furious.

The

Yaqui general, Urbalejo, was promptly dispatched from Naco
to Cananea with orders to detain officials of the CCCC and
to compel regular payment of wages despite the shut-down.
Upon occupying the town, Urbalejo demanded from CCCC and
SPM officials gold levies of $25,000 and $150,000 respec
tively.

Failure to pay, the General indicated, would be

punished by the destruction of all railroad property at Naco
and Cananea and the mining properties at the latter site as

2 8 Ibid.,

October 29, 1915.

^ F u n s t o n to the Adjutant General, November 4, 1915,
SDR 812.00/16752.
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Shortly thereafter, word arrived in Washington that
still other foreign firms with operations in northern Sonora
were being subjected to similar pressure by Villista authorities.

30

"It is the belief here," the American commander at

Nogales reported, "that all these unreasonable demands are
the last frantic efforts of the factional chiefs in Sonora."
Nonetheless, they were not to be taken lightly.

"There is

grave personal danger," he warned, "to any American in
Sonora, and threats are being openly made at Naco and in
Nogales at acts of retaliation" against United States citizens.

31

By the last week in October, then, some twenty

million dollars worth of American property in northern Sonora
was at the mercy of Villista commanders.

32

At the same time,

hundreds of American residents of the mining districts, par
ticularly those at Cananea, had begun to fear for their
,.
33
lives.

30

New York Times, November 5, 1915.

31

Funston to the Adjutant General, November 4, 1915,
SDR 812.00/16752.
33Mix to Ashurst, October 28, 1915, SDR 812.00/
16643.
33

Funston to the Adjutant General, November 4, 1915,
SDR 812.00/16752.
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On October 29, Lansing moved to forestall further
Villista depredations.

On the same day that Randall's

ominous protest was received in Washington, the Secretary
warned the Governor in no uncertain terms that both he and
his chief would be held strictly accountable for the abuse
of American citizens in northern Sonora as well as for the
confiscation or destruction of their p r o p e r t y . I t was a
stern rebuke and an effective one.

Soon after, Urbalejo

himself vouched for the safety of Americans at Cananea . 35
For the moment, at least, the danger there had passed.
Not so, however, at Agua Prieta.
brewing.

There a storm was

On or about October 30, during an interview with

newsmen, Villa obtained absolute confirmation of the formal
recognition of the Carranza regime.

Although obviously

disappointed, he appeared resigned to the fact and accepted
it with considerable aplomb.

He did not, however, receive

with equanimity the disclosure of American cooperation with
the defenders of Agua Prieta.

Quite the c o n t r a r y . " I n d i g 

nant and defiant," he burst into a "tirade" against the

3 ^Ibid.;

New York Times, October 30, 1915.

35Funston to the Adjutant General, November 4, 1915,
SDR 812.00/16752.
35Carothers to Lansing, October 31, 1915, SDR 812.00/
16653.

468
United States Government:

"This is the way the United States

repays me," he raged, "for the . , . protection I have given
foreigners in Mexico.

Hereafter, I don't give a

happens to foreigners in Mexico . . . .
the United States."

37

what

I am through with

He would take Ague Prieta, he vowed,

"if he had to fight the whole Carran 2 a army and the United
States" as well.

38

Meanwhile, as Villa fumed, four more

trainloads of Constitutionalist troops crossed into Agua
Prieta.

At the same time, some 6000 American soldiers from

the hastily reinforced garrison at Douglas took up defensive
positions just north of the international boundary.

39

"The

situation here," Carothers reported late on the 31st, is
"rather tense."

40

During the following afternoon, Villa began his
advance on Agua Prieta.

Shortly after midnight, following

an extended artillery duel, he launched a series of four
successive assaults against the Constitutionalist defenses.

37

Ibid.; New York Times, November 1, 1915; Funston
to the Adjutant General, November 1, 1915, SDR 812.00/16679.
3 8 Ibid.

39New York Times, November 1 and 2, 1915.
40
16653.

Carothers to Lansing, October 31, 1915, SDR 812.00/
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Exposed by powerful searchlights, allegedly operated by
American adventurers, and subjected to intense cannon and
machine gun fire, the attackers were driven back with heavy
losses.^

In the morning. Villa withdrew his forces some

distance from the town, apparently to regroup preparatory to
a fresh assault.
Meanwhile, during the course of the battle, stray
rounds had killed and wounded a number of spectators on the
a

American side of the line.

e

Funston, having recently ar

rived in Douglas, responded by notifying both belligerents
that deliberate firing into the city would not be tolerated.
Should it occur, he warned, American troops would cross the
border and forcibly suppress it.

43

The Villistas, of course,

Ibid., November 3, 1915; Clendenen, The U. S. and
Villa, 211.
"Villa's previous successes in night attacks,"
Clendenen notes, "caused him to have great faith in them, but
at Agua Prieta the night was turned into day by powerful
searchlights, the beams of which not only revealed the on
coming attack but blinded the attackers.
These searchlights
caused much bitterness among the Villistas and were quickly
added to the grudge which they were building up against the
United States." Villa believed that the searchlights were
furnished by the United States Armyr manned by American sol
diers, and located on the American side of the line. What
ever the case, Clendenen concludes, power for the searchlights
"undoubtedly came from the United States." Villa had cause
for complaint.
Ibid.
43

New York Times, November 2, 1915.
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because of their position opposite Douglas, were most likely
to give offense.

Consequently, on the morning of November 3,

Villa sought and obtained an interview with the General.
His aim, apparently, was to determine whether or not Funston
indeed intended to intervene on behalf of the Constitu
tionalists.

At the meeting Villa expressed his aversion to

opening hostilities against the United States.
the details are unclear.

Beyond that

Funston reported only that Villa's

"attitude was quite satisfactory."

44

Villa chose not to renew the attack.

Whatever, the case,
Instead, later in the

day, he broke camp, swung south of Agua Prieta, and took a
position twenty-five miles to the west at the tiny border
town of Naco.

There Villa hoped to establish another port

of entry and a new base of operations in the North.

Once

firmly established on the border, he planned on the one hand
to renew the campaign against Calles and on the other to ex
tend his influence into western Sonora and down the Gulf of
California to Sinaloa.

45

The meeting with Funston, Clendenen notes, "was
probably the last occasion on which an American official saw

^F u n s t o n to the Adjutant General, November 3, 1915,
SDR 812.00/16727; New York Times, November 4 and 5, 1915.
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and talked [with. Villa]

face to face*"

The latter*s "resent

ment against the United States and his bitterness at American
ingratitude must have been increasing hourly, as the magnitude of his disaster sank deeper into his consciousness."

46

Certainly, within a very short time. Villa's hatred of the
United States had become intense.

In the weeks and months

that followed, it was manifested repeatedly in an increasingly
violent assault upon American lives and property on both
sides of the international boundary.
For several days, Villa rested at Naco.

In the in

terim, Lansing's warning notwithstanding, he and his lieu
tenants persisted in their campaign against foreign interests
in northern Mexico.

On November 4, the American-owned

Nichols ranch, several miles from Naco, was swept clean of
livestock, and threats were subsequently made to confiscate
the huge herd of the Cananea Cattle Company, a subsidiary
of the CCCC in eastern Sonora .47

Also on November 4, it was

learned in Washington that officials of the latter firm had
finally succumbed to Villista pressure, paying $25,000 in gold
for an "immunity" of dubious validity.

Other large mining

4<*Clendenen, The U. S. and Villa, 215.
47New York Times, November 4 and 7, 1915.
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concerns in eastern Sonora promptly followed suit.^®
doubtless it was well that they did.

And

Some three weeks earlier,

just before leaving for Agua Prieta, Villa himself confirmed
the order confiscating the ASARCO smelting plant at Chihuahua
City and all other company property in the state.

49

Although as yet no Americans had lost their lives in
the northern campaign, it was clear that those who remained
in Villista territory did so at great risk.

On November 6 ,

Villistas at Cananea arrested all Turkish merchants in the
vicinity and held them for ransom.

50

Moreover, on the same

day, two American physicians, employees of the CCCC who had
gone to Agua Prieta to care for the wounded, crossed the
border at that site with a shocking account of physical
abuse and near execution at the hands of Villista soldiers.

51

Thus while Lansing's admonition of October 29 succeeded in
intimidating Governor Randall and Villista civil authorities,
it by no means curbed the excesses of Villa himself or those

^®Ibid.f November 5, 1915.

^ Bernstein, Mexican Mining Industry, 108; Clendenen,
The 0. s. and Villa, 213.
5QNew York Times, November 7, 1915.
51

xIbid.; Funston to the Adjutant General, November 10,
1915, SDR 812.00/16803.
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of his military commanders.

In fact# Carothers reported on

November 8 , Villa was now "absolutely irresponsible and
subject to violent bursts of temper."
of any extreme."

He was "fully capable

Neither "promises nor assurances of good

intentions" could be accepted at face value.

Villa's "brutal

treatment" of the American doctors, Carothers contended, was
a "fair example of his present state of mind."
clear, then:

52

It was

sooner or later, Americans would die in

northern Mexico.

IV.
Early in November, the First Chief moved to drive
his surviving opponents from the field.

In the North,

Obregon on the border was to cooperate with General Manuel
co

Dieguez, then at Guaymas, in bringing Villa to bay.

Thus,

on November 6 , Obregon established his headquarters at Agua
Prieta and began preparations for what was confidently ex
pected to be the final campaign in the North.

The following

day, Dieguez* army of 7000 men occupied Hermosillo with
little difficulty, tightening the vise on Villa and blocking

^2Carothers to Lansing, November 8 , 1915, SDR 812.00/
16739.
53

New York Times, November 8 and 9, 1915.
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his escape route south down the main line of the SPM.

54

Constitutionalist strategy now presupposed a final Villista
stand at Naco and the subsequent flight of Villa himself
across the international boundary to internment in the
United States .55
Apparently, the full cooperation of United States
authorities was taken for granted.

Although there is no

evidence of a formal agreement to that effect, American
officials on the border were unquestionably well-disposed
toward Obregon and hostile in varying degree to Villa.
Funston, for instance, conferred at length with Obregon upon
the latter's arrival at Agua Prieta.

What passed between

them is unknown; the meeting, however, was most cordial.5®
More explicit indications

of officialAmerican sentiment

manifested in the respective

were

attitudes ofCustoms Collector

Zach Cobb at El Paso and Special Agent Carothers at Douglas,
Arizona.
In the first instance, Cobb recommended that per
mission be denied to Villa to send several hundred severely

5 4 Ibid.,

November 7 and 8 , 1915.

5 5 Ibid.,

November

9, 1915.

56Ibid., November

7, 1915.

475
wounded soldiers across the Southwest to Ciudad Juarez .57
Accordingly, Lansing rejected Villa's appeal, thereby
deepening the latter's hatred of the United States.

58

In

the second, Cobb, strongly supported by Carothers, repeatedly
urged the appropriate authorities in Washington to halt the
export of coal to Mexico on the grounds that it would ulti
mately fall into Villa's hands and be used to fuel his
trains.

59

Without coal, of course. Villa would lose much

of his mobility, and the bases at Naco and Nogales, isolated
from the interior of Mexico, would become virtually useless.
And, in addition to attempting to deny Villa fuel, Cobb also
took steps to deprive him of his principal source of revenue.
On his own initiative, the Collector halted the sale of
Villista cattle at El Paso and urged his superiors to endorse
his action.

Such measures, he argued, were essential to the

destruction of Villista power in northern Mexico .59
concurred.

Carothers

If Villa were "permitted to gain a footing" at

either Naco or Nogales, the agent warned, he would become a

57Cobb to Lansing, November 4, 1915, SDR 812.00/
16705.
5®Lansing to Cobb, November 6 , 1915, Ibid.
5 9 Clendenen,
6 0 Ibid.

The U. S. and Villa, 215-216.
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"dangerous menace."

Not only coal, Carothers advised, but

all other supplies of potential use to the Villistas should
be embargoed.

61

Villa, meanwhile, with some 12,000 men scattered
throughout northern Sonora, realized that his position at
Naco was rapidly becoming u n t e n a b l e . F l a n k e d on the east
by Calles and Obregon, he was cut off from Ciudad Juarez,
and his communications with Chihuahua were in serious jeo
pardy.

He had to act, and quickly.

A new assault on Agua

Prieta, far stronger since the arrival of Obregon, was
obviously out of the question.
the interior of Chihuahua.

So, too, was withdrawal to

The only acceptable alternative,

then, was a sudden thrust into western Sonora in hopes of
defeating Dieguez.

Indeed, if villa succeeded in destroying

Dieguez' army and establishing himself at Hermosillo, he
would have "a new lease on life . . . and a base from which
he might yet conquer all of Mexico."

63

If nothing else, he

6^Carothers to Lansing, November 8 , 1915, SDR 812.00/
16739.
62

New York Times, November 8 , 1915; Simpich to
Lansing, November 10, 1915, SDR 812.00/16785; Funston to
the Adjutant General, November 17, 1915, SDR 812.00/16842.
63Clendenen, The U. S. and Villa, 214.
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might still succeed in brushing by Dieguez and escaping
southward to join Zapatista and other nominally Villista
forces operating in the States of Durango, Sinaloa, and
Jalisco.

64

Accordingly, on November 14, as Obregon began

his advance on Naco, Villa withdrew from the border and
proceeded rapidly southward toward Hermosillo.6^
Four days later, skirmishing commenced around Alamito,
a dozen miles north of Villa's objective . 66

Then, on the

20th, Villa himself led a disastrous assault on the Consti
tutionalist outpost.

Caught in a lethal triangle of cannon

and machine gun fire, his veterans were utterly routed.
the morning of the 21st, it was all over for Villa.

67

By
In

the "most decisive defeat" since Celaya and Leon, Villista
morale was shattered:

68

"The hard Villa army began to

®4Davis to Lansing, October 30, 1915, SDR 812.00/
16793. Villista forces in Jalisco were particularly strong
at that time, very nearly seizing the important city of
Guadalajara on October 31. Davis to Lansing, October 31,
1915, SDR 812.00/16794.
65New York Times, November 15, 1915.
66

67

Ibid., November 20, 1915.

Funston to the Adjutant General, December 9, 1915,
SDR 812.00/16951; Carothers to Lansing, November 20, 1915,
SDR 812.00/16831; Literary Digest, LI (December 11, 1915),
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disintegrate."

69

Leaving behind them more than 800 dead,

many seriously wounded, and great quantities of ordnance and
other materiel, the survivors began a long forced march to
the border.

70

There, at Nogales, Randall and a small

Villista garrison held the last remaining refuge in the
entire Northwest.

With Dieguez in determined pursuit, dis

cipline dissolved, desertions soared, and villa reverted to
type.

He and his people, Hostetter reported from Hermosillo,

behaved "shamefully" during the retreat from Alamito.
himself set the example.

Villa

"He acted like a wild beast in

this section," the Consul concluded in disgust.

71

While Dieguez was dealing the death blow to Villa's
main force in western Sonora, Obregon, at least in part be
cause of urgent State Department representations, moved

^Clendenen, The U. S. and Villa, 214.
70New York Times, November 22, 1915.
7 ^"Hostetter

to Lansing, December 27, 1915, SDR 812.00/
17053. At La Colorado, for instance. Villa's men "sacked
every store in the town and murdered sixteen Chinamen, some
were hung, others shot and a few were killed by being pulled
to pieces by horse.*r Then, at San Pedro de las Cuevas, they
"shot seventy-eight men, every man in the town, and outraged
every girl and woman in the place . . . .
This he [Villa]
did after collecting forty thousand pesos in silver and
promising not to injure anyone . . . ." Ibid.
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swiftly against the smaller Villista concentration in the
eastern portion of the state.

There# General Jose Rodriguez

occupied Cananea and detachments from General Francisco
Acosta's command held the smaller towns and camps in the
adjacent mining districts.
at Cananea was "desperate.

72
73

By late November# the situation
Despite the "immunity" recently

purchased by the CCCC, Rodriguez had sacked the town and
threatened to execute every American citizen therein.

Upon

Obregon's approach# he took up positions around the great
smelting works of the American>-owned Cole-Ryan Corporation
and announced his determination to stand fast.

Obregon# in

turn# was equally determined to dislodge him, threatening to
bombard the town# if necessary, to drive Rodriguez into the
open.

The lives of hundreds of Americans and investments

valued in the millions of dollars were at stake.
complications {were]

"Serious

feared there," the New York Times con

cluded .74
Soon after# however# Rodriguez force of 5500 broke

72New York Times# November 20, 1915.
^Ibid., November 22, 1915.
74

Ibid., November 24 and 29# 1915; Funston to the
Adjutant General# November 10# 1915, SDR 812.00/16803;
Carothers to Lansing, November 22, 1915, SDR 812.00/16840.
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through the Constitutionalist encirclement, eluded pursuit,
and disappeared into the mountains.

75

Sorely disappointed,

Obregon turned on Acosta's scattered bands, driving them be
fore him toward the border.

Funston, closely following the

campaign, was apprehensive.

If Rodriguez and Acosta were to

join Villa, then falling back on Nogales, their combined
forces would considerably outnumber O b r e g o n . U n l e s s
Dieguez came up fast from Hermosillo, the entire Constitu
tionalist position in the North would be in jeopardy.
Along the Arizona-Sonora border, meanwhile, Villista
animosity toward the United States had risen sharply following
the formal recognition of the Carranza regime.

Nowhere along

the border was anti-American sentiment stronger than it was
at Nogales, Sonora.

There, since October 30, when the SPM

had ceased to operate in Villista territory, repeated "declara
tions and • • . demonstrations" against the Government of the
United States had occurred.

Feeling on both sides of the

border, the American commander reported, particularly on the
Mexican side, was "at high tension . " 77

The circumstances

7^Funston to the Adjutant General, November 25, 1915,
SDR 812.00/16855.
7 6 Ibid.

77Funston to the Adjutant General, November 10,
1915, SDR 812.00/16803.
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surrounding Villa's defeat at Agua Prieta, of course, had
seriously aggravated the situation.

Soon after that setback,

rumors of an imminent Villista attack on the American town
began to drift across the border.

Then, on November 4,

American authorities "unearthed" positive evidence of such
a scheme.

An attack was indeed scheduled for the night of

the 6 th when a small band was to cross the border and "loot
the various banks and stores."

Those involved included

Villista non-commissioned officers and soldiers, Mexican
civilians, and some fifty to sixty of "the Mexican rabble
on the American side."

Some of the latter group were "pledged

to join in the attack on the American Boundary guard."

That

the projected raid did not occur was due almost certainly to
its premature exposure and to the obvious readiness of the
strong American garrison.

78

Nonetheless, in the days that

followed, both towns remained in ferment.

79

Excitement rose

to a fever pitch on November 24 when the remnants of Villa's
shattered army entered the Mexican town.®**

79

On or about November 19, for instance, Governor
Randall seized from the CCCC a consignment of copper bullion
worth in excess of a half-million dollars. New York Times,
November 20, 1915.
®°Ibid., November 25, 1915.
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By late November, Clendenen contends, the Villistas
were convinced that they would have taken Agua Prieta if
Calles "had not been reinforced through the United States
and that the crushing blow at Hermosillo would not have
occurred."

Consequently, when they reached the border,

their hatred burst forth "in open violence."81.

That very

day, a concerned Governor Randall informed American authori
ties that a number of Villista officers on the Mexican side
of the line were "intoxicated and beyond his control."

pO

Soon after, a number of mounted Villistas rode to the edge
of the international boundary and "hurled insults across the
line at the American border guards, daring them to fight."
Brigadier General George Bell, commanding American forces at
Nogales, responded by rushing troops to prepared positions
along the border.

83

And it was well that he did.

That night

a serious riot erupted in the Mexican town when the rumor
spread that even then Obregon was advancing on Nogales through
United States territory.

84

Only the presence of Bell's troops

on the border prevented a march on the American town.

8 1 Clendenen,

82

The U. S. and Villa, 219.

New York Times, November 25, 1915.

83Ibid.

84Ibid., November 27, 1915.
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The following day, customs officials closed the Port
of Nogales and permitted no food or other supplies to cross
to the Mexican side.

"This added materially to the tense

ness of the situation."®®
incident.

It also provoked a very serious

Later in the day, two Villista colonels, one of

whom was garrison commander at Nogales, and some thirty
soldiers approached the international boundary near the
Nogales Customs House.

Seeing Simpich and the collector of

customs, they charged in their direction, brandishing their
weapons and "calling them vile names."

Although no shots

were fired, several soldiers rode across the border with
drawn guns, threatening people on the streets of the American
town and driving them back in confusion.®®
guard did not open fire, Funston queried,

Why the border
"I do not know.'1®^

The General was unquestionably alarmed over the
state of affairs at Nogales.

Within the previous 24 hours,

he reported on November 25, there had occurred five separate
incidents in which Villistas had fired across the border at

85

Funston to the Adjutant General, December 9, 1915,
SDR 812.00/16951.
86

Ibid., Simpich to Lansing, November 25, 1915,
SDR 812.00/16854; Funston to the Adjutant General, November
25, 1915, SDR 812.00/16855.
87-,.
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American soldiers.

Several of the latter had been wounded,

and a number of Mexicans hit and probably killed by the
return fire.

88

The situation at Nogales, he advised the

War Department, was "one of the gravest we have faced on
the border."

General Acosta, he continued, would shortly

join Villa thereby raising the number of troops opposite the
American town to more than 3000.
expected to follow.

And General Rodrigues; was

Given the breakdown of discipline in

the Villista ranks and the vengeful mood of the recent
arrivals, a potentially explosive situation was rapidly
developing.

Accordingly, the General closed, he had already

ordered reinforcements to Nogales and was leaving at once
for that place himself.®^
It is clear that Funston anticipated a serious clash
with Villista forces at Nogales.

And very likely something

of the sort would have occurred had not the sudden convergence
of Dieguez and Obregon on the town forced its precipitate
evacuation.

Thus on the night of the 25th, Villista soldiers

looted foreign properties in the Mexican town and began a

®®Funston to the Adjutant General, November 25, 1915,
SDR 812.00/16858; New York Times, November 27, 1915.
89

Funston to the Adjutant General, November 25, 1915,
SDR 812.00/16855.

485
disorderly withdrawal down the main line of the SPM.

At the

same time, a large number of deserters, including Governor
Randall and General Acosta, crossed to the American side and
sought political asylum.

90

The following morning, shortly

before Constitutionalist Colonel Lazaro Cardenas entered
Nogales, drunken Yaqui soldiers abandoned at the railroad
station began a deliberate fire across the border,

in the

ensuing skirmish, one American soldier and fifty to sixty
Yaguis were killed.

91

Later in the day, a second clash

occurred when Cardenas' command, then approaching Nogales,
mistook elements of the Tenth Cavalry for fleeing Villistas.
Although two of Cardenas' men were killed and several others
wounded, the Constitutionalists readily acknowledged their
error and the matter was amicably resolved.

92

By nightfall

of the 26th, Obregon and the main body of the Constitution
alist army had occupied the Mexican town.

The crisis at

Nogales had passed.

90Funston to the Adjutant General, December 9, 1915,
SDR 812.00/16951; New York Times, November 28, 1915.
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V.
Initial American reaction to Villista reverses in
northern Mexico was one of guarded optimism.

On November

28, for instance, the New York Times opined editorially that
Carranza's rival probably was f i n i s h e d . A n d indeed it
seemed so.

During the week immediately following the evacua

tion of Nogales, large numbers of Villista troops, including
Orbalejo's entire command of 1400 Yaguis, surrendered to
Dieguez or Obregon.9^

Scores of Villista officers, the

backbone of the Division of the North, were summarily exe
cuted.

Other units simply disbanded, leaving behind them

great quantities of ammunition, as well as cannon, machine
guns, and other war materiel all but impossible for Villa
to replace.

95

Although Villa himself, as well as Rodriguez

and several less prominent commanders, retained sizable
personal followings, they no longer constituted an army.9^
And upon withdrawing from Nogales they went their separate
ways.
If, however, the conventional war was over, the
guerrilla had just begun.

93_, . ,
Ibid.
96Ibid.

For the moment, though, that fact

9*Ibid., December 2, 1915.

95Ibid.
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was largely overlooked.

The situation in Mexico, the New

York Tiroes declared, was "much more promising than we had
reason to believe it would be so soon after the recognition
of Carranza.1' But appearances, particularly in revolutionary
Mexico, were apt to be misleading.

Thus thepossibility

re

mained, the writer cautioned, that still new "international
complications" might arise from "misapprehensions on one
side or the other."

97

And indeed they did.

On November 25, on the eve of the evacuation of
Nogales, Villa summoned his officers before him, informed
them that the United States Government "was to blame for his
present predicament," and called upon them to join him in a
guerrilla campaign against the northern border.

Those who

wished to leave him, he declared, were free to go.

As there

was "little enthusiasm" for the scheme, the great majority
of Villa's officers chose the latter option.
least, believed their chief insane.

98

Some, at

The rapid succession of

defeats in the North, they explained, had left him seriously
and perhaps dangerously deranged.

99

Inexplicably, in view

"ibid., November 28, 1915.
" Garrison to Lansing, December 1, 1915, SDR 812.00/
16893.
99New York Times, December 2, 1915.
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of Villa's notorious vindictiveness and penchant for violence,
American military authorities on the border failed to take
the threat seriously.

Funston, for example, could "scarcely

believe" that Villa meant what he said .***0

And yet however

absurd the scheme might have appeared in some quarters, it
was obviously feasible.

De la Rosa, Pisano, and the Texas

revolutionaries had established that fact beyond equivocation
on the Lower Rio Grande.

And Villa, in deadly earnest, would

do so again along the Chihuahua-New Mexico border.
Immediately, however, Washington and Queretaro had
to contend with a new series of attacks upon American and
other foreign properties in northern M e x i c o . O n November
28, Rodriguez' band struck the headquarters of the Moctezuma
Copper Company at Nacozari, Sonora. . Although the raiders
were eventually driven off by the Constitutionalist garrison,
extensive property damage resulted.
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On December 1, the

approach of another Villista band prompted the evacuation of

^00Garrison to Lansing, December 1, 1915, SDR 812.00/
16893; New York Times, December 2, 1915.
1 0 *Ibid., November 27 and December 2, 14, 1915;
Funston to Adjutant General, December 23, 1915, SDR 812.00/
17030; Simpich to Lansing, December 14, 1915, SDR 812.00/
17031.
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El Tigre, Sonora, the site of American-owned gold and silver
mines.

Again, Constitutionalist soldiers drove off the

attackers.*03

q U£

the appearance of Rodriguez and other

Villista marauders in the mining districts of eastern
Sonora effectively shut down most of the smaller camps and
prompted a new exodus of Americans to the border.
Meanwhile, in the southwestern United states, anxiety
mounted over the fate of American citizens in the interior
of Sonora.

It was generally believed that if Rodriguez

succeeded in taking either Nacozari or Cananea, his avowed
objectives, he would execute all Americans therein.
In Washington, too, then, concern was manifested over
conditions in northern Mexico, not only in Sonora but in the
Villista-controlled states of Chihuahua and Durango as well.
Those Americans who had failed to heed Lansing's warning
to come to the border would be in grave danger
expected. Villa recrossed the Sierra Madre.

if, as

Moreover, in

addition to hundreds of American lives, millions of
dollars worth of American property was threatened.

There

l°3ibid.
lO^Punston to the Adjutant General, November 30,
1915, SDR 812.00/16893.
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would be no buying "immunity" after Nogales.

Consequently,

early in December, Lansing began to receive urgent appeals
for protection from American firms with interests in northern
Mexico.10^
Responding sympathetically, the Secretary requested
on December 7 that Obregon strengthen the Constitutionalist
garrison at Cananea so that production there might be resumed
in

s

a

f

e

t

y

.

Some days later, the General complied.

Then, on December 11, in response to a particularly urgent
appeal from ASARCO representatives, Lansing explicitly called
for the protection of that company's plant in Chihuahua City
and its other properties in the state as well.^08 Impossible,
at the time, to fulfill, the Secretary's request doubtless
sorely vexed Constitutionalist officials.

They had more

important priorities.

l°5see, for example, L. C. Neal to Lansing, December
11, 1915, SDR 812.00/16944„and Frank L. Peckham to Lansing,
December 11, 1915, SDR 812.00/16953. Neal was an attorney
for American ranching and agricultural interests in the
States of Chihuahua and Durango.
^®6Lansing to Simpich, December 7, 1915, SDR 812.00/
16927a.
^O^Simpich to Lansing, December 9, 1915, SDR 812.00/
16928.
^°^Lansing to Parker, December 11, 1915, SDR 812.00/
16944.
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While Rodriguez and other roving Villistas swept
through the mining districts of Sonora, Villa himself and
several thousand followers made straight for Chihuahua.
Crossing the Sierra Madre on horseback, they emerged in the
western portion of the state on December 11.

109

Advancing

on the town of Madera, site of the American-owned Madera
Lumber Company, they "looted and destroyed" all of the
American homes and stores in the community and demanded a
large sum of money from the company.**°

Thirty of its em

ployees, all American citizens, were seized and taken along
to Chihuahua City as hostages against payment of the levy.1**
Only the hasty departure of the majority of American residents
"averted a wholesale killing, as Villa pursued them for miles
with his cavalry ."*'*'2
Entraining at Madera, Villa soon arrived at Chihuahua
City, then held by Governor Avila and a garrison of 500 men.
There, he demanded food and money from all foreign-owned

109«rhomas D. Edwards to Lansing, December 12, 1915,
SDR 812.00/16942. Edwards, a former South Dakota editor and
civil servant, was consul at Ciudad Juarez from June, 1905
to September, 1917. Register, 1918, 107.
110^ ew York Times, December 14 and 15, 1915.
***Clendenen, The U. S. and Villa, 224.
112New York Times, December 14, 1915
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businesses, permitting his soldiers to loot those establish11 o

ments that r e s i s t e d . T h e n ,

on the 13th, he learned that

Washington again had granted permission for Obregon to move
troops through the United States, on that occasion from Agua
Prieta to Las Paloroas preparatory to an attack on Ciudad
Juarez.

Villa was furious.

He would "destroy American

property wherever it was found," he vowed; "no American life
would be safe in his territory."

It was feared, the New York

Times lamented, "that a massacre of Americans may occur at
any time in Chihuahua State or city."*1,1*
Already on December 12, however, Carothers had re
ported the existence of "serious dissension . . . between
Villa and several of his prominent generals."

Moreover,

rumors of disaffection within the Villista party, particularly
among its adherents at Ciudad Juarez, were rife.

115

Then,

on or about December 16, at a council of war in Chihuahua
City, Villa was abruptly deposed.
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There, his assembled

subordinates sought to impress upon him "the hopelessness of

1 1 3 Ibid.

1 1 4 Ibid.

115

Carothers to Lansing, December 12, 1915, SDR
812.00/16938.
116

Edwards to Lansing, December 17, 1915, SDR 812.00/
16964; New York Times, December 19, 1915.
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his struggle and insisted that it should end immediately."
Ultimately, Villa gave in, but as manifest in a rambling,
highly emotional farewell address, not without great bit
terness and indignation and a profound sense of personal
betrayal.

117

in stepping down, he was more dangerous than

ever before.
At the close of the aforementioned address, Villa
indicated his desire to join his family in the United States,
declaring that he would abide by that country's laws and
refrain from any further political activity.

Should the

Americans deny him asylum, he declared, he would go on to
Spain or to some other neutral country.

118

Shortly there

after, Governor Avila arrived in Ciudad Juarez, sought out

117

Ibid.
"For five years I have fought the enemies
of our great republic, and I have lost," Villa declared.
". . . I have done everything which my love of country has
directed me to do. That men surrounding me were self-seeking
and traitors to the cause of Mexican liberty, I cannot help.
They will fight no longer, for they see no more money in
sight.
I have been in the field for five years.
I have
fought three dictators and have vanquished two - Diaz and
Huerta. Had it not been for the traitorous alliance with
the United States I would have vanquished Carranza, but the
great country to the north, which professed friendship to me
is all powerful now that Europe is at war, and I can do
nothing but bow my head to superior force . . . .
I have
no plans. I have planned so much for my people and they
have turned against me just as they turned against the
great and good Madero . . . ." Ibid.
118Ibid.
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Consul Thomas D. Edwards, and handed him a telegram from
Conventionist authorities at Chihuahua City.

Intended

for President Wilson, it reviewed recent developments in
Chihuahua, including Villa's dismissal as commander-inchief of the Conventionist Army, and called upon the Presi
dent to offer the General asylum in the United States.
Villa, Avila assured the Consul, was now in complete ac
cord with the new regime at Chihuahua City and had himself
approved the Governor's mission.
The following day, on December 18, Avila received a
reply.

The United States Government, Lansing declared, would

accept Villa as a political refugee and would guarantee his
safety and immunity from prosecution.

Such terms, however,

were contingent, first upon the immediate release of all
American hostages in Villista hands and, second, upon re
ceipt of a reciprocal guarantee of American lives and pro
perty from Villa and those of his commanders still in the
field.

120

It is doubtful whether Villa ever received

Lansing's message.

Nor, apparently, would it have mattered

**9Edwards to Lansing, December 17, 1915, SDR 812.00/
16964.
120

Lansing to Edwards, December 18, 1915, Ibid.
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if he had.

Later in the same day, Villa and several hundred

followers entrained at Chihuahua City, ostensibly bound
for Ciudad Juarez and exile in the United States.

Accordingly,

General Pershing at El Paso sent troops to the international
bridges in anticipation of the party*s arrival.
waited in vain.

121

They

Villa never appeared.

VI.
From the first, there had been considerable skepti
cism in some quarters over the authenticity of Villa's
retirement.

And not without cause.

On December 17, soon

after the General's dismissal, the entire Villista treasury some 2,000,000 pesos - had been transferred from Juarez to
banks in El Paso.

Moreover, on the same day. Villa's wife

had guilelessly informed American reporters that her hus
band's retirement was only temporary:

"'Should his party

not succeed within a reasonable time,' she said, 'he would
seek to return to Mexico and again assume command.*"
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Villa, the New York Times deduced, had no intention of per
manently retiring from Mexican politics.

Nor, it observed,

would Carranza soon succeed in restoring order in all parts
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New York TimeB, December 20, 1915.
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Ibid., December 19, 1915.
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of the republic.

Consequently, the journal concluded with

eerie prescience. Villa, "no longer either Constitutionalist
or Conventionist [might] yet appear armed and on horseback
as the militant leader of some other variety of Mexican
patriotism . " * 22
And indeed the General himself had implied as much.
Taking leave of his former comrades-in-arms at Chihuahua
City, he had urged them not only to make their peace with
Carranza but also to retain their weapons as well.

"You

will need them soon," he promised, "and it will be the
American invader against whom you will fire them, and not
against your brothers."

Intervention, he predicted, was

"coming sooner" than they knew.

And when it did, he con

cluded, "fight for your country and you will find General
Francisco Villa beside you."

124

Villa's dismissal and subsequent disappearance into
the vastness of western Chihuahua was followed soon after
by the capitulation of the Conventionist regime in that state
and by the surrender of its remaining outposts in the North.
On December 19, Governor Avila concluded a protocol with Con
stitutionalist representatives in Chihuahua City, formally
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Ibid., December 20, 1915.
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ending hostilities, transferring the capital to Carrancista
forces, and providing for the inclusion of former Conven
tionist officers in the Constitutionalist Army .3,25

In

addition, it was agreed that Conventionist civil servants
would continue at their posts through nation-wide general
elections tentatively scheduled for March, 1917.

1 26

Some

days later, the city was occupied by Constitutionalist
troops under General Jacinto B. Trevino.
Meanwhile, in Ciudad Juarez, Carrancista ConsulGeneral Andres Garcia and Villista generals Banda and Limon
quickly negotiated the surrender of the last Conventionist
stronghold in the North.
go smoothly.

127

The transfer, however, did not

It was rumored that Villa himself was advancing

on the city with a large force, determined to undo the capitulation and to start a new revolution.
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Although there was

no substance to the rumor, rioting swept the city on the
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morning of the 2 1 st, and force was required to suppress
it.

129

Then, later in the day, disgruntled Villista soldiers

vented their wrath against the United States by deliberately
firing across the river into El Paso.

130

Upon the death of

an American railway inspector, Pershing rushed troops to the
river front, "giving them orders to return vigorously any
Mexican fire directed toward the United States . " 131

By

nightfall the firing had ceased and order had again been
restored in Ciudad Juarez.
arrived at the border.

The following day, Obregon

The remaining Villista troops were

disarmed and mustered out, and a Constitutionalist force
under General Gavira occupied the city.

132

Upon the collapse of the Villista movement and the
conclusion of peace at Chihuahua City, at least some students
of Mexican affairs were willing to express a guarded optimism
in viewing the immediate future of the neighboring republic.
The de facto Government, it was noted, was now in control of
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the "entire border territory except one or two unimportant
sub-porta."

133

And Villa* indisputably Carranza's most

dangerous rival, was clearly in eclipse.

Believed to be

in hiding somewhere in the mountains of western Chihuahua,
he was again little more than an outlaw with a price on his
head.

For the moment, at least, his days appeared numbered.

Thus, with no other serious opposition still in the field,
there was no apparent reason why the de facto Government
could not get on with the urgent business of completing
pacification and beginning the monumental task of recon
struction.
Certainly, then, there was cause for optimism.

And

yet, among close observers of the Mexican scene, a nagging
uneasiness persisted.

As Zach Cobb put it early in the new

year, there was "an unpleasant drift" in the conduct of the
Carranza regime.

It was "very difficult," he admitted, "to

fora a balanced judgement on Mexican affairs."
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17028.
^ ^ C o b b to Lansing, January 8, 1916, SDR 812.00/
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Chapter 11

THE FAILURE OF PACIFICATION

I.
Collector Cobb's concern over the state of affairs
in Mexico was by no means restricted to those individuals
whose job it was to observe and report on developments in
the southern republic.

By the end of 1915, congressmen,

Administration officials, and newsmen alike shared a dis
comfiting suspicion that serious trouble in Mexico, far from
being over, might have just begun.
On December 20, the New York Times reported that a
discussion of the "Mexican situation" and a general review
of the Administration's Mexican policy could be expected on
the floor of Congress shortly after the holiday recess.

And

in the Senate, it was revealed, a resolution was to be pre
sented "calling upon the State Department to furnish the
Foreign Relations Committee with all the documents, letters,
and other data bearing on the negotiations with Mexico.

^•New York Times, December 20, 1915.
500

501
Partisan as its origins admittedly were, the pending con
gressional investigation of Mexican affairs unquestionably
reflected a genuine and growing apprehension over the
seemingly interminable disorder in Mexico and a widespread
lack of confidence in the ability of the de facto Government
to put things aright.
within the Department of State, of course, the Anti
revolutionists had never had the slightest faith in the
ability of the Constitutionalist party, either to complete
the pacification of the republic or to preside over its re
generation.

Indeed, both immediately before and shortly

after the extension of recognition to the Carranza regime,
Canova and his staff implicitly questioned the wisdom of
that decision in formal memorandums to the Secretary of
State.

2

Without doubt, they anticipated further, even

greater disorder in Mexico in the not so distant future .3
Lansing, too, despite his seminal role in shaping the Ad
ministration's new Mexican policy, was far from sanguine.

2

Canova, "Brief Statement of Present Political
Situation in Mexico Based on Official Reports," October 6 ,
1915, SDR 812.00/16962; Anderson, "Memorandum on the Mexi
can Situation," May 24, 1917, SDR 711.12/47%.
3Ibid.
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When, early in January, 1916, the Secretary of War suggested
that "in view of . . . improved conditions in Mexico" cer
tain units might be recalled from the border, Lansing
strenuously objected.

4

Precisely because of continuing

turmoil in the republic, he argued, not one man should be
withdrawn from the border.^
Among the more important journals, even those
friendly to the Wilson Administration and well-disposed
toward the de facto Government, there were manifestations
of concern over the situation in Mexico and of grave doubts
as to the future course of events in that country.

On

December 20, 1915, a New York Times editorial writer neatly
caught the prevailing mood:

"The Mexican question," he

contended, "would not be a political issue" during the
coming election year unless "something" were to happen to
"check" the progress of Mexico toward "the restoration of
peace and prosperity."

However, he pointedly warned, that

"something" might well happen.

And if it did, the writer

believed, it would occur "through the machinations of

^Garrison to Lansing, January 6 , 1916, SDR 812.00/
17070.
5
Lansing to Garrison, January 12, 1916, Ibid.
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Mexican exiles in the United States" acting in “connivance"
with certain Americans "who may have reasons of their own
for desiring the failure" of the Carranza regime.
The following day, despite the pessimistic tone of
the above editorial, the same journal sympathetically re
viewed the Government's recent relations with Mexico and
endeavored to conclude its summary of current Administra
tion Mexican policy on an optimistic note.

Washington, it

explained, had gone to great lengths to facilitate negotia
tions between the Constitutionalists and Villa's Conventionist regime in the belief that with Villa "out of Mexico
the way would be cleared for the restoration of order" in
that country.

In offering asylum to the General, the Ad

ministration had "taken the step with [the]

realization that

it [might] provoke criticism in some quarters and very
probably [would] be made the occasion for an attack from
Colonel [Theodore]

Roosevelt."

Indeed, there was "keen

realization in official circles that the whole progress of
the negotiations with Mexico [would]
approaching presidential campaign.

be raked over" in the
It was, however, the

"hope" of the Administration that the months ahead would be

^New York Times, December 20, 1915.
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marked by such progress in "restoring something like normal
conditions in Mexico that the course of the Administration
will be vindicated thereby nullifying the effect of the
expected attacks."

Whatever the case, the President would

"stand pat on the belief that nothing [had] happened in
•J

Mexico which would have justified armed intervention."
Carranza, then, would continue to receive the benefit of
the doubt.

He would be given every opportunity to prove

himself.
By the end of 1915, the First Chief was desperately
in need of all the help he could get.

It was far simpler,

he and his generals were learning, to cope with an army in
the field than it was to deal with the dozens of small,
highly mobile guerrilla bands that had arisen in the wake
of successive Constitutionalist victories.

By the beginning

of the new year, the de facto Government was faced with a
frustrating impasse:

although Carrancista forces were in

nominal control of all but one of the states and indeed
occupied the cities and most of the larger towns, a bewilder
ing melange of bandits, local autonomists, and self-styled
revolutionaries completely dominated the countryside.

^Ibid., December 21, 1915.

Hordes
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of outlaws infested every state, cutting rail communications,
seizing and looting the smaller towns, and consistently
eluding the infrequent, uninspired punitive expeditions
sent against them by Constitutionalist authorities.

Out

side of the principal towns, then, virtual anarchy prevailed
over the greater part of the republic.

It was precisely

that condition which the Wilson Administration, through
recognition of the Carranza regime, had so fervently hoped
to preclude.
Then, too, older problems persisted.

Despite an

apparently sincere initial attempt by the First Chief to
suppress the Texas revolutionaries and to prevent a recur
rence of the disturbances along the Lower Rio Grande, ad
herents of the irredentist movement had by no means abanQ

doned their plans.

In fact, during the winter of 1915-

1916, they intensified their recruiting and organizational
activities south of the border in expectation of resuming
their offensive in the spring of the latter year.

In the

State of Sonora, meanwhile, inability to solve the so-called

^Breckinridge to Lansing, December 22, 1915, SDR
812.00/16999; Lansing to Silliman, January 18, 1916, SDR
812.00/17042; Robertson to Lansing, June 9, 1916, SDR 812.00/
20165.
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Yaqui problem continued to embarrass the de facto Government.
There, the much-heralded "campaign of extermination11 against
9
the Indians bogged down almost immediately.
Within a
matter of months it was virtually abandoned.

Finally, in

improving its image and in bettering its relations with both
the government and the people of the United States, matters
of utmost importance to its very survival, the Carranza
regime failed abysmally.

Despite repeated assurances to

the contrary, harassment of the Mexican Church and persecu
tion of the clergy persisted.^

So, too, in contravention

of prior pledges, did encroachment upon the property rights
of American and other foreign citizens and corporations in
Mexico.^

In conjunction with the obvious inability of the

9Funston to the Adjutant General, January 8, 27 and
February 3, 1916, SDR 812.00/17112, 17194, and 17239; Baker
to Lansing, February 14, 1916, SDR 812.00/17278.
^ New York Times, November 30 and December 14, 20,
1915; Funston to the Adjutant General, January 6, 1916,
SDR 812.00/17078.
•*-*See, for example, Funston to the Adjutant General,
November 17, 1915, SDR 812.00/16842; Davis to Lansing,
December 4, 1915, SDR 812.00/17528; Simpich to Lansing,
December 14, 1915, SDR 812.00/17031; Williams to Lansing,
January 15, 1916, SDR 812.00/17107; Vincent to Lansing,
January 19, 1916, SDR 812.6363/202a; Parker to Lansing,
November 16, 1915, Foreign Relations, 1915, 951-952; Lansing
to Silliman, December 28, 1915, Ibid., 962-963.
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de facto Government to complete pacification of the republic,
those abuses, in turn, gave rise to new and increasingly
insistent demands for American armed intervention.
Carranza, then, by the beginning of the new year,
was in a most difficult position.

He could not afford to

further antagonize those interests in the United States
already hostile to his regime, much less the Wilson Adminis
tration.

Nor, on the other hand, could he continue to

frustrate the largely unfulfilled revolutionary aspirations
of his more zealous lieutenants, to say nothing of those of
i2

the great mass of the Mexican people.
dilemma.

And therein lay his

He could not serve two masters.

XI.
Immediately upon obtaining coveted Pan-American
recognition, the First Chief moved to mend his political

12

In November, 1915, for instance. Constitutionalist
General Cabanillas advised the United States Consul at
Mazatlan that he and his comrades-in-arms had not yet
"carried out our ideals and secured the laws that we have
been fighting for . . .
Their objectives were, for the
most part, contrary to the existing constitution of Mexico.
They would have to be realized through sweeping decrees
issued in a pre-constitutional period. Thus, the General
warned, any attempt to stage an election or to place the
country on a constitutional basis "before a lapse of at
least two years" was bound to provoke a new revolution.
Alger to Lansing, November 10, 1915, SDR 812.00/16833.
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fences both foreign and domestic.

In late October, 1915,

Carranza himself, accompanied by Obregon and a sizable
retinue of civil and military officials, began a triumphal
if leisurely progress through the restless Northeast to
the Texas border.

In addition to reasserting his tenuous

authority over wayward subordinates in that near-autonomous
region, the First Chief was anxious to conciliate the
aroused Anglo-American populace of the Lower Rio Grande
Valley and to impress upon the government in Washington his
determination to personally investigate and suppress the now
embarrassing Texas rebellion.

He enjoyed notable success in

the former endeavor, but failed singularly in the latter.
Special Agent John Belt, attached to the Carranza
party, reported on October 22 that the First Chief's tour
was "fast resulting in a most clever political move."

The

presence of General Obregon, "in apparent perfect accord"
with Carranza, was "having a telling effect on every military
man throughout the entire section traversed."

As supreme

head of the Constitutionalist forces, Obregon was treated by
other officers, "including Generals, with notable deference."
And there was "no doubting," Belt assured his superiors,
"General Obregon*s complete loyalty to Carranza."
himself was deeply impressed with Obregon.

The agent

It was certain.
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he declared, that in the future the General would "figure
prominently in the affairs" of Mexico:

"He is at the present

moment the dominating character among all military men in
this Republic."

13

Clearly, then, so long as Obregon stood

by Carranza, the latter*s position was secure.
Unquestionably, Carranza's presence - and that of
Obregon - in the Northeastern border states had a dampening
effect upon the Texas rebellion and, to a somewhat lesser
degree, upon the broader Plan of San Diego as well.14

The

removal of Nafarrate as commander at Matamoras and his re
placement, first by General Eugenio Lopez and then by the
able and conscientious General Alfredo Ricaut, effectively
curtailed the offensive operations to the raiders.

The last

serious strike across the Rio Grande was executed on October
29.

Although rumors of new raids in the offing recurred

through the balance of the year, none of the threatened
strikes occurred.

Nonetheless, the expectation that, at any

moment, the raids might recommence kept tension high along

^ B e l t to Lansing, October 22, 1915, SDR 812.00/
16568.
14Hanna to Lansing, December 8, 1915, SDR 812.00/
16946. Philip C. Hanna was United States Consul-General at
Monterrey. Prior to his appointment to that post, he had
served as a consular officer in Venezuela, Trinidad, and
Puerto Rico. Register, 1918, 117.
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the south Texas border.

The result was to prolong and in

tensify ethnic polarization in the Lower Valley and to sus
tain the virulent anti-Mexican sentiment manifested by the
majority of Anglo-American residents of the region.

Under

the circumstances, there was little that Carranza or anyone
else could have done to dispel that deeply-rooted antagonism.
By late October, the temper of the Anglo-American
15

community of south Texas had reached the flash point. ^
Following de la Rosa's attack on the St. Louis, Brownsville
and Mexican Railway train, the leaders of that community in
Cameron County (Brownsville), Texas, complained bitterly to
the Secretary of State, sharply criticizing the Administra
tion's response to the raids and demanding armed intervention
to suppress them.
the blame lay:

There was no doubt in their minds where

"Carrancista soldiers or bandits, whichever

you prefer to call them."
j
Undoubtedly representing the Anglo-American consensus
in the Lower Valley, they presented their case as follows:
It is a matter of common knowledge that the so-called
authorities across the Rio Grande have for months been
actively supporting this campaign of murder and plunder.
The belief is universal among the Mexicans that they

15

Funston to the Adjutant General, November 4, 1915,
SDR 812.00/16752.
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have bluffed the United States into recognizing Carranza,
that the wholesale murder of Americans and destruction
of American property has forced the United states to
accept the so-called Carranza Government. To the
hatred which the Mexicans have always felt for
Americans, is now added utter contempt, induced by
the weak and vacillating policy of our Government in
dealing with the Mexican situation generally and the
border trouble in particular* The bandits who mur
dered and raided last night are safe in Mexico today
and will be banqueted as heros in Matamoras tonight.
These raids will continue as long as American soldiers
are confined to the north bank of the Rio Grande. We
who confine our activities to peaceful pursuits, who
have been sniped at from the bush, boldly shot at from
across the river, and seen our murdered friends lying
dead, feel that we are entitled to at least as much
consideration as the oil interests. Nothing but
vigorous action will relieve the situation - action
not limited to the American side of the river.16
Although Constitutionalist authorities themselves
shortly brought the raids to a halt, Mexican-American tension
on the Lower Rio Grande persisted.

On October 28, Funston

reported that "all the people" in Matamoras "sympathized very
deeply with Pizano and de la Rosa in what they called their
'revolution.'"

And it was the "general opinion that this

revolution would continue to grow and grow until Texas became an independent Mexican republic."

17

16

H. L. Yates to Lansing, October 19, 1915, SDR
812.00/16523.
17

Funston to the Adjutant General, October 28, 1915,
SDR 812.00/16667.
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Some days later, Texas Senator Morris Sheppard re
turned to Washington from a week in the south Texas counties
to report that "the situation there continues to be full of
danger, possessing many of the terrors of impending race
war."

18

Meanwhile, despite Lansing's stern admonishment

of Governor Ferguson concerning persecution of MexicanAmericans by Texas lawmen, Funston reported on November 4
that the abuse continued.

Large numbers of those people

continued to abandon their homes in south Texas and to cross
over to Matamoros.

The exodus, he explained, was "due both

to harassment of Rangers and Peace Officers and to threats
by unidentified Mexicans."

19

Time did nothing to improve

the situation.20
Carranza, meanwhile, earnestly endeavored to allay
t

mutual Mexican-American animosity and to promote a degree
of reconciliation along the lower border.

On November 3,

the First Chief's party arrived at Piedras Negras, opposite
Eagle Pass, Texas.

There, in a "most cordial" meeting,

^Sheppard to Lansing, November 4, 1915, SDR 812.00/
16700.
19

Funston to the Adjutant General, November 4, 1915,
SDR 812.00/16752.
20

New York Times, November 22, 1915.
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Carranza conferred with Belt, Silliman, and his representative
in Washington, Eliseo Arredondo, on the troubles in the Lower
Valley.

He assured the State Department agents that he was

doing all that he could to suppress the raids.

He then

suggested the negotiation of an international agreement
providing for the reciprocal right to cross the border in
hot pursuit of bandits.2^* Such suggestions, however prac
tical, were not then well-received in Washington, and nothing
came of the First Chief's proposal.

Lansing dared not risk

the presence of Mexican soldiers in the south Texas counties.22
Later in the day, "many Americans called at the custom house
to pay their respects" to Carranza and General Obregon.

The

latter, accompanied by General Candido Aguilar, then crossed
the border and "lurched with newspaper representatives and
prominent American businessmen of Eagle Pass."

23

It was an

encouraging start.

2*Silliman to Lansing, November 3, 1915, SDR 812.00/
16686.
22"I think you will agree with me," the Secretary
wrote New Mexico Senator Henry Ashurst, "that the United
States could not allow Mexicans to exercise rights so pregnant
with possibilities of serious complications on the border."
Lansing to Ashurst, November 9, 1915, SDR 812.00/16823.
23
16687.

Blocker to Lansing, November 3, 1915, SDR 812.00/
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Eagle Pass, though, was some 200 miles up the river
from the center of raider activity and had barely been
touched by the Texas rebellion.
there was relatively slight.

Mexican-American friction

Along the Lower Rio Grande,

however, where feeling ran the highest, there was no sur
cease.

A minor incident on November 8 added to the ani

mosity and anxiety already rife in the south Texas counties.
Near La Feria, ten miles north of the river, an American
patrol was fired upon by unknown assailants and one soldier
was wounded.

0 A

Consequently, Senator Shepard requested

that American troops be stationed at nearby Ojo de Agua and
that the Constitutionalists garrison Reynosa Viejo on the
opposite bank.

The inhabitants of both settlements, the

Senator explained, were "personally related" to the raiders,
and the Mexican town was "a recruiting place" for those
"lawless spirits."

Moreover, the headquarters of at least

one of the bands was believed to be "in the brush" nearby.

75

Lansing complied with the Senator's request, and a few days
later Reynosa Viejo was occupied by Constitutionalist troops.

24

New York Times, November 10, 1915.

25Sheppard to Lansing, November 8, 1915, SDR 812.00/
16778.
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Soon after, Funston reported that the Pizano and de la Rosa
bands, known to have been camped in the vicinity, had with26
drawn upriver and "seemingly disappeared.11
Although by mid-November, raider activity along the
river front had all but ceased, the persecution of MexicanAmericans on the north bank continued apace.

On November

21, General Luis Caballero, Military Governor of the State
of Tamaulipas, revealed that many Mexicans living in Texas
had written him requesting land and asylum in Mexico.

27

Those letters, he explained to reporters, were "from my
people who cannot live any longer in the State of Texas."
There, he charged, they were denied protection, and many
had been murdered by "irresponsible armed posses who have
killed innocent people without reason."

The refugees were

afraid to live there and many were being forced to leave
small farms "which they purchased with the savings of a
lifetime."

Some 300 such families were in Nuevo Laredo

alone and many more in Matamoras.

Some, he declared angrily,

had arrived with "just the clothes they [had] on, compelled
to flee at night to escape.

28

26
Funston to the Adjutant General, November 10, 1915,
SDR 812.00/16803.
27New York Times, November 22, 1915.

28Ibid.
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The results o£ those excesses were as deplorable as
they were predictable.

Relations between Texas authorities

and those initially friendly Mexican officials sent to the
border to replace the anti-American Nafarrate and his staff
were strained from the very beginning.

Moreover, the already

deep hatred of many border Mexicans for the United States
was intensified, thereby swelling the ranks of the raider
bands then organizing and training in the interior of Tamaulipas and Nuevo Leon.

The would-be peacemakers in the Lower

Valley had a difficult task indeed.
On November 24, they tried again.

On that day, at

Nuevo Laredo, Carranza met and conferred with Governor Fer
guson.

Consul Garrett, reporting the meeting the following

day, noted that Mexican-American feeling appeared "to be
better for it."

By that time, too. General Alfredo Ricaut

had assumed command at Matamoras and General Reynaldo Garza
at Nuevo Laredo.

Garrett was optimistic.

It was his opinion

that the new commanders would make every effort to halt the
"bandit raids" and that ultimately they would succeed.

29

Two days later, however, the Secretary of War received
a discouraging and disconcerting report from Colonel A. P.

2 Garrett to Lansing, November 25, 1915, SDR 812.00/
16852.

517
Blocksam at Brownsville.

It puzzled Administration officials

and forced them to re-evaluate the First Chief’s protesta
tions of innocence with regard to his alleged complicity in
the Texas rebellion.

Both Pizano and de la

Rosa,

it was

revealed, were then at Nafarrate's headquarters at Victoria,
Tamaulipas.

And, despite Carranza's assurances that the

raider captains had been outlawed and were to be shot on
sight, both men were in Constitutionalist uniform and assigned to Nafarrate's staff.
amiss and seriously so.

30

Something was obviously

Either the First Chief was lying

deliberately to Washington or he had so little control over
his generals that Nafarrate could flout his orders with im
punity.

Whatever the case, it looked bad for Carranza - and

for the Administration's new Mexican policy as well.
Spokesmen for the irredentist movement, meanwhile,
had indicated that its partisans would remain out of sight
and refrain from conducting new offensive operations until
the First Chief's departure from the northeastern border
states.

Immediately thereafter, however, they planned to

renew their activities north of the Rio Grande.

The focal

point of the projected campaign was the area around San

Bundy to the Adjutant General, November 26, 1915,
SDR 812.00/16890.
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Antonio, Texas, where the movement already had many sympa
thizers.

There, the raiders would operate under the broader

Plan of San Diego, indicating the existence of a close
working relationship between the adherents of that plan and
those of the so-called Army for the Liberation of Texas.
They would receive their orders, it was stated, from a junta
already established in San Antonio.

31

On November 30, four days after dispatching the afore
mentioned report to his superiors, Colonel Blocksam met and
conferred with the First Chief and his party on the inter
national bridge at Brownsville.

Accompanying Carranza and

General Ricaut on their goodwill visit were the strongly
anti-American Governor Caballero and General Nafarrate.

In

a "cordial" if ludicrous exchange, the First Chief again
deplored the Lower Valley raids and repeated his specious
promise to do "all in his power to suppress the bandits."
Blocksam, who had only recently strengthened his patrols in
response to renewed suspicious activity on the south bank,
somehow managed to bite his tongue .32
their respective thoughts.

One can but wonder at

Later in the day, in still another

31Ibid.
32Funston to the Adjutant General, December 9, 1915,
SDR 812.00/16951.
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exercise in dissimulation, the leading citizens of Browns
ville called upon the First Chief and his party to express
their gratitude for suppression of the Texas rebellion.

33

On December 8 , the camaraderie on the border not
withstanding, a second alarming report concerning resurgence
of the irredentist movement reached officials of the Depart
ment of S t a t e . P h i l i p C. Hanna, United States ConsulGeneral and long-time resident of Monterrey, Nuevo Leon,
advised Lansing that for the past four months he had been
receiving word of "plots to cause international trouble by
the invasion of the State of Texas .'1
tinued to reach him.

And such reports con

Pizano, de la Rosa, and Agustin Garza,

one of the original San Diego conspirators, had been "quite
recently in Monterrey in connection with their plans of
’Setting Texas Free.'"

One of Hanna’s informants, a Carran-

cista colonel whose support had been solicited by the raiders,
revealed that he "had been offered big money to go to Texas
and organize Texas-Mexicans."

Upon asking who was able to

pay such handsome salaries, the colonel was advised "not to

33

New York Times, December 1, 1915.

34Hanna to Lansing, December 8, 1915, SDR 812.00/
16946.
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worry about that" as the movement was "being backed by two
of the richest nations in Europe, Germany and Austria."
Other officers in the Constitutionalist Army were reported
to have been approached in a similar manner.
"I am told," Hanna continued, "that quite a large
organization has existed in Monterrey for some time.”

Its

agents, however, had been less active since Carranza's re
cognition, and especially since the First Chief's presence,
in the Northeast and the appointment of General Ricaut as
commander at Matamoras.

Only a few days earlier, Hanna

concluded, he had learned that "a certain European Consul"
(German) had approached another one of Carranza's colonels
and "offered him very large pay for his services in Texas
as a leader of the Texas revolution and invasion."

35

Hanna's

report must have been particularly disturbing to State De
partment officials because the Consul-General was both an
inveterate optimist and a strong supporter of the Carranza
regime.

He was not one to pass on idle rumors.
Disclosure of German involvement in the disturbances

along the Lower Rio Grande prompted officials in Washington
to take a much closer look at the Texas Liberation movement
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and the affiliated Plan of San Diego and to probe more deeply
into the intrigue.

Rewarding results, more often than not

corroborated by a variety of sources, were soon forthcoming.
On or about December 14, Colonel Blocksam submitted
to Funston a summary of his findings regarding the origins
and activities of the irredentist movement.

36

There had

existed since May, 1915, he reported, a conspiracy to in
vade and detach the State of Texas from the United States.
Those persons most immediately involved were Governor Caba
llero, General Nafarrate, Luis de la Rosa, and an American
Negro physician, Dr. Jesse M. Mosely, M. D.

Many lesser

officials of the State of Tamaulipas were also implicated.
The conspiracy, Blocksam charged, "was entered into before
the bandit uprising on the border."

It was "the direct

cause of said uprising which was planned and carried out"
by the aforementioned conspirators "through men who were
subject to their orders."

Headquarters of the movement was

the city of Victoria, capital of the State of Tamaulipas.
Blocksam*s information came from persons who had attended
meetings of the conspirators there and who had been "present
when orders were given" to open the Texas offensive.

36

Breckinridge to Lansing, December 22, .1915,
SDR 812.00/16999.
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Dr. Mosely, the Colonel disclosed, had recently
"spent about three months in Texas and Oklahoma trying to
enlist Negroes to join in an uprising against the Govern
ment of Texas . . . ."

Both he and de la Rosa had been in

Victoria only a few days earlier, and the doctor had boasted
that several platoons of Negro soldiers in the United States
Army "had agreed to desert" and join the revolutionary move
ment.

Those parties were "still actively engaged in planning

an uprising," Blocksam warned, "and have been heard to say
that they could enlist in their cause a large number of
Germans . . . German-Americans, [and] Japanese."

Their

present plans called for the creation of a disturbance at
some point along the border in hopes of drawing American
forces to that area while the main body of raiders crossed
into Texas near Nuevo Laredo.

The movement was well-financed,

Blocksam concluded, and apparently had "an organization 11 in
the States of Texas, New Mexico, Arizona, and California.
The Plan of San Diego was authentic.

37

A little more than a week after the receipt of Block
sam* s findings, the War Department received a corroborative
report, in still greater detail, from the commander of the

37lbid.
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Laredo garrison.
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Chief of organization for the irredentist

movement, it was revealed, was the former school teacher
from San Diego, Texas - General Agustin Garza.

The General -

"about 35 years old, tall, thin, pale, with a glass eye . • .
and an elegant appearance" - had for weeks been traveling
along the border between £1 Paso and Matamoros.

He spent

the greater part of his time "organizing this movement and
perfecting his arrangements."

Since the disintegration of

the Villista movement, he had been much in £1 Paso and
Ciudad Juarez fishing in troubled waters.

It was said that

Garza had "many followers among . . . Villista officers and
soldiers" who were "in great sympathy” with the irredentist
movement.

His proposal for the invasion of Texas, moreover,

was known to be "very popular all along the border with many
Carrancista officers and soldiers" as well.

The General,

then, was believed to be enjoying considerable success in
his recruiting efforts.
Operational headquarters for Garza and for the move
ment generally was the Iturbide Hotel in Monterrey, a fact
corroborated by the Consul-General's report.

Apparently,

Constitutionalist authorities permitted Garza and his aides

3ft

'"Funston to the Adjutant General, December 23, 1915,
SDR 812.00/17030.
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to conduct their activities with a minimum of interference*
Only recently, it was reported, those officials had re
ceived an order for the General's arrest signed by the First
Chief himself.

Garza was promptly "informed of the purport

of the order and advised to disappear."

He did so, going

to Matamoros "with the intention of inducing General Ricaut
to join the movement and to show him how it would be to his
interest" to go along.
Although Garza failed to suborn Ricaut, he did
succeed in winning over Maurilio Rodriguez, a former Carrancista general of some prominence along the lower border.
As late commander of the Osuna Brigade, the General had
"many followers" among Constitutionalist officers and soldiers
in the States of Tamaulipas and Nuevo Leon.

Appointed com

mander of the so-called Northeastern Division by Garza,
Rodriguez soon raised some 300 men in Monterrey alone and
another 200 men at other points along the border.

In addi

tion, he could count on the support of "a large number of
confederates" across the border in Texas.

Armaments pre

sented no problem, as a Carrancista general in the City of
Mexico promised Rodriguez 800 rifles, ammunition, and trans
portation for the movement as well.
the General was ready to move.

By early December, then,
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On December 6 , it was understood, Rodriguez was to
have proceeded to Nuevo Laredo preparatory to launching the
offensive referred to in Blocksam's report.

Failure, how

ever, to receive the requisite arms and money in time had
forced him to postpone the operation.

As of late December,

then, Rodriguez and his band were camped south of the Rio
Grande, about thirty miles below San Ygnacio, Texas.

There,

the General expected to assemble a force of from 300 to 500
men, cross the river near San Ygnacio, and lay waste to the
surrounding countryside.

Like Garza, Rodriguez had recently

spent a good deal of time in San Antonio, El Paso, and Ciudad
Juarez, "recruiting and organizing."

He, too, had enjoyed

notable success, particularly in attracting former Villista
soldiers in the latter city.

"The invasion of Texas,"

American authorities speculated, was "waiting the time when
General Carranza will leave this part of the country.,"
There appeared to be no other explanation for the delay.
In a particularly damaging passage, the Laredo re
port noted that Carranza himself, both immediately before
and after his visit to the border on November 24, was be
lieved to have conferred secretly in Monterrey with Luis
de la Rosa.

The orders which the First Chief has issued

for the arrest of the raider captains, the report concluded.
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were now revealed to have been no more than "perfunctory and
merely for American consumption."

39

Apparently, then, the

recurring charges of Carranza's complicity in the Texas
rebellion had some substance after all.

Certainly American

authorities on the border were convinced of it.
The facts presented in the Brownsville, Monterrey,
and Laredo reports constituted a damning indictment of
Carrancista authorities in northeastern Mexico and, impli
citly, of the First Chief as well.

And in conjunction

with extant intelligence relative to the origins, execution,
and alleged suppression of the Texas rebellion, the afore
mentioned reports were particularly embarrassing to Carranza
himself.

He stood thoroughly discredited on the grounds of

duplicity or ineptness or both.

Thereafter, as far as

officials of the Departments of State and War were concerned,
his credibility and that of all but a few of his aides were
decidedly suspect.

Whatever faith those officials might

have had in the integrity of the Constitutionalist hierarchy
at the moment of recognition had all but vanished by the be
ginning of the new year.

39Ibid.; Robertson to Lansing, June 9, 1916,
SDR 812.00/20165.
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III.
Perhaps if the differences of the de facto Government
with the United States had been limited to the disturbances
along the lower border, better relations between it and the
government in Washington might one day have been achieved.
There were, however, so many other points of friction that
any lasting reconciliation between the governments was out
of the question.

Those multiple irritants aggravated the

existing tension, enhanced mutual animosity and suspicion,
and finally destroyed what little confidence Lansing and
other prominent Administration officials in Washington had
in the intent of the Carranza regime to fulfill its pledges
and in its ability to assure its own survival over the long
term.
Increasingly, after December, 1915, to many in Wash
ington and particularly to officials of the Department of
State, further support for the First Chief and his party
seemed to be more trouble than it was w o r t h . C a r r a n z a ' s
prospects appeared hopeless.

40

Rather soon, then, the position

See, for example, Carothers to Canova, March 7,
1916, SDR 812.00/20668; Anderson, "Memorandum on the Mexican
Situation," May 24, 1917, SDR 711.12/47%; Long to Lansing,
August 10, 1918, SDR 711.12/130.
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of the Antirevolutionists became the dominant one in the
Department of State and, in time, won important converts in
other executive departments as well.

In Congress, too, it

had its vigorous supporters, particularly among the delegations from the southwestern border states.

41

And, finally,

in journalistic circles, it found a vociferous advocate in
jk^
the editorial columns of the powerful Hearst chain.
Foremost among the aforementioned points of conten
tion was the failure of the First Chief to consolidate his
victory in the field.

Throughout the remainder of his tenure,

he was plagued by serious domestic disaffection emanating on
the one hand from powerful secessionist or local-autonomist
movements and, on the other, from essentially reactionary
elements determined to overthrow his regime, suppress the
Revolution, and re-establish conservative rule.

Both ex

tremes had been active in the pursuit of their various ob
jectives for some time prior to Pan-American recognition of
the Constitutionalist Government.

And that development,

other than inconveniencing the First Chief's opponents, had

4 *See, for example. New York Times, January 13,
14, 15, and 16, 1916.
42 W. A. Swanberg, Citizen Hearst;
A Biography of
William Randolph Hearst (New York: Bantam Books, 1963),
352-354.
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no effect on their determination to proceed with their re
spective plans.

From the first, then, Carranza was hard-

pressed to exert his authority over large areas of the
republic, and, within months of his recognition, even to
maintain himself in office in the face of an increasingly
powerful counterrevolutionary opposition.
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Officials in Washington, of course, followed post
recognition developments below the border with surpassing
interest.

They could not tolerate, particularly in an

election year, the eruption of new disorders in Mexico,
attended as they most surely would be by further destruction
of American and other foreign lives and property.

Conse

quently, relations between Washington and the de facto
Government became increasingly strained as the First Chief
proved unequal to the task at hand, and Administration
officials, in turn, were forced to admit, albeit privately,
that they had backed a loser.
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Early in November, having momentarily regained con
trol over the restive Northeast, Carranza again turned his

43Carothers to Lansing, February 7, 1916, SDR 812.00/
17259; Carothers to Canova, June 16 and August 4, 1916,
SDR 812.00/20670 and 20761.
44
Canova, "Confidential Memorandum," February 14,
1916, SDR 812.00/17271%.

attention to his opponents in the field.

Preparations were

made to launch the final campaigns against Villa in the
Northwest and Zapata and Conventionist remnants in the
South.

Obregon, as already noted, was expected to complete

the destruction of Villa's army and then to proceed on to
Sonora to wage a "war of extermination" against the trouble
some Yaquis.

At the same time, south of Mexico City,

General Pablo Gonzalez was to open a new offensive against
the Zapatistas in the State of Morelos.

Having thereby

removed the only immediate internal threats to Constitu
tionalist ascendancy, the First Chief could turn at leisure
upon the several regional caudillos and the many lesser
guerrilla chieftains and crush them one by one.

Assisted

by the American embargo on the shipment of arms to their
opponents and by the overt moral support of the United States
Government, Constitutionalist leaders were unquestionably
optimistic on the eve of the dual offensive.

So, too, were

their backers in Washington.
The campaign in the North, of course, proceeded as
planned, and Villa's army was swept from the field.

Per

mitting the General himself to escape, however, was to prove
the gravest of errors and certainly detracted from the success
of the campaign.

Within a matter of weeks, the de facto
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Government was faced with an outbreak of banditry and
guerrilla activity in the north-central states which it
was never able to overcome.

In the South, meanwhile, the

projected Constitutionalist offensive failed to materialize.
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There, near the end of the year, Conventionists and Zapatis
tas, organized in bands of several thousand men each, seized
and held the initiative.

Moving in concert into the Federal

District, southern and central Puebla, and southern Mexico
State, they threatened the City of Mexico itself.

At the

same time, other columns moved southward into the State of
Guerrero, recapturing Chilpancingo, the capital, and driving
the surviving Carrancista forces into a handful of fortified
towns.

46

By late January, 1916, Consul Clement Edwards at

Acapulco could report "an absolute lack of control by Carrancistas [in Guerrero]

outside this town . " ^ 7

The decisive

first phase of pacification fell far short of expectations.
Even less success attended attempts to break the
power of the more important regional caudillos.

^Womack, Zapata, 249-250.

In the

^Ibid., 249.

*7Edwards to Lansing, January 25, 1916, SDR 812.00/
17256; Daniels to Lansing, February 15, 1916, SDR 812.00/
17291. Edwards, an attorney, newspaper editor, and business
man, was consul at Acapulco from 1911 to 1917. Register,
1918, 107.

532
oil-rich Huasteca, for instance, Manuel Pelaez, during the
spring and summer of 1915, had not only maintained but
appreciably strengthened his grip on the petroleum province.
By the fall of that year, he had approximately 700 irregulars
permanently stationed in the several producing oilfields
and a considerably larger reserve capable of mobilization
in the event of an emergency .48

For some time, Pelaez had

been extorting money and supplies from the major foreign
oil companies in exchange for "protection" of their highly
vulnerable properties.

The funds, in turn, were used to

purchase arms and ammunition, both overtly abroad and
clandestinely from the Carrancistas themselves.5^

Well-

armed, paid regularly in gold, and fighting on home ground
for their own ranches and petroleum properties, the Pelaecistas constituted a highly-motivated, formidable force
and an insurmountable obstacle to Constitutionalist control
of the oilfields.5*

^ B e v a n to Lansing, October 13, 1915, SDK 812.00/
16476.
49

Testimony of Doheny, IMA, 284-285.

^ B e v a n to Lansing, November 18, 1915, SDR 812.00/
16857.
51

Testimony of Doheny, IMA, 280, 285-286. Doheny
believed that Carranza wanted very much to drive Pelaez
from the Huasteca - "the most valuable spot in Mexico, the
most valuable spot in the whole world" - but that the First
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As of late 1915, although Candido Aguilar and
various other Carrancista officials had already begun to
hint at nationalization of the petroleum industry and con
fiscation of foreign holdings in the Huasteca, American
oilmen were relatively sanguine as to the future security
of their huge investments there.

52

Pelaez, then, was still

viewed as a nuisance - and an expensive and potentially
dangerous one at that.
blackmailer.

53

Unquestionably the General was a

Through the greater part of 1915 he repeatedly

threatened to halt the flow of oil from the fields to the
shipping terminals at Tampico and Tuxpam unless he received
his customary fee.

54

The oilmen, then, had not yet come to

appreciate Pelaez as their sole effective defense against
impending revolutionary expropriation.

In reality, their

overriding interests and those of the Pelaecistas were

Chief was simply unable to do so. Carranza's failure to
defeat Pelaez and to occupy the oilfields were, in Doheny's
words, "the one big blot on his claim of dominating Mexico
. . . ." Ibid., 289.
52William F. Buckley noted that the oilmen lacked
"understanding" of the political situation in revolutionary
Mexico. They assumed that they could secure their invest
ments by bribing Constitutionalist officials. Testimony of
Buckley, IMA,830-831. Doheny, for instance, gave the Con
stitutionalists $1 0 0 , 0 0 0 in cash and agreed to furnish a
large quantity of fuel oil for their trains. Testimony of
Doheny, Ibid., 278.
53Ibid., 280.

54Ibid., 280, 285-286.

534
identical:

both had an immense stake in preserving the

status quo in the Huasteca and in staving off Constitu
tionalist control of the oilfields.

The oilmen, however,

were slower to grasp the full significance of a Carrancista
victory in the Mexican civil war.
In the fall of 1915, American oilmen still hoped
for Pelaez 1 demise and repeatedly solicited both Washington
and Queretaro to that end.

55

The Constitutionalists, of

course, needed no prompting, but were never able to mount a
eg
successful offensive in the petroleum province.
The
Wilson Administration, in turn, was equally anxious to see
de facto forces in control of the oilfields:

first, in

order to stabilize a region of immense strategic importance
and, second, to guarantee to the impecunious Carrancista
regime a steady flow of desperately-needed revenue.

57

Con

sequently, Lansing and the oilmen alike were highly pleased
when negotiations between Pelaez and Carrancista representatives were opened in early October, 1915.

58

The talks, how

ever, were strained and collapsed completely by the middle
of the month.

Pelaez then renewed his demands upon the

5 5 Ibid.,

281.

5 6 Ibid.,

280-281.

^Lansing to Bevan, October 16, 1915, SDR 812.00/
16476.
5testimony of Doheny, IMA, 285.
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operators for "general loans" and "taxes," and the oilmen,
in turn, complained again to the Department of State.
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Accordingly, on October 16, Consul Bevan at Tampico was
instructed to "urge General Carranza [to] take prompt action
to put an end to the injurious activities of Pelaez and his
lawless b a n d s . C a r r a n z a ,
to do so.

of course, made every effort

His forces in the Huasteca, however, were no

match for the Pelaecistas.
On November 18, Bevan reported the resumption and
subsequent failure of new negotiations between Pelaez and
Constitutionalist authorities.

The oilmen, he revealed,

were "cooperating to the best of their ability for the
success" of the Administration's new Mexican policy and
doing "all in their power" to reconcile Pelaez with the
de facto Government.

Indeed, he noted, officials of the

Huasteca Petroleum Company had initiated the latest nego
tiations and had permitted the parties involved to conduct
them over the company's long distance telephone line be
tween Tampico and the oilfields.

59

Bevan to Lansing, October 13, 1915, SDR 812.00/

16476.
60Lansing to Bevan, October 16, 1915, Ibid.
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At first all had gone well, Bevan recounted.

But

just as the negotiators appeared on the verge of a settle
ment, Pelaez had received a large arms shipment from Pensa
cola aboard the American schooner Lucy H ,

Thus strengthened,

the General had abruptly terminated the talks.
discouraged.

Bevan was

American workers in the Tuxpam fields, he

closed, had since reported hard fighting south of the Tuxpam
River and were themselves convinced that the prospects for
peace were "not so bright ."6 1
It was an astute observation.

During the next

month and a half, Pelaez blunted the Constitutionalist
offensive and drove his antagonists completely out of the
petroleum province.

62

and Tuxpam remained.

Only the strong garrisons at Tampico
Then, on December 21, the General

attacked Tampico Alto, only a few miles from the port itself, seizing a large quantity of arms and ammunition.

63

Resupplied and firmly in control of the oilfields, he upped

^ B e v a n to Lansing, November 18, 1915, SDR 812.00/
16857.
6^Testimony of Doheny, IMA, 280; Daniels to Lansing,
January 14, 1916, SDR 812.00/17099; Bevan to Lansing,
February 1, 1916, SDR 812.00/17196.
6^Daniels to Lansing, January 14, 1916, SDR 812.00/
17099.

his demands on the companies.

64

Afraid that in complying

with Pelaez* demands they would antagonize Washington on
one hand and Queretaro on the other, representatives of the
Doheny firm "laid the question" before the appropriate
officials of both governments.
vised to pay.

65

In the end, they were ad-

They did so, and other foreign producers

immediately followed suit.

As galling as that decision must

have been, neither government dared counsel resistance.
stakes were far too high.

The

Ultimately, then, economic ne

cessity transcended political expedience.

By the beginning

of the new year, there was no longer any doubt who con
trolled the Huasteca - the richest province in the republic.
In addition to Pelaez, several other regional strong
men had succeeded in establishing virtually autonomous
fiefdoms during the prolonged struggle between rival revo
lutionary factions.

They, too, were able to successfully

defy the First Chief and to deny to the de facto Government
the manpower and resources of large areas of the republic.
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Testimony of Doheny, IMA, 280=281, 285.

6 5 Ibid.,

285-286.

^ B e v a n to Lansing, February 1, 1916, SDR 812.00/
17196.
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The effect was to seriously undermine the power and prestige
of the Carranza regime domestically and to diminish still
further what little confidence it had initially inspired
abroad.
In the traditionally separatist State of Yucatan,
Constitutionalist Governor Salvador Alvarado went his own
way.

One of the best-ordered states during the violent

phase of the Revolution, the Yucatan was also one of the
most productive of revenue.

67

As the sole source of sisal

hemp for North American grain growers, it was assured of at
least relative prosperity and should have been a major
contributor to the fiscal rehabilitation of the Carranza
regime.

68

Early in 1915, however, Alvarado obtained con

trol of the growers' marketing agency— the Comision Reguladora de Heneguin— and compelled the planters to sell their
crop to the Comision at a fixed price.

Within a short while,

the Governor personally monopolized the marketing of the
entire sisal crop.

69

He then proceeded to raise the price

6?Guyant to Lansing, February 21, 1916, SDR 812.00/
17332; Long to Lansing, August 10, 1918, SDR 711.12/130.

69

Ibid.; Daniels to Lansing, November 18, 1915,
SDR 812.00/16825.

of hemp to North American buyers, prompting the latter to
press the Department of State to act on their behalf.

The

International Harvester Company, in particular, sought dip
lomatic and, later, armed intervention to force Alvarado to
release the 1915 sisal crop.
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President Wilson, however,

refused to countenance such a move, and the buyers were
forced to meet the Governor's price.

Accordingly, during

the next four years, the price of the essential Yucatan
commodity rose by leaps and bounds.
enormously.

Alvarado profited

His "rake-off" in 1916 alone was estimated at

twenty million dollars, and it rose sharply in successive
years.

The bulk of those revenues, of course, went to the

Governor and his staff and not to the Treasury of the
chronically insolvent de facto Government.
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Meanwhile,

Alvarado's control of the Yucatan was absolute.

72

Far re

moved as he was from the base of Carranza's power, there
was little that could be done to bring him to heel.
In October, 1915, in the extreme Northwest, another
Constitutionalist governor broke with the First Chief.

70ibid.; H. L. Daniels to Canova, October 4, 1915,
SDR 812.00/16407. Daniels was manager of the International
Harvester Company.
71
Long to Lansing, August 10, 1918, SDR 711.12/130.
72
Guyant to Lansing, February 21, 1916, SDR 812.00/
17332.

Colonel Esteban Cantu, governor and military commander of
the Northern District of Lower California, proclaimed the
"absolute neutrality" of his province during the "interne
cine strife of Mexico."

Firmly established at Ensenada,

Cantu had been virtually independent since December, 1914.
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However isolated and apparently insignificant his domain,
its disaffection was nonetheless both painful and embarras
sing to the Carranza regime.

Considerable revenue from the

border ports of Tijuana, Tecate, and Mexicali was thereby
lost to the de facto Government, to say nothing of prestige
in the eyes of American border-dwellers - the single most
important segment of the United States population insofar
as Mexican-American relations were concerned.

The Northern

District, moreover, was of no mean strategic importance.

In

the wrong hands, it would constitute a serious threat to the
security of the de facto Government.

Because of its proximity

to the large, politically-active exile community in southern
California, it might at any time have become the staging area
for a powerful counterrevolutionary thrust into northwestern
or north-central Mexico.

^ G u y a n t to Lansing, October 25, 1915, SDR 812.00/
16668.
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Although in late December, 1915, an "understanding"
was concluded between Cantu and the de facto Government, it
served as little more than a face-saving device for the
First Chief,

The Colonel's authority was confirmed, and,

for some time thereafter, Cantu was his own man and the
Northern District an essentially autonomous province.
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Excepting the activities of the Pelaecistas in the
Huasteca, the most significant of the separatist movements
to emerge during the Mexican civil war was that in the large
and important south-central State of Oaxaca.

There, the

Constitutionalist governor. General Jesus Agustine Castro,
made his headquarters in the Pacific coastal town of Salina
Cruz.

Southern terminus of the Isthmian Railroad, that

port, in the hands of an able and energetic commander, might
have become a bastion of Constitutionalist power in southern
Mexico.

Castro, however, was content to control no more than

a narrow strip of territory along the Gulf of Tehuantepec.
He made little effort to extend his authority into the high
lands that constituted by far the greater part of the state.
In fact, from all accounts, he assiduously shunned the field
and devoted himself instead to a life of license and

^ G u y a n t to Lansing, December 27, 1915, SDR 812.00/
17018.
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lechery.
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The Governor, Admiral Winslow reported, "does

not pay much attention to General Carranza, but runs the
76
government of Oaxaca to suit himself."
The interior of the state, comprising twenty-five
of its twenty-eight political subdivisions, was controlled
from Oaxaca City by a genuinely popular regime under General
Santibanez and Governor Guillermo Meixueiro.
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Originally

a Maderista and later a Constitutionalist, the General had
grown to distrust and despise Carranza.

Ultimately, in

December, 1914, in a bizarre and bloody act of defiance,
he broke with the First Chief and withdrew his state completely from the Mexican civil war.
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Commanding an army

75

Castro, the Admiral revealed, "devoted much time
to the ladies and on numerous occasions . . . has demanded
that well-to-do Mexican families give up such daughters as
he fancied. Refusal to obey such an order meant that the
family would be thrown into jail and the girl forcibly taken."
The Governor, however, had recently married, and it was said
that he had "calmed down considerably." Daniels to Lansing,
November 22, 1915, SDR 812.00/16843.
?6 Ibid.
^Ibid.; Roosevelt to Lansing, November 29, 1915,
SDR 812.00/16889; Canada to Lansing, February 15, 1916,
SDR 812.00/17365.
78
Fearing that Carranza planned to depose him, Santi
banez invited the First Chief's brother, Jesus, the latter*s
son, and a number of Carrancista lieutenants to dine with him
at Salina Cruz. During the banquet the guests were seized
and dragged from the hall. The following morning all but the
Carranzas were summarily shot to death. The First Chief's
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of 10,000 to 15,000 Oaxaca Indians, and operating in terri
tory ideally suited for guerrilla warfare, the General
"repeatedly defeated" Carrancista expeditions sent into
the highlands against him.
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Oaxaca, consequently, was

less affected by the Revolution than any other Mexican
state, and foreign interests therein - primarily large
agricultural enterprises - maintained operations

unmolested.

In June, 1915, Santibanez and Meixueiro declared
their state independent.
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Loose alliances were subsequently

concluded with the Zapatistas to the west and with the inde
pendent General Higinio Aguilar who operated to the north
and east in the States of Puebla and Veracruz.
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One re

sult of those maneuvers in the summer of 1915 was the ef
fective withdrawal of virtually the entire South from the
rest of the Mexican Republic.

Another was the isolation of

brother and nephew were subsequently taken into the mountains
and executed. Daniels to Lansing, November 22, 1915,
SDR 812.00/16843.
7 9 Ibid.

®^Roosevelt to Lansing, November 29, 1915, SDR 812.00/
16889; Canada to Lansing, February 15, 1916, SDR 812.00/17365.
®1Roosevelt to Lansing, November 29, 1915, SDR 812.00/
16889; Daniels to Lansing, November 22, 1915, SDR 812.00/
16843.
®^Ibid.; Womack, Zapata, 301-302.
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the Yucatan to such a degree that a reassertion of Carran
cista control over the Alvarado regime was out of the
question.

Disaffection and loss of the State of Oaxaca

was a major setback, economically as well as politically,
for the new de facto Government of Mexico.
Obviously, it was very much in the First Chief’s
interest to return that state to the Mexican union.

And,

in the fall of 1915, the opportunity to do so presented
itself.

Shortly after Pan-American recognition of the

Constitutionalist Government, the Oaxaguenos sought a recon
ciliation and peaceful reentry into the republic.
were harshly rebuffed.
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Yet they

Undoubtedly embittered over the

treacherous assassination of his brother and nephew, Car
ranza was determined to crush the secessionist state mili
tarily and to even personal scores.

"The Chief," Silliman

explained in an awkward analogy, "looks at Oaxaca like
Jackson did at South Carolina."

However, if Carranza's

insistence upon retribution was understandable, it was also
most unwise and ultimately very costly.

By repeatedly

^Roosevelt to Lansing, November 29, 1915, SDR
812.00/16889.
8^Silliman to Lansing, January 22, 1916, SDR 812.00/
17135.
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refusing to compromise with Santibanez and Meixueiro and
by making very clear what fate awaited them in event of
the conquest of Oaxaca, the First Chief drove them to make
common cause with a much more dangerous opponent - the
counterrevolutionary Felix Diaz .85

IV.
The inability of the de facto Government to sup
press or otherwise assert its control over the several se
cessionist provinces obviously invited and ultimately
assured attempts by one or more of the conservative or
reactionary exile groups to return to the republic, estab
lish itself in one of the disaffected areas, and use it as
a base from which to launch the long-anticipated counter
revolution.
Few developments could have posed a graver threat
to the Carranza regime.

Fully preoccupied with the restora

tion of order and the extension of its authority over those
areas already under its nominal control, it could ill afford
another round of protracted civil strife.

And against a

powerful and determined adversary, financed and resupplied
from abroad, its chances of surviving, much less of emerging

85Ibid.
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victorious, would be slight indeed.

Those facts were well

understood outside of Mexico - by the exile groups, by
foreign investors in the republic, and by officials in
Washington as well.

Unquestionably, then, the emergence of

a strong new counterrevolutionary coalition - particularly
one with a secure base within the republic itself - would
further undermine Washington's waning confidence in the
viability of the Carranza regime and encourage its opponents
both within and without the Wilson Administration to renew
their efforts to bring it down.
Although, by late 1915, there were many in northern
Mexico who would have joined the large exile community in
the southwestern United States in an uprising against
Carranza, the prospects for opening a counterrevolutionary
front in that part of the republic were not good.

The

President of the United States, if not all members of his
administration, was unalterably opposed to such a course
and had already, almost single-handedly, frustrated a number
of attempts to subvert the Revolution and restore the old
order in Mexico.

Discovery and suppression of the Huerta-

Rintelen scheme had resulted in even stricter enforcement
of the neutrality laws and much closer surveillance of the
exile community.

Finally, following Pan-American recognition
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of the Constitutionalist regime, Washington had embargoed
arms shipments to all other Mexican factions and manifested
its intent to assist that government materially in hastening
the destruction of its domestic enemies.

So long, then, as

the Government of the United States favored the Carranza
regime, successful counterrevolution in northern Mexico was
out of the question.

If the First Chief was to be over

thrown, the impetus would have to come from another quarter.
The southern separatist states were admirably suited
for such an endeavor.

Both Oaxaca and the Yucatan were

readily accessible by sea and possessed of adequate port
facilities for resupply from abroad.

In addition, they

were sufficiently distant from the bases of Constitutionalist
power to preclude serious interference by the de facto
Government in the critical initial phase of an uprising.
Governor Alvarado, however, if disloyal to the First Chief,
was himself a thoroughgoing revolutionary who had even less
in common with the exiles than did the head of the de^ facto
Government.

The Yucatan, then, was unavailable as a base

from which to launch an anti-Constitutionalist offensive.
Not so, however, the State of Oaxaca, due in large part to
the stubborn vindictiveness of the First Chief himself.
Thus, by late 1915, the latter state unquestionably offered
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the best prospects for incipient counterrevolution.

It was

there, then, that Felix Diaz and his followers chose to
establish themselves early in the new year.

By mid-1916,

the Felicista movement had become "the most serious oppo
sition in Mexico.
For months prior to Pan-American recognition of
the Carranza regime, the several exile groups in the United
States had vied with one another for the favor of the Wilson
Administration.

It was their hope, of course, to obtain

both a relaxation of the neutrality laws and the moral
support of the government in Washington.

Those concessions,

in turn, would assure them not only a secure base from
which to open their offensive, but also the substantial
financial support of certain unnamed American interests
eagerly seeking a reestablishment of the old order in
Mexico.

Although several of the exile groups, particularly

the Xturbidistas, had indeed succeeded in winning important
allies within the Administration, they were consistently
frustrated in the pursuit of their objectives by the
President himself, by Bryan, and, finally, by Lansing as
well.

Qg

Womack, Zapata, 263.
March 30, 1916.

See also New York Times,
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The apparent hopelessness, then, of obtaining the
tacit support or even the strict neutrality of the United
States Government in a counterrevolutionary venture unques
tionably drove many impatient exiles to adopt desperate
measures*

They would proceed with their plans regardless

of neutrality laws and the opposition of the United States
Government.

That attitude, in part, explains the readiness

of so large a number of exiles to join General Huerta in
his ill-fated, obviously hazardous scheme to start a new
revolution along the northern border.
Following the General's arrest and the precipitate
collapse of the Huertista movement, the more sophisticated
exile leaders turned again to their friends in Washington.
Iturbide, Dr. Vazquez Gomez, Manuel Calero, and other
important Mexican conservatives were well aware of the
Administration's disgust and impatience with the endlessly
feuding revolutionary factions.

And, through their ties

with the Division of Mexican Affairs, they were also
cognizant of the Lansing-Canova plan, then under considera
tion by Administration officials.

That scheme, it will be

recalled, envisioned an imposed settlement of the Mexican
civil war, conceivably through the installment and support
of a prominent exile leader as provisional president of the
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republic.

Thus encouraged, they renewed their bid for the

support of the Wilson Administration.

And from late July

through early September, they vigorously pursued that
objective.

87

In the end, however, they failed:

first,

because of the President's unswerving committment to a
revolutionary settlement in Mexico, and second, because
Obregon's highly successful campaign in the North all but
assured imminent Constitutionalist victory in the Mexican
civil war.
Washington's subsequent decision to extend recog
nition to the Veracruz regime utterly destroyed the exiles'
hopes of obtaining the support of the Wilson Administration.
It also effectively discouraged their plans to start a
new revolution in the northern border states.

There were,

however, those exile leaders who remained convinced of the
inherent weakness of the Carranza regime and who were
determined to try another tack to bring it down.

Foremost

among them were the heads of the so-called Clerical Party.
That group, in turn, descended for the most part from the

®^Teitelbaum, Wilson and the Mexican Revolution,
261-262. See, for example. Lane to Lansing, July 31, 1915,
SDR 812.00/17538 and Fuller, "Conference of South American
Republics," August 3, 1915, SDR 812.00/17561.
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Mexican Catholic Party, enjoyed both the confidence and the
thinly disguised support of the American Roman Catholic
hierarchy.

Its ostensible chief was the perennial counterQQ

revolutionary— General Felix Diaz.
Nephew of the old dictator, Porfirio Diaz, the
General was a native of the State of Oaxaca and a personage
of some prominence in southern Mexico.

Despite a lengthy

exile, he retained a sizable following in his home state
and in parts of neighboring Puebla and Veracruz as well.
Because of that support and the prestige attached to his
name, he seemed the logical choice to initiate and lead
a counterrevolutionary movement in the South.
Accordingly, in the spring of 1915, the General
had been brought into the Huerta-Rintelen scheme.

Supported

by German arms and money, he was to have started a revolt
in one

of the southern coastal states to coincide with

Huerta's rising in the North.

89

Having made the necessary

arrangements for an uprising in the South, probably in the
Yucatan, Diaz left New York as scheduled.

16870;

Soon after,

88Carothers to Lansing, November 22, 1915, SDR 812.00/
New York Times.-November 28, 1915 and March 30, 1916.
88Ibid., November 25, 1915.
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however, Huerta was arrested, and the northern revolt
aborted.

By that time, too. Constitutionalist authorities

in the South had been alerted and "were ready to welcome
Diaz with an army."

90

The General, then, called off his

own pending insurrection and returned to New York City.
Diaz, however, was by no means ready to quit.

In

early September, he moved his headquarters to New Orleans
and commenced organizing a second counterrevolutionary
venture.

91

Felicista agents, meanwhile, had been active

among the exile community in the Southwest.

Establishing

themselves at El Paso, they began a round of conferences
with former Huerta generals and large landlords driven
from their properties by the Revolution.

Within a relatively

short time, a Felicista junta had emerged in the border
city .92
The new movement was well-organized and liberally
financed.

"In addition to the millions which the Catholic

Church is said to be supplying through the . . . Clerical

9 0 Ibid.
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Ibid., November 28, 1915; Wilson to Lansing,
January 19, 1916, SDR 812.00/17170^; Bielaski to Canova,
January 25, 1916, SDR 812.00/17220.
92

New York Times, November 28, 1915.
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Party," the New York Times revealed, "the junta was pledged
to receive more millions from the old Cientifico crowd . . .
who have been driven out of Mexico . . . and see little
chance of returning under Carranza."

Some of the wealthiest

men of Porfirian Mexico were affiliated with the movement,
including such great hacendados as Luis Terrazas and
Enrique Creel— the pre-revolutionary lords of Chihuahua.
So, too, were a number of prominent military men— Generals
Julian Medina, Manuel Mondragon, Canuto Reyes, and many
other former Federal officers.

It was believed, moreover,

that the imprisoned Huerta would be released in time to
assume command of the Felicista army.

By mid-November,

the junta was receiving from undisclosed sources "large
sums of money to assist in recruiting" in towns along the
border.

At the same time, it was reported, Diaz himself

had purchased a steamer at Vancouver, B. C., preparatory to
shipping munitions to his followers at Puerto Angel, an
isolated port on the Pacific coast of Oaxaca.

93

By late 1915, the Mexican exile community in the
United States was in full ferment.

Carothers, then on the

Texas border, was able to use his ties with former Villistas

93Ibid,

to good advantage in discovering developments therein.

lie,

too, saw the old Catholic Party as the guiding hand in the
emerging Felicista movement.

Members of that body, he

believed, "in connivance with the Madero family" were
"attempting to get control of the Villa organization."
They were said to have offered Villa himself a military
command contingent upon his agreeing to accept "a chief of
their choosing . " ^ 4

On December 12, Carothers confirmed his

earlier suspicions.

The "third party movement" in El Paso,

he informed Lansing, had "become very apparent."

And it was

"undoubtedly backed" by Felix Diaz and the Maderos— a
cynical alliance indeed in view of La Decina Tragica.
Moreover, it appeared that Iturbide, with his considerable
financial support, would soon cast his lot with the new
party.

A number of American cities— New Orleans, El Paso,

Los Angeles, and San Diego— were the centers of Felicista
activity.

It was Carothers' belief that "a financial group

in New York" was ultimately directing the movement .®5
did not elaborate.

®4Carothers to Lansing, November 22, 1915, SDR
812.00/16870.
95

Carothers to Lansing, December 12, 1915, SDR
812.00/16938.
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Army commanders along the border were also cognizant
of the developing Felicista movement and able to supply
additional pertinent information concerning its progress.
Early in December, General Pershing reported from El Paso
that Felicista elements there were considering the seizure
of Ciudad Juarez to serve as a base for a secondary revolt
against the de facto Government in the North .9 6

And from

Mission, Texas, in the Lower Valley, came another interesting
rumor.

The Felicistas, it was reported, planned to delay

major operations until the beginning of the presidential
campaign in the United States.

Then they hoped to have

the support of the Republican Party and, after the elections,
"the sympathy of the American people through a Republican
97
Administration .11

The conspirators, it seemed; had culti

vated the opposition.
If an actual uprising and the opening of a counter
revolutionary front against Carranza was being purposely
delayed, recruiting and organizational activity proceeded
apace*

By the beginning of the new year, the Felicista

^6Funston to the Adjutant General, December 9, 1915,
SDR 812.00/16951.
97

Funston to the Adjutant General, December 23, 1915,
SDR 812.00/17030.
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movement had grown to such proportions as to deeply alarm
the de facto Government,

On January 8 , 1916, its repre

sentative in Washington lodged a formal complaint with the
Department of State.

A new revolutionary junta, Arredondo

informed Lansing, had recently been organized in New York
City.

Composed of Felix Diaz and Generals Mondragon,

Blanquet, and Rubio Navarrete— incidentally, all co
conspirators in the overthrow of Madero— the junta had
established a subordinate operational organization in New
Orleans under General Gaudencio de la Llave and Javier
Larrea.
Oaxaca."

Their objective was "to send an expedition to
That force, in turn, was to land near Puerto

Mexico, in southern Veracruz, where it would be met "by a
band of rebels from Oaxaca" and escorted into the interior.
His government, Arredondo closed, requested that the Wilson
Administration suppress the Felicista movement on the
grounds of violation of American neutrality laws.

98

Lansing, who had himself been following the rise of
the Felicistas with growing apprehension, moved immediately
to comply with Arredondo's request.

He forwarded the Con

stitutionalist complaint to the Department of Justice and

88Arredondo to Lansing, January 8 , 1916, SDR 812.00/
17071.
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urged that it be acted upon at once.

99

Accordingly,

Justice Department agents intensified their surveillance
of Felicista activities in hopes of encountering violations
of the neutrality laws.

100

They failed, however, to

uncover sufficient evidence to bring charges against the
conspirators.
Exile leaders had learned much from the HuertaRintelen fiasco.

Anticipating just such a situation as

arose early in 1916, they had sought to conduct their
activities with the utmost discretion.
ceeded admirably.

101

And they suc

Despite the fact that Administration

officials soon possessed considerable intelligence on the
Felicista operation they were unable legally to prevent
its execution.

Throughout the early weeks of 1916, then,

the movement rapidly matured.

Finally, sometime late in

March, Diaz himself and a small band of followers managed
to elude American authorities and cross the Gulf of Mexico

Lansing to American Legation, Guatemala, January 20,
1916, SDR 812.00/17146a; Office of the Secretary of State,
Memorandum, January 20, 1916, SDR 812.00/17170^; Bielaski
to Canova, January 25, 1916, SDR 812.00/17220.
^Carothers to Lansing, February 7, 1916, SDR 812.00/
17259.

to southern Veracruz.
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Within a matter of weeks they

were firmly established in the State of Oaxaca.
thereafter* the counterrevolution commenced.

102

New York Times* March 30* 1916.

Shortly

Chapter 12

PRELUDE TO INTERVENTION:

DISAFFECTION,

DISORDER, AND DECAY

I.
If at any moment after recognition there was reason
to hope that the die facto Government might somehow surmount
the many problems besetting it and thereby endure, it was
on the eve of Villa's anticipated arrival at Ciudad Juarez
to begin American exile.

Virtually overnight, however,

those hopes were dashed.

Instead of proceeding to the

border. Villa's party struck westward for the Sierra Madre.
Almost at once, for Washington and Queretaro alike, all
went awry in Mexico.

Within weeks of Villa's escape, the

already strained relationship between those governments
was subjected to sudden violent stress from which it never
recovered.

Thereafter, United States armed intervention

in Mexico was only a matter of time.
By the end of 1915, with the greater part of
northern Mexico ostensibly under Carrancista control, much
of the danger which had caused the earlier mass exodus of
559
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Americans from that region was believed to have passed.
The de facto Government, moreover, went to great lengths
to convince Americans and other foreigners that "Villa no
longer constituted a threat" and that it was safe for them
to return to their properties in former Villista territory.
Although the government in Washington urged its citizens
to "stay out of Mexico until conditions became more settled,
[its] advice was ignored."^

Hundreds of Americans recrossed

the border to assess the damage to their properties, to
begin reconstruction, and, if possible, to resume operations.

By early January, 1916, an estimated 1000 Americans

had returned to the State of Chihuahua, a somewhat larger
number to the State of Sonora, and hundreds more to the
north-central States of Durango, Zacatecas, Aguascalientes,
3
and San Luis Potosi.
Located on remote ranches or in equally isolated
mining or agricultural communities, far from major concen
trations of Constitutionalist troops, the returnees were

^Atkin, Revolution;

Mexico, 1910-1920, 268.

^Parker to Lansing, December 30, 1915, SDR 812.00/
17028; Simpich to Lansing, December 14, 1915, SDR 812.00/
17031; New York Times, December 21, 1915.
3Ibid., January 16, 1916.

561
extremely vulnerable to attacks by guerrillas or by roving
bands of outlaws.

Without exception, each of the afore

mentioned states contained sizable bodies of Villista
sympathizers, to say nothing of large numbers of recently
discharged Villista veterans.^
danger:

Consul Simpich foresaw the

"It would be too much," he advised Lansing, "to

expect that these people, after four years of license and
lawlessness, should settle down— over night— to lives of
C
order and respect for law.
And many of them did not.
To be sure, a degree of brigandage had been endemic
in Mexico since the outbreak of revolution, but the wave
of banditry which swept the North in the wake of the VillistaConventionist collapse was without precedent.

American and

other foreign residents and investors in Mexico suffered
accordingly, both in loss of life and in the seizure and
destruction of property.

Washington, of course, looked to

the de facto Government for relief.

Since recognition,

however, that regime had been confronted with so many serious
problems, each of which appeared to demand its immediate

^Edwards to Lansing, December 28, 1915, SDR 812.00/
17024.
5Simpich to Lansing, December 14, 1915, SDR 812.00/
17031.
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attention, that its response to any one of them was almost
certain to be insufficient and hence ineffective.
it was with the problem of banditry.

And so

Washington, then,

waited in vain for relief.
In the North, what little optimism attended the
Villista collapse at year’s end was soon dispelled.

General

Jose Rodriguez, although defeated by Calles on December 11,
was by no means finished.

Driven out of Sonora, he moved

into western Chihuahua at the same time that Villa himself
was making for that district . 6

Thus by the end of the

month, a relatively large concentration of Villista guerrillas
was established in the foothills of the Sierra Madre Occi
dental, a region from which it was all but impossible to
drive them.
Officials in Washington were much concerned over
that development because so many Americans had recently
returned to that very region.

On December 24, then,

Carothers met with Obregon at El Paso to seek protection
for his countrymen.

The General,

"very cordial" and

6Ibidi
7

Edwards to Lansing, December 28, 1915, SDR 812.00/
17024; New York Times, December 24, 1915.
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cooperative, informed the agent that he had been ordered
to "clear up" the State of Chihuahua and to "afford every
protection" to foreign interests therein.

8

Washington

could ask no more.
Unfortunately for future Mexican-American relations,
the de facto Government failed to redeem its pledge.

Al

ready Villa had raided William Randolph Hearst's huge
Babicora ranch near Madera.

There, he drove off thousands

of head of cattle and kidnapped six American and English
employees.

9

He then proceeded on to Madera itself and

sacked the American settlement there for the second time
in less than a month.

By the end of the year, he had

established himself on the Bustillos ranch, another American
owned property, in the Guerrero district of western Chi
huahua.^

Carrancista forces made no move to dislodge him.

With some 4000 men under his command and Obregon's
brother as hostage. Villa felt secure enough to pause at
Bustillos and await the arrival of Generals Rodriguez and

g

Carothers to Lansing, December 24, 1915, SDR
812.00/17013.
q

New York Times, December 25, 1915.

^Ibid., December 24, 1915.
11Ibid., December 29, 1915.

Medinavista from the northern portion of the state .12
confidence had fully returned.

His

Accordingly, in late

December, he issued a proclamation renouncing his earlier
pledge to leave the republic and calling upon his former
comrades-in-arms to rejoin him in a new revolution.

It

was his immediate intent, he revealed, to move south into
the State of Jalisco and make common cause with Zapata.

13

For some time thereafter, nothing more was heard either
from or about Villa from that quarter.

An ominous calm

descended over the State of Chihuahua.
Throughout the greater part of northern Mexico
opposite conditions prevailed.

In early November, Consti

tutionalist forces in southern Tamaulipas had "made great
headway" there against the Villista general, Alberto Carrera
Torres.

They had failed, however, to destroy his army.

Consequently, that officer and some 5000 soldiers had made
their escape into San Luis Potosi and established themselves
in a strong position at Ciudad del Maiz.

14

From that moun

tain fortress, the General had commenced raiding the sur
rounding countryside.

1 2 Ibid.,

"Showing an ugly disposition toward

December 24 and 29, 1915.

1 3 Ibid.

^ B e v a n to Lansing, November 18, 1915, SDR 812.00/
16857; Daniels to Lansing, December 23, 1915, SDR 812.00/
17014.
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. . . American colonists," he struck repeatedly at their
properties, seizing possessions and expelling the owners
from the state.

15

In time, he concluded a loose alliance

with the independent Saturnino and Magdaleno Cedillo, the
classic bandit chiefs of San Luis Potosi.

The Cedillistas,

in turn, were natives of the state who obtained their
arms and supplies by "holding up trains and attacking
inferior forces."^

By mid-November, then, "a great

number of armed bandits alleging to be Villistas" were
operating in the triangle between Ciudad Victoria, Tampico,
and the city of San Luis Poto s i . ^

And Nafarrate and other

Constitutionalist commanders in the area did little or
nothing to restrain them.
By late in the month, Villista bands had extended
their operations as far eastward as the Panuco oilfields.
On the 24th, one party entered the town of Panuco, sought
out an American oil company employee, and deliberately shot

15Desteiguer to Daniels, November 16, 1915, SDR
812.00/16808; Bevan to Lansing, November 18, 1915, SDR
812.00/16857.
^ B e v a n to Lansing, November 11, 1915, SDR 812.00/
16813.
•*-^Bevan to Lansing, November 18, 1915, SDR 812.00/
16857.
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.
him down. ° When asked to provide protection for foreigners

in that district, the Carrancista commander at Tampico
replied that he was "powerless" to do so.

Although only

thirty miles distant, Panuco was not under his jurisdiction.
Only the First Chief himself, it was explained, could
authorize such protection.
coming from that quarter.

19

None, however, was forth

Ironically, when order was

eventually restored in the Panuco district, the benefactor
was none other than Manuel Pelaez.

20

Further west, early in the new year, General Tomas
Urbina moved south from Bustillos ranch into the State of
Durango.

There he assumed command of the new Villista

revolutionary movement.

Soon after, Consul Homer Coen

reported from Durango City that some 4000 Villista guer
rillas infested the countryside and that "absolute anarchy"
prevailed in the outlying districts .21

Urbina1s men

^Daniels to Lansing, December 23, 1915, SDR 812.00/
17014.

^Ibid.
20Bevan to Lansing, February 1, 1916, SDR 812.00/
17196.
21Coen to Lansing, January 12, 1916, SDR 812.00/
17085. Homer C. Coen was United States Vice-Consul at
Durango. An attorney and insurance agent, Coen went to
Mexico in 1910 and entered the cattle business. He received
his appointment as vice-consul in February, 1915. Register,
1916, 81.

567
operated freely along the important rail line between the
state capital and the strategic communications center of
Torreon, and Constitutionalist troops in the area "showed
no disposition to engage them."

22

In fact, Coen declared, the Carrancista garrison
at Durango City posed a graver threat to foreign interests
in that part of the state than did the Villistas.

Because

of a jurisdictional dispute between the provisional
governor. General Mariano Arrieta, and the regional mili
tary commander, General Francisco Murguia, the former had
received neither pay nor supplies for many weeks.

Conse-

quently, Arrieta1s men were forced to "live off the land."

23

For some time, then, they had been requisitioning supplies
from American and other foreign property owners in the
vicinity, paying for them in worthless receipts.

Already,

foreigners around Durango City had lost property valued in
excess of one-and-a-half million pesos.

And the requisi-

ry j

tions continued.

22

Lansing was distressed by Coen's report

Lansing to Silliman, January 12, 1916, SDR 812.00/

17080.
23

Ibid.; Coen to Lansing, January 1, 11, 1916,
SDR 812.00/17040, 17142.
24Ibid.
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and moved quickly to halt the confiscations.

The matter

was to be brought to Carranza's attention immediately, he
instructed Silliman on January 12, and the First Chief was
informed that he must send reliable troops to Durango at
once.

There must be no repetition of the "outrages."

25

Around Torreon, meanwhile, conditions were far
graver.

There, in the heart of the rich Laguna district,

where Americans and other foreigners owned and operated
huge cotton plantations, a new and potentially serious
revolt against the de facto Government was already in
progress.

26

Some time during late October or early November,

1915, twenty-five Villista, Zapatista, and ex-Federal or
Huertista generals had met at Santa Clara, Durango, and
declared against the Carranza regime.

27

Presided over by

Lagos Chazaro, president of the moribund Convention of
Aguascalientes, the Santa Clara Convention, through its
affiliation with the former body, purported to represent

25

Lansing to Silliman, January 12, 1916, SDR 812.00/

17080.
26

Blocker to Lansing, January 24, 1916, SDR 812.00/

17172.
27

New York Times, January 22, 1916; Cobb to Lansing,
February 4, 1916, SDR 812.00/17246.
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the sovereignty of the Mexican people.

Commanding a force

of some 4000 men, the assembled officers chose as Generalin-Chief the popular and able Zapatista leader, Benjamin
Argumedo.

They then declared the State of Durango "center

of operations" against Carrancistas and Americans alike.
The latter were held to be enemies "for having united with
Venustiano Carranza."

28

By the end of 1915, the new Convention had assumed
the offensive.

During the first week in January, all

communications between Torreon and the rest of the republic
were severed.

Argumedo then seized the town of Gomez

Palacio, only three miles from Torreon, and, on the 7th,
very nearly took the city itself.

29

Unopposed by the 3000

Constitutionalists therein, the Conventionists thoroughly
sacked Gomez Palacio and adjacent settlements and struck
hard at foreign-owned haciendas in the vicinity .30

Finally,

on the 10th, having terrorized the Laguna district for more
than a week and fully exposed the impotence of the de facto

28

Ibid.; New York Times, January 21, 1916.

^°Ibid., January 12, 1916.
3 0 Ibid.,

January 11, 21, 1916; Coen to Lansing,
January 27, 1916, SDR 812.00/17237; Williams to Lansing,
January 15, 1916, SDR 812.00/17107. C. A. Williams was
United States Consular Agent at Torreon.
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Government in a vital sector of the republic, Argumedo
withdrew to the mountains.

31

In the days that followed, roving bands of Conventionists extended their operations into northern Durango
and southern Chihuahua, "scouring the country" and "clearing
ranches, mines, and other property belonging to foreigners
of everything valuable."

32

And, in mid-January, General

Rosalio Hernandez seized and briefly occupied the important
mining town of Parral.

33

There, for some days, the lives

of several hundred Americans and foreign property valued
in the millions of dollars were in the gravest jeopardy.
Again, Carranza did nothing.

34

35

II.
On January 11, 1916, a benevolent New York Times
observed that "while the military situation in Mexico

[had]

been simplified by the surrender of the principal Villa
forces,

[it was] still far from being cleared up."

The

31New York Times, January 12, 1916.
3 2 Ibid.,

January 18,. 19, 20, 21, 1916.

3 3 Ibid.,

January 12, 1916.

3 4 Ibid.,

January 16, 1916.

35Blocker to Lansing, January 22, 24, 1916, SDR
812.00/17132, 17172; Coen to Lansing, January 22, 1916,
SDR 812.00/17205.
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de facto Government, it acknowledge reluctantly, had "only
fairly started the task of pacification."

36

As well dis

posed as it was to the Carranza regime and to Wilsonian
Mexican policy as well, the journal could find no words of
praise or encouragement for that campaign.
government in Washington.

Nor could the

From all over Mexico— from

consular officials, special agents, and naval officers
alike— accounts of the situation therein were uniformly
bleak.
Consul Thomas Edwards, reported from Ciudad Juarez,
outlined the problem in brief:

Constitutionalist authorities,

he admitted, were "making every effort possible" to suppress
the hordes of guerrillas and bandits that infested the
countryside.

The army, however, was not equal to the task.

Composed of soldiers from all factions and paid in worthless
Constitutionalist scrip, its motivation was minimal and its
morale low.

37

Moreover, in many of the states both the

soldiers and their quarry were of "the same class" and
often related to one another.

Consequently, the troops

36New York Times, January 11, 1915.
37Edwards to Lansing, January 14, 1916, SDK 812.00/
17095.
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seldom pressed the bandits.

38

In sum, large numbers of

Constitutionalist soldiers were neither loyal nor obedient.
And, with increasing frequency, they refused to carry out
their superiors' orders.

The military situation had so

deteriorated in his district, Edwards noted, that Carrancista officers there had already moved most of their
ammunition across the border to El Paso.
"confidence in the future," he concluded.
alone.

They had no
39

Nor were they

In Washington, too, knowledgeable officials had

begun to question whether the de facto Government could
long endure.
By the beginning of 1916, the problems confronting
the Carranza regime were manifold and without apparent
solution.

Politically, in addition to widespread popular

disaffection, internal disorders, and impending counter
revolution, the First Chief had to contend with serious
schism and rampant corruption within his own party.

For

some time it had been rumored that a break between Carranza

38Brown to Lansing, January 8 , 1916, SDR 812.00/
17113. A. Gordon Brown was United States Vice-Consul at
Mazatlan.
39Edwards to Lansing, January 14, 1916, SDR 812.00/
17095.
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and Obregon was imminent.

And, despite assurances to the

contrary from Belt and Silliman, officials in Washington
continued to receive convincing evidence to that effect.
Within less than a month after recognition, Parker reported
from Mexico City the existence of serious friction there
between the "military" and "civil" elements of the Consti
tutionalist party.

The former, headed by General Pablo

Gonzalez, was closely associated with the First Chief; the
latter, in turn, was led by the Sonora politician, Adolfo
de la Huerta, "the sub rosa representative of General
40
Obregon."

Nor did time improve the relationship.

Fol

lowing the Villa collapse in the North, new differences
arose over the spoils of victory.

Late in December, 1915,

a serious quarrel erupted over control of the State of
Chihuahua.

Obregon, logically enough, had assumed that

that state would be placed under his jurisdiction and had
planned to make his headquarters at Chihuahua City.

Instead,

that prize was conferred upon General Jacinto ,B. Trevino, a
powerful member of the First Chief's personal entourage.
The result, Cobb reported on January 8, was new "political

40Parker to Lansing, November 16, 1915, SDR 812.00/
16896.
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conflict between the Sonora element of Obregon and the
Coahuila element" of Carranza.4^

The rift, of course,

continued to widen in the months that followed, seriously
weakening the Constitutionalist Government, and culminating
finally in the General's resignation and the rise of an
Obregonista opposition.
No less harmful to the de facto regime was a per
vasive corruption which spread to every branch of the civil
bureaucracy and the armed forces and permeated every level
of administration.

In late 1915, Americans returning to

the United States from the Mexican Northwest reported that
"the entire fabric of authority" in that region had been
"corrupted in the desire for graft.”4^

Similar accounts

reached Washington from all parts of Constitutionalist
Mexico.

Zach Cobb, from his vantage point at El Paso,

noted early in the new year that the deplorable trend
"along the lines of graft that became distinctive of the
Maderos and Villa" had already "set in."43

It was left to

4^Cobb to Lansing, January 8, 1916, SDR 812.00/
17098.
42

Funston to the Adjutant General, December 23,
1915, SDR 812.00/17030.
43Cobb to Lansing, January 8, 1916, SDR 812.00/
17098.
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an American banker at Hermosillo, however, to state suc
cinctly the significance of that moral decay to the foreign
investor in Mexico:

"The Villista outfit was so bad we

couldn't stand it," he lamented, "but this crowd is worse.1,44
Economically, conditions were even more discouraging.
Over great areas of the republic commercial and industrial
activity had ceased, and agricultural production had so
declined that many persons were starving.45

Communications,

of course, were uncertain even in those areas nominally
under Constitutionalist control and utterly unreliable
elsewhere.

Swarms of bandits operated largely unopposed

along all the major railroads.
confronting the

Fiscally, the problems

facto Government were overwhelming.

Huge foreign and domestic debts, long in default, continued
to spiral upward as the interest on them went unpaid.

Con

sequently, the new government had no credit and was unable
to borrow either at home or abroad.

A£

Moreover, because of

its inability to assert its authority over the several

44Funston to the Adjutant General, December 23, 1915,
SDR 812,00/17030.
4^Daniels to Lansing, January 22, 1916, SDR 812.00/
17151.
46New York Times, February 7, 1916.

secessionist provinces, its revenues were sharply diminished.'
And shortsighted revolutionary economic policies coupled
with official peculation on a grand scale reduced them
still further.

48

As a result, the regime was forced to

turn to that most hazardous of monetary expedients, fiat
money, in order to conduct its day-to-day affairs.40

From

the moment of issue, however, Constitutionalist scrip
rapidly depreciated.

In time, it became virtually worth

less, seriously exacerbating the existing economic crisis.
As of early 1916, then, the Mexican economy was a shambles.50
Some time before the beginning of the new year, the
government in Washington began to receive the first of a
battery of increasingly discouraging reports on the state
of affairs in Mexico.

Those reports, in turn, tended to

confirm the harsh conclusions drawn by Boaz Long in his
lengthy memorandum of the previous July and to vindicate
the Antirevolutionist position generally.

And in that

47Ibid.
AO

Daniels to Lansing, January 22, 1916, SDR 812.00/
17151.
49Ibid.
50

Ibid.; Cobb to Lansing, January 25, 1916, SDR
812.00/17178; New York Times, February 7, 1916.
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respect, they were extremely damaging to the de facto
Government.

In the end they utterly destroyed the waning

confidence of Administration officials in the ability of
the Carranza regime to endure and resigned them to its
imminent collapse.

From that point it was but a short

step to intervention.
On December 23, the American commander at Nogales
reported that the condition of Sonora and the entire west
coast of Mexico as far south as Mazatlan was "far from
meeting the expectations" that had accompanied recognition
of the Carranza regime.

Americans returning to the border

from the interior of the Northwest were "unanimous in con
demnation" of the state governments and were "exeedingly
pessimistic of the development of any ability to control
the situation or handle the problems confronting present
Mexican authorities."5^-

In addition to their disgust with

the glaring ineptitude and venality of those regimes, the
returnees were uniformly struck by the vindictiveness of
Carrancista authorities.5^

"The promise of amnesty," it

51Funston to the Adjutant General, December 23, 1915,
SDR 812.00/17030.
^ D a v i s to Lansing, December 4, 1915, SDR 812.00/
17258.

was noted, had become "a mockery— a mere subterfuge to bait
the overconfident into their hands."

Carranza's pledge

of reconciliation notwithstanding, "the spirit of revenge
[was]

unsubdued."

In fact, the "persecution and execution

of former political enemies [was]
as ever in Mexican history."

53

as flagrant and sanguinary

It was no way to reunite a

nation.
In their relations with foreigners as well, the
Constitutionalists were found wanting.

Despite the First

Chief's assurances of good will and the official encourage
ment of foreign firms to resume operations in the republic,
returning Americans found their reception by Constitution
alist authorities "not one of welcome."

Although not

actively hostile, those officials were surly, suspicious,
and uncooperative in their relations with foreigners
generally and with Americans in particular.

54

While many commercial and mining interests had
nonetheless resumed operations in the Northwest, there was
"not manifest" in that region the official confidence which
Obregon and other Constitutionalist spokesmen had "endeavored
53

Funston to the Adjutant General, December 23, 1915,
SDR 812.00/17030.
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to convey in their remarks along the border."
contrary,

On the

"the attitude and atmosphere permeating the whole

situation" was one of "want of confidence and general sus
picion" even among the authorities themselves.

The antici

pated return of "calm and confidence" had not materialized,"
the Nogales commander declared.

Instead, reports of rapid

deterioration in the Northwest were coming to him "from all
directions."

The consensus of opinion, he concluded, "is

to the effect that the situation cannot last six months."
Some said two months.

Much, however, appeared to depend

upon the actions of Obregon.

Meanwhile, the feeling was

"strong" among Mexicans in the Northwest, even among "the
better class of the so-called Carrancista party," that
the First Chief could "never be accepted as President."
Indeed, it was stated that his "elimination" was an essential
prerequisite for the "peaceful solution of Mexican problems."

55
Similar depressing accounts came from other areas

of Constitutionalist Mexico as well.

On January 6, 1916,

Parker informed his superiors that conditions in and around
the City of Mexico were causing "much uneasiness" among the

55

Ibid. See also Cobb to Lansing, January 25, 1916,
SDR 812.00/17198.
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foreign community.

The Zapatistas continued to control the

surrounding countryside, occasionally raiding into the
suburbs of the city itself.
ties to task:

Parker, too, took the authori

"Inumerable abuses," he complained, "small

in themselves but in the aggregate tending to create a lack
of confidence in the administrative ability of the de facto
Government" continued to be committed.

That "unpleasant

drift" in the conduct of the Constitutionalist regime was
already well under way.56

III.
On the same day that Parker expressed his growing
concern over the situation in the City of Mexico, certain
members of the United States Senate were revealing their
disgust and dissatisfaction with the entire state of affairs
in the southern republic and with the Mexican policy of
the Wilson Administration as well.

On January 4, Republican

Senator Albert B. Fall of New Mexico had made public a draft
resolution calling on the President to release to Congress
all pertinent information "regarding conditions in Mexico."

57

^6Parker to Lansing, Janury 6, 1916, SDR 812.00/
17060.
5?New York Times, January 5, 1916; "Senate resolution
submitted by Mr. Fall," Foreign Relations, 1916, 463-464.
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The Senator, it was reported, took the position that the
"latest information" Congress had received from the Adminis
tration as to Mexican affairs was the President's address
of April 20, 1914, "in which he said there was no government
in Mexico and asked the authority to seize Veracruz."

The

resolution, then, began "by asking the President whether
there is now a Government in Mexico, and, if so, where it
is."58
The ostensible occasion for the inquiry was the
recent receipt by the Senate of the President's nomination
for Ambassador to Mexico.

So, at least, contended Senator

Lodge of Massachusetts, Fall's powerful colleague on the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee:

"After telling us that

there was no Government in Mexico," Lodge explained to
reporters, the President had reopened the discussion by
sending to the Senate the name of Henry Prather Fletcher,
his selection as Ambassador to the Mexican Government.
Lodge professed to be puzzled.

"Where," he queried, "is

this Government and how long will it last?"

Fletcher, then

Ambassador to Chile and himself a prominent Republican, was
an "excellent diplomat," the Senator conceded.

^8New York Times, January 5, 1916.

r

Nonetheless,

582
he concluded, "I think the Senate ought to know to what
Government he is being sent."

59

Apparently, then, the Fall

resolution was a purely partisan measure designed primarily
to embarrass the Wilson Administration.60

There are indi

cations, however, that it might well have been something
more.
To be sure, the motives of its author were suspect.
Having spent some years in Mexico in one endeavor or another,
Fall considered himself something of an expert on Mexican
matters.6^

His frequently proferred advice on Mexican

affairs, however, had been consistently ignored by the
White House.

Moreover, the Senator was well-acquainted with

the old Porfirian ruling class and with many of the large
and important American investors in Mexico as well.

Unques

tionably, he sympathized strongly with both groups.62
Finally, he was himself an investor in Mexican mining and
ranching properties.

5^Ibid.

63

The Senator, then, was more than

66Clendenen, The U. S. and Villa, 224.

6■'■Clif ford W. Trow, "Senator Albert B. Fall and
Mexican Affairs: 1912-1921" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation,
University of Colorado, 1966), 8-12.
62Ibid.
63

Ibid.; Manuel A. Machado and James T. Judge,
"Tempest in a Teapot? The Mexican-United States Intervention
Crisis of 1919," SHQ, LXXIV (July, 1970), 8.
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casually interested in Mexico.

Without doubt, he hoped to

force the President's hand in his relations with the de facto
Government.

64

In short, the Senator wanted intervention.

It

was, of course, an election year, and there were few areas
in which the Wilson Administration was more vulnerable than
in the conduct of its relations with revolutionary Mexico.
Self-interested and fiercely partisan, Fall recognized a
fortuitous opportunity in the rapidly deteriorating Mexican
situation.

And he was determined to make the most of it.

On January 6, following an "acrid discussion" of
Mexican affairs, the Senate adopted the nine-point Fall
resolution.

65

In supporting his measure, the Senator

vigorously attacked the President's Mexican policy and
raised a number of hard questions increasingly on the minds
of his colleagues. Administration officials, and the Ameri
can people alike:
"I want to know if in recognizing Carranza, the
President has required that those guilty of inflicting
suffering and outrages upon citizens of the United
States are to be held to definite reckoning. I want
to know what arrangements were made prior to the
recognition with reference to the payment of damages

®^Trow, "Senator Albert B. Fall and Mexican Affairs:
1912-1921," 8-12; Link, Wilson: Confusions and Crises, 203.
65New York Times, January 7, 1915
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for property and assaults committed upon American
citizens.
I want to know, and I believe the Senate
wants to know before we confirm an Ambassador, if there
are any assurances that these outrages shall at least
be paid for.
We have no information that Carranza is the
president of the de facto government of Mexico; in
fact, he does not pretend to be. He is merely desig
nated as the First Chief of the de facto government.
Yet we read that he is forming a Cabinet, but not to
meet in the City of Mexico; rather in a place two or
three hundred miles from that city.
We have heard the President use strong words.
We have heard his use of the words 'strict accounta
bility1 in his reference to the Lusitania, but we
have yet to hear him employ the same language with
regard to Mexico."66
Senator Lodge, in turn, ridiculed the conduct of
the Administration's relations with Mexico and effectively
made light of the Carranza regime.

"We don't know what

Government has been recognized," he chided Wilson's floor
leaders, "but we learn through the newspapers, an excellent
but unofficial source, . . . that it is the Government of
Carranza."

However, he queried, was it not a "normal re

quirement of a Government seeking recognition that it should
occupy the capital of its own country?"

Was the American

Ambassador to go to Mexico City, "where Carranza is not,
owing to his due regard for his personal safety?"

Perhaps,

the Senator jeered, the Ambassador might "follow the flitting

66Ibid
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abode of Carranza from San Luis Potosi to Torreon and
Queretaro."

Those things "we should know," he insisted,

and "the President should inform us . . .

.

67

The "political effect" of the Fall resolution, the
Mew York Times contended defensively, was "largely dis
counted" by Administration strategy on the floor of the
Senate itself.

Some days earlier, it revealed, in antici

pation of Fall's maneuver. Democratic Senator William J.
Stone of Missouri, Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee, had conferred at length with President Wilson on
the matter.

Between them they had devised an effective

defense.

Stone, then, was prepared for the Republican

attack.

Accordingly, in response to Fall's demands, he

calmly announced that he "knew of no opposition anywhere
to the resolution and

[that] there should be none."

Thus

assured of Democratic acquiescence, many Republicans who
planned to speak on Administration Mexican policy allowed
the resolution to come to a vote.

Democrats, in turn,

following Stone's lead, "let the resolution pass without
opposition."

68

The anticipated floor fight did not develop.

Two days later, in an editorial entitled "Fall's
Fireworks Fizzle," the New York Times attempted to deprecate

67Ibid.

68Ibid.
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the Mexican resolution and Pall's attendant remarks in the
Senate.

Although the New Mexico Senator had introduced

his measure "with great ado," the journal contended, he
had "failed to obtain the display of political fireworks
on which he had counted."

Instead, the willingness of the

Administration to comply with Fall's request had "reduced
the demonstration to a sputter."69
The writer, however, perhaps purposely, omitted
some salient points.

Foremost, for the very first time,

the new Administration Mexican policy had come under sharp
attack in Congress.

That development, in turn, served to

focus the attention of the general public on conditions in
Mexico at a critical moment in that country’s relations
with the United States.

Secondly, despite the journal's

repeated assertions to the contrary, that policy was unques
tionably the Achille's heel of the Wilson Administration.
And it was an election year.

And, finally, as brief as it

was, the Republican thrust was a telling one.

It drew blood.

Neither Wilson nor Lansing were nearly as sanguine
over the attack as Senator Stone's glib accomodation of
Fall implied.

Quite the contrary.

69Ibid., January 8, 1915.

More than six weeks
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later, long after the "early day" of delivery pledged by
Stone, the President and Lansing continued to debate
whether or not to comply with the Pall resolution.
Secretary strongly counseled against it.

7d

The

Much more

clearly than the President, he foresaw the damage that
would result— not only politically but diplomatically as
well— from full disclosure of all data pertaining to United
States relations with revolutionary Mexico.

Consequently,

at his behest, when the President ultimately chose to
comply with the Fall resolution, a great deal of pertinent
information was w i t h h e l d . B u t to no avail.

Those facts

released to the Senate, many of which were of a highly
inflammatory nature, were promptly made public.

7?

Unques

tionably, they played a very significant role in preparing
the American people for subsequent armed intervention in
Mexico.

^ L a n s i n g to Wilson, February 12, 1916, SDR 812.00/
17062.

72»The President's message transmitting to the
Senate a report of the Secretary of State, Foreign Relations,
1916, 469-478.
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IV.
Fall's "fireworks" may indeed have sputtered, as
his critics jibed, but the Senator's purpose was served.
The train was laid, and all that was needed was a spark.
Four days after the passage of the Fall resolution, an
obscure Villista colonel applied the match.

On the night

of January 10, Villista guerrillas under one Pablo Lopez
halted a train near Santa Ysabel, Chihuahua, dragged off
seventeen American mining engineers, and summarily shot
them to death.

73

Overnight the Senator's attack on Wil

sonian Mexican policy was fully vindicated.

And in the

most sensational development in Mexican-American relations
since the seizure of Veracruz the United States stood poised
to intervene in Mexico.

74

While tempers flared across the United States in
response to the atrocity at Santa Ysabel, officials in
Washington were treated to one of the broadest and most
depressing analyses of the Mexican situation received in

7^Cobb to Lansing, January 11, 12, 1916, Ibid.,
651-652.
74New York Times, January 13, 14, 15, 16, 1916;
New York World, January 13, 1916.

589
many months.

75

It was all the more sobering because it

came from a relatively disinterested source, a United States
naval officer in no way influenced by or connected with
Mexican exiles, Antirevolutionists, or major foreign inves
tors in Mexico.

The aforementioned officer was Captain

D. E. Dismukes, commander of the battleship Kentucky.

That

vessel, in turn, had been stationed off the east coast of
Mexico for some time.

The Captain, then, was able to view

firsthand the rapid deterioration of Constitutionalist
authority.
Reporting to tiffe Secretary of the Navy early in
January, Dismukes warned that it would be a "mistake" to
take the momentary calm along the Mexican gulf coast as
"an indication of a permanent settled condition of affairs"
in the republic.

He had been unable, he stressed, to find

any knowledgeable person, "either foreign or Mexican," who
considered conditions there "at all satisfactory."
essence of the problem, he contended, was economic:

The
the

stagnation, accelerating decline, and apparently imminent
collapse of the Mexican economy.

That condition, in turn,

gave rise to much of the political unrest which threatened

75Daniels to Lansing, January 22, 1916, SDR 812.00/
17151.
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to tear the country apart.

"Things were getting worse in

so, far as the economic life of the country is concerned,"
he warned, and, unless the situation were soon reversed,
there would be serious political repercussions.

It was

"difficult to believe" that the people would "remain quiet."
At the moment, the Captain continued, the fiat scrip was
"rapidly becoming worthless."

Even more significant, how

ever, was the fact that virtually every industry in the
country except petroleum and sisal production, neither of
which were under Carrancista control, was at "a standstill."
And politically conditions were little better:

"Each state

is an arbitrary little government all to itself."

Although

"more or less" subject to the First Chief, the several
governors had assumed "the power to issue decrees of the
most sweeping character independent of all outside authority
or responsibility to the people of the state."7®
Republic was a union in name only.

The Mexican

In view of Dismukes'

account and the great number of corroborative reports that
followed, officials in Washington were forced to admit,
albeit privately, that Senator Fall had indeed raised some
timely questions:
so where was it?

76Ibid.

was there a Government in Mexico, and if
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V.
Following the murders at Santa Ysabel, conditions
in Mexico became increasingly intolerable as far as those
officials were concerned.

Recognition of the Carranza

regime was generally if privately acknowledged to have been
at best premature and at worst an unmitigated disaster for
Mexico and the United States alike.

Moreover, the list of

American grievances against that government was growing.
In addition to the unchecked depredations of Villistas,
Conventionists, Zapatistas, and various other guerrilla
and outlaw bands, the actions of the de facto Government
itself were fast becoming a source of serious MexicanAmerican friction.

A systematic, quasi-legal campaign

against American and other foreign investors in the republic
was well under way.?7

Confiscatory taxation, increased

government regulation, and other measures obviously pre
liminary to eventual expropriation of the mining and

77See, for example, Cobb to Lansing, January 28,
1916, SDR 812.00/17178; Canova, "Confidential Memorandum,11
February 14, 1916, SDR 812.00/17271%; Carothers to Lansing,
February 7, 1916, SDR 812.00/17259.
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petroleum industries were already manifest.

7 ft

Harassment

of the Mexican Church and persecution of the clergy not only
continued but intensified.

And, finally, the threat to

American lives and property on both sides of the border was
in no way diminished.

The Yagui campaign in Sonora had

already ground to a halt, and there was little indication
that it was to be resumed.

Consequently, new raiding into

the Yaqui Valley was imminent.

Far graver, of course, was

the resurgence of the Plan of San Diego.

It was well under

stood that partisans of that movement were ready to resume
offensive operations at a moment's notice.

They were but

biding their time, awaiting more propitious circumstances.
And, by early 1916, Carrancista collusion in that movement
was common knowledge.

Meanwhile, politically fragmented,

economically moribund, and torn by new civil strife, Mexico

^®See, for example, New York Times, January 12, 1916;
Williams to Lansing, January 15, 1916, SDR 812.00/17107;
Funston to the Adjutant General, January 6, 1916, SDR 812.00/
17078; Bevan to Lansing, November 15, 1915, SDR 812.6363/
200; Vincent to Lansing, January 7, 1916, SDR 812.00/6363/
218; Bevan to Lansing, January 26, 1916, SDR 812.6363/211;
Johnson to Canova, January 15, 1916, SDR 812.00/17095;
Parker to Lansing, November 16, 1915, Foreign Relations,
1915, 951-952; Lansing to Silliman, December 28, 1915,
Ibid., 962-963.

was disintegrating as a nation and sliding rapidly into
anarchy.

79
The die was cast at Santa Isabel.

What followed
t

was anticlimactic.

As the initial furor over the murders

began to subside, South Carolina Senator Benjamin R. Tillman
expressed what was undoubtedly national as well as congres
sional consensus on the matter:

"I don't like this killing

of Americans," he declared, "[but] I do not believe [that]
there should be immediate intervention."

Carranza, the

Senator contended, should be given one more chance to set
things aright below the border.

Should the First Chief

fail, however, "measures must be taken to stop the slaughter.
Clearly, Tillman had armed intervention in mind.®^

79"i have become reconciled to the hopelessness of
the situation as it now exists," Cobb confided to Lansing
late in January, 1916:
"The element of confidence . . .
does not seem to exist. There is lack of confidence in
the wisdom of the leaders, in the de facto government's
money, that carries its tale to everybody, in the amnesties
proclaimed, as to life, in the respect of rights, as to
property— and in the power of the de facto government to
make good. There are good elements among them (the Consti
tutionalist leaders) who are trying hard enough. But the
trend has set in wrong . . . .
The finish of Carranza is
inevitable. Unless some great change comes, the Carranza
forces will go on the rocks within less than ninety days."Cobb to Lansing, January 25, 1916, SDR 812.00/17178.
8QNew York Times, January 16, 1916.
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By the beginning of 1916, it was patently impossible
for Carranza to provide the degree of protection for foreign
lives and property in Mexico insisted upon by Tillman and
his colleagues.

Sooner or later, then, a new outrage was

bound to occur.

And when it did, the President would be hard

pressed to withstand the clamor for retribution.

Thus after

the Santa Ysabel incident. United States armed intervention
in Mexico was a foregone conclusion.
place were uncertain.

And, on the night of March 8-9, Villa

determined them as well.
Wilson's hand.

Only the time and the

The Columbus raid, in turn, forced

Within less than a week, the Pershing

Expedition had crossed into northern Mexico.

The October

rapprochement was a thing of the past; a new and virulent
phase of Mexican-American relations had commenced.
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